PROGRAMME / PROGRAM

SOCIETE INTERNATIONALE POUR L'ETUDE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE MEDIEVALE

XV^e Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale
Paris-Aubervilliers, 22-26 août 2022

The XVth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy
Paris-Aubervilliers, 22-26 August 2022

LA PENSEE RADICALE AU MOYEN ÂGE

RADICAL THINKING IN THE MIDDLE AGES

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All the Plenary Lectures will be held in Auditorium 250/Auditorium 150
All the Special commission meetings and Parallel Sessions will be held in the rooms 3.01-3.11 on the 3rd floor and in Room 50 on the ground floor. *Nota bene*: Room 3.04 is not a sessions room.
The temporary SIEPM office (for membership issues and voting) will be located in Room 100 of the building on the ground floor near the lobby.

Lundi/Monday 22-08-2022

8h30-9h30: Registration

Room /Salle 100

9h30-11h15: Ouverture du Congrès / Opening of the Congress

Auditorium 250/Auditorium 150

Mots d'ouverture / Welcoming words

President of the SIEPM:	Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen
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Opening lecture by the Special guest: **Alain de Libera**
Chair: Irène Rosier-Catach

11h15-11h45: Coffee Break

11h45-13h00: 1re Session Plénière/ 1st Plenary Session

Auditorium 250/Auditorium 150

Sarah Stroumsa: *The Voice of Written Texts, and the Myth of Jewish Andalusian Freethinking*
Chair: Steven Harvey

In the search for the roots of radical enlightenment, al-Andalus (Islamic Spain) has long been mentioned as one possible venue for ideas that question the authority of religion. To prove this speculative claim, scholars rely on the analysis of a small number of medieval texts. The present paper focuses on the way we read such texts, and offers some tools to evaluate their bearing on the existence of skeptical trends in this period. It is argued that in the early middle ages, genuine freethinking was as rare among Andalusian Jewish intellectuals as in the rest of the Islamicate World.

13h00-14h30: Lunch

14h30-15h30: I. Special commissions: *Critical Edition and Latin Philosophy*

Auditorium 250

Chair: William Duba and Tobias Hoffmann

15h30-17h00: Sessions ordinaires et spéciales/ Ordinary and Special Sessions

Salle / Room 50

Aula 1: À la racine de la connaissance, du vouloir et de l'agir / I : À la racine des actes moraux et du mal

Special Session proposed by Tobias Hoffmann
Sponsor: Centre Pierre Abélard, Sorbonne Université
Chair: Hamid Taieb

Stève Bobillier: *L'existence du mal radical chez Pierre de Jean Olivi*

Olivi est connu pour être un penseur radical de la liberté humaine. Il affirme que la volonté est la racine tant de la subsistance personnelle que du libre arbitre. En opposition à Anselme, il en déduit ainsi que le pouvoir de pécher fait partie intégrante de cette faculté. Fort de ce pouvoir « quasi divin », Olivi n'a de cesse à travers toute son œuvre de répéter les mots de l'Apôtre selon lequel « la cupidité est la racine de tous les maux » (Tim 6. 10), interprétant ce vice tantôt comme de l'avarice, tantôt comme de l'orgueil. Se faisant, il critique ouvertement Aristote qui place le bonheur humain dans le sensible, affirmant que cette position est à la racine de nombreuses erreurs impies. Olivi analyse que le péché des démons, mais en un certain sens tout péché actuel également, a pour racine un amour présomptueux de soi. Cet orgueil se traduit par une volonté de pouvoir sur autrui et par conséquent par un mépris de Dieu. Olivi parvient finalement à affirmer l'existence d'une mauvaiseté radicale : celle-ci consiste à vouloir de toutes ses forces ce qui est le plus outrageant à Dieu et aux siens. Ainsi, l'idolâtrie, le sacrilège et le mépris de Dieu peuvent être ramenés à trois racines vicieuses que sont l'avarice, la luxure et l'orgueil. Ce mal radical ne consiste donc pas dans une mauvaise compréhension du bien, comme le suggère Aristote, ni même de faire le mal pour le mal (ce que même le diable ne fait pas), mais dans la possibilité d'acrasie stricte, c'est-à-dire de vouloir ce qui est clairement compris comme un mal, mais considéré par la capacité de libération de la volonté comme un bien préférable pour soi. Dans une volonté de perfection évangélique et de défense de l'usage pauvre, Olivi souligne que la solution à ces maux réside dans l'humilité et la pauvreté. Ces vertus premières éradiquent la racine de la cupidité et sont au contraire à l'origine de toutes perfections. En effet, elles font prendre conscience au croyant de son peu d'importance et de la vanité des richesses temporelles au profit de Dieu et des richesses spirituelles. Ainsi, Olivi suppose que l'humilité est la racine de toute ordre, de toute mesure et de toute modération et, en un certaine, de toute vérité, tandis que la racine de tout mérite est la charité rapportée à Dieu. L'absolue liberté qu'a affirmé Olivi entraîne ainsi une profonde responsabilité, mais également la seule possibilité de mérite réel. La racine de toute bonne action se trouve ainsi être l'amour charitable du prochain et à travers lui, de Dieu. Tout se rapporte à Dieu, Olivi concluant même que Dieu est la racine du libre arbitre, en tant qu'il est le suppôt de la nature humaine.

Pascale Bermon: *À la racine du vouloir et de l'agir : l'argument* Etiamsi daretur *de Grégoire de Rimini*

La présente contribution analyse un texte célèbre de Grégoire de Rimini, extrait de son commentaire des Sentences publié à Paris en 1346, II *Sentences* d. 34-37 q. 1, qui demande « si Dieu

est la cause efficiente immédiate du péché actuel ». Ce texte porte sur les fondements de l'éthique. Grégoire de Rimini y affirme en substance que si Dieu n'existait pas, agir contre la droite raison équivaudrait tout de même à commettre un mal. On n'a donc pas besoin de Dieu pour savoir comment agir. Autrement dit, Dieu n'est pas à la racine de la connaissance qui guide l'agir. Ce texte est considéré comme la première formulation de l'autonomie de la morale par un théologien philosophe. Il a fait l'objet d'une reprise célèbre par Grotius au XVI[e] siècle et de plusieurs analyses à l'époque contemporaine, qui le rapprochent notamment du rejet de l'hétéronomie morale dans la philosophie critique de Kant. On propose ici une relecture de ce texte, attentive à sa logique argumentative et au jeu des autorités qu'il met en œuvre. Grégoire de Rimini est né en 1300 à Rimini. Il prit dans sa jeunesse l'habit des Ermites de Saint Augustin, dans le couvent de sa ville natale. Il vint à Paris pour une période d'études de 1323 à 1329, puis retourna en Italie, où il « occupa », probablement jusqu'en 1338, la « chaire principale » du *studium generale* augustin de Bologne, avant d'être envoyé dans les mêmes fonctions à Padoue, puis à Pérouse. Il revint à Paris en septembre 1342, comme candidat à la Lecture des *Sentences* de Pierre Lombard. Bachelier sententiaire en 1343-1344, puis bachelier « formé », il devint maître en 1345 et continua d'assumer les fonctions de maître régent du *studium* augustin de Paris jusqu'à l'été 1346, date de son retour en Italie. Il avait édité son commentaire des *Sentences* à cette date (1346). En 1351, il reçut la charge de lecteur principal du *studium generale* nouvellement fondé à Rimini, où il resta jusqu'à son élection, en 1357 à Montpellier, comme dix-neuvième prieur général de l'ordre des Ermites de Saint Augustin. Il mourut dans l'exercice de ses fonctions, lors d'une visite pastorale qu'il effectuait à Vienne (Autriche) en novembre 1358. Il repose dans la crypte de l'église Saint- Augustin de Vienne, où il partage la tombe de son prédécesseur à la tête de l'ordre des Augustins, Thomas de Strasbourg († 1357). L'Ordre des Ermites de Saint Augustin est associé de multiples manières au renouveau de l'augustinisme dès la période du premier humanisme de Pétrarque (1304-1374). La façon dont Grégoire de Rimini traite la question des racines de l'agir moral illustre une fois de plus à quel point celui qui allait recevoir le titre de « Docteur Authentique » figure au premier plan du renouveau scolastique et humaniste de l'érudition augustinienne au XIV[e] siècle.

Ide Lévi: *A la source des interdits moraux : la lecture de la définition riminienne du péché dans les* Moralia *de Jacques Almain*

Aux chapitres 15 et 16 du III[e] traité de ses *Moralia*, Jacques Almain (v. 1480–1515) aborde la question du fondement des interdits moraux (*le péché est-il péché parce qu'interdit ?*) et s'interroge sur l'existence d'actes intrinsèquement mauvais. Il présente alors (au début du chapitre 16) comme étant la plus probable l'opinion des maîtres qui ont affirmé, comme Grégoire de Rimini – mais aussi, selon le texte d'Almain, Thomas d'Aquin, Bonaventure et même Ockham –, qu'il existe bel et bien des actes intrinsèquement mauvais, c'est-à-dire des actes dont Dieu lui-même ne peut faire qu'il soit au pouvoir de l'homme de les accomplir sans pécher. L'exposé de la position de Grégoire est largement centré sur la distinction entre les interdits impératifs, essentiellement contingents, d'une part, et les interdits indicatifs issus de la droite raison, plus fondamentaux que les premiers, par lesquels les actions peccamineuses se trouvent nécessairement proscrites d'autre part. Concernant cette deuxième catégorie d'interdits, Almain se montre attentif à la question du rapport qu'entretiennent ce qu'il est commode d'appeler les faits moraux ('que x – par exemple le vol ou la volonté de voler – soit une action mauvaise') avec les lois qui interdisent les actions en question. Ainsi est-il conduit à discuter la théorie méta-éthique que l'on peut qualifier de 'réaliste' selon laquelle les faits moraux fournissent un fondement aux jugements moraux issus de la droite raison, sur lesquels ils possèdent une priorité de nature. Pourtant cette théorie réaliste, loin de venir ici en renfort de la position de Grégoire et de la thèse de l'autorité supérieure de la droite raison et de ses interdits indicatifs nécessaires, est plutôt présentée dans le texte d'Almain comme une objection à la voie riminienne (ou éventuellement comme une alternative réaliste à cette voie). Le problème que rencontre Almain à l'occasion de sa lecture non réaliste de Grégoire est finalement celui du

statut méta-éthique de la « droite raison » : faut-il dire que ses jugements décrivent la réalité morale, ou faut-il la traiter comme l'instance qui constitue les faits moraux comme tels ? Je me propose donc de faire voir comment la lecture de ces chapitres d'Almain peut contribuer à l'histoire des théories morales réalistes, et plus largement des conceptions méta-éthiques au Moyen Âge.

Salle / Room 3.01

Aula 2: Roger Bacon's Utopia

Special Session proposed by Cecilia Panti
Sponsor: RBRS – Roger Bacon Research Society
Chair: Roberto Lambertini

The idea of presenting a panel on Roger Bacon and his utopias has been solicited by our shared interests in Bacon's utopic/visionary attitude which characterizes his philosophy. The goal of this panel is to test the coherence of this attitude as a comprehensive key for considering three main subjects of Bacon's radical speculation, that is, language, nature and society. In turn, these three subjects express the three main divisions of philosophy into logic, natural and moral, which embrace the totality of human knowledge for the full achievement of wisdom.

Nicolas Weill-Parot: *Roger Bacon: l'utopie scientifique comme anti-magie*

Après la rupture de 1250, le rejet par Roger Bacon de toute magie n'est pas un procédé rhétorique consistant à rejeter simplement le terme « magie », tout en habillant des pratiques similaires d'autres noms comme celui de *scientia experimentalis*. Il procède d'un changement radical de perspective par rapport au modèle de rationalité scolastique dominant et d'un changement radical de la fonction attribuée à la science de la nature. Le modèle du dévoilement des secrets que prône alors le savant franciscain ne laisse aucune place à la magie naturelle, mais s'inscrit dans un projet qui mérite véritablement le nom d'« utopie scientifique ». Je montrerai cela à partir de quelques cas précis où l'opposition entre magie et science utopique est particulièrement significative.

[*Roger Bacon: scientific utopia as a anti-magic.* After the turning-point of 1250, Roger Bacon's rejection of all magic was not a rhetorical device consisting in simply rejecting the term "magic", while dressing up similar practices with other names such as *scientia experimentalis*. This rejection proceeded from a radical change of perspective in relation to the dominant scholastic model of rationality and a radical change of function assigned to the science of nature. The model of the unveiling of secrets that the Franciscan scientist advocated then left no room for natural magic, but was part of a project that truly deserved the name of "scientific utopia". I will show this from some specific cases where the opposition between magic and utopian science is particularly significant].

Irène Rosier-Catach: *Roger Bacon: le langage et les langues au cœur du projet de rénovation du savoir*

Si Roger Bacon a enseigné la grammaire et la logique à l'université de Paris dans les années 1240, c'est un intérêt tout différent pour les langues et le langage qu'il développe après son retour à Oxford, puis son entrée dans l'ordre franciscain, en 1257, et qui se révèlera dans différents écrits à partir de 1267. Il déplore vivement la méconnaissance généralisée des langues, chez les théologiens notamment, ainsi que ses conséquences pour la Chrétienté, et s'engage avec ses confrères dans un travail d'exégèse philologique et scientifique des textes sacrés, en opposition à la scolastique des écoles. En raison notamment de traductions déficientes, qui mériteraient selon lui d'être refaites, seule la connaissance des langues sapientielles pourrait permettre un véritable accès au savoir, sacré ou scientifique. A partir de sources antiques, comme Augustin, ou arabo-musulmanes comme Al-Kindi Al-Farabi ou Avicenne, il développe une théorie originale de la *persuasio* et des pouvoirs du

langage, aux finalités religieuses et politiques. Il propose également une analyse originale des signes, fondée sur la liberté du locuteur et la possibilité infinie de modifier la signification des mots. On est ainsi face à un projet cohérent, mené durant une cinquantaine d'années et impliquant la mobilisation de toutes les sources disponibles, au service de la sagesse et de l'Église, de la lutte contre ses ennemis, de la prédication aux Fidèles, de la conversion des Infidèles, dans lequel le langage tient un rôle central.

[Although Roger Bacon taught grammar and logic at the University of Paris in the 1240s, it was a very different interest in languages and language that he developed after his return to Oxford and his entry into the Franciscan order in 1257, and which would be revealed in various writings from 1267 onwards. He strongly deplored the widespread ignorance of languages, particularly among theologians, and its consequences for Christianity. He engaged with his colleagues in philological and scientific exegesis of sacred texts, in opposition to the scholasticism of the schools. Because of deficient translations, which in his opinion should be redone, only the knowledge of sapiential languages could provide true access to knowledge, whether sacred or scientific. From ancient sources, such as Augustine, or arabo-Muslim sources such as Al-Kindi Al-Farabi or Avicenna, he develops an original theory on *persuasio* and the powers of language, with religious and political purposes. He also proposes an original analysis of signs, based on the freedom of the speaker and the infinite possibility of modifying the meaning of words. We are thus faced with a coherent project, carried out over some fifty years and involving the gathering of all available sources, in the service of wisdom and of the Church, of the struggle against its enemies, of preaching to the faithful, of the conversion of the Infidels, in which language plays a central role].

Cecilia Panti: *Roger Bacon's Millenaristic Utopia: The Astrological, Geographical and Historical Narration of the* sectae

Roger Bacon proposed a reform of knowledge and re-foundation of Christendom starting with an original consideration of the ancillary nature of philosophical knowledge with respect to moral science and theology. In this reconsideration of the sciences, judicial astrology, which is the science of predicting political and religious upheavals, is the eminent discipline for prefiguring future events and justifying past ones on a universal scale. The scientific foundation of judicial astrology underpins Bacon's philosophy of history. In his view, the "reading of the stars" forces Christian society to unite in order to defend itself from the imminent attacks of the enemies of Christianity and for the effective and definitive propagation of the *secta fidelis*. The present contribution intends to frame this millenarian and utopian scenario, taking into account the different historical, geographical and astronomical declinations through which Bacon, in different sections of the *Opus maius*, narrates the alternation of religious sects and the *populi* that represent them. In so doing, Bacon explores radical methods in the building-up of an utopic intellectual, historical and geographical horizon of the "true faith".

[*L'utopie millénaire de Roger Bacon: le récit astrologique, géographique et historique des sectes*. Roger Bacon propose une réforme du savoir et une refondation du christianisme en affirmant de façon originale le caractère accessoire du savoir philosophique par rapport à la science morale et à la théologie. Dans cette remise en cause des sciences, l'astrologie judiciaire, qui prédit les bouleversements politiques et religieux, est la discipline éminente pour préfigurer les événements futurs et justifier les événements passés à l'échelle universelle. Le fondement scientifique de l'astrologie judiciaire est à la base de la philosophie de l'histoire de Bacon. Dans sa vision, le « livre des étoiles » oblige la société chrétienne à s'unir pour se défendre contre les attaques imminentes des ennemis du christianisme et pour la propagation effective et définitive de la *secta fidelis*. Cette contribution entend cerner le cadre de ce scénario millénariste et utopique, en tenant compte des différentes déclinaisons historiques, géographiques et astronomiques à travers lesquelles Bacon, dans

différentes sections de l'*Opus maius*, relate l'alternance des sectes religieuses et des *populi* qui les représentent. Ce faisant, il explore des méthodes radicales dans la construction d'un horizon utopique – à la fois intellectuel, historique et géographique – de la « vraie foi »].

Salle / Room 3.02

Aula 3: Radical Thinking in the 15th Century

Ordinary Session
Chair: David C. Albertson

María Cecilia Rusconi: *The Ontological Status of Number According to Nicholas of Cusa in* De theologicis complementis

Between 1451 and 1456 Nicholas of Cusa maintained an epistolary exchange with the monks of the Tegernsee Abbey, in southern Germany. This correspondence documents the concerns that would motivate him to write some of his works. In two of them, *De theologicis complementis* (1453) and *De beryllo* (1458), he develops a method that had begun to take shape in *De docta ignorantia* (1440), based on a symbolic use of mathematics. Less systematic than *De beryllo*, *De theologicis complementis* could be characterized as a compendium of mathematical symbols, used to explain metaphysical problems. In this context, a radical question in the framework of the text draws attention. It is a controversy between Pythagoreans and Aristotelians regarding the ontological status of number. According to Nicolás: "the Pythagoreans and the Peripatetics differ in their assertions, when the Pythagoreans assert that number is a substance and the Peripatetics assert that it is an accident". The aim of my presentation is to identify Cusanus' solution to this conflict. In order to do this, I will focus, first (1), on paragraphs 9 and 10 of *De theologicis complementis*, which deal with the construction of regular polygons. Secondly (2), I will deal specifically with the conflict around the number in paragraph 10 of the work. From 1 and 2, I will try to show that Cusanus' solution takes place in two steps; the first disarticulates the question about the ontological character of number, as it would have been posed by Pythagoreans and Peripatetics, while the second rethinks it from the Christian notion of *imago dei*.

Mikhail Khorkov: *Nicholas of Cusa and Plato's* Phaedrus *in Codex Cusanus 177: New Approaches*

The *De idiota* dialogues, that were written by Nicholas of Cusa during the summer of 1450 in the context of the preparation of his legation journey through the German empire (1451-1452), indicate a particularly intensive work of Cusanus on Plato's ideas and texts. Among other Platonic texts, Nicholas of Cusa made for the first time in his writing career an extensive reception of Plato's dialogue *Phaedrus* as one of his main philosophical sources. This is undoubtedly confirmed not only by numerous direct references to this dialogue found in Nicholas of Cusa's works *De sapientia* and *De mente*, but also by his handwritten *marginalia* to Leonardo Bruni's Latin translation of Plato's *Phaedrus*, preserved in the manuscript Bernkastel-Kues, St. Nikolaus-Hospital, 177 (Codex Cusanus 177), ff. 102v-111v. This clearly means that Nicholas of Cusa must have read Plato's *Phaedrus* intensively and written his *marginalia* to it very probably over or shortly before a period around the summer of 1450, when he was working on his *De idiota* dialogues. More specifically, it is unlikely that there was a significant time gap in Cusanus' life between reading Plato and writing his own texts under the influence of this reading that would allow us to say that these two activities should belong to different periods of Nicholas of Cusa's life and work. My paper will specifically focus on new approaches to the study of the contexts and addressees of Nicholas of Cusa' dialogues and attempt to answer the question of why a massive and radical reception of Plato was necessary for them in this particular chronological period.

Luciano Micali: *Scholastic Examinations of Radical Doctrines and Texts. The case of the Millelogicon of Heymericus de Campo (1395-1460)*

In 1450, while he is a professor of theology at the University of Leuven, Heymericus de Campo (1395-1460) writes the *Millelogicon,* a theological *determinatio* about two books (now lost) circulating within the radical community of the Beghards near to Cologne and containing some radical doctrines on various topics of dogmatic and mystical theology. In the *Millelogicon*, transmitted by only one manuscript (Ms. Bruxelles, Bibliothèque Royale 11571-75, ff. 74vb-118vb), Heymericus analyses 33 *articuli* organized in 6 chapters: 1. *De Deo*; 2. *De processionibus diuinis*; 3. *De ydemptitate Dei et hominis*; 4. *De gracia et uirtutibus merito et demerito*; 5. *De perfectis hominibus*; 6. *De beatitudine.* The aim of Heymericus' analysis is that to provide a philosophical and theological appraisal on the truth or the falseness of each article, using the methods that are typical of the medieval scholastic disputation (*modo meo solito disceptatorie,* ff. 75ra). If some propositions are defined as *verisimiles de rigore sermonis* (ff. 75ra)*,* the philosophical and theological examination leads to the censure of all the articles and of all the theses that they contain. In my paper, through the analysis of some relevant textual passages, I will present the *Millelogicon* in its reasons, contents, sources, and relevance for our knowledge not only of the thought of Heymericus de Campo, but also of the radical doctrines circulating at his time. This *determinatio* will be contextualized in the more general frame of the academic reactions to radical doctrines and texts circulating among the Beghards in the late medieval Rhineland, comparing Heymericus' approach and strategies with those of other coeval masters such as Jean Gerson (1363-1429) and Felix Hem- merlin (1388-1458). This presentation will also be the occasion to shortly refer about my work for the critical edition of this text, that I am currently finalizing for the publication.

Salle / Room 3.03

Aula 4: Theological Discussions

Ordinary Session
Chair: Guy Guldentops

Francesco Benedittis: *Defining the Subject of Theology: the Role of Radicality in John Pecham's Commentary on the* Sentences

The aim of this paper is to illustrate how the Franciscan master John Pecham includes the idea of radicality to present his vision of the epistemological statute of theology, with a focus on its theological implications. In his introduction to the *Commentary* on the First Book of the *Sentences*, where he deals with this topic, Pecham exposes an original and interesting theory about the subject of theology, in which he uses the word «radicale» with regard to the general process of *reductio ad unum*. This idea of radicality is fundamental in elaborating two central aspects of Pecham's theological thought. In his attempt to identify the material cause of theology, Pecham indicates several possibilities to define it. In particular, following the principle of *reductio*, and referring to the unity of theology, Pecham claims that the material cause of theology may be identified with God, as proposed by Odo Rigaldi and Thomas Aquinas. Comparing theology to metaphysics, in which it is possible to reduce everything to the substance, Pecham claims that God is the "subiectum radicale" of theology because it is possible to lead back to him all creatures and all created things. In this way, the Franciscan master marks the centrality of the Trinitarian perspective of his theology, highlighting the will to insert his elaboration in the Augustinian and Neoplatonic tradition in opposition to the Aristotelianism of the second half of the 13th Century, using terms such as *exitus–reditus*, *bonum*, etc. However, this is just one of the ways in which the

subject of theology may be considered from Pecham's point of view. In fact, in the effort to find an agreement among all different positions on the material cause of theology, Pecham considers also a "subiectum integrale" (which is "Christum integrum") and a "subiectum universal" of theology. The latter is identified with the "bonum salutare" because this kind of good can include everything theology deals with: God, Christ, sacraments, miracles, etc. In this sense, God is the "bonum principaliter et causaliter", since the world is originated from him; for this reason, he is the "sapientia increate". Moreover, Christ is part of this definition as well, because he is the root to which everything in the Church is traced back, and, in particular, "quantum ad sacramenta, que a Christo fluunt ut a radice". In this sense, Christ becomes the "bonum radicale" of theology, and, therefore, he comes to represent the one to whom the entire theological speculation must be reduced. Pecham insists on the christological perspective when he refers to Christ as "bonum radicale", which represents the centre of the whole theological speculation according to the Franciscan tradition. The idea of radicality intrinsic to the "bonum salutare", in which God and Christ are included, allows Pecham to find the subject of theology that reveals the fundation of theology itse

Maria Eduarda Dias Pinto Machado: *The Anatomy the Problematic of the One in Thomas Aquinas's Philosophy*

This work presents a mapping of Thomas Aquinas's thought about the problem of the One and how the Angelic Doctor outweighs the paradox. The issue of the one and the multiple is within the foundations of the entire metaphysic thought since Greek Philosophy until the modern age. Is the intent of this presentation to manifest Aquinas's contribution to the development of the philosophical thoughts of his time and its relevance to contemporary metaphysics. Medieval philosophy, since patristics until high scholasticism, was deeply carved by the novelty and liberty to incorporate the Greek philosophy as its contemporary, and, in reverse, by the pressure to accordingly match the exegetical demands imposed by theological work about the sacred scriptures. From this tension, arises the line of thinking that characterizes the middle age - high level of abstraction, logical validity and an unsurpassed radicality - whose logical and Aristotelian imprints allowed for the construction of adequate starting points for new metaphysics capable of answering the speculative needs created by the mathematical theorization of physics. Thomas Aquinas is one of the most notables when it comes to the distinctiveness of medieval doctrines. The compatibility between the idea of unity and the idea of simplicity of God with His multiple attributes, His trinitarian nature, and with the multiform nature of the created reality, was a central piece in the theological work of the medieval era. Additionally, it had as essential and always present, the Parmenidean problem. Thomas Aquinas elaborated proposals to several theological-philosophical questions, through a purely philosophical way and applying his own solution of One's aporia. Thomas doctrine of the One, was developed in different philosophical domains: metaphysical, ontological and logical-semantic, gnoseological. The first domain question emerges either in the unity of the existing act and his extension to all beings, and in the relation of God with the world in a creational point of view [ex nihilo] - the world as plurality created by the One -, and in the definition of God's nature as simple and simultaneously trinitarian. The second domain of reality's ontological structures presents the relation of unity by the idea of participation, and it incorporates logical-semantic notions of analogy and proportion (also mathematical). The final domain, equally important, is the gnoseological, which focused on God's knowledge of things, as for how just by one single intellectual act He can know plurality - how is His knowledge's unity compatible with the multiplicity of the objects known by him, including contingent futures. Two logical principles are adjacent to these domains, a definition of unity and another of identity, both influenced by Aristotelian thinking, and worked on throughout history by many philosophers. On these principles resides the overcoming of the One's problematic developed by Thomas Aquinas, which

presents innovations yet poorly explored by the secondary literature, but worthy of appraisal and explanation.

Franco Manni: *Private and Public According to Aquinas*

Although Aquinas borrows from Augustine the metaphor of interior and exterior, he never says that thoughts are subjective or private, apart from the trivial meaning that not always do I read or talk aloud; for him the spiritual is the communal and is immaterial; this view is the contrary of Descartes' who thinks that the spiritual is the private whereas the material (the body) is the public. Aquinas thinks that there cannot be such a thing as a private language, there is a sharp distinction between individual material sensation and non-individual understanding: what is bodily and material about me constitutes my privacy, my individuality; whereas my intellectual capacities liberate me from the prison of my subjectivity. This fact makes us see how thoughts are distinguishable from other acts of the individual sentient animal and that, therefore, they are a sort of 'transcendence' of materiality. From the first part of his *Discourse on the Method*, we know how much Descartes had been annoyed by his teachers, books and discussions with other people, and that this experience could have persuaded him that thinking is mainly a private activity. For a Cartesian consciousness is something private, but for an Aristotelian it is the most shared and public thing of all, 'no one can have my sensations; everyone can have my thoughts'. This 'transcendence of materiality' (said in a medieval way) and this 'flight from the prison of privateness towards the public sphere' (said in a neo-Marxist way from the Sixties) are language characteristics that produce 'objective knowledge'.

Salle / Room 3.05

Aula 5: Aquinas on Cognition

Ordinary Session
Chair: Roberto Hofmeister Pich

Andrey Ivanov: *The Cooperation of the* vis cogitativa *with Art in Thomas Aquinas*

Thomas Aquinas, in the Commentary on Metaphysics (I, lect. 1, n. 17-30), when dealing with the degrees of human knowledge, addresses the issue of comparing experience (*experimentum*) with art (*ars*), and divides the question in two: (1) the generation of experience and art, and (2) the prominence of one over the other. Experience is generated by comparison (*collatio*) of many singulars received in memory, and this belongs to the cogitative power (*vis cogitativa*). By many experiences apprehended results a universal apprehension of all similar ones; therefore, one passes from sensations and memory to experience, and from there to the universal, and this belongs to art. The prominence of one over the other is with regard to action and knowledge. As for action, experienced (*experti*) are more successful in operation than those who have a universal without experience. As for knowledge, art is superior to experience; the artificers (*artifices*) are judged wiser than the experienced ones because they consider the universals. The present communication seeks to explore, based on Thomas's texts, the cogitative power cooperation for the generation of art.

Napolean Schoeller de Azevedo Junior: *From Intellect to Passion: An Analysis of How the Apprehension through the* vis cogitativa *Is Influenced by the Intellect*

When Aquinas writes about human nature, He develops interesting topics in philosophy of mind and epistemology. In this presentation, I will analyze one of these topics: the influence that an intellectual content exerts on the process of sensitive apprehension by an agent and on the appearance of his passions. More specifically, I will explain how the intellect exerts influence on the interior sense called *vis cogitativa*. It is central to this analysis to understand what particular

intentions are, as they are the object of the *vis cogitativa*. Using this interior sense, a human being is able to apprehend, by means of comparing, these intentions ("which are not received through the senses", as Aquinas says). The explanation of the nature of this comparison requires, in addition to considerations about the intellect, considerations about the role of the imagination and memory in the process of sensitive apprehension, since imagination and memory are like storehouses: the first is a storehouse of forms received through the senses, the latter is a storehouse of particular intentions. The above considerations lead us to some interesting results. One of them is that it is possible for human beings to be emotionally affected by something that they do not believe to exist, such as fictions. The relationship between the sensitive aspect and the intellective aspect of a human being is subject of great debate, indicating that Aquinas' theses on the subject present some degree of controversy. I hope to contribute to the clarification of some of them.

John Antturi: *Aquinas on the Immateriality of the Agent Intellect*

In recent decades, Thomas Aquinas's arguments for the immateriality of the human intellect have received critical scholarly attention. Among these arguments, the mode argument (MA) is considered by many commentators to be his best-developed argument. Briefly, according to MA, the intellect must be immaterial because it cognizes its objects in a universal, and thus immaterial mode, which no material power can do. However, Joseph Novak and Robert Pasnau have alleged that MA contains a fallacious inference known as the "content fallacy," the conflation of the nature of the intentional objects of intellectual cognition and the intrinsic nature of intellectual cognition. Just because intellectual cognition is about immaterial things secundum *esse intentionale*, it does not necessarily follow that intellectual cognition is itself intrinsically immaterial. I intend to show how Aquinas's theory of intellectual cognition can overcome the content fallacy by combining MA with Therese Cory's reading of Aquinas's abstraction theory. Cory's key insight is her re-interpretation of Aquinas's characterization of the agent intellect as an "intellectual light" – it is a precise technical analogy, where light and the agent intellect are both understood as an active explanatory principle for the actuality of a given visible/intelligible species. I argue that if one accepts the analogy that Cory's reading proposes (without question-beggingly assuming the immateriality of the human intellect), then one must also accept that the activity of *some* immaterial substance is involved in every act of human intellectual cognition. Excluding immaterial substances outside the individual human intellect as candidates, the only remaining candidate for such an immaterial substance is the individual agent intellect of the human cognizer. If this argument is successful, it demonstrates that Aquinas has good, non-circular reasons to consider the human soul to be immaterial in his theoretical context, and that no fallacious inferences or question-begging *ad hoc* premises are required to reach this conclusion.

Salle / Room 3.06

Aula 6: William of Ockham / I

Ordinary Session
Chair: Sabine Rommevaux

Charles Leitz: *Demons in the Schools: Radical Deception in Oxford and Paris*

Epistemological skepticism - the position that we are in a dramatically worse epistemic position than we habitually assume - has been defended with a huge profusion of arguments. These days, the most prominent such is the 'demon argument', so called after the *malin genie* of Descartes' First Meditation. Despite its name, the demon argument is not original to Descartes, and in fact had a long and fascinating medieval history. This presentation deals with the part of that history that occurred between two sets of condemnations: the Parisian and Oxonian condemnations of 1277, and the condemnations of Nicholas of Autrecourt and John of Mirecourt in 1347. The

condemnations of 1277 established the orthodoxy that God, in his absolute power, could produce Himself immediately any effect ordinarily produced by a secondary cause. This familiar doctrine played a key role in Ockham's version of the demon scenario, according to which God could destroy, for example, a tree, while conserving all of its causal powers Himself. As Ockham used it, this scenario was not taken to have any skeptical consequences, but rather as a methodological tool to demarcate absolute and conditional possibilities. This presentation details how this 'divine deception' demon scenario underwent two parallel escalations in Oxford and in Paris, by the end of which it became possible to pose it as a genuine challenge to scholastic epistemology and to the possibility of knowledge.

In Oxford, Ockham's successors Adam Wodeham and William Crathorn deployed the demon scenario for their own epistemic purposes. These purposes required that they move the demon out of the realm of the merely possible *de absoluta* and gradually into the realm of the possible *de ordinata* and even, in Crathorn, arguably into the realm of the *actual*. In Paris, on the other hand, Mirecourt and, especially, Autrecourt, in the course of their attempts to use divine deception as a *reductio ad absurdum,* gradually escalated its scope and severity. By the time of Autrecourt, the scenario undermines not just sensory knowledge of trees and other created things, but introspective knowledge, knowledge of the 1rst principles of logic and mathematics, and knowledge of revealed religion. These escalating demon scenarios were still not being oIered as skeptical demon *arguments*: neither the Oxonian Ockhamists nor the Parisian masters were skeptics in the traditional sense. They employed the demon epistemologically, to be sure, but purely methodologically, in service of non-skeptical epistemic ends. Despite this, the combined result of the two escalations was a set of plausible, powerful demon scenarios in European intellectual circulation that could - and eventually would - be adopted by later philosophers for directly skeptical ends.

Anastasia Kopylova: *William Ockham and Adam Wodeham on sensory powers*

In this paper I will analyze Ockham's approach to dealing with the question of the division of soul into parts, more specifically, parts of the sensory soul. I shall focus on the question whether he accepted the division of the sensory soul into parts and, if yes, in what way and how it related to the question of the unity of soul. This way I intend to settle the on-going debate on this issue. As, for instance, S. de Boer (de Boer, 2014), M. Klein (Klein,2021)) claimed, Ockham has to divide the sensory soul into quantitatively distinct parts. However, the question how the sensory soul as a substantial form could be divided into quantitatively distinct parts seems to be puzzling. Ockham is famous for his radical reductionism, I will consider whether his approach dealing with parts of the sensory soul could be considered as i) radical ii) reductionist.

I shall approach this debate by applying Ockham's vital mereology to the question of the division of the sensory soul into the distinct parts. In particular, I will focus on Ockham's usage of the notions 'essential part' and 'integral part'. Ockham uses the notion of 'part' several times when he speaks about the powers (capacities)of the sensory soul. Ockham claims that the sensory soul is i) material ii) extended, i.e. whole in whole and part in each part. At first sight this claim doesn't satisfy the criteria of holenmerism. Sensory powers, according to Ockham, could be understood in two ways:

1) For the necessary condition for whichever vital act
2) For the that which holds from the part of the soul eliciting that act, as a partial principle

Challenges:

- Ockham prima facie seems to claim that there are parts of the sensory soul. So that the soul is quantitatively divisible in homogenous parts/parts of the same kind (*eiusdem rationis*) which are really distinct between themselves.
- Does it mean that the sensory soul is quantitatively divisible into several parts?

- He also claims that one part of the sensory soul perfects one part of matter and anotherpartofthesensorysoulperfectsanotherpartofmatterandapartwhich perfects one part of matter is a power. For instance, 'this part of the sensory soul which perfects an organ of vision is the power of vision'.
First, I will show that Ockham speaks about the sensory soul being material in a way analogous to the white surface example, which he takes from Aquinas. The sensory soul is dependent on the matter, so could be understood as really distinct only due to its accidental dispositions. Secondly, I will show that Ockham doesn't consider the sensory soul as a potential whole, because powers are not potential states (argument from *Rep. II, q. 20*; but also work for the discussion of sensory soul). I will conclude by showing that the sensory soul in the proper sense is not divided into parts. It is divided only through accidental dispositions, which are parts of the same kind.

Rui Xu: *Ockham and Buridan on Quantity*

This paper examines the diverging views of Ockham and Buridan regarding the ontological status of quantity. The question regarding the ontological status of quantity is a scholastic formulation of the question regarding extension: do physical entities have extension *by nature*, as it seems only natural to think of them as having extension? For most scholastic authors, there is no obvious answer. Ockham, when demonstrating that quantity is not something distinct from the substance it inheres in, renders material substances as intrinsically extended. Buridan, on the other hand, believes that material substances are extended only by quantity, which he takes to be something distinct from substance. In this paper I classify Ockham's view as one of "quantity nominalism", and Buridan's view as one of "quantity realism". To support their views, both Ockham and Buridan have come up with their own explanations on one particular kind of quantitative change: rarefaction and condensation. It is on this issue that Ockham's and Buridan's explanations most explicitly diverge. For Buridan, rarefaction and condensation are the very natural phenomena that quantity nominalists are unable to account for, since these phenomena should be explained by the generation and corruption of the substance's quantity. For Ockham, rarefaction and condensation prove "just the opposite", and can be explained, in accordance with his quantity nominalist view, by reducing it to the local motion of the substance's parts. Their obvious difference in explaining rarefaction and condensation has triggered the interest of contemporary scholars, but many believes that Ockham easily has the upper hand, thus their debate over quantity is to be (or ought to be) one-sided, in which Ockham should have won hands down. Marilyn McCord Adams, for example, holds that "neither they [Ockham's quantity nominalist successors] nor Ockham should have been impressed" by Buridan's reasoning. Robert Pasnau also remarks that Buridan's conclusion "is easily evaded" for quantity nominalists who argue along similar lines as Ockham does. In this paper, I aim to show that by giving a coherent explanation on rarefaction and condensation, Buridan has not only successfully made a case for quantity realism, but also renders it at least equally (if not more) convincing against a quantity nominalist theory like Ockham's. Moreover, Buridan's explanation can be quite illuminating upon closer examination, for it in effect opens up a new possibility of conceiving existence, a possibility that is made actual by early modern empiricism. In this regard, this paper also aims to provide a new and well-motivated interpretation of Buridan's explanation on rarefaction and condensation.

Salle / Room 3.07

Aula 7: Radicalité et hérésie

Ordinary Session

Chair: Luca Bianchi

Irene Caiazzo: *L'hérésie amauricienne et sa postérité, ou des bienfaits des condamnations*

Alors que nous n'avons aucun écrit d'Amaury de Bène et ses disciples, les doctrines qui lui sont attribuées par les chroniqueurs et ses détracteurs au début du XIIIe siècle subissent des transformations considérables au fil des siècles. La mention d'Amaury de Bène dans la constitution *Dampnamus* du IVe concile du Latran joue un rôle déterminant. Au XIIIe siècle, le pape Grégoire IX décide de réunir plusieurs textes de droit canonique, dont celui du IVe concile du Latran, dans une collection officielle, les Décrétales. Augmentées et enrichies le long des siècles au fur et à mesure des conciles et des bulles papales, les Décrétales seront utilisées dans les écoles pour l'enseignement du droit canonique et feront l'objet de commentaires suivis. Au XVIe siècle, les Décrétales sont insérées dans le *Corpus juris canonici*, utilisé jusqu'en 1917. Bref, le nom d'Amaury de Bène retentit dans les classes pendant des siècles et attisa les interprétations les plus hardies.

Matteo Esu: *Calling for a New Crusade: University Theology and Religious Violence in the Unedited* De religioni militari contra Hussitas *by Petrus of Pirchenwart (Vienna †1436)*

Petrus Reicher of Pirchenwart, dean of the faculty of Theology and rector of the Vienna University, played a major role in facing the spread of Hussite heresy. In 1431, sixteen years after the condamnation of Jan Hus in the Concile of Constance, a delegation of secular authorities come to the Vienna University, one of the most influent cultural centre of the period. Their purpose : request an opinion on the most suitable way to fight the circulation of the heresy in neighbouring Hungary (*quodam seculari petenti consilium super exstirpacione cuiusdam heretici in Ungaria*). Pirchenwart, professor of theology and at the time Rector of the University, takes charge of the issue writing his *De religioni militari contra Hussitas*, of which it remains just an acephalous copy. Toghether with his more famous *Determinatio contra Hussitas,* those two unedited texts can provide new informations on the late-medieval relations between the emergence of religious minorities and their radical suppression by the political and spiritual power, and between an "abstract" theological knowledge and its practical impact on the society.

Aurélien Robert: *L'éthique radicale de Galeotto Marzio da Narni (ca. 1425-1495)*

Galeotto Marzio da Narni (ca. 1425-1495), laïc qui fréquenta diverses cours, et notamment celle de Matthias Corvin, a été taxé de tous les noms. De son vivant, on en faisait un épicurien; aujourd'hui, les uns en font un sceptique, d'autres un averroïste, voire un libertin. Condamné et jeté dans les geôles vénitiennes pour les thèses radicales qu'il défendait dans son traité *De incognitis vulgo*, son œuvre philosophique, largement inédite, reste encore méconnue. Nous voudrions présenter cette pensée radicale en nous concentrant sur ses réflexions sur l'éthique, qui l'amènent à défendre non pas l'idéal de la vie philosophique des aristotéliciens radicaux du 13e siècle, mais une éthique concentrée sur les actions qui régissent et régulent l'espace social et politique. Au sein de ces interactions sociales, l'individu doit se contenter d'acquérir des *commoda*.

Salle / Room 3.08

Aula 8: Second Scholasticism as Radical Revisionism

Special Session proposed by Jacob Schmutz
Sponsor: Centre De Wulf-Mansion, UC Louvain
Chair: Jacob Schmutz

Second Scholasticism has long been portrayed as a conservative movement, reviving medieval modes of thoughts after the challenges of Renaissance philosophy, humanism and the Reformation. Our session will propose a different hypothesis: Second Scholasticism should be read as a form of "radical revisionism" of medieval doctrines and modes of thought. Early-modern scholastics were avid readers not only of Aquinas and Scotus, but also of many other patristic and later medieval authorities which they used for new purposes and in order to invent new concepts. The radicalism of these revisions is confirmed by the fact that they often led to very polarized doctrinal debates within scholastic circles themselves and outside of them. The papers proposed in this session will provide different case-studies of such attempts to revise medieval insights.

Claus Andersen: *Radical Scotism: Angelo Volpe and John Punch on the Verge of Heresy*

Scholastic debates over God's knowledge of possible creatures face the challenge of explaining the ontological status of this sort of beings without postulating that they have any real being independently of God, which would be to commit an error of faith. Duns Scotus levelled this charge against Henry of Ghent's notion of an uncreated 'being of essence' (*esse essentiae*). Yet, within the Scotist tradition itself, the Subtle Doctor's own commentators faced the same charge or even threw it at each other. On the background of the condemned heretic John Wyclif's attribution of eternal real being to possible creatures, the awareness of the doctrinal peril involved in this debate only increased. This paper focuses on the strategies Early Modern Scotists developed to escape the charge of heresy. I shall in particular focus on the Scotist Angelo Volpe da Montepeloso († 1647), whose vast *Sacrae Theologiae Summa* was put on the Roman *Index of Prohibited Books*, and on the heated exchange between Bartolomeo Mastri († 1673) and John Punch († 1661) over the status of possible creatures prior to their real existence. I shall highlight, how both Volpe's and Punch's metaphysical innovations (Volpe's idea of possible creatures' *virtual being* and Punch's idea of a kind of being that is *neither real nor mental*) in spite of all precaution fell victim to the charge of radical thinking.

Pátricia Calvario: *Revising 'Benedictus Deus': Gabriel Vázquez and Louis Thomassin on the Vision of God*

After decades of heated debate about the impossibility of cognizing the divine essence, provoked by a growing interest in the Greek Patristic tradition Pope Benedict XII issued his bull *Benedictus Deus* (1336), where he established that the blessed *divinam essentiam videant*, "immediately, plainly, clearly and openly, and in this vision, they will enjoy the divine essence"; and forbade anyone to discuss the issue further. For the early-modern scholastic tradition, the different positions of the Latin Christian West and the Greek Christian East on the beatific vision were reconciled by Thomas Aquinas's interpretation of the Greek Fathers who stressed the absolute unknowability of God's essence by any created intellect in this world and in the age to come. Aquinas asserted that when the Greek Fathers claimed it is impossible to see the divine essence, they were referring to a "vision of comprehension" (*visione comprehensionis*) and not to a "clear vision" or knowledge (*visione clara Dei*), that is, precisely, to the incomprehensibility, but not to the unknowability of the divine essence. The knowledge that God has of himself and that only he can have, and the knowledge proper to a finite intellect. Even if the intellect is in its full activity, because it is finite, it will always have a less perfect knowledge of the essence of God than God has of himself. This distinction will become, for the Second Scholasticism commentators of Aquinas, the interpretation key to the

Greek Fathers who seemed to reject the vision of the essence. The commentators of Aquinas remained faithful for many years, until the Jesuit Gabriel Vazquez shockingly accused openly the Greek Fathers (Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, John Chrysostom, John Damascene and others) of heresy for their denial of the vision of the essence of God, and, therefore, also revising Aquinas's interpretation. The accusation of Vázquez immediately triggered an intense debate on the subject, with replies from authors such as the Jesuits Suárez and Ruiz de Montoya, but also from Ysambert and the Oratorian Thomassin. Curiously, amongst the treatises produced in this framework, some developed theories which, at the end, were not aligned with the official position on the beatific vision, which is the case with Thomassin's theory. I propose to unfold this, so far neglected, debate on the beatific vision, analysing the cases of Vázquez and Thomassin and showing how they represent challenges to the well-established previous tradition.

Jacob Schmutz: *How Radical was Grotius' Suggestion of a Natural Law without God?*

In his *De jure belli ac pacis* (1625), Hugo Grotius declared that natural sociability was the source of rights, and that this would be true "even if God did not exist" (*etiamsi daremus non esse Deum*): feeling the radicality of this sentence, he added that this could not be admitted "without the greatest wickedness" (*quod sine summo scelere dari nequit*). Many readers of this Grotius, from Catholic and Protestant scholastics of his time down to commentators of the twentieth century, have argued that Grotius's position was a radical claim which prepared the rise of early-modern atheism and secularism: Ernst Cassirer famously called Grotius the "Galileo of legal thought", who overturned centuries of legal theocentrism, and more recently Jonathan Israel claimed that Grotius had thereby "emasculated religious authority". In this paper, I will challenge this common assumption, by looking at medieval antecedents of Grotius's statement and by replacing his own claim in the broader context of some other of his works, in particular his commentaries on the Pentateuch and Jewish Law. Far from proposing a break from the medieval tradition, I will argue that Grotius's famous phrase should be read as a positive reappraisal of claims that can be found in the Christian and Jewish medieval tradition.

Salle / Room 3.09

Aula 9:Radical Themes in Medieval Jewish Philosophy

Special Session proposed by Steven Harvey
Chair: Sarah Stroumsa

Daniel J. Lasker: *Were there any Karaite Radical Thinkers?*

Karaism is a form of Judaism which denies the central tenet of rabbinic Judaism, namely that two divine Torahs were revealed to Moses on Mt. Sinai, a written one, as found in the Pentateuch, and an oral one, eventually encapsulated in the Talmud. In the absence of the oral Torah, Karaism, which was first identified as a separate movement in the ninth century in the Islamicate world, has developed its own interpretations of the Torah, leading to an alternative set of laws and practices. In theology, however, Karaites and Rabbanites (followers of rabbinic Judaism) have generally agreed about basic principles and have adopted similar philosophical systems, influenced by their cultural environment. Thus, both Rabbanites and Karaites in the tenth and eleventh centuries were drawn to Islamic Kalam, and eventually both made the switch to Aristotelianism. As a usually small, but vocal, minority, struggling to maintain their separate Jewish identity, Karaites have tended to conservatism in many fields, including theology. They have been strong believers in a personal, providential, creator God whose will was revealed to the prophets and who administers justice by rewarding the righteous and punishing the wicked. One does not usually associate Karaite theologians with radical thought. Nevertheless, one can find two instances in which there might be a similarity between two. First, in the Kalam stage of Karaism, Karaites taught, based on I Chron.

28:9, that one first had to "know" God before one could "serve" God. That meant that before the prophets were accepted as conveyors of God's will, one first had to prove God's existence and the veracity of the prophets. Thus, the path was open to skepticism about the validity of religion which was not to be accepted simply on face value. Second, the fifteenth-century Elijah Bashyatchi, the ultimate Karaite legal authority, provides broad hints in his discussion of the principles of Judaism, that he rejected the traditional understandings of creation, providence and resurrection, leaving behind a radical, Aristotelian Karaite theology.

Gitit Holzman: *"And God Created Man in His Image"*: *Equality and Diversity, Intellectuals, Prophets and Laymen in Medieval Jewish Philosophy*

The verse "And God created man in His own image" (Genesis 1:27) is undoubtedly a key biblical principle. Numerous commentaries addressed the essence of the connection between God and mankind implied in this verse, be it physical, spiritual, or intellectual. Most commentaries suggested that this verse promoted the concept of substantive equality between human beings-men and women, rich and poor, slaves and freed men, Jews and Gentiles. Indeed-various biblical verses promoted this idea throughout the scriptures. Maimonides composed his *Guide of the Perplexed* circa 1190, commencing with his own commentary to the biblical "Image of God". However, whilst the Bible advocated human beings were created equal, Maimonides claimed that only virtuous individuals indeed acquire the desired "Image of God". The proposed lecture will discuss the manner in which Jewish ideas regarding "Image of God" inflicted upon mankind were evolved, focusing on different aspects of radical thinking inherent in it. The principle of fundamental equality between human beings, which lies in the understanding that every human being was created the image of God is quite radical regarding the ancient East world in which kings were perceived as Gods on the one hand, and slaves were deprived of all right son the other hand. However, Jewish philosophy has detached itself from this egalitarian conception and presented different models of distinctions between human beings. Just like Halevi claimed that the people of Israel had special qualities distinguishing them from all members of the human race, adding that the prophet shad even more unique qualities. Abraham Ibn Daud held a similar position. Just like Halevi and Ibn Daud, Maimonides established that men fundamentally differed in their ability to realize human potential. However, in his view these differences did not at all correlate to any ethnic origin. Maimonides bluntly stated that unintellectual people were basically animals. The 14th century philosopher Moshe Narboni relied on this theory, claiming there was a fundamental difference between educated and ignorant people regardless of their religious affiliation. He argued it was difficult to fathom how fools and wise people belonged to the same biological species. Shmuel Zarza went so far as to claim that scholars belonged to a different human race and even to a different biological species than ignorant people. The lecture will discuss medieval Jewish philosophers' radical interpretations of human creation in the image of God concept. The lecture will focus on the way in which they completely dissociated themselves from the under lying idea of equality between human beings, emphasizing the fundamental gap between intellectuals and commoners. The lecture will discuss the influence of Greek and Muslim philosophy on Jewish philosophy on this issue.

Yoav Meyrav: *The Anonymity-Factor in the Study of Medieval Hebrew Philosophy*

The vast body of medieval Hebrew manuscripts is extraordinarily well-documented. Today, thanks to massive digitization efforts, it is also accessible like never before. This combination of documentation and accessibility puts the Hebrew corpus in the privileged, perhaps unparalleled position of being able to be studied on an incredibly wide scale. Scholars can examine considerable amounts of material quickly and side-by-side, employing modes of investigation that were hitherto impossible. This fortunate development should be set against the long-recognized distinctive

features of Hebrew manuscripts. First, they are largely private (rather than institutionalized) endeavors that display considerable individuality, idiosyncrasy, and liberties with the texts they contain. Second, they exhibit exceptionally high levels of anonymity concerning all the players involved. Within this context, works of philosophy and science are no exception. They display a wide diversity among copies of the same work and a high level of involvement in the text: sometimes explicit, in the form of copyist glosses and annotations, and sometimes implicit, by altering the texts they are reproducing, for various reasons. The numerous scribes, editors, compilers, and readers are for the most part unknown. What is more, a large part of the Hebrew philosophical corpus is based on translation, about which a great deal of information is missing: of the nearly 700 philosophical and scientific Hebrew translations, nearly 40 percent are anonymous. Even in philosophical works originally written in Hebrew, there are several cases of unknown or uncertain authors. In short, a significant portion of the Hebrew history of philosophy is populated by anonymous scholars whose individuality and proactive approach nevertheless shine through the manuscripts that they produced and studied. This creates a challenging landscape that undermines traditional concepts applied to texts such as authority and authorship or correctness and error. It is also for the most part incompatible with traditional approaches to textual criticism. The proposed presentation aims to ask how the notion of anonymity can be worked into the scholarship about Hebrew philosophy. My "radical" argument is that in order to get a clearer picture of the history of philosophy in Hebrew, we should shift our emphasis from towering figures to "real- world" philosophical agents. This is something that can be finally done thanks to the unprecedented accessibility of Hebrew manuscripts. As a first step, and with the aid of several examples, I will present a non-binding typology of different anonymous players with respect to their causal power in the creation, transmission, and reception of the Hebrew philosophical corpus. I will then ask how the study of these players can be incorporated into our historiographical and philological practices.

Salle / Room 3.10

Aula 10: Radical Aristotelianism after 1277: Godfrey of Fontaines

Special Session proposed by Martin Pickavé
Chair: Antoine Côté

Giorgio Pini: *Godfrey of Fontaines' Radical Theory of Cognition*

Godfrey of Fontaines held that cognizers are passive subjects of cognitive activity. When applied to sensory acts such as seeing and hearing, this view has some immediate appeal and was shared by several of his contemporaries. Much more controversial, however, was Godfrey's idea that even thinking is not something that you and I *do* but something that the things we are thinking about *do to us*. In this essay, I will reconstruct Godfrey's view and consider his motivations. In particular, I will focus on how Godfrey could account for a complex activity such as reasoning while remaining faithful to his basic assumptions. My goal is to show that Godfrey's view, far from being naive, is a sophisticated attempt to deal with the central difficulties faced by the generation of thinkers immediately following Aquinas.

Martin Pickavé: *Godfrey of Fontaines' Radical Philosophy of Action*

Godfrey of Fontaines holds that we are mostly passive with respect to the objects of cognition and also that the will is not a self-mover but rather determined and moved by our cognitive capacities. These two positions taken together seem to put in doubt whether human beings are agents in any significant sense of the term. In my short presentation, I will explore in what sense there is place for genuine agents in Godfrey's metaphysics and philosophy of nature and discuss whether there are any agents that can ground a sufficiently robust understanding of moral responsibility.

Peter King: *The Belgian Connection: Godfrey of Fontaines and Marguerite de Porete*

While we know that there was some connection between the Parisian Master and the lay theologian, it has been unclear exactly what it was and how deep it ran. The most promising lines have been about Godfrey's sympathy for Marguerite's so-called `mystical' lay theology. I'll divide this into two parts, one dealing with his support for her views, the other dealing with his attitude toward lay theologians having (and expressing) views. The latter involves not only Godfrey's explicit discussion of who may hold an opinion on theological matters, but on the kind of aid or assistance he may have provided to Marguerite, where the evidence is circumstantial but compelling that he actively promoted and protected her.

Salle / Room 3.11

Aula 11: Philosophie et théologie réformées face à la pensée radicale: prolongations d'un débat médiéval

Special Session proposed by Ueli Zahnd
Sponsor: Project: *A Disregarded Past – Medieval Scholasticism and Reformed Thought*
Chair: Ueli Zahnd

De la Renaissance à l'âge classique, la question du statut de la philosophie en théologie a constitué l'un des principaux motifs de la polémique des orthodoxies protestantes contre les radicalités religieuses. Il n'est pas pour autant aisé de livrer une formule générale des marqueurs de cette radicalité, ni de déterminer le critère d'identification d'une pensée radicale, au regard du sort qu'elle aurait réservé au discours philosophique. S'il était possible d'être radical par excès, il était en effet aussi possible d'être radical par défaut, et à côté des « rationalistes », qui de Faust Socin à Ludwig Meyer, prétendaient soumettre l'Écriture et la foi aux principes de la « raison commune », les orthodoxies protestantes, et en particulier l'orthodoxie réformée, ont également condamné unanimement les discours jugés trop fidéistes, comme ceux des anabaptistes et de différents courants spiritualistes qui prétendaient exclure intégralement la philosophie du savoir théologique. Ce panel se propose d'offrir une étude des usages de la philosophie médiévale dans la tradition réformée moderne en lien avec ce combat contre les dissidences et les radicalités religieuses. Il s'articulera principalement autour de deux axes :
1/ Le premier s'étendra des débuts de la Réforme (1520) jusqu'à l'avènement des orthodoxies confessionnelles (~1580). Cette période est marquée par une réhabilitation progressive de la philosophie au sein de la tradition réformée, dans le contexte de la controverse contre l'Église de Rome, mais aussi contre les anabaptistes, et leur conception stricte du principe de la sola Scriptura. Si le discours réformateur s'était en effet nourri au départ d'une critique acerbe de « la » philosophie scolastique, ce rejet radical a rapidement cédé la place à un discours plus conciliant, si ce n'est à une franche restauration. Mais quelle philosophie, au juste, restaure-t-on et selon quelles limites ? En outre, le rejet initial de Luther, de Zwingli ou de Calvin n'était-il pas lui-même enraciné dans une certaine radicalité médiévale ? Enfin, quel rôle a joué le combat contre les dissidences, et en particulier contre l'anabaptisme, dans la redéfinition du rapport entre philosophie et théologie dans le monde réformé ?
2/ Le second axe s'attachera à étudier l'institutionnalisation progressive d'une « scolastique réformée » entre la fin du XVIe et le milieu du XVIIe siècle (~1580-1650). Le contexte de cette institutionnalisation est celui de la réception de la métaphysique de Suarez dans la Schulmetaphysik réformée, mais aussi de la pluralisation interne des controverses, entre réformés et arminiens, entre réformées et sociniens, et entre réformés et luthériens. Quel rôle ont joué ces controverses dans la définition de cette « voie moyenne », si caractéristique de la position réformée au sujet du statut de la philosophie en théologie ? Y avait-il une philosophie, et en particulier une tradition scolastique médiévale, plus susceptible de définir ce point d'équilibre, dans le moyen terme entre ce qui était

perçu comme un excès de philosophie (arminiens et sociniens), et au contraire comme un défaut (luthériens) ? Dans quelle mesure le cartésianisme, puis l'émergence du rationalisme philosophique, ont-ils enfin redéfini la recherche de ce point d'équilibre ?

Arthur Huiban: *La philosophie au secours de la Trinité: augustinisme et scotisme dans la tradition réformée*

Peu après l'excommunication de Luther, la controverse contre les Réformes « radicales » a joué un rôle décisif dans la configuration intellectuelle des Réformes dites « magistérielles » (luthéranisme et calvinisme) et dans la réorganisation des études universitaires en terres protestantes, rôle étudié en particulier dans le luthéranisme (Kusukawa, 1995). J'aimerais explorer ici le pendant réformé de la réhabilitation progressive de la philosophie, en partant du contexte de la controverse contre l'anabaptisme des années 1520-1530, mais aussi de la controverse, plus longue et sans doute plus décisive, contre une autre forme de radicalité religieuse : l'antitrinitarisme. Parmi les différentes stratégies de réponses à l'antitrinitarisme dans le monde réformé, je me concentrerais ici sur les arguments *pro Trinitate* fondés sur la philosophie et la raison naturelle. Il s'agira en particulier de suivre le passage progressif d'une démonstration d'inspiration augustinienne, dominante chez les premiers Réformateurs, à une démonstration scotiste de la Trinité, qui culmine, à la toute fin du XVIe siècle, dans l'œuvre du théologien réformé Bartholomaeus Keckermann.

Zachary Seals: *A Radical Departure? The Beatific Vision in Reformed Scholasticism*

This paper explores the impact the increasing utilization of philosophy had on the doctrine of the beatific vision within Reformed scholastic systems of theology. More specifically, I seek to explore explanations for why the concept reemerged within the Reformed tradition in the early seventeenth century (that is, within the re-emergence of philosophy described above) when it can be found seminally within the earliest reformers. To accomplish this task, I will examine the progressing importance of the beatific vision as it is variously contextualized in polemical debates of the time as well as the increasing utilization of philosophical paradigms which are drawn from medieval scholasticism.

Giovanni Gellera: Metaphysica reformata? *The Medieval Legacy and the Fight against Radical Thought*

Confronted as they were, on the one side, with what they considered fideist radicals and, on the other, with rationalist radicals, in the late sixteenth century Reformed thinkers abandoned their initial suspicion of metaphysics as excessively rationalistic and re-engaged with the question about metaphysics and its status. In their search for moderate accounts, they resorted to the rich medieval legacy. This paper investigates the varieties of Reformed metaphysics in the period 1550 to 1650. I will argue that metaphysics was especially inspired to two medieval 'models'. On the one side, the 'Thomistic' model understood metaphysics as the 'bridge' discipline which connected theology and philosophy conceptually and terminologically, and where potential conflict would be resolved. On the other side, the 'nominalistic' model understood metaphysics as the highest achievement of unassisted human reason, sitting squarely in the philosophical camp: therefore, potential conflict with theology would be resolved as between two distinct disciplines.

17h00-17h30: Coffee Break

17h30-19h00: Sessions ordinaires et spéciales/ Ordinary and Special Sessions

Salle / Room 50

Aula 1:In memory of Herbert A. Davidson

Special Session proposed by Richard C. Taylor and Luis López-Farjeat
Sponsor: *Aquinas and 'the Arabs' International Working Group* (AAIWG)
Chair: Charles H. Manekin

Josep Puig Montada: *Herbert A. Davidson (1932-2021) and Maimonides, Community of Faith and Intellectual Endeavor*

After his retirement in 1994 at UCLA, Professor Davidson concentrated his research on Maimonides and almost ten years later, he published *Moses Maimonides: The Man and His Works* (Oxford University Press, 2005), a densely argued but eminently readable work of 567 pages. Professor Davidson describes in detail Maimonides' life, education, and interests and he analyzes the whole intellectual production of the Rambam. In the course of his life Professor Davidson had authored additional articles on Maimonides and six of them were collected in the volume *Maimonides the Rationalist*, (Liverpool University Press, Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2011) together with three new chapters. Through reading these as well as through learning the accounts that I am glad to have heard from Professor Davidson, I came to appreciated Maimonides' effort to preserve traditional Jewish religious thought in conjunction with contemporary philosophy. At the same time, I admired how Professor Davidson himself joined the Rambam in this common endeavor.

Steven Harvey: *Herbert Davidson's Contribution to the Study of Medieval Jewish Ethical Philosophy and His Unradical Take on Maimonides*

Herbert A. Davidson (1932-2021) was Professor Emeritus of Hebrew, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures, at UCLA. He was one of the outstanding students of Harry Austryn Wolfson at Harvard University in the fifties and became one of the best known and respected scholars of medieval Jewish and Islamic Philosophy. Davidson's versatility as a scholar may be gauged from his most cited books: his edition of Jacob Anatoli's early thirteenth-century Hebrew translation of Averroes' Middle Commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and on Aristotle's *Categories* (1969) and his annotated English translation of these two commentaries by Averroes (1969); his monograph on the views of the *falāsifa* on the Active Intellect and the human intellect (1992); his comparative examination of the proofs of the medieval Islamic and Jewish philosophers for eternity, creation and the existence of God (1987); and, of course, his two major volumes on Maimonides (2005 and 2011). My remarks will not focus on Davidson's important studies on medieval logic, physics, psychology, cosmogony, cosmology, or metaphysics, but rather on his lesser-known contribution to the study of medieval Jewish ethical philosophy as may be discerned from his various publications. Davidson was a meticulous and learned scholar who studied Greek, Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin texts, but he was, at times, also controversial, provoking healthy, intelligent, and stimulating debate with his colleagues. At times, his views were radical and, at times he opposed radical trends in the modern interpretation of the writings of the leading medieval thinkers, especially Maimonides. I will try to suggest how both these aspects come in to play in his approach to medieval Jewish ethical philosophy.

Richard C. Taylor: *Davidson's Opening of the Door to Radical Interpretation of Ibn Rushd*

The extraordinary contributions of the late Professor Herbert A. Davidson to the study of key figures of the Classical Rationalist Philosophical Tradition have long and widely been recognized

as both insightful as well as foundational for the study of al-Farabi, Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes). One important short study on the thought of Ibn Rushd in his book, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes On Intellect. Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect and Theories of Human Intellect (Oxford U.P., New York - Oxford 1992) that has seldom been highlighted opens the door to a very radical interpretation of the thought of the Cordoban. Davidson writes regarding the view of scripture implied in Ibn Rushd's early Commentary on the Parva Naturalia, "The intent would be ... that the human author of Scripture first acquired theoretical knowledge through proper scientific methods and then coolly and deliberately – not through an inspired imaginative faculty – recast his hard-won philosophic knowledge into language appropriate for his less enlightened brethren. The term prophet would, on this reading, mean nothing more than the human author of Scripture; and the term revelation would mean a high level of philosophical knowledge." The present short paper links this to other passages in the work of Ibn Rushd and explores the question of whether this interpretation is itself too radical or may be a cogent account of the thinking of the great Aristotelian commentator.

Salle / Room 3.01

Aula 2: Political Radicality I

Ordinary Session
Chair: Juhana Toivanen

Anto Gavrić: *La radicalisation de l'anthropologie aristotélicienne - l'anthropologie politique de Rémi de Florence*

La redécouverte de l'oeuvre d'Aristote a incité le débat portant sur la conception de l'homme comme animal politique. On y voit émerger une nouvelle anthropologie politique et une certaine radicalisation de l'anthropologie aristotélicienne. L'appartenance active à la communauté humaine et politique apparaît comme un élément constitutif de l'humanité. L'auteur présente l'exemple de l' (Remigio dei Girolami, + 1319), disciple de Thomas d'Aquin et une des figures influentes de Florence à l'époque de Dante. Citoyen actif, il écrit: „Si non est civis, non est homo." Lorsqu'il évoque l'*esse morale* ou plus encore l'*esse civile*, la philosophie politique apparaît comme une préoccupation très significative de la pensée du dominicain florentin: elle montre son intérêt pour l'actualité ainsi que son engagement actif dans la vie publique de son temps. Plusieurs de ses écrits témoignent du souci continuel de guider ses concitoyens vers la concorde, vers la justice, vers la paix, ainsi que de les convaincre de la primauté du bien commun (*bonum commune*) sur le bien particulier et les ambitions personnelles.

Camila Ezidio: *The Natural and Positive Foundations of the* Ius Gentium *in Thomas Aquinas and Francisco Suarez*

There is a well-known discussion in secondary literature about the ambiguity regarding the foundations of the so-called *ius gentium* in Thomas Aquinas. Although nature is considered the source of all moral and political rule in Thomas Aquinas, the philosopher takes distinct positions during his writings, characterizing the right of the nations sometimes as positive, sometimes as natural. Through the reception and interpretation of the Aquinas' texts, this problematic extends to the authors of the second scholasticism. However, Francisco Suárez seems to present an intermediate-resolutive position regarding the natural-positive character of the *ius gentium*, through the distinction between two senses of the right of nations: the *ius intra gentes* and the *ius inter gentes*. This presentation intends to propose in the first place, that the ambiguity of the *ius gentium* in Thomas Aquinas can be read as a necessary duality, considering the moral and political issues with which this right has to deal. And, secondly, that the distinction of the *ius gentium*, made by Francisco Suárez, allows that the problem concerning the positive or natural character of the right of nations

can be understood in an intermediary way: while the *ius inter gentes* evidences the natural foundation of a right practiced among all men of the different political communities, the *ius intra gentes* points out the consuetudinary and positive aspect of a right observed in the ordering of the internal relations of some nations.

Julien le Mauff: *La* communitas perfecta *chez les lecteurs d'Aristote: aux racines de la pensée civique et de l'exclusion*

Cette communication vise à se saisir du concept de *communitas perfecta*, importé dans la pensée politique chrétienne à partir du XIIIe siècle, à travers la traduction par Guillaume de Moerbeke des *Politiques* d'Aristote et de la notion de *teleios koinônia* abordée au livre I. L'idéal de la cité comme « communauté parfaite » gagne les textes de nombreux lecteurs et commentateurs d'Aristote dans le long siècle suivant la redécouverte des *Politiques*, à commencer par Thomas d'Aquin, Marsile de Padoue, ou encore Nicole Oresme. Chacun à sa manière reprend ainsi le propos selon laquelle la cité serait le résultat d'une évolution naturelle depuis de premières communautés élémentaires et imparfaites (la famille, le village) jusqu'à la cité. Cette importation est aussi, souvent, adaptation du discours au contexte plus familier, pour ces auteurs, de l'environnement urbain du bas Moyen Âge. Le *vicus* est ainsi progressivement moins compris comme une communauté primitive (le village par opposition à la cité) que comme un élément constitutif de la communauté parfaite (la rue comme partie de la ville). Cette évolution n'a rien de superficiel, et la lecture d'Aristote évolue vers un regard de plus en plus fonctionnel sur la cité, à l'exemple de Marsile, dont la description s'approche d'un écorché de l'espace urbain. Au même moment, le mot *communitas* voit également son usage se répandre avec une signification politique nouvelle, en particulier au sein des communautés civiques, depuis les *communitates* de marchands, artisans, marins, jusque dans les chartes et statuts des bourgs et villes aspirant à la reconnaissance de leurs libertés et privilèges, et même, en Angleterre notamment, jusqu'à la notion de *communitas regni* utilisée en particulier par le camp baronial au cours du Mad Parliament. Le vocabulaire du commun naît aussi de la prolifération de ces usages légaux, jusqu'à l'émergence vernaculaire de la *commune* française ou *comune* italienne. Le lien entre les lectures d'Aristote et cette prolifération du langage de la communauté dans les sources civiques fera l'objet d'investigations. Cette présentation de la *communitas perfecta* ne peut toutefois pas s'abstraire de son insertion originelle dans l'appareil aristotélicien et, tout particulièrement, de la définition du citoyen. Pour dessiner la catégorie des membres de cette communauté, les auteurs cités reprennent aussi, en général, le propos tenu au livre III des *Politiques*, qui débute par l'exclusion des jeunes garçons, des esclaves, des étrangers et des femmes, ainsi que le rappelle par exemple Marsile. De même le vocabulaire de l'étranger et de l'exclu se voit-il enrichi dans le commentaire des *Politiques* par Oresme (*peregreins*, *trespassans*). La communication s'attachera à montrer comment l'essor d'une pensée de la communauté civique à partir de la redécouverte d'Aristote est aussi indissociable de la clôture de cette communauté: se propagent, de façon concomitante, une pensée nouvelle de l'inclusion civique, et des processus d'exclusion. Revenir aux lecteurs médiévaux d'Aristote permet ainsi de saisir l'enracinement médiéval de la pensée civique et des régimes modernes d'exclusion, comme une vérification précoce et inattendue du paradigme schmittien de l'ami et de l'ennemi.

Salle / Room 3.02

Aula 3: Second Scholasticism and Scholastica colonialis / I

Special Session proposed by Roberto Hofmeister Pich, Alfredo Culleton and Alfredo Storck

Chair: Jacob Schmutz

Roberto Hofmeister Pich: *Causation and Experimental Knowledge in Early Modern Scholastic Natural Science from Colonial Chile and Ecuador*

The writings of Latin American scholastic thinkers in the seventeenth and eighteenth century largely followed the structure of the *cursus philosophicus*—logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics—imported from Salamanca and Alcalá. In their expositions on the philosophy of nature, which were profoundly inspired by Aristotle and his medieval commentators, physics, hence the scientific attempt of explaining change in natural realm, increasingly took root in experimental aspects of science, resulting in a separation between "general" and "special" physics. This paper investigates physics in colonial scholasticism through three sets of authors teaching philosophy of nature. First, it discusses the work of Juan de Fuica (c. 1660 – ?), who taught in Santiago de Chile and was the author of a complete Scotist *cursus philosophicus* (1688–89). For Fuica, the philosophical study of substance – taken as composite substance and formally as changeable being – belongs already to the philosophy of nature. Metaphysics as such is a science of transcendental concepts, its formal object is the *ens reale*. Second, the paper analyzes courses written by professors from Ecuador at the Jesuit Universidad de San Gregorio, which reveal a shift in the teaching of physics, from pure scholastic debates to explanations challenged by an experimental approach in the theory of knowledge. This shift is further pursued by investigating Ignatius Gil Castelvi's *Tractatus in universam Aristotelis dialecticam, amplectens physicam, et metaphysicam ad unum corpus redactus* (1665) and Juan Bautista Aguirre's *Physica ad Aristotelis mentem* (1758). The study aims to determine the extent to which these *magistri* incorporated experimental knowledge into their analyses of causal explanation in natural processes, and how their expertise in Aristotelian natural philosophy – in some cases *ad mentem Scoti* and in some cases *ad mentem Thomae* – enabled or hindered that process.

Marlo do Nascimento: *Sobre os conceitos de justiça e direito na obra* De iustitia distributiva et acceptione personarum ei opposita disceptatio *de Juan de Zapata y Sandoval (1547-1630)*

Este trabalho propõe realizar uma análise dos conceitos de justiça e direito, presentes na obra *De iustitia distributiva et acceptione personarum ei opposita disceptatio* (1609), de Juan de Zapata y Sandoval (1547-1630). De maneira específica, essa obra versa, essencialmente, sobre os limites e distinções do poder eclesiástico e civil tendo como ponto referencial os conceitos de justiça e direito. O filósofo mexicano aborda esses dois conceitos de maneira mais teórica, na primeira parte do *De iustitia distributiva*. Nela o pensador delimita o campo conceitual da justiça a partir de suas distintas formas. Além disso, elabora uma exposição, na qual pondera sobre a possibilidade do direito ser objeto da justiça. Nesse sentido, esse trabalho deter-se-á, basicamente, na primeira parte dessa obra, objetivando compreender como a noção de direito se encontra relacionado com a de justiça. Juntamente a isso, pretende-se analisar as formas em que Zapata y Sandoval divide e define a justiça, a saber: justiça legal, comutativa e distributiva.

Alfredo Storck: *The* distinctio formalis intentionalis*: A Note on the Reception of Baconthorpe's Thought in the South American Jesuit Colleges*

The reception of medieval philosophy in the Portuguese colonies of South America is a very complex process. It is linked in part to the way in which the missionary religious orders of early modernity turned to medieval authors to elaborate textbooks used in their colleges. In this context, the fathers of the Carmelite order relied on the works of John Baconthorpe to elaborate their works on logic and formulate their thesis on the *distinctio formalis*. The first Portuguese Carmelite author to have recourse to Baconthorpe was Manuel Inácio Coutinho who published his *Compendium Philosophico-Theologicum* in 1734. Surprisingly, years before the publication of Coutinho's work, the Jesuits installed in the Colégio do Maranhão were already criticizing the distinctio formalis bacconica and this suggests that the reception of bacconic philosophy occurred earlier in the American colonies than in Portugal. The purpose of my talk will be to address these criticisms by showing how they were incorporated into the philosophical theses defended at the Colégio do Maranhão.

Salle / Room 3.03

Aula 4: Anselme

Ordinary Session

Chair: Kristell Trego

Marcia Colish: *Anselm's Boethius: A View from* De concordia *1*

Debated since antiquity, Aristotle's treatment of necessity and contingency in *De interpretatione* 9 entered medieval thought via Boethius' commentaries on that text and his *Consolation of Philosophy*, standard works which Anselm unquestionably knew. Quellenforschung aside, much recent scholarship on Boethius' treatments of *De interpretatione* 9 focuses on their perceived viability, in the authors' own literary or philosophical terms. The Boethius who emerges from this process is often judged as failing to make the cut, according to modern criteria, an assessment sometimes extended as well to Anselm on necessity and contingency by scholars who consider his use of Boethius on this topic. Making no effort to contribute to existing evaluations of the presumed tenability of Boethius or Anselm on this question, posed and answered according to modern—or ancient—criteria, this paper seeks, rather, to understand Boethius on *De interpretatione* 9 in his own terms, and to propose an Anselmian reading of Boethius in Book 1 of his *De concordia*, informed as it is by the issue of divine foreknowledge and human free will as Anselm treats it in that work.

Michael Bauwens: Non quoad nos*? Anselm and Aquinas on the Knowability of God*

Thomas sets out his five ways (ST Ia Q.2, A.3) after rejecting several 'a priori' arguments for the existence of God (ST Ia Q.2, A.1), most notably among them his account of Anselm's argument. The difference is usually accounted for by his shift from an Augustinian to an Aristotelian epistemology. This paper is a critical philosophical discussion of his rejection of these a priori arguments. Both in his main reply to the a priori arguments, and in his reply to the third a priori argument, he distinguishes between what is knowable, and what is knowable for us. But especially in his reply to the third a priori argument – the argument from truth as arguably found in Bonaventure, but dating back to Augustine – this is arguably problematic. That argument states that God's existence is self-evident, since God is truth and any denial of truth implies a contradiction. Aquinas replies to this by stating that the existence of truth in general is self-evident, but not the existence of a first truth. But the transcendent nature of truth implies a transcendental

dimension of the argument on which it explicitly relies, that is not taken into account in Aquinas's answer. Both the argument and Aquinas's answer shift to a meta-level to discuss truth itself, but the argument relies on the transcendental dynamic at work in such a shift since the transcendence of truth implies that it applies across all language levels, and derives a substantial conclusion from that. Aquinas rejects this by claiming that "non est per se notum quoad nos" that there is a first truth. However, this claim instantiates a meta-level from which a property of truth is discussed which can either be warranted or rejected, implying the knowability of the truth claims made on this meta-level. Any further discussions would only instantiate further meta-levels, or eventually have to accept a first truth as that truth 'higher than which nothing can be thought'. Although Anselm starts from goodness in chapter one of his *Monologion*, in chapter 18 he clearly recognizes this transcendental dynamic of truth, which he also takes up again in *De Veritate*. Hence, the 'argument from truth' as developed above arguably forms part and parcel of the 'unum argumentum' as he presents it in chapter 2 of his *Proslogion*. Moreover, it would give a stronger reading to the version of the argument in chapter 3, reading it along the lines of the argument from truth. Given that interpretation of Anselm's argument, the same transcendental dynamic can be applied to Aquinas's main reply on the unknowability of God *for us*, as well as his proper reply to Anselm's argument.

Parker Haratine: *On Nothing: A Paradox of Denoting from Augustine to Anselm*

This paper explores how Augustine, Fredegisus of Tours, and Anselm respectively deal with the issue of what it means to intelligibly talk about 'nothing'. Each of these thinkers loosely hold to the Boethian position that every noun signifies something and has a proper signification. With few exceptions, such as the words that are reflexive (e.g. the word, 'word') or indexical **(e.g. the word, 'this'), every word rigidly signifies something that is not itself**. Adherence to this thesis results in a conundrum when talking about 'nothing', for what does this word denote? I explore each of these thinker's approaches. Augustine, for his part, silently sets the issue aside in his early treatise *De Magistro* 2 (Cf. G.R. Evans, *Augustine on Evil*, 174-5). Fredegisus, for his part, takes the theory to its logical conclusion: that nothing is something. While perhaps sophistical, his theory lends itself to a theology of creation (Cf. Nathan J. Jun). This would lend insight to an understanding of nothing implicit in Augustine, where all created objects are made of nothing and so 'tend toward nothing', which is in one part an explanation for how things fall away from the good (Cf. John Rist, 1994; ch. 5). Anselm of Canterbury offers the most robust approach of the three thinkers. He verbally maintains three noteworthy theses. First, words can signify by deleting (*destruendo*), such as '*non-aliquid*' or 'no-thing.' Second, he maintains that words can be used improperly and properly: a word is used improperly when used not according to common usage and its God-given purpose, where a word is used properly if it is used according to these. Third, Anselm maintains that when words such as 'nothing' and 'evil' are used properly, they do not signify something in reality, but something according to the form of the expression. Anselm uses this point to conclude that we cannot prove the existence of something simply because there is a word for it. But what it means for a word to signify not in reality but according to its expression is not immediately clear. I explore two ways to understand this claim: first, that we should understand this in terms of the distinction of existing *in intellectu* and *in re* that Anselm deploys elsewhere **(**Cf. Visser and Williams, *Anselm*). Given some difficulties with this first option, I turn to the second option, that Anselm has radically (though not fully) left behind the Boethian theory of signification. On this reading, signification according to expression just is a way in which a word is used improperly, that brings something to the understanding (Cf. Thomas Williams, "Anselm on Evil," 126). If this is the case, for Anselm, not all words have significations in the traditional sense of denoting an object existing in reality or extra-mentally. I conclude by discussing the merits of Anselm's developments and position.

Laura Busetto: *I limiti della dialettica nel Periphyseon di Giovanni Scoto Eriugena*

Le radici della filosofia occidentale medievale sono legate alla rinascita carolingia, un periodo di effervescenza culturale germogliata attraverso la trasmissione di testi e insegnamenti di missionari e maestri anglosassoni che conservarono la cultura latina e la riportarono in Francia. In questo contesto si inserisce la speculazione di Giovanni Scoto Eriugena. La sintesi delle sue dottrine è contenuta nel Periphyseon, il più importante scritto sistematico dell'alto medioevo, in cui convergono i risultati dell'intero sistema speculativo eriugeniano: un progetto complesso e ambizioso che mira a ricondurre la totalità della natura in una prospettiva unitaria. Se la prima divisione della natura si fonda sulla differenza tra id *quae sunt* e id *quae non sunt*, immediata per l'intelletto ma oscura; la seconda divisione, quella delle quattro nature, si articola attraverso la differenza posta dal verbo 'creare' e permette alla ragione di collegare per analogia la prima natura a Dio creatore, la seconda alle cause primordiali, la terza alla creazione come determinata nello Spazio e nel Tempo, e infine la quarta a Dio come eschaton. Se da un lato le radici del pensiero dialettico eriugeniano sono salde nelle sue fonti, sia greche che latine, la sua trattazione della dialettica costituisce le basi per una speculazione che segni i limiti dell'intelletto senza abbandonare la ragione all'estasi mistica o ridursi ad un mero nichilismo. Alla dialettica, che opera sui concetti di genere e specie, pertiene la conoscenza categoriale, che Eriugena espone nel primo libro del *Periphyseon.* Per quale motivo le categorie possono essere applicate a Dio solo metaforicamente ? Il percorso che Alumnus e Nutritor – i protagonisti del *Periphyseon* – intraprendono è quello della conoscenza. La scientia funge da mappa del cammino che poggia sulla grazia di Dio, l'uomo è quindi viator in un percorso di contemplazione che parte dal sensibile in cui si rivela la divinità. Tutto ciò che l'uomo comprende non è altro che apparenza dell'inapparente. La dialettica si concentra sull' οὐσία come principio da cui deriva ogni suddivisione. L'intelletto discende dai generi alle specie diaireticamente e ritorna al suo principio per analisi : una volta scalate le teofanie di Dio nel mondo, ruota con movimento intelligibile intorno all'essenza ultima senza però poterla afferrare. La via della diaireis e dell'analisi non è più efficace. A questo punto del percorso conoscitivo è la retorica che prende il posto della dialettica tentando di rendere visibile ciò che è intelligibile.

Salle / Room 3.05

***Aula 5:Radical Debates within* Principia**

Special Session proposed by Monica Brinzei
Sponsor: Project ERC-DEBATE, n° 771589
Chair: William Duba

Alexandra Anisie: *The Debate on the Beatific Cognition of God in Some Fourteenth-Century* Principia

This paper explores the debate on the beatific cognition of God in the Principia of two theologians who read the Sentences in Paris during the years 1359-1360: Johannes Regis and Iacobus de Altavilla. Specifically, it focuses of their views regarding the question of whether the beatific vision requires, or is compatible with, a representation of the divine essence, either in the form of a species or of a mental word. For some thinkers, positing a concept or species in the beatific vision was also a way of accounting for the role played by the light of glory, especially after the Clementine constitution (promulgated in 1317), which denounced as heretical any views maintain that the human intellect can attain the beatific vision without the light of glory. For Thomas Aquinas, the light of glory is a supernatural but created habit by means of which God elevates the human intellect, making it capable of a direct knowledge of the divine essence. However, other thinkers interpret it in different ways, including as a kind of representation of the divine essence. In 1336, the constitution Benedictus Deus described the beatific cognition of God as "an intuitive and even

facial vision, without the mediation of any created thing that behaves as an object", in which the divine essence is seen "plainly, clearly and openly". As C. Trottmann suggests, these words could be interpreted as a rejection of mediating species in the beatific vision. However, this constitution did not settle the matter of representations in the beatific vision. As W. Duba has shown, the debate on mediating species in the beatific vision and on the role of the light of glory was still alive in 16th century, and, moreover, there were still thinkers who interpreted the light of glory as a mediating species. This paper intends to add another piece to the history of that debate by looking at the its development shortly after the constitution Benedictus Deus.

Andrei Marinca: *The Structure and Content of Franciscus de Bacona's Principial Lectures at the University of Paris (1364-1365)*

My paper is an exploration of Franciscus de Bacona's principial lectures which he held at the University of Paris in 1364-1365. This *principia* have been preserved in two witnesses: ms. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, 15374 (P) and ms. Roma, Archivum Ordinis Carmelitarum, II, pers. 4 (R), but have not received a critical edition. My aim is to describe Franciscus's debates with his fellow socii, a Cistercian, an Augustinian, and two Dominicans (Nicolaus de Sancto Saturnino, and Hugo de Monteforti), as found in his *principia*.

Wojciech Baran: *The Certainty of Theological Statements and the Value of Philosophy in the* Principium *to the First Book of Lombard's* Sentences *of Benedict Hesse of Cracow*

The Cracow Academy founded in 1364 – the easternmost European medieval university – experienced in the 15th century its golden age. One of its most prominent scholars of this time was Benedict Hesse (1389-1456), who left numerous philosophical and theological commentaries used for the following years as academic textbooks in Cracow. It is extremely interesting to read his *Principium* to the first book of Lombard's *Sentences* which rests unknown to a wider circle of researchers and is preserved in Cracow in the Jagiellonian Library in the manuscripts no 1518 and no 1538. In his *Principium*, Cracow theologian deals with the problem of a surety of theological statements and the value of philosophy in general. I would like to present this unedited text in my lecture during the Congress of SIEPM in August 2022 in Paris. A superficial reading of only the first article of Hesse's *Principium* indicates that the author reworked the *Principium* of Conrad of Ebrach, and this fact is marked in the *Catalog of Manuscripts of the Jagiellonian Library*. Nevertheless, attentive reading of the entire text shows that the next three articles present solutions independent of Konrad's text, in which Thomas Aquinas is the main point of reference for Hesse. It is revealing, because Hesse, like his colleagues of the Cracow Academy, in his philosophy presented nominalist views in the spirit of John Buridan. This fact is known, for example, in his commentary on the *Physics* of Aristotle. In this context, Hesse's *Principium* appears as his creative text, in which the theologian from Cracow returns radically to the thought of Aquinas and faces the questions of his time. Hesse's *Principium* sheds new light on the thought of its author and prompts the continuation of research on his texts waiting to be discovered.

Salle / Room 3.06

***Aula 6:Reflecting on the* De anima**

Ordinary Session

Chair: Katja Krause

Simon Monteillet: *Aux origines de* substantia*, une analyse du* De anima *de Tertullien*

S'il est fort probable que le terme *subtantia* a été un mot d'usage courant avant de devenir un concept philosophique à part entière comme fut notamment le cas d'*hupostasis* en Grec, il n'est pas moins certain que ses premiers vestiges sont à situer chez un philosophe, Sénèque en l'occurrence, chez qui on peut le recenser six fois. Cependant, si *substantia* apparaît chez le philosophe de Cordoue dans une conceptualité stoïcienne pour référer au fond corporel sur lequel repose toute chose, à l'assise matérielle qui procure stabilité et solidité, c'est chez l'africain Tertullien que ce terme se répand comme une trainée de poudre et envahit l'entièreté de son œuvre, faisant dire à Jérôme Alexandre que : « la place de ce concept tout au long de l'œuvre est considérable ». Circonscrivant notre étude au *De anima*, nous essaierons de comprendre le sens donné à ce vocable par le carthaginois. Est-ce seulement le sens stoïcien qu'il faut entendre ou est-ce à un sens autre auquel on est confronté ? L'invisibilité et l'éternité attribuées à la substance ne font-elles pas que cette dernière excède le sens proprement stoïcien pour y imprimer une nouvelle appréhension ? En quoi Tertullien est-il redevable du stoïcisme ? C'est à ces quelques questions que l'on s'emploiera à apporter un éclairage par une analyse minutieuse des usages de *substantia,* terme fondamental – s'il en est – de la métaphysique médiévale et moderne.

[If it is very likely that the term *subtantia* was a word in common use before becoming a philosophical concept, as was notably the case of *hupostasis* in Greek, it is no less certain that its first vestiges are to be found in a philosopher, Seneca in this case, in whom it can be found six times... However, if *substantia* appears in the philosopher of Cordoba in a Stoic conceptuality to refer to the bodily bottom on which rests all thing, to the material base which gets stability and solidity, it is with the African Tertullian that this term spread like wildfire and invades the entirety of his work, making Jerome Alexandre say that: "The place of this concept throughout his work is considerable". Circumscribing our study to *De anima*, we will try to understand the meaning given to this term by the Carthaginian. Is it only the Stoic sense that we must understand or is it another sense that we are confronted with? Don't the invisibility and the eternity attributed to the substance make that this last one exceeds the properly Stoic sense to print a new apprehension there? In what way is Tertullian indebted to Stoicism? It is to these few questions that we will try to shed some light through a meticulous analysis of the uses of substantia, a fundamental term - if there is one - of medieval and modern metaphysics.]

Antonio Madalena Gedz: *A Buddhist Look at the Experiment of Man Suspended in Space, with Contributions from Theories of Complexity*

The experiment of the man suspended in space is marked by a diverse and varied reception over time, by the so-recognized estrangement in the face of this, perhaps artifice, to show or demonstrate. — quite different things, by the way — the priority of the soul over the body. In the history of reception, for us moderns, a stone in the path, as an indication of a path or of astray, has been an apparent proximity or similarity with what Descartes engendered to reach some certainty, one at least. Our proposal is to examine the experiment from a Buddhist perspective. And in addition, to do some references to complexity theories, in order to reaffirm some properties found in the experiment. There is, of course, an initial difficulty. Avicenna works with the concept of the soul. More than that, the experiment aims to show the priority of that over the body. Our thesis is that overcoming conceptual differences, the Buddhist framework endorses the experiment as an

accessible experience and more than that, a practical experience in Buddhist meditation. According to Buddhism the body is a secondary formation, the five skandas. At the same time, the body is fundamental to the Buddhist practice of meditation. Meditation brings the meditator into a sense of self, through the body, beyond the body. At the same time, the very idea of mind in Buddhism leads us to a wide range of reflections. According to complexity theories, top down and bottom up processes occur simultaneously, manifesting the order of the real as we know it. One of the necessary elements to approach this approximation is precisely to undo the analysis based on Descartes, who has an epistemological intention. In fact, the Cartesian maneuver, of matrix, as we said, epistemological, generated and bequeathed us a schizophrenic cleavage between mind and body, I and world/other. Nothing could be more distant, both from the Buddhist vision, and from the very conception of reality within which Avicenna moved. So, in a radical way, this Buddhist look, with touches of complexity theory, intends to help us to see Avicenna's radicalism. And like everything that is well rooted, an experiment that dialogues very well both with Buddhism, and also or mainly with modern theories of complexity.

André Martin: *Active Intellection Regardless of an Agent Intellect in Thirteenth to Fourteenth-Century Latin Medieval Philosophy*

In *De anima* III.5, following Aristotle's cryptic discussion (in III.4) of thought (*nous)* or intellect which is what it is by "becoming" or "receiving" all things, sometimes thinking and sometimes not thinking, Aristotle raises the equally cryptic discussion of thought or intellect which, in contrast, is always active and makes all things intelligible, "and without this nothing thinks". The former intellect (of III.4) has come, following the proceeding tradition, to be referred to as the "potential", "passive", or "material" intellect, and the latter (of III.5) as the "active" or "agent" intellect. Moreover, by extension, Averroes, in his commentary on Aristotle's *De anima,* also describes a so-called "agent sense" (*sensus agens)*, which is said to perform an active role in sensation, on analogy to Aristotle's "agent intellect" for thinking; this agent sense is said to enable sensation, in contrast with any passive sense, which merely receives sensation. When I tell other historians that I work on Latin medieval debates concerning the activity/passivity of cognition, starting in the 13th century, I am often met with the assumption that the chief concern, for all parties involved, is over the existence/nature of such Aristotelian agent powers (the agent intellect for intellectual cognition, the agent sense for sensitive cognition); that is, it is assumed that the relevant sort of "activity" in cognition at issue would be granted by some role in cognition from one of these Aristotelian "agent" powers. This assumption is understandable, nominally, and given the known influence of Aristotle on much of Latin medieval philosophy, starting in the 13th century. However, the aim of this paper is to explain the, perhaps surprising, truth, that for many medieval figures of interest, the activity of cognition is not universally answered by admitting such Aristotelian "agents", at least as they were commonly understood at the time. As way of evidence, I'll present three cases: first, Godfrey of Fontaines, who grants, at least, an agent intellect, but still endorses a clearly "passive" view of intellectual cognition; second, Peter John Olivi, who endorses an active view of cognition but explicitly argues against (at least the sufficiency of) such Aristotelian "irradiating" agents; third, Durand of St. Pourçain, who argues similarly to Olivi, but more precisely against the necessity of positing such Aristotelian agents, at least if they are meant to be truly distinct from any corresponding passive principles of cognition. Finally, I'll end by addressing whether this marks a "radical" anti-Aristotelianism in these thinkers or simply a natural shift in the discussion.

Salle / Room 3.07

Aula 7:Byzantine Philosophy

Ordinary Session

Chair: Michele Trizio

Dmitry Biriukov: *Porphyry's Teaching on Unity and Divisibility within the Genus-Species Hierarchy in Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Palamas*

I will consider how an important argument of Porphyry's Isagoge worked in doctrines of Byzantine thinkers: in Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Palamas. According to this argument, the movement along the genera/species hierarchy towards the more particular is associated with the concept of division, while the movement towards the more general is associated with the concept of unity. Porphyry stated that the individual relates to divisibility and is "participating", while the general is being "participated in" and relates to unity. I argue that Gregory of Nyssa picked up Porphyry's argument. In this regard, while dealing with the topic of the indivisible monad, he used the discourse of the divisible and participating hypostases and the united and indivisible substance, which the hypostases participate in. Gregory Palamas used the Porphyrian discourse as well. He did it when he maintained the non-participibility of the divine essence and the distinction between substance and energies in the Divinity. I suggest he borrowed this discourse from Gregory of Nyssa. At the same time, Palamas transformed it crucially for his aims, so that for him it is the "participated in" is that which is divisible (what contradicts Porphyry's and Gregory of Nyssa's position). Indeed, for Palamas, the divine substance is indivisible, while the energies of this substance are divisible and participated in.

John Demetracopoulos: *Picking up the Philosophical Gauntlet: Plethon on Rationally Justifying True Theology in Laws, Bk. I, ch. 2 and its Sources*

Some time in the first half of the 15th c., George Gemistos or Plethon (c. 1360 – 1452 or 1454) completed his Laws, which is considered no less than a pagan Gospel. In Bk. I, ch. 2, which forms part of the programmatic section, he deals with the pagan and Christian versions of a certain form of pervertly revering the divine, declared by certain religious men to be beyond rational scrutiny and thereby accessible solely through one's "tradition", which allegedly one ought not challenge in any way (τὰ καθεστῶτα κινεῖν). According to Plethon, who elaborates on the theologia tripertita as described by Plutarch of Chaeronea, "tradition" can mislead, since it is mostly expressed by "poets", whom Plethon ranks much lower than the (wise) legislators and the (true) philosophers. Meticulous examination of Plethon's arguments and diction shows that one of his main sources was Plutarch's Amatorius and its Sceptically-coloured fideistic reception by Gregory of Nyssa in the De anima et resurrectione. Nevertheless, Plethon's radical rejection of "traditions" paves the way for the tradition, namely the perennial, uninterrupted conception and application of truth, ideally expressed in a golden chain of pre-Greek and Greek legislators, sages and philosophers, whom he considered both as auctoritates and apices of rational thought.

Salle / Room 3.08

Aula 8:Radical Astrology and Alchemy

Ordinary Session

Chair: Maria Sorokina

Elisa Rubino: *Geomancy and Radical Thinking*

The purpose of geomancy is to predict future events that touch upon many areas of human life. The geomantic method focuses on the observation and analysis of a wide array of elements (i.e. figures such as Mothers, Daughters, Nephews, but also houses and zodiac signs, astral influences, complexion of the planets, and so on), which are made knowledgeable by casting points on the sand or on a piece of paper and then interpreting them. Such interpretation is never accidental but is rather based on a series of "rules" that the geomancer must know and strictly apply. In this sense, predicting the future does not seem to have anything to do with magical practices that aim to influence reality, but rather with the interpretation of reality within specific rational limits, even if these limits are not always well accepted. In fact, some thirteenth-century geomantic texts are hardly condemned, because they are seen as an attempt to overcome the limits of human knowledge. William of Moerbeke's *Geomantia*, which has circulated also in the vernacular and has been the only medieval geomantic treatise published so far, shows, although with some limits, to be greatly indebted to the principles of natural reason and to a rigor that make geomancy a radical and uncompromised knowledge.

Sophie Serra: *Une histoire de racines. Le* Tractatus reprobationis *contre Nicole Oresme de Johannes de Fundis*

Parmi les manuscrits copiés entre 1455 et 1494 par Arnaud de Bruxelles et qui, conservés à la Bibliothèque nationale de France, constituent aujourd'hui un fonds précieux pour l'étude de l'astronomie et l'astrologie médiévale, le manuscrit BnF, lat. 10271 retient particulièrement l'attention. En effet, il comprend un « *Tractatus reprobationis eorum que scripsit Nicolaus Orrem in suo libello intitulato De proportionabilitate motuum celestium contra astrologos et sacram astrorum scientam, compilatus per Johanne Lauratium de Fundis* » qui, sur près de cents folios, présente la restitution des arguments de Nicole Oresme issus de plusieurs de ses ouvrages contre l'astrologie judiciaire, et la réponse à ceux-ci par un astronome, astrologue et médecin bolonais du XV^{ème} siècle, Johannes de Fundis. Si ce texte a été mentionné par E. Poulle et L. Thorndike, il n'a pas encore fait l'objet d'édition ou d'étude précise. Pourtant, ce traité composé en 1451 – soit près de cent ans après la rédaction par Oresme des nombreux ouvrages au sein desquels il a bâti ses critiques du bien-fondé des prédictions astrologiques, mérite notre considération et s'inscrit dans la thématique de « la pensée radicale » à plusieurs égards. L'intérêt de ce texte est tout d'abord historique. En effet, il constitue un témoin précieux de la réception de la pensée oresmienne et de la survivance de celle-ci, au point qu'elle ait inspiré à Johannes un traité dédié. À cet égard, il s'agit de lire dans ce *Tractatus reprobationis* un essai d'affirmation du bien-fondé de l'astrologie, dont les praticiens ne craignent pas de remonter le temps pour affronter leurs adversaires déclarés et, peut-être, les contemporains qui en font les racines de leurs propres arguments. Le traité de Johannes se distingue également par son ton : il présente une défense de l'astrologie tout aussi enflammée et convaincue que la critique l'était sous la plume de Nicole Oresme dans sa *Questio contra divinatores horoscopios*, son *Tractatus de commensurabilitate vel incommensurabilitate motuum celi*, son *Ad pauca respicientes*, son *Tractatus de proportionibus proportionum*, son *Tractatus contra judiciarios astronomos*, son *Livre de divinacions* et ses *Problemata*. La confrontation entre Johannes et Nicole est donc véritablement mise en scène comme une bataille d'idées radicale, entre celui qui se présente comme un maître universitaire mais également un praticien chevronné de l'astronomie, et son adversaire qui, s'il fut un « expert en philosophie naturelle et spéculative, et même un excellent calculateur et géomètre », n'en était pas

moins « étranger à l'art ». Enfin, un troisième aspect, plus conceptuel et que j'ambitionne de pouvoir présenter plus en détail d'ici Août et le congrès de la SIEPM, concerne le positionnement de Johannes au sujet l'un des enjeux classiques du déterminisme astral : la nativité et la contrainte qu'exerce l'horoscope radical (autrement dit, le ciel de naissance) de l'individu dont on entend prédire les heurs et malheurs. Johannes lutte en effet, dans le *Tractatus* comme dans sa prédiction pour l'année 1435 mentionnée par L. Thorndike, pour reconnaître aux princes une force morale assez grande pour résister aux influences astrales. Présenter au congrès de la SIEPM ce texte, que j'entends étudier dans les mois à venir, me permettrait donc d'aborder des questions conceptuelles mais aussi de transmission des textes, de délimitations des savoirs et de conscience historique des auteurs qui se sont disputé le territoire de la science astrale à la fin du Moyen Âge.

Antoine Calvet: *L'Alchimie, image ou contre-image d'une pensée radicale*

Au XIIIe siècle, la bonne alchimie se définit elle-même comme radicale, comme un retour à la racine des métaux pour obtenir, après de multiples opérations, le métal parfait, l'or. Cette bonne alchimie s'oppose aux expérimentations d'une mauvaise alchimie fondée sur une théorie erronée aux pratiques douteuses, si ce n'est carrément démoniaques. Un tel clivage entre vraie et fausse alchimie déborde du cadre scientifique et se retrouve dans la littérature, illustrant deux formes de vie réformée, la première bonne, la seconde frelatée, marquée par l'erreur et l'errance. Après avoir, dans un premier temps, rappelé ce que transmettent les textes alchimiques sur le sujet, l'importance du pseudo-Avicenne et du pseudo-Geber, autrement dit Paul de Tarente, et la constitution en Europe d'un corpus de textes véhiculant ces idées, comme ceux du pseudo-Lulle et du pseudo-Arnaud de Villeneuve, de Jean de Roquetaillade, nous proposons de regarder dans les œuvres littéraires françaises et anglaise, comment cette querelle entre les bons et les mauvais alchimistes a été employée par les auteurs pour porter leur propre message. Notre étude partira du premier écrivain à parler d'alchimie en français, Jean de Meun, jusqu'à aborder d'autres œuvres comme celles de Richard de Fournival, de Philippe de Mézières, celles aussi de Christine de Pizan, de Pierre Chastellain, de René d'Anjou et de Chaucer.

Salle / Room 3.09

***Aula 9:*Aristoteles Latinus**

Special Session proposed by Lisa Devriese
Sponsor: Aristoteles Latinus, KU Leuven
Chair: Clelia Crialisi

Lisa Devriese: *On the Fringes of the* Corpus Aristotelicum. *Berthaud of Saint-Denis, an Unknown Aristotle Commentator*

The presentation will focus on the philosophical output of Berthaud of Saint-Denis (d. 1307), a theology master at the University of Paris and bishop of Orléans. He became involved in several theological disputes with his contemporaries, and was until recently only known for his theological sermons and quodlibeta. Recently, a new medieval commentary on the pseudo-Aristotelian *De coloribus* was discovered – and moreover, this is the only known medieval commentary on this natural philosophical treatise – which can, according to the colophon, be attributed to Berthaud of Saint-Denis. In addition, based on the same writing style, the only known medieval commentary on the Aristotelian *De progressu animalium* can be attributed to him as well. Why would a theologian comment on two texts that are situated on the fringes of the Aristotelian corpus and that are generally neglected by other commentators; what are his motives to embark on this project? This presentation will focus on these two unedited and not yet studied commentaries of Aristotelian treatises, in order to examine their (innovative – if any) content and importance for medieval thought, as well as try to answer the following questions: do Berthaud's interpretative strategies

reveal something on the goal of the commentaries? How close does the theologian stay to the foundations of the Latin Aristotelian text, or to what extent can the content be considered as ground-breaking? Finally, how to reconcile his explicit opinions in different theological debates with the unique project of writing two commentaries on hardly known Aristotelian treatises?

Nena Bobovnik: *The* Magna Moralia*'s Fate in the Latin West: Towards a Critical Edition*

The ethical treatise *Magna Moralia*, traditionally attributed to Aristotle, entered the Latin West as a latecomer within the process of the transferal of Aristotle's philosophy into its Latin scholastic counterpart. The Latin translation of this work was made by Bartholomew of Messina during his time at the court of King Manfred of Sicily (1258–1266). In the current times, 57 manuscripts containing his translation are extant. However, until now neither a critical edition of the Latin *Magna Moralia* has been made nor a close study of its reception history conducted. With this paper that stems from my PhD project at KU Leuven (*Aristoteles Latinus*), I aim at making the first steps towards the mending of this lacuna in modern scholarship. The paper has two principal points. Firstly, I will present the preliminary phase of my work on the critical edition. Secondly, however, I will provide the first results of my research on the incorporation of this treatise into the scholastic philosophy. The latter indubitably relies on the former: I will turn to the hitherto virtually unknown reception history of the *Magna Moralia* only upon presenting the evaluation of the manuscript tradition and explicating the *exemplar* and *peciae* system by which *Magna Moralia* circulated in the Latin West. In turn, my assessment of the reception history of the *Magna Moralia* will be grounded in the study of the marginal annotations in the manuscripts and the references to the *Magna Moralia* in medieval compendia and commentaries – which usually focused on the more popular *Ethica Nicomachea*. In this vein, I will put forward the views of some influential medieval philosophers. On the one hand, some perceived *Magna Moralia* to be nothing more than a recapitulation of Aristotle other ethical treatises (such as Giles of Rome), while other scholars admitted that it contains new ideas that are not to be found in the *Ethica Nicomachea* (e.g., Albert the Great). Tracing the integration of the *Magna Moralia* into the medieval philosophy, I will thus attempt to nuance the predominant view maintaining that the *Magna Moralia* only received scant attention due to its redundancy compared to the *Ethica Nicomachea* and *Liber de bona fortuna*, a widely disseminated ethical work that contains a part of the *Magna Moralia* and *Ethica Eudemia*. Corroborating my argument will be the fact that despite recent scholarly discussion which considers Aristotle's *Ethica Eudemia* as being presumably even more authentic than the *Ethica Nicomachea* (cf. Anthony Kenny 2016), the Middle Ages seem to have placed significantly more importance on the *Magna Moralia* than the *Ethica Eudemia*. The latter was first translated into Latin only in the 15th century. *Magna Moralia*, however, in the same century received four new translations.

Valérie Cordonier: *Qu'est-ce qu'une lecture radicale d'Aristote ? L'exemple de la réception du* Liber de bona fortuna *(1275-1575)*

Dans mes publications, j'ai utilisé le lexique de la « radicalité » pour décrire les faits suivants : (i) les conséquences nouvelles que Gilles de Rome (dans les années soixante-dix du 13e s. latin) a tirées de thèses thomasiennes portant sur les modalités du gouvernement divin et sur l'origine de l'inclination humaine vers le souverain bien dont il est question en *Eth. Nic.* 1094a 19-25 ; (ii) l'approche « strictement philosophique » d'Aristote que Gilles a explicitée, revendiquée à son compte et appliquée avec la plus extrême rigueur en analysant le *Liber de bona fortuna* ; (iii) la distinction que son collègue Henri de Gand, en débat avec lui à propos de cet opuscule aristotélicien, a proposée entre providence générale et spéciale ainsi qu'entre les deux modes d'effectuation du projet divin auxquels correspondent ces deux types distincts de providence ; (iv) une page dans laquelle Coluccio Salutati (à la fin du 14e s.), dans une prose à l'élégance toute « humaniste », défend à partir du *Liber* et de ses interprétations scolastiques une vue proche de celle

d'Henri de Gand (*De Fato et Fortuna*, III,3, éd. Bianca, 131, l. 71-132, l. 84). Dans cette contribution à un colloque entièrement consacré à l'idée de radicalité, je présenterai mes travaux plus récents sur la réception de ce traité aristotélicien singulier. En activant du terme « radical » un sens somme toute assez littéral, je proposerai essentiellement ces thèses : 1] au vu de notre connaissance actuelle de la réception du *Liber de bona fortuna* au XIV[e] s., le lecteur le plus radical de ce texte d'Aristote au cours de ce siècle est Nicole Oresme ; 2] si l'on compare, au XVI[e] s., les lectures à présent connues de ce traité, la plus radicale n'est pas celle de Pietro Pomponazzi (pourtant souvent décrit comme un « penseur radical ») ; 3] dans une communauté donnée de chercheurs, un lecteur –ou un penseur– radical n'est pas nécessairement celui qui crie plus fort que ses collègues.

Salle / Room 3.10

Aula 10: Radical Thinking in Albert the Great / I

Special Session proposed by Alessandra Beccarisi and Alessandro Palazzo
Chair: Alessandro Palazzo

The panel, coordinated by Alessandra Beccarisi and Alessandro Palazzo and articulated into two sessions, aims at analyzing different aspects of Albert the Great's philosophy as a significant example of medieval radical thought. The talks will cover crucial areas of Albert's intellectual enterprise, ranging from Biblical exegesis to psychology, from politics to the methodological distinction between philosophy and theology. Attention will also be paid on the legacy of Albert's philosophy (Henry of Herford). The panel is part of the scientific activities of a research group which is directed by Amos Bertolacci and includes several Italian universities (Scuola IMT Alti Studi Lucca, Università di Firenze, Università di Foggia, Università di Napoli L'Orientale, Università di Pisa, Università del Salento [Lecce], Università di Siena, Università di Trento).

Alessandra Beccarisi: *Neoplatonic Theories (Neoplatonism) in Albert the Great's Gospel of Matthew*

In 1964 Bernhard Geyer published the well-known article Albertus Magnus and Meister Eckhart. It was the first review of a widespread narrative that assumed a direct influence of Albertus Magnus on German speculative mysticism and in particular on Meister Eckhart, especially the work *De causis et processu universitatis*. Yet, a recent study has shown a certain distancing from Albert's metaphysics and epistemology and an apparent marginality of *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa* in Meister Eckhart's work. As the explicit and implicit sources show, Eckhart's preference was undoubtedly directed toward a work of Albert's that is still one of the least appreciated, namely the *Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew*. Based on this remark, the aim of this paper is to show Albert's Neoplatonism in the commentary on the *Gospel of Matthew*, with specific regard to the relationship between philosophy and theology.

Paola Bernardini: *The Notion of* Forma Hominis *in Albert the Great's* De quindecim problematibus

In the 1260s-70s, the notion of *forma hominis* was at the centre of a lively debate concerning the redefinition of the status of the intellect and of its relation to the other faculties of the human soul and to the human body. This debate was sparked by the circulation of anthropological doctrines associated with the teaching of Aristotle and of the Greek and Arabic sources read in medieval universities. In Paris, it involved leading personalities such as Albert the Great, Siger of Brabant, and Thomas Aquinas, who critically redeveloped Aristotle's theories in the light of a different way of understanding the activity proper to human beings, *intelligere*, and hence the subject of intellection. Against this historical-conceptual background, the present contribution aims to explore the concept of *forma hominis* in Albert's *De quindecim problematibus*, written around 1270 (but

its dating remains controversial: Geyer 1975 dated it to before 1270, Van Steenberghen 1947 to 1273- 1276, but the debate is still open). The issues addressed in this work are closely related to the 13 articles that Tempier censored in Paris precisely in 1270: the notion of forma hominis is explicitly discussed in *problema* VII, which corresponds to art. 7 in the list of censored articles: "that the soul, which is the form of the human being as such, is corrupted when the body is corrupted" ("Quod anima, que est forma hominis secundum quod homo, corrumpitur corrupto corpore"). Albert's argument, which at first might seem designed to uphold the immortality of the human soul, actually condenses and links a range of doctrinal aspects which he had already examined elsewhere (chiefly in *Summa de homine*, *De unitate intellectus*, *De anima*, and *De natura et origine animae*). The main concepts at play are the notion of human intellect and the way of understanding its separability, the notion of human body and the characteristics of its corruptibility, the relations between the human soul's faculties and, finally, the notions of human species and human life. Against this background, throughout the problema, Albert proposes a radical redefinition of the notions of act and form, on the basis of philosophiae principia which he strongly affirms. What proves most interesting about *problema* VII is therefore the peculiar formulation in its title, as well as its argumentative structure. Through a careful investigation of both these aspects, the present contribution seeks to reassign the problem its rightful place within Albert's philosophy and in its historical-doctrinal context, by illustrating its connections with coeval and earlier philosophical- theological reflections.

Tommaso Ferro: Nostra intentio est omnes dictas partes facere Latinis intelligibiles*: Albert the Great and the Radicality of Making Aristotle's Politics Intelligible to the Latins*

The paper focuses on Albert's method and it wants to deepen Doctor Universalis' attempt to make Aristotle's *Politics* intelligible to the Latins. Indeed Albert's approach to *Politics* has involved a relevant revision and in some cases a drastic transformation of the original meaning of Aristotle's work. The Dominican Master had to rearrange the Aristotelian text, which is full of exempla and specific references to Aristotle's cultural, political and social context, in order to achieve the general purpose that he has set in his commentary on the *Physics*. Ultimately, the Doctor Universalis' commentary on *Politics* has established an extremely original connection between the Middle Ages and the Classical antiquity and it involved a real "actualization" of Aristotle's *Politics* to the social and cultural context of Albert. Moreover, this commentary has allowed the Doctor Universalis to reconsider completely the political and social reality of his time in a philosophical and secular perspective and it presented for the first time a comprehensive and innovative philosophical vision of the 13th century to modern scholars. In my paper the concepts of "radical" and "radicality" are considered in Albert the Great and in his commentary on *Politics* from two perspectives: The first one, from the point of view of the general purpose of the Doctor Universalis. Indeed any other consideration is subordinate to Albert's radical intention of making Aristotle intelligible to the Latins. In my paper I will analyze this question through a study whose aim is to understand "in what way" and "in what perspective" the ultimate goal presented by Albert in the commentary on the *Physics* is included in the specific context of the commentary on the *Politics*. This study could provide a new and innovative examination of the issue precisely because of the particularity of Albert's commentary among all other works of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*. Indeed in the *Politics* both the Philosopher and the Dominican Master proceed "colligendo et narrando" not giving *rationes* as they do in the other scientific works. This means that the Doctor Universalis had to establish a new method of investigation in this work, which is different from the method used in the previous works, in order to achieve the general purpose he had set in the *Physics*. The second one, from a methodological and hermeneutical point of view, because the achievement of the final aim presented in the *Physics* makes Albert's *Politics* anything but a work of simple literal commentary, as many scholars believe. Indeed the Commentary on *Politics* turns out to be an extremely original work from a philosophical point of view, precisely because the Doctor Universalis tries to establish some radical connections between his world and the world of Aristotle. In the commentary on the

Politics, in fact, the theoretical juxtaposition of different factual realities becomes an opportunity for the Dominican Master to study the whole social and political reality of the 13th century in a philosophical way. In order to explain this concept, I will try to analyze some of the most significant comparisons proposed by Albert in his work. This research is important to reflect on the "radicality" of Albert's method starting with some concrete and specific cases taken from the commentary on the Politics.

Salle / Room 3.11

Aula 11: Radical Logic I

Oridnary Session
Sponsor: Project Gramata and IUF-Paris
Chair: Véronique Decaix

Nathaniel Bulthuis: *Walter Burley on the Consequence: "If Some Proposition Is False, its Contradictory Is True"*

Many philosophers in the fourteenth century endorse what I call propositional actualism, the thesis that the bearers of truth and falsity are concrete inscriptions, utterances, or mental acts, the existence of which is both contingent and transient, insofar as propositions only exist presently as or as in a subject. Walter Burley (died c. 1344) argues that philosophers who maintain this position must deny the following consequence: if a proposition is false, then its contradictory is true. Burley argues that these actualists must reject this consequence because, as actualists, they must concede that it is possible that some false proposition p exists, but its contradictory not-p does not. As something that does not exist, however, not-p cannot be the subject of any alethic value, and so cannot be true. But surely that consequence, if any, is a good one, a claim that Burley argues is supported by both authority and reason. In contrast to his actualist interlocutors, then, Burley begins by noting that things can have a kind of existence distinct from their actual existence, namely, objective existence. Things exist objectively insofar as they exist as objects of the mind, whether sensed or intellected. These two forms of existence—actual and objective—are not mutually exclusive. My seeing the proposition displayed on the screen makes that proposition an object of my vision, such that it exists objectively in sense cognition. But it also exists subjectively or actually, independent of my seeing it. Even when some particular thing ceases to exist actually, however, Burley argues that it can still exist objectively in the mind, as an object of memory. For example, I can recollect that proposition on my computer screen which I deleted just moments ago. As a proposition, it signifies the world's being a certain way. Since the truth of a proposition consists in its signifying just as things are in reality, moreover, such a proposition is true just in case it signifies just as it is in reality, and false otherwise. Consequently, a proposition can be the bearer of alethic value even if it is not actual. Burley's interlocutors have a ready response to this. As an object of recollection, it is not the case that the recollected proposition is true, but rather that it was true. In reply, Burley argues that, in addition to the objective existence of particular things in memory, the mind, via a process of abstraction, can also conceive of what is common to the many particular objects of perception and recollection. This is as true of propositions as it is of anything else. This is especially clear, Burley argues, in the case of disputation, since "the opponent and respondent direct their intellects to those things common to all those spoken propositions about which they dispute." Beyond mere tokens, then, Burley argues that there exist, at least objectively, proposition types, whose existence isn't temporally marked or delimited. It is propositions of this sort, and their logical relations to one another, that secure the truth of the aforementioned consequence.

Marcus Paulo Rycembel Boeira: *Deontic Logic in the 13th and 14th Centuries: Normative Operators and Conditional Modalities Between William of Ockham and Roger Roseth*

The emergence in the 13th and 14th centuries of so-called the theory of properties of terms (*proprietates terminorum*) coincided with the development of the modal logic. Modal logic and its variants might be thought in a particular way. As is known, logicians at Oxford bequeathed many contributions to the analysis of later theological and philosophical issues. From the logic of terms by William of Ockham, the enlargement of modalities has been seen as a *modal logic approach* inside of powerful terministic logic of medieval scholasticism. Roger Roseth, in his "*Lectura super Sententias"* discusses the sovereignty of divine authority. He presents some principles corresponding to obligations and prohibitions relatives to the normative system arising from the *lex statuta Dei*. In the terministic era, the discussion of this theme is based around deontic modes, according not only to the logical operators enclosed inside the shape of applied modal logic but also to its variants, as epistemic and deontic ways. From this point of view, a primitive, but consistent, deontic logic was erected, among the Middle Ages philosophical questions. Roseth uses some deontic paradoxes of divine will to build a deontic model of solutions. But what exactly is this task of identifying normative logical operators on the medieval modal logic system? Roseth offers a alternative conception that pervades the horizon of human acts qualified on the determinations of divine law, as well as the modifications allowed in this normative system due to the divine will. In attention to doctrine of salvation, acts and abstentions are postulated as logical subject. Any deontic expression as permission, obligation or prohibition must be regarded as a predicative term, which are most commonly used in this modal logic way. There are two conditions to deontic validity of the *lex statuta Dei*, as follows: (i) the norms established by the divine will may suffer, due to the contingent character of its objects, transformations, thus modifying the content and recipient of these same determinations; and (ii) human acts themselves are expressed as logical propositions of each singular action and abstention in conformity with divine determinations, and they receive their own modalities by virtue of the epistemic, aletic and deontic conditions. In modal semantics, a set of possible worlds is introduced. In that case, possible worlds semantic corresponding to deontic operators also around the rules of implication - *consequentiae* - and the semantic paradoxes, in front of the contingency of obligations and prohibitions. John Buridan, in his "*Tractatus de Consequentiis"*, rejects some operators into the scope of modal logic. Buridan understands that there is no valid syllogism in certain sentences composed with epistemic and deontic modalities. Therefore, it is debated whether an obligation or prohibition evokes semantic worlds independently of an epistemic logic. Roseth, in its turn, presents a standard of modal logic in which previous deontic operators as inferential patterns of theological and logical dilemmas befitting with divine power. The most important consequence of this deontic logic was that it introduced into theological issues normative patterns of problem solutions.

Roberta Miquelanti: *Les cas* supernaturalis *et la nécessité chez Buridan*

Dans son œuvre logique, Buridan utilise souvent les arguments *per casus possibilem* comme stratégie pour penser des situations différentes de celles du monde actuel, testant l´ampleur et les limites des notions sémantiques. Dans cette communication, nous visons à analyser comment l´usage d´arguments de *casus supernaturalis* est fait dans les textes métaphysiques et de philosophie naturelle. Dans ces textes, ces arguments sont fréquement utilisés avec le but d'extraire des conséquences épistémologiques, pour tester les différents degrés de preuve de la connaissance humaine. Mais ils apparaissent aussi dans le contexte du traitement des changements qui se produisent en raison de l'action divine, ou du miracle. Selon cet usage, ils permettent d'établir différents niveaux ou degrés de nécessité : un degré fort de nécessité, appelé nécessité *simpliciter* ou absolue, et un degré de nécessité moins forte, ou la nécessité *secundum quid* ou naturelle, considérant le postulat du cours normal de la nature. La limite du pouvoir divin sur l'ordre créé est donnée par la notion de

possibilité logique absolue ou par le principe de non-contradiction, c'est-à-dire selon lequel tout ce qui n'implique pas de contradiction est possible. Mais Buridan admet aussi que tout, sauf Dieu, pourrait être différent de ce qu'il est actuellement, puisque toutes les choses étant contingentes, elles ne pourraient tout simplement pas exister. Mais nous nous demandons si, dans un sens plus fort, les choses pourraient être différentes de ce qu'elles sont, comme par exemples si le feu pouvait être froid. Ainsi, notre objectif est d´établir dans un cadre théorique les différentes utilisations des *casus supernaturalis,* principalement les cas discutés dans les *Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis,* en montrant leurs relations et leurs limites par rapport aux differents types de causalité, notamment par rapport à la causalité divine.

19h00: ***Opening Garden Cocktails: Condorcet, Jardin du Bâtiment Nord***

Mardi/Tuesday 23-08-2022

9h00-10h30: Sessions ordinaires et spéciales/ Ordinary and Special Sessions

Salle / Room 50

Aula 1:Topics in Quodlibetal Debates at the Late Medieval Faculties of Arts

Special Session proposed by Ota Pavlíček
Sponsor: project ERC Academia, no. 949710
Chair: Aurora Panzica

Do You Have Some Problems? Arts Quodlibetal *problemata* in Light of New Evidence
Does anyone have some solved problems? This question relates to the *problemata* genre, which stemmed from the under-researched quodlibetal debates that flourished at the Faculties of Arts in the late middle ages and early modernity. According to the current state of research, during these debates, the masters solved a *quaestio* and a *problema*. However, until today, the only source we had concerning the *problemata* were their titles, i.e. questions beginning with the word „quare". This paper introduces the *problemata* genre and examines the quodlibetal *problemata* based on new evidence, including newly discovered responses to several Arts quodlibetal *problemata*. It reveals the significance of the quodlibetal *problemata* to the history of medieval philosophy.

Ota Pavlíček: *Places of Philosophical Knowledge: The Cartography of Quodlibetal Debates at Faculties of Arts*

Quodlibetal debates at Faculties of Arts interconnected Europe in the Late Middle Ages and Early Modern period. Since thousands of university masters participated in these disputations and periodically prepared treatises on topics covering most of the curriculum of European universities, the materials stemming from this tradition may provide precious information about our scholarly past and present. The Arts quodlibets are, however, a neglected and understudied genre. In this paper, in an effort to make one of the first steps to fill this gap, I will describe the cartography of these debates and argue that Arts quodlibets were similar to the scholarly congresses and conferences of our time.

Barbora Kocánová: *Debatable Nature of Comets: The Diversity of Opinions Presented at Quodlibetal Disputations in Prague*

The Arts quodlibets mirrored the interests of medieval universities and provided a significant space for polemics concerning scientific and political issues of the time. One such issue, the subject of this paper, was the nature of comets. As will be shown, Aristotle's idea of the sublunar origin of comets was generally accepted in the Latin Middle Ages; however, as the Prague quodlibets show, comets were still a matter of debate. This paper will discuss the public presentation and discussion of opposing viewpoints on comets during the Prague quodlibets (whether they concern their origin, movement and duration, or they regard comets as signs of the future) to illustrate the astonishing diversity of ideas related to this natural phenomenon.

Lukáš Lička: *Optical Roots, Astronomical Fruits: Geometrical Optics and Astronomical Observations in Late Medieval Disputations in Paris and Leipzig*

Are the celestial bodies truly in the places where they are observed to be? Medieval responses to this question advocated two phenomena rooted in geometrical optics: parallax and atmospheric refraction. The paper traces the articulations of these problems in the general texts on optics and

spherical astronomy and the elaborations in the commentaries on these textbooks and especially in the framework of disputations at the faculties of arts. Investigating the transmission of the issue from Paris to Central Europe, the paper focuses on two late medieval disputed questions: Nicole Oresme's *De visione stellarum* disputed in Paris in the 1340s and Nicole Smylow of Hamburg's *positio* from a 1440s Leipzig quodlibet.

Salle / Room 3.01

Aula 2: Political Radicality II

Ordinary Session
Chair: Mihai Maga

Tuomp-Paavo Salokas: *John of Salisbury as a Radical Synthesizer and as a Creator of Politics*

If we think John of Salisbury's (c. 1115—1180) political thought in the light of the word 'radical', we may well say, at least for etymological reasons, that he was a radical forerunner, for he returned to the roots of the definition of politics, i.e. *ad radices politicae*. Yet, I would argue that his thinking was also fundamentally striking in another sense. Namely, he is the second important writer in the history, alongside Cicero, who bases the whole system of his thinking on the quarrel between philosophers and rhetors. This historical quarrel, which started right at the beginning when the sciences in the Greek world were arranged, was one of the fundamental dividing lines of discussions, and for example Henri-Irenée Marrou in his *L'éducation dans l'Antiquité* gives it a fundamental role in the history of thought. The third reason why John's solutions were unique is that – partly because of this division into rhetoric and philosophy – he, as one of the founders of Western political thought in his *Policraticus* and *Metalogicon* and in his other works, defined and created the theory of politics greatly stressing the role of rhetoric and gaining material from it.

In his project for laying foundations for politics, he got the main part of his ideas from the rhetorical books of Marcus Tullius Cicero, whose attempt to unite the spheres of rhetoric and philosophy in his *De oratore*, and to a lesser degree in his earlier *De inventione*, was historically a notable one. John, following Cicero, states that the union of philosophy and rhetoric creates the science called *civilis ratio*, and makes the true *vita politica* possible. This synthesis was also a book historical coincidence, since John was one of the few persons who in this period of the so-called Twelfth Century Renaissance knew Cicero's *De oratore*. Moreover, he knew the commentaries written on *De inventione*, and he was personally educated in Cicero's rhetoric by his teachers in the region of Paris. Since the nature of politics became thus defined, it also impacted John's conceptions on the nature of philosophy and rhetoric in a unique way. First, he inherited through Cicero the Isocratic view on the link between rhetoric and virtue. Secondly, he clearly and strongly endorsed the philosophy of the Middle Academy, and in fact his interpretation of the ideal philosophy is also filled with the rhetorical underlining, for he confesses himself as a proponent of the Academic *in utramque partem* philosophy, which is the root for the liberty of speech in John's ideal society. In my presentation, I will argue that John's solution to construct the theory of politics and base it on rhetoric was a fundamentally radical solution, of which there are very few traces in Western thought. Hence, I will clarify to which extent we can find traces of rhetoric in his political theory.

Ricardo Strefling: *A radicalidade do pensamento político de Marsílio de Pádua*

Marsílio de Pádua, pertencia a família dos Mainardini, além de filósofo e ´médico, foi reitor da Universidade de Paris, entre 1312 e 1313. Nasceu por volta de 1280 em Pádua e faleceu em 1343 em Munique. Viveu num período de fortes conflitos entre os partidos gibelinos e guelfos e desde jovem envolveu-se com as questões políticas de seu tempo. Na disputa entre o Papa João XXII e o Imperador Ludovico IV da Baviera, Marsílio coloca-se ao lado do governante civil e escreve a obra *Defensor pacis*, que vem a ser publicada em 1324. Tal escrito apresenta uma forte crítica ao

papado e desenvolve uma teoria argumentativa a favor de uma sociedade política laica, enquanto autônoma da autoridade eclesiástica. Marsílio de Pádua embora tenha se utilizado das obras de Aristóteles para fundamentar sua filosofia politica, todavia é um cristão que está a tratar do *regnum* ou da *civitas* e em certa medida isso é diferente da *polis* grega. No inicio do século XIV encontramos autores, como Dante de Alighieri, João Quidort e Guilherme de Ockham, que foram partidários da separação entre o poder imperial e o poder religioso. Marsílio é o primeiro que se atreve a excluir o clero do poder político e a sustentar o fundamento somente racional do poder, se contrapondo à autoridade magisterial. Tem-se aqui a inversão dos poderes espiritual e temporal e a derrocada do primado do intelecto em relação à vontade. A ideia da soberania popular onde a lei tem sua causa eficiente na vontade popular nos permite identificar o filósofo patavino como uma das raízes das teorias do estado moderno. Este estudo pretende demonstrar em que sentido o consenso da vontade popular se sobrepõe radicalmente a tradição fundamentada na autoridade. Trataremos das raízes e consequências desta aporia enfrentada por Marsílio.

Rogerio R. Tostes: *The Problem of Conscience as a Radical Reform of Legal* vinculatio *in Francesc Eiximenis' Thought (s. XIV)*

The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to the analysis made by a 14th century Catalan Franciscan, the theologian Francesc Eiximenis; it regards his 'radical thinking' on the uses of subjective consciousness in linking canonical and secular norms. He proposed this analysis to rethink the spheres of moral competence on canonical *culpa* and civil delict. Eiximenis moves both topics from their usual spaces of interpretation to present with them the reconfiguration of the *res publica* through the central questioning of conscience and its way of submitting civil law itself to a more general level of bindings. Despite the post-Gratian canonical doctrine having consolidated the legal division between public crimes and subjective sin, some medieval philosophers like Eiximenis would begin to indicate a radical revision of this scheme. In his major work named *El Crestià* he proposed a hierarchy of bonds that mixed the punitive roles of the ecclesiastical and civil spheres following their common purpose: which was to manage the *omni homini* consciences, that is to keep individuals subjected to different spheres of existing legal systems. Always under the premise that human law is in line with the parameters of eternal law, Eiximenis declares that it is imperative to apply civil norms by examining «la intenció de la ley», to go beyond the legal technicality, forced mainly by the only understanding of Roman law. The search for a meaning of the law was already discussed by medieval lawyers for a long time. Still, now the *mens legis* is required by Eiximenis to meet the dictates of an intimate science of the subject, interpreted by him as the command of nature that corresponds to the precepts contained in the *libro cordis interioris* of the subject. Without wanting to expand, on the one hand, the Church's competence in the control of conscience, even though in recognition of its primordial role of repairing the serious scandals caused by human error, Eiximenis demands, on the other hand, that human laws dictated by the secular power only have validity if they are also linked to the internal forum: «si la ley és justa e feta per aquell qui la pot fer, e és feta per bé de la cosa pública, no solament obliga en for públich, hoc encara en for de consciència» (*Dotzè del Crestià*, CCII). Thus, the Catalan friar will argue that the validity of human law depends not only on a condition of non-contradiction with the principles of eternal law but also on its respect for the forum of conscience. This statement should give Eiximenis a place among the first authors who came to consider in a disruptive way that the positive law links human action in the internal forum, anticipating a problem that will only be discussed by the generations of philosophers in the 15th and 16th centuries. Based on these premises, this paper proposes a reading of Eiximenis' *opus* to expand the usual understanding limits given to his political theory works.

Salle / Room 3.02

Aula 3:What is Radical About Melancholy?

Special Session proposed by Evelina Miteva
Sponsor: Project: *Medieval Concepts on melancholia*, Babeș-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca
Chair: Evelina Miteva

This panel proposal is sponsored by the project "Prophets and Idiots. Medieval Concepts on melancholia. Philosophical, Medical and Literary Perspectives" (Babeș-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca, Romania).

As a PI of the project, I am proposing a topic, which would showcase the project itself while locking into the general topic of the SIEPM Annual Colloqium. The three speakers are part of the international research team of the project.

Melancholy falls into the broad discipline of natural philosophy, and while a link to *humor radicalis* would have been immediate to the general theme of the Congress, that would have been too restrictive to the fascinating nature of the subject matter. Melancholy is a phenomenon that was perceived throughout the centuries as an ambiguous phenomenon, both a threatening condition and a source of creativity. Melancholy encompasses different approaches and fields of study. The panel seeks to open up a broader debate: "What is Radical About Melancholy?" The question implies different perspective that could be put into fore.

From a *medical and natural* point of view melancholy is regarded as one of the four humors that govern the body and its functions, and influences the body-soul unity. In the first presentation, Marilena Panarelli will be focusing on the medical perspective and the medical vocabulary that Avicenna and Averroes settle for the topic. Thus, the first part of the panel would focus on that most obvious link of natural philosophy to being radical: melancholy and *radical moisture*.

From a *methodological* point of view melancholy is one among the four complexions, which however receives most attention by the medieval scholars. Why is that? A reason might be the ambiguity that melancholy imposes to human nature. Melancholy is a "normal" complexion, one that is predominant in melancholic people. However, it can easily bring the human being to the verge of their "normality". Melancholy is a humor that rarely stays balanced, it is easily corruptible into noxious humor. Imbalanced melancholy brings to the front radical aspects of human nature. In the second presentation of this panel, Vlad Ile is focusing on the "*radical mind*", i.e. the states of mind induced by imbalanced melancholy that were regarded as 'radicalized', ill-bound, extreme, or even possessed. Would one approach the question "What is radical about melancholy" in the Middle Ages from a *historiographical* perspective, the question transforms into a conundrum. While melancholy in successive epochs, starting from early Renaissance on, has received a great share of scholarship, melancholy in the Middle Ages seems to be *radically forgotten*. There is a visible paucity of studies on the notion of melancholy in the Middle Ages. Does this paucity in the studies correspond to a lesser attention of the medieval scholars towards melancholy? Does the topic of melancholy really re-surface in the Renaissance, taking up ancient authorities, or was there a continuity throughout the Middle Ages that has been understudied up to the present moment? In the last part of the panel Mario Loconsole focuses on Dante and his medieval predecessors on the topic of the sadness as a vice, *acedia*. That would help to bridge up the view on melancholy from Scholasticism to early Renaissance period.

Marilena Panarelli: *From Radical Moisture to Melancholy: the Latin Reception of Arabic Pharmacology*

Within the medieval medical tradition, the classification of different kinds of fevers has strongly influenced the elaboration of the theory of radical moisture. This theory is strictly connected with the theory of the four humors, which bridges the gap between medicine and philosophy. As a

matter of fact, different kinds of fevers may affect different kinds of humors, either one of the four or several. In severe cases, even radical moisture itself can be affected. The aim of the present study is to compare the classification of fevers proposed by Averroes in his *Colliget* with that of Avicenna's *Canon* in order to determine terminological differences between the two texts. Moreover, the relation between radical moisture and the four humors, in particular melancholy as the most refined humor, shall be scrutinized. Therefore, the evolution of the melancholic fever - that is, the fever that affects the melancholic humor - into the hectic fever, which affects the radical moisture as such, will be investigated. Finally, Avicenna's and Averroes' pharmacological approaches to this kind of disease will be examined.

Vlad Ile: *The Radical Mind. Thinking and Perceiving in the Melancholic State*

The Medieval explanations regarding human cognitive faculties have always depicted the human condition as placed between two opposing poles: the immaterial soul and the corporeal body. Being indebted to the Aristotelian doctrinal framework, which was filtered through the Arabic and Judaic traditions, the Medieval psychology establishes, at a constitutive and fundamental level, how the human soul performs its functions through its corporeal and incorporeal faculties. However, those explanations that are focused on the faculties of the human soul and are usually related to the tradition of commentaries to Aristotle's De anima, are unable to offer an image of how the mind works in the most radical and extreme states of the human condition.Parallel to this tradition and often in a direct interplay with it, the medical teaching of the Middle Ages, enriched by the Latin translations of some important authors like Avicenna and Ishaq Ibn Imran, offers an image of the human soul which is not focused on its constitutive faculties but on its different accidents. By using the classical doctrine of humors, the medical tradition explained how an imbalance of blood, phlegm, yellow bile and especially black bile produces, due to internal or external causes, a series of illnesses or accidents, having a direct influence on the mind. Through the Galenic principle "corpus animam in sua actione sequitur, anima corpus in sua passione comitatur", it established the prerequisites for a study of the human soul placed at the limits of its corporeal determination. My paper will explore some of the extreme states of human mind caused by the humoral imbalance of black bile or melancholy. The illness of melancholia was considered one of the most intriguing and versatile medical afflictions in Middle Ages, since it had a double effect on the human mind. On the one hand, it has been considered the cause for political, intellectual, philosophical and prophetic excellence; on the other, it was regarded as causing major distortions of reality, carnal obsession and irrational thoughts. Those major mental disorders where often considered within a specific aetiology, as in the case of lycanthropy and lovesickness. My study proposes a survey on melancholic state, from the point of view of the radical effects that it bears on the human mind. In doing so, I will explore some of the most relevant examples found in Avicenna's Canon medicinae, Hildegard of Bingen, Albert the Great and some of the works attributed to Constantinus Africanus. The ultimate goal is to offer a picture of the melancholic mind placed at the limit of the human condition.

Mario Loconsole: *Melancholy and* acedia. *The Medical Roots of the Description of Slothful Sinners in Dante's Inferno.*

The relation between the moral account of the capital vices and the philosophical analysis of the passions of the human soul finds a fundamental juncture from the 11th century onwards, during the recovery of medical knowledge in the medieval West. In this wave of enthusiasm in a physiological approach to the investigation of man's nature, the vice of acedia - as described by the Christian moral tradition - and the melancholic temperament - as result of a millenary reworking and technicalisation of medical knowledge - found a point of contact in the passion of sadness: while authors such as Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas – taking up the Christian tradition –

characterised acedia as the aggravation and radicalisation of the passion of sadness, the medical tradition – from Hippocrates and Galen to Constantine and Avicenna – saw sadness as one of the most typical manifestations of the melancholic temperament. The aim of this study is to demonstrate, by tracing some aspects of this interweaving of traditions after the year 1000, how Dante's description of the sinners of acedia in canto VII of Inferno takes up the legacy of this hybridisation, showing how the moralistic description of the slothful sinners sinks its roots in the medical account of melancholy. Here, the radicalised sadness that characterises acedia – being the distinctive trait of slothful sinners – acquires features derived by the physiological description of melancholic temperaments.

Salle / Room 3.03

Aula 4: Thomas Aquinas I

Ordinary Session

Chair: Jörg Alejandro Tellkamp

Felipe de Souza Terra: *The Role of Light on Thomas Aquinas' Theory of Visual Perception*

An important theme in the development of his epistemology, the sensible perception is approached on Thomas Aquinas' *oeuvre* through an aritotelian conceptual scheme. In development of commentary of *De anima* and *De sensu et sensato*, Aquinas take back a philosophycal problem of the estagirite concerning the operation of the visual sensation. The problem consists precisely on explain the way the visual apparatus can see the colours of corporal things. The terms in which Thomas conceive the problem is what follows. The colours are accidents that inform corporal things. As such, they are characterized by the natural mode of being in external things, for example, the red colour exists naturaly in the apple so that apple become red. However, by informing the eyes, the colours have a spiritual mode of being, because the red colour, for example, does not render the eyes red. Explaining that, Aquinas says that there is a modification of the mode of being of the colours: from a natural being in the corporeal things, the colours assume a spiritual mode of being. Therefore, the philosphycal problem can be summed like this: how to explain the modification of the natural to the spiritual of being of the colours? On my presentation, I'll first introduce the role the light have for Aquinas in the causal chain that is involved in the visual perception. Next, the caracterization of the light as a immaterial thing will be considered as a key for explaning the passage of the natural mode of being to the spiritual mode of being. That modification of the ontoligical *status* of colours, so, is possible because the light operate as a medium between the eyes and the corporal colours.

Carlos Arthur Ribeiro do Nascimento: *L'arbre de la philosophie*

Rien de plus radical qu'un arbre, parce que c'est de lui qu'on a pris l'emploi métaphorique du mot "arbre" et de ses parties. La presente communication a pour sujet "L'arbe de la philosophie" comme représentation du système des sciences. On part de son usage par Descartes, on relève sa présence dans les écrits de Roger Bacon et son absance chez Thomas d'Aquin. Cette métaphore se ratacherait aux systèmes qui accentuent l'unité de la connaissance humaine ainsi que son orientation pratique, comme la sagesse baconienne et le cartésianisme à l'opposé de Thomas, plus sensible, avec Aristote, à la spécificaté d'objet et de méthode de chaque secteur du savoir.

Salle / Room 3.05

Aula 5: Henry of Harclay

Special Session proposed by Fabrizio Amerini
Chair: Fabrizio Amerini

Alessandro De Pascalis: *Can Man by His very Nature Love God more than Himself? The Answer of Henry of Harclay*

Since the second half of the 13th century, philosophical debate over divine fruition has been enhanced by a new and interesting question: is it possible for man, by virtue of his very nature and without the cooperation of divine grace, to love God more than himself? The origin of this question is to be found in the solution provided by the Parisian master William of Auxerre in his Summa Aurea: «by means of his natural love, the angel loves himself more than God [...] the love by which in fact a creature loves his own utility or his own preservation is natural, and in fact, even if through this love he loves himself more than God, in this there is no sin» (William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, II, tr. II, cap. I). The first, probably, to systematically challenge such a solution was Thomas Aquinas. According to Aquinas, in fact, «each thing that by its very nature belongs to another is such that it is inclined more principally and more intensely toward that to which it belongs than toward itself». Since therefore God as good contains within itself angels and men and all creatures, concludes the theologian, «it follows that even by natural love an angel or man loves God to a greater degree and more principally than himself» (Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Iª, q. 60, a. 5). The solution offered by Aquinas is picked up and widened in an original way by the secular master Henry of Harclay, whose Commentary on the Sentences, I, is currently in the process of being edited by Francesco Fiorentino and Andrea Nannini. This is an interesting point, considering that Harclay is commonly considered – relatively to his early Parisian period – a Scotist, and that Scotus deals very little with the subject, to which he devotes no more than a few lines in his Ordinatio (John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, III, d. 29, q. un., ed. Vaticana, X, p. 94). Distinction 1, q. 3 of Harclay's Commentary on the Sentences, I, is entirely devoted to investigating the possibility, for man, of naturally loving God more than himself. After an initial polemic against a doctor (probably Godfrey of Fontaines) who defends the position of William of Auxerre, Harclay provides his own original solution to the question, structured in five points. 1) Every appetite which is directed by something, maximally tends toward that by which it is directed; and since the natural human appetite (i.e., his will) is directed by God, it is directed to him. 2) Man, as a created entity, tends toward God as end; such order on the ontological level has its counterpart on that of the passions, so that naturally the human will is inclined in loving God first and foremost. 3) For a creature, to love a created entity before loving God represents a sin, and therefore a corruption of the natural inclination of its will. 4) The human intellect can naturally, by a practical syllogism of the intellect's reason, conclude that "God is to be honored and the Sabbath celebrated". 5) A natural appetite is directed directly more by God than by the creature itself, and God has sufficient power to direct it where he wills. The paper aims to illustrate the history of the problem of loving God naturally, from its genesis to its early fourteenth-century developments, showing positions and counter-positions on the topic. The focus on Henry of Harclay presents the original contribution of this author, today largely unpublished.

Gian Pietro Soliani: *Duns Scotus and Henry of Harclay on the Will. Affinities and Divergences*

My proposal is focused on Harclay's theory of the will in order to show affinities and divergences with the voluntarism starting with Duns Scotus. In many of his works, Scotus strongly affirms the autonomy of the human will with respect to the human intellect, in order to preserve the absolute freedom of the will. However, Duns Scotus argues, following the common doctrine, that God's omnipotence only addresses to what is possible, because what is self-contradictory can neither be

known nor willed by anyone. Harclay, on the contrary, maintains that the proper object of the will goes beyond the possible good. As the intellect, he argues, can know imaginative and fictitious objects (e.g. the hircocervus) with an act of 'simple intelligence' (intelligentia simplex), so the will also have the same extension of the intellect. While accepting a certain number of Duns Scotus' theories about the freedom of the will, including the synchronic contingency, Harclay refuses some aspects of his master's thought. He affirms the possibility of hating God, but under certain conditions. For example, a created will could want that God doesn't own his omnipotence, by 8 willing something self-contradictory comes true and, therefore, escapes God's power. Radicalizing and overcoming Scotus' voluntaristic view, Harclay connects the distinction between potentia propinqua and absolute power with synchronic contingency. In this way, Harclay argues that the blessed could sin by means of the absolute power of his will. On the contrary, this would not be possible per potentiam propinquam, because of the divine laws and the grace of God, which do not allow such an outcome. Finally, according to Harclay, the autonomy of the will with respect to the intellect makes the former the one measure of the moral action. Under the influence of Duns Scotus, Harclay maintains that the happiness desired – according to Augustine's theory – by every man is only a something formal, namely an indefinite well-being (bene esse), that is very different from the catholic idea of happiness. Harclay represents an interesting example of radical voluntarism, whose influence will be affected by both William of Ockham and sixteenth-century voluntarism at the University of Paris (e.g. John Mair and Jerome de Hangest).

Francesco Fiorentino: Utrum Deus generet alium Deum. *A Logical Puzzle for Henry of Harclay*

Thomas Aquinas defines two predications in his Sentences commentary, I, d. 4, q. 1, a. 3, i.e. the predications of the adjective and the noun in divinis: «[…] nominum essentialium quaedam significant essentiam substantive, quaedam vero adiective» (see also Summa theologiae, I, q. 39, aa. 3-5). While the predication of the noun refers to the divine Persons in the singular and according to individual properties, the predication of the adjective refers to them in the plural and in an accidental fashion. But, granted that God as Father generates God as Son, one may deduce the proposition "Deus generat alium Deum", which is problematic if the predicate is assumed according to the predication of the noun. Thomas perceives this problem, but limits himself to explaining that, in the proposition "essentia est res generans", the predicate 'generans' is connected to 'res' that is predicated of the subject 'essentia' according to the predication of the noun. Such predications apparently re-appear in a controversial text by John Duns Scotus: an annotation at the beginning of distinction 4 of the first book on his Commentary on the Sentences, in the fourth volume of the Vatican edition, which has been notoriously conducted on the basis of ms. Assisi, Municipal Library, 137: «Habetur in questione Cantabrigensi. Sed sic: Sicut in omnibus concretis, sive substantivis sive adiectivis, quare non mumerantur sicut habentia formam». No mention of two predications can in fact be found in the textual place indicated: Lectura Cantabricensis or Reportatio I-C, preserved in ms. Todi, Municipal Library, 12, fol. 140ra (cfr. C. Balic, "Adnotationes", ed. Vaticana, IV, pp. 1*-46*; B. Hechich, "Il problema delle 'reportationes'", in M. Carbajo (ed.), *Giovanni Duns Scoto. Studi e testi, Antonianum*, Roma 2008, pp. 59-128; A. B. Wolter, "Scotus' Cambridge Lecture", *Franciscan Studies* 58 (2000), pp. 313-326). The two predications instead are present in Henry of Harclay's Commentary on the Sentences, I, d. 4, q. 1, in both the extant manuscripts: ms. Casale Monferrato, Episcopal Seminary Library, B25, fol. 25ra; ms. Vat. Lat. 13687, fol. 29rb, attributed by the scribe to Scotus (cfr. my contributyion in collaboration with Ch. D. Schabel in *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 78 (2011), pp. 97-116; my contribution in *Franciscan Studies* 72 (2014), pp. 305-371). With respect to this question, which is in the process of being critically edited by me and Andrea Nannini (together with the entire first book), this contribution aims to focus on the very innovative contribution by Henry of Harclay: the devaluation of the adjectival predication as semantically excessive with respect to the noun 'Deus';

the correct verification of subject and predicate in the proposition 'Deus generat alium Deum'; the disconnection of generation from mutation in divinis; the bestowing of individual properties to individual divine Persons by restriction; the hypothesis of the attribution of the property of creating to the Father in himself and according to the predication of the noun, and not to the divine essence according to a distributive sense or to God as Father according to the predication of the noun. This hypothesis will be also discussed by Aufredus Gonteri Brito and John of Reading.

Salle / Room 3.06

Aula 6:Peter Auriol

Ordinary Session
Chair: Russell L. Friedman

Laura Moaté: Tale autem esse intentionale habet duplex subjectum: *Pierre d'Auriol et la théorie averroïste des deux sujets de l'intellection*

En 1312, Pierre d'Auriol se rend vraisemblablement au couvent franciscain de Bologne comme *lector*, et y rédige un traité de philosophie naturelle, le *Tractactus de principiis naturae,* malheureusement transmis incomplet. Bien qu'amputé de sa partie portant sur l'âme humaine, le texte développe un certain nombre d'aspects d'une théorie de la connaissance reconnue pour son originalité au sein de laquelle Auriol formule, pour la première fois nous semble-t-il, la thèse selon laquelle l'être intentionnel possèderait deux sujets. Cette thèse, dont la marque d'Averroès frappe d'emblée, se retrouve plus tard dans son *Commentaire des Sentences.* Il nous faut donc expliquer comment et pourquoi, immédiatement après les condamnations opérées par le Concile de Vienne, Auriol juge indispensable de reprendre la thèse averroïste des deux sujets de la pensée pour la déplacer vers la défense d'un double sujet de *l'intentio*.La querelle issue de l'affirmation opérée par Averroès dans son *Grand Commentaire,* selon laquelle la pensée possède deux sujets, est bien connue. Elle conduit à la critique thomasienne formulée en 1270 dans le *De unitate intellectus,* puis aux condamnations de Tempier en 1277. Lorsque le Concile de Vienne affirme, en 1312, que l'âme intellective est forme du corps humain et lui est unie selon l'être, le débat semble clos. Il devient impossible sans accusation d'hérésie de souscrire à cette affirmation dite « averroïste ». Rappelons très rapidement que, chez Averroès, l'intellection s'articule entre, d'un côté, l'intellect matériel, qui est en puissance, et de l'autre la forme imaginée, substrat nécessaire à son passage à l'acte. L'intellect matériel reçoit le concept à partir de ce qu'Averroès appelle une intention imaginée, qui est un intelligible en puissance, substrat offert par la faculté imaginative, ou cogitative. Voilà donc le premier sujet de l'intellection : la cogitative, portant l'intention imaginée, en tant qu'elle est motrice de l'acte de l'intellect. L'intellect agent se chargera de faire passer ce contenu intentionnel à l'acte, et donc de produire un concept, reçu dans l'intellect matériel. Ceci permet de poser un second sujet de l'intellection, l'intellect matériel, récepteur du concept, dont Averroès affirme la séparation. L'intellect matériel n'est pas uni au corps de l'homme, n'en constitue pas le principe d'animation. Il est principe formel de l'opération d'intellection en l'homme, mais nul besoin pour cela de poser leur union dans l'être. À cela, Thomas répondra que, dans ce cas, l'on ne peut concevoir qu'*hic homo intellegit.* L'homme ne serait qu'un outil, moteur indispensable au passage à l'acte de l'intellect mais néanmoins non-agent de l'intellection au sens strict. Pourquoi, dès lors, Pierre d'Auriol réintroduit-il, sous la forme d'une proposition déroutante, le thème des « deux sujets » au sein de sa noétique ? Au deuxième livre de son *Commentaire des Sentences,* au cœur de la distinction 11, l'on peut en effet lire la phrase suivante : « talem autem esse intentionale habet duplex subjectum, sicut habet duplex esse », proposition dont notre intervention tâchera de rendre raison.

Giacomo Fornasieri: *Peter Auriol on 'Individual', 'Singular' and 'Universal'*

Pugnacious in character, the late Medieval Franciscan Theologian Peter Auriol is famous for being a sharp-minded thinker, frequently endorsing quite controversial philosophical and theological theses. Among them, one which is worth noting, but still has undergone little attention in contemporary research concerns Auriol's view on ontology. When asked about whether one has to admit some kind of individuating principle to explain the individuality of any given particular, Auriol cuts the chase and straightforwardly asserts that discussing about the principle of individuation is simply talking nonsense: everything insofar as it exists, exists as singular. As a result, no cause for a thing to be particular should be looked for in addition to the bare fact that it exists: being an individual is a primitive feature of each extra-mental object. Now, even adopting such a radically lean ontology, Auriol maintains that our universal concepts are in fact rooted in extra-mental reality. They do grasp features, with which things are really endowed. In order to square the irreducible singularity of things in the world with the fact that we can group them together under not purely conventional general species and genus concepts, Auriol relies on the distinction between what it means for a thing to be an individual and a singular. As he sees it, an individual is what is consistently conceivable as an entity being part of a larger species. A singular, in contrast, is what *cannot* be consistently conceived as an entity being part of a larger species. What follows, then, is that, in Auriol's mind, what accounts for universal cognition and scientific knowledge is precisely the fact that (as ordinary experience tells us) extra-mental reality is made of individuals instead of singulars. What would normally have led one to adopt stricter nominalistic positions (which is to say, the idea that only numerical unity is real) is what surprisingly leads Auriol to give shape to his own moderate conceptualism. The aim of this paper is therefore to show how, despite appearances, Auriol makes use of his radically lean ontology to lay the foundations for an original and an even more radical solution.

Kamil Majcherek: *Peter Auriol on Final Causality: Radical Aristotelianism against Thomism?*

It is something of a commonplace to contrast Aristotle's teleology with medieval teleology along the following lines. Aristotle, it is said, embraces *intrinsic* teleology, in which things have their proper ends in virtue of their natures, without any need for a creator that would produce them and thus order them towards their ends. By contrast, the medievals espouse a model in which God plays an integral role, since, it is said, on the medieval model, God, as an intelligent creator, is necessarily presupposed in the system of teleology, especially when it comes to beings that are themselves devoid of intellects. This interpretation would be fully justified if one focused only on Thomas Aquinas and medieval Thomists, who indeed endorse such a view. But this teleological model was contested by other medieval thinkers. This paper will examine how and why the Thomist model of teleology was rejected by its most influential later medieval critic, Peter Auriol. At its core, the question addressed by Auriol concerns the relationship between final and efficient causality, and is this: assuming that God is the final cause of all things, does this by necessity imply that he is also their efficient cause? Or, more broadly speaking, from the fact that something has a final cause, does it necessarily follow that it also has an efficient cause? Against the Thomist Hervaeus Natalis, who defended an affirmative reply to these questions, Auriol argues that while it can be proven that God is the final cause of all things, on this basis it cannot be demonstratively shown that he is also their efficient cause. As I will show, Auriol is not the first author to have disputed an Aquinas-like version of teleology; however, it was precisely Auriol's critique of the Thomist view that attracted most attention of later thinkers, both those rejecting it, such as Francis of Marchia and Gerard of Siena, as well as those endorsing it, such as Michael of Massa and Gregory of Rimini. I will try to show that Auriol's view is much closer to Aristotle's original teleology than the Thomist theory and its likes: Auriol comes very close to Aristotle's own view when he argues that each thing's nature is enough for it to be teleologically directed, without any intelligent agent producing

it and directing it towards its end. So, Auriol's radicalism on this issue is in a sense a radical *Aristotelianism*: a return to a more stripped-down version of teleology, without any necessary connection to a creator God.

Salle / Room 3.07

Aula 7:Augustine

Ordinary Session
Chair: Pascale Bermon

Luiz Marcos da Silva Filho: *Foundation Theory, Objectivation of Will and Culture Critique in Augustine*

In this presentation, I will investigate whether the Augustinian critique of paganism retains the status of a critique of culture. Therefore, I will propose that there is in Augustine a theory of the foundation inseparable from a theory of the objectivation of the will, proposed in the preface to The City of God (and refined in DCD, XIV, xxviii; XIX, xxiv), in which the immanent foundations of the two cities are modalities of desire investments: the love of God or pure desire, in the case of the celestial city; the libido of domination or perverse desire, in the case of the earthly. In addition, I will point out three dimensions of the foundation (and history) theory developed in The City of God. The first is related to the foundations of pagan culture and Rome, which Augustine presents to us based on a libidinal cosmogony, cosmology, customs and politics. A second relates to the foundation of a denaturalized human condition, about which I will question whether the original fault or contradiction is deficient or constitutive. A third relates to the foundation in this world by Christian faith, hope and charity of a social life and historical experience that could never have come from within paganism, according to Augustine. In this third point, I will suggest that we also find in The City of God a theory of the heterogeneity of time, because the temporal and historical experiences of the pagan and the Christian are distinct and even immeasurable. Finally, I will make some comments on what the Augustinian expedient is to consider real contradictions problems treatable by discourse, which is inserted in an Augustian agenda of rupture with the essential harmony between being, thinking and saying and of the foundation of prayer and of the sermo humilis as a strategy to go beyond the limits of declarative discourse to deal with real contradictions.

Darlan Lorenzetti: *Por uma genealogia do poder temporal: A Teoria do Estado de Tomás de Aquino em interface com o pensamento político de Aristóteles e Agostinho de Hipona*

Nossa apresentação no XV Congresso da *Societe Internationale pour l'Etude de la Philosophie Medievale* (SIEPM) será guiada pela breve e sintética exposição dos diversos elementos reflexivos contidos em um *paper* previamente redigido sob o título *"Por uma genealogia do poder temporal: A Teoria do Estado de Tomás de Aquino em interface com o pensamento político de Aristóteles e Agostinho de Hipona"*. O artigo em questão tem por objetivo geral reconstituir o movimento de fundamentação do poder temporal e do senhorio de uns sobre os outros, empreendido por Tomás de Aquino (1225-1274) no opúsculo *De Regno*. Em termos metodológicos, isto é realizado através de um estudo comparativo com o pensamento político de dois autores que cronologicamente antecedem o Aquinate: Aristóteles e Agostinho de Hipona. Do ponto de vista estrutural, o trabalho constitui-se a partir de três seções nas quais o supracitado objetivo é desdobrado por meio da tematização de conteúdos referentes aos objetivos específicos. Assim sendo, o estudo trata de recuperar, inicialmente, os elementos basilares contidos nos processos de justificação da existência do poder político, empreendidos pelo Estagirita e pelo Bispo de Hipona em seus respectivos escritos. No caso do primeiro filósofo, a abordagem se dá, sobretudo, a partir de fragmentos da *Política*. Em se tratando do segundo

pensador, o referencial bibliográfico será o *De Civitate Dei* e, em particular, o livro XIX daquela obra. No que tange à elucubração acerca dos pressupostos teóricos relativos à filosofia política de Tomás de Aquino no *De Regno*, a continuidade da apresentação será conduzida segundo dois enfoques analíticos distintos, porém complementares, nos quais os demais objetivos específicos são contemplados: Num primeiro momento tematiza-se a "teleologia" da potestade política, salientando os fins inerentes à mesma; no passo subsequente, aborda-se algo próximo a uma "ontologia" das estruturas temporais de poder, buscando-se explicitar suas características fundamentais. Este primeiro passo é operado, pois, na segunda seção do artigo, que tem como pano de fundo temático a teleologia, e que procura esquadrinhar os vários elementos referentes à natureza, razão de ser e finalidade do governo humano. Nesta mesma seção, é refeito o caminho argumentativo no qual Tomás demonstra que é pela própria razão natural que os seres humanos estão condicionados a viverem e organizarem-se em comunidades com seus semelhantes, intentando, por meio delas, assegurar sua subsistência e aperfeiçoamento moral e intelectual. Na terceira seção, o texto concentra-se na problematização do domínio político enquanto mecanismo de conservação da ordem social e, por conseguinte, do bem maior da paz. Opera, assim, uma reflexão sobre o estatuto ontológico da comunidade política. Na sequência, realiza um breve apanhado geral das diversas configurações mediante as quais a governança sobre a multidão pode ser exercida, ressaltando os motivos que tornam alguns destes esquemas virtuosos e outros, viciosos. Em seguida, desdobra o processo de justificação pelo qual o Aquinate elege a monarquia (ou governo de um só) como a mais excelente dentre todas as formas de governo. Finalmente, tendo reposto aspectos constitutivos daquilo ao que poderíamos atribuir o nome de "Teoria do Estado" em Aristóteles, Agostinho e Tomás de Aquino, o estudo ensaia uma tentativa de rastreamento da "radicalidade", ou então, da "genealogia" do pensamento político tomista. Evidencia, então, aspectos mediante os quais é possível identificar as afinidades eletivas e os pontos de inflexão do Aquinate para com estes dois eminentes filósofos predecessores.

> **Mariana Paolozzi**: *A radicalidade da experiência dos afetos em Agostinho e o problema da dessexualização do amor*

Com este trabalho pretende-se discorrer sobre a radicalidade dos afetos em Agostinho e suas contradições, lançando-se um olhar mais atento a uma questão específica: a cisão entre eros e ágape, através do problema da dessexualização do amor, tal como veremos a seguir. Podemos dizer que a resposta à célebre pergunta das *Confissões* "*Quem sou*?" ("Q*uid ergo sum, Deus meus?*", Conf. X, XVII, 26), posta por Agostinho no distante séc. IV, implica também o olhar à imprescindível dimensão afetiva. Agostinho propõe o ordenamento das paixões humanas segundo a ordo amoris. Vê-se, no hiponense, uma ruptura provocada por seu pensamento com relação aos estoicos e Platão no que diz respeito ao papel e importância das paixões. Em outras palavras, quanto aos afetos e segundo a tradição filosófica, Agostinho salienta duas abordagens principais: a daqueles que reconhecem sua presença na alma, mas os dominam, e daqueles que pretendem negar seu acesso ou influência na alma. Na verdade, Agostinho dirá que essas duas posições divergentes se devem, sobretudo, a questões de palavras, e que tendem a esconder algo em comum: a suposição de que uns e outros veem as paixões (ou os afetos) como negativos. Platão os considerava como fonte de mal juntamente com o corpo (dirá Agostinho: "O erro dos platônicos foi ter pensado, como já vimos, que a carne e suas paixões eram a origem de todos os males". *De civ. Dei* XIV, 5), e os estoicos as consideravam como perturbações do espírito. Mas, qual a posição agostiniana com relação a este tema? Agostinho recusará o ideal estoico de 'apatia', ou de imperturbabilidade da alma. Aqui, convém esclarecer o sentido que se dá a esse termo. Agostinho declara primeiramente: *"esse estado que se chama em grego apatheia (e que se chamaria em latim, [se fosse possível], impassibilitas, impassibilidade) – se entendemos por ele (aplicando-o, bem entendido, ao espírito e não ao corpo) o fato de viver sem as afecções (afetos) que sobrevêm à revelia da razão e que perturbam o espírito– é inteiramente bom e desejável no mais alto grau; mas não pertence em si próprio a esta vida*" (XIV, 9, 4). Isto é, o estado da alma de viver de modo

imperturbável, sem sofrer a influência dos afetos ou paixões é um estado desejável, no entanto, não é realizável; e, mais, seria um estado inumano, indicativo de certo torpor: "4. [...] S*e delas [das afeições] carecêssemos, enquanto puxamos a pesada carga de nossa vida, nosso viver não seria reto. O Apóstolo censurava e detestava certas pessoas e acusou-as de não terem afeição alguma. Também o salmo sagrado culpou aqueles de quem diz: Procurei quem compartisse de minha tristeza e não o encontrei.* (XIV, IX, IV) De modo que, para Agostinho, todas as pessoas, boas ou más, provam todas as paixões, emoções ou afetos; no entanto, e eis o principal, os bons têm paixões boas e os maus, más. Nestes movimentos da alma, cabe ressaltar principalmente a sua indispensabilidade, isto é, a importância dos afetos e a oportunidade e ocasião de serem experimentados, vivenciados retamente. E nisso há uma radicalidade e oposição quanto aos estoicos e platônicos; isto é, a da imprescindibilidade da experiência dos afetos e do sentir. Podemos acrescentar que para Agostinho os afetos ou paixões são suscetíveis - como a própria alma da qual procedem e o ser humano por inteiro - de serem salvos ou restaurados em sua integridade originária, de tal modo que seus movimentos estejam em conformidade com a ordem divina. Isto é, por sua Encarnação e Paixão, Cristo assumiu e salvou todo ser humano, incluindo-se aí as paixões. Todavia, frente a este pano de fundo, importa ressaltar o desvalor atribuído, no âmbito do amor, ao desejo e ao prazer, o que conduzirá à dessexualizaça6o do amor. Para discorrer sobre este tema específico, recorreremos às reflexões de Uta Ranke Heinemann, tal como apresentadas na obra Eunucos pelo reino de Deus. Agostinho discute o tema do amor de forma inédita, dando-lhe relevância. A célebre passagem das *Confissões* (XIII, 9) o evoca expressivamente: "*O amor é o meu peso. Para qualquer parte que vá, é ele quem me leva*". Ou ainda, tal como lemos no *Comentário a Primeira Carta de João* (VII, 8): *Uma vez por todas, foi-te dado somente um breve mandamento: Ama e faze o que quiseres. Se te calas, cala-te movido pelo amor; se falas em tom alto, fala por amor; se corriges, corrige por amor; se perdoas, perdoa por amor. Tem no fundo do coração a raiz do amor: dessa raiz não pode sair senão o bem!*" Está aí a radicalidade do amor, no seu sentido etimológico primeiro: o amor como raiz (radix), fonte e origem do ser humano e da natureza divina Deus (Dilectio Deus est). Todavia, some-se a isso a exclusão do prazer do sentido do amor, e nessa medida, uma cisão entre eros e ágape (o amor sexual e o amor caritativo, por assim dizer). Na economia agostiniana dos afetos, o prazer sexual é recriminado. E mais, a ele é associado a culpabilidade do pecado original. Conforme Uta Ranke-Heinemann (1996, p. 88), Agostinho "teria fundido o cristianismo com o ódio ao sexo e ao prazer em uma unidade sistemática". Ela observa que a importância de Agostinho para a moralidade sexual cristã não é questionada (ao menos até quando ela escreveu seu livro, publicado na sua primeira edição em 1988 na Alemanha) e que o hiponense teria, com suas concepções, influenciado séculos e milênios que se seguiram. Dessa maneira, toda uma tradição anti-sexual do amor foi se estabelecendo. A tendência ascética e neoplatônica de Agostinho, aliada ao seu anseio de romper com as coisas terrenas, teria o conduzido a uma versão escapista do cristianismo (Ranke-Heinemann 1996, p. 94). Agostinho separa de maneira peremptória o amor da sexualidade, o que configuraria a própria dessexualização do amor. Isto conduziria a uma experiência do amor, por assim dizer, desencarnada, com o prazer sexual negado: "*Estou convencido de que nada afasta mais o espírito do homem das alturas do que os carinhos da mulher e aqueles movimentos do corpo, sem os quais um homem não pode possuir sua esposa*" (Solilóquios I, 10). Em suma, se em Agostinho o amor ganha uma dimensão inaudita, fundamento de sua ética, importa olhar para a cisão entre e eros e ágape, referida aqui pela dessexualizacao do amor. Isso contribuirá para a história dessa cisão, na busca de um conceito único do amor e da sua experiência, debate retomado por Luc Marion (2007, p. 5) em, por exemplo, *The Erotic Phenomenon: "Univocal, love is only told in one way".*

Salle / Room 3.07

Aula 8: Roger Bacon's Early Writings: New Investigations on Ontology and Cognitive Theory

Special Session proposed by Yael Kedar
Sponsor: Roger Bacon Research Society
Chair: Irène Rosier-Catach

Roger Bacon was one of the earliest scholars to teach Aristotle in the Faculty of Arts in the first half of the thirteenth century. His early texts therefore comprise a testimony of the introduction of Aristotelianism in the medieval university. They are of particular importance for both our understanding of the cultural history and for the internal analysis of Roger Bacon's thought. These lectures and questions on the *Physics*, the *Metaphysics*, the *De sensu* and *Liber de causis* have been published a long time ago, in the collection of the *Opera hactenus inedita*. They have been the subject of rare studies since the 1950s (especially by Theodore Crowley and Thomas S. Maloney) yet, even today, they remain widely unexplored. The study of these texts raises two critical and intertwined questions: (1) their authenticity, and (2) the continuity or discontinuity between these early lectures and the mature works (*Opus Maius, Communia naturalium*, etc.) of Roger Bacon's thought.

Yael Kedar: *Roger Bacon's Extreme Realist Position on the Inherent Visibility of Colours in the* De sensu*-Questions*

This paper examines Bacon's theory of colour as it appears in his commentary on Aristotle's *De sensu*. In this text, Bacon rejects many tenets of Aristotle's theory of colour, as well as those of Grosseteste. The core of this position is that light has no significant function in the being and essence of real colours, only in the being of apparent colours. In fact, true colour according to Bacon, is a property of a mixture made up of the elements. Bacon was an extreme realist when it comes to colours: He thought that they exist objectively within matter, in the dark as well as in light, regardless of whether they can be perceived. Hence, the presence or absence of light has no effect on their being, whether that light is considered an integral part of colour, or an external condition of its actuality. Bacon placed colour on equal footing with light, as two species of the same genus, both inherently visible by nature. I argue that this is a unique position, which can be found in none of Bacon's principal sources, namely, Avicenna, Averroes, Alhacen and Grosseteste. Moreover, the inherent visibility of colour, and its independency of light, are features present also in his writings from the 1260s, in which his mature theory of vision is introduced.

Pia A. Antolic-Piper: *Understanding Roger Bacon's Contribution to Theories of the Intellect and the Possibility of Metaphysics in the Early 13th Century (MS Amiens, BM, 406)*

In my presentation I respond to a recent argument (Silvia Donati, 2013) throwing doubt on the authorship of three Aristotelian commentaries which up to that point had been unanimously yet (for the most part) uncritically identified as *reportationes* from Roger Bacon's lectures on Aristotle from his time as a Master of Arts in Paris in the 1240s. Drawing from doctrinal evidence, I argue that the three contested commentaries are authentic. By an analysis of the Parisian commentaries and Bacon's later works, I show that there is a consistent, underlying systematic commitment to certain distinctive claims about human cognition. My argument is based on Bacon's cognitive theory, specifically on his commitment to theories of illumination and a belief in the centrality of the agent intellect in human cognition. Disparate claims about the agent and possible intellects notwithstanding, I argue that Bacon endorses several key claims not only in the commentaries preserved in MS Amiens, BM, 406 but also in his later works from the 1260s. To wit, Bacon consistently holds that: (1) while in an embodied state, the human soul's noetic processes are not autonomous but rather inherently deficient, (2) that from this epistemic deficiency follows human cognitive dependence on divine aid, (3) that this divine aid is supplied by the action of the agent

intellect, and, lastly, (4) that from this divine aid results a certain intimacy of the human soul with God which makes the metaphysical speculation of separate substances possible.

Dominique Demange: *Roger Bacon's Theory of Abstraction: a Comparison between the Parisian Questions and the Mature Writings*

A difficulty in Roger Bacon's cognitive theory concerns his psychology of abstraction – the theory according to which universal concepts are extracted from sensory matter by a psychological, spontaneous mechanism, separating the universal characteristics from the individual ones. This idea usually draws on Aristotle's *De anima* book III chap.4-5 in terms of the abstractive action of the agent intellect which illuminates the forms of imagination present in the sensitive soul. We find a typical formulation of this theory in the questions on *Physics* attributed to the young Roger Bacon by the editors of the *Opera hactenus inedita* and another in the *Quaestiones supra librum De causis.* However, in the writings of the second period (written after 1260), references to psychological abstraction disappear, and Bacon seems to adopt a theory of incorporation of species in the soul and its progressive spiritualization by the successive faculties along the path of intromission. Are we allowed to conclude that Bacon changed his mind about the cognitive process, that he has moved from an abstractive to a receptive theory? A careful examination of the texts relating to abstraction in the entire corpus shows that this is not the case. Bacon devoted many pages to the various modes of abstraction in the *Communia mathematica* and he has always taken for granted Aristotle's axiom according to which our universal knowledge comes from sensory experience, and that numbers and figures have no real existence apart from the sensible substances from which they are abstracted. I argue that Bacon never embraced the standard view we associate with the psychology of abstraction, and that he had always linked the general idea of abstraction with the process of the reception of species in the faculties of the soul.

Salle / Room 3.09

Aula 9: Questions épistémologiques autour de l'infidélité

Special Session proposed by Natalia Jakubecki
Sponsor: Universidad de Buenos Aires/CONICET; Universidad del Salvador
Chair: Jean-Luc Solère

Natalia Jakubecki: *L'*abusus ratione *et l'infidélité dans la pensée de Gilbert Crispin*

Gilbert Crispin a obtenu une place dans les études philosophiques principalement grâce à ses deux disputations, la *Disputatio iudei et christiani* et la *Disputatio cum gentili*. Elles ont été abordées notamment selon ce qui concerne l'usage de la raison dans le dialogue avec des infidèles, et, plus particulièrement, l'établissement des règles du débat et la base sur laquelle les conclusions auxquelles les interlocuteurs arrivent seront acceptées (ou non). Dans ses autres œuvres –qui n'ont pas encore été suffisamment étudiées–la raison joue aussi un rôle important, notamment quant à sa fonction morale. En effet, Gilbert définit le péché comme un « *abuti ratione* ». Cette communication vise donc à analyser ladite définition et d'autres connotations morales de *ratio* dans la *Disputatio cum gentili*, le *De angelo perdito*, le *Sermo in Ramis Palmarum*, le *De anima*, le *De Simoniacis* et un extrait des *Florilegium* I, afin de déterminer s'il est possible de comprendre l'infidélité –selon qu'elle est caractérisée dans les deux *dispuationes* religieuses– comme un *abusus ratione* et, par conséquent, les infidèles comme pécheurs.

Alexander Fidora: *"The Infidels Believe that We Believe...". Ramon Llull on Inter-Religious Misperceptions as an Epistemological Problem*

With the translation of Islamic texts during the twelfth century and the increasing missionary activity, more and more information on Islam became available in the Latin West. This information referred not only to Islamic faith as such, but also to Islamic polemics against Christian doctrines, to wit, the Trinity or Incarnation. Thomas Aquinas, e.g., wrote his treatise *De rationibus fidei* in order to defend the Christian faith against the infidels' polemic arguments. While many authors, such as Aquinas, saw these arguments in the context of an ill-willed *irrisio infidelium*, a mockery of the infidels, Ramon Llull approached the problem from a decidedly philosophical point of view. This paper explores Llull's analysis of the gnoseological structure of such polemic perceptions and criticisms of Christianity.

Christophe Grellard: *Que croit un infidèle quand il rend un culte ? Las Casas et l'épistémologie de la religion des Indiens*

Dans l'*Apologia*, qui est une réponse à Sépulvéda, après la fameuse controverse de Valladolid, Las Casas offre une justification théorique de l'infidélité et de l'idolâtrie des Indiens, ancrée dans un certain nombre de présupposés psychologiques, épistémologiques et théologiques. La religion, entendue comme culte rendu à Dieu, est un phénomène universel, mais dans la mesure où l'objet final est connu de façon incertaine et confuse, les modalités des cérémonies diffèrent. Il n'en reste pas moins que chacun pense que son dieu est vrai (même quand il est faux) et que sa religion est la bonne. En reprenant l'analyse de Las Casas, on cherchera à en expliciter certaines sources possibles, et à montrer comment se met en place à la fin du Moyen Âge une épistémologie de l'altérité religieuse.

Salle / Room 3.10

Aula 10: Thinking – Rooted in the Self

Special Session proposed by Martin Klein
Chair: Martin Klein

Thinking in itself is radical, because it is self-conscious. To describe pre-reflexive or phenomenal consciousness in more detail, medieval thinkers made use of expressions from natural philosophy and medicine: cognitions are conscious, because they sprout from the soul as its living subject (Walter Chatton), are vital acts of the soul (Hugolino of Orvieto), are rooted in the soul (Peter John Olivi), are the offspring of the soul (Francisco Suárez). At the same time, medieval thinkers echo Augustine here to assert that whenever one is in a mental state, one is at once aware that one exists. This panel wants to explore vitalist expressions in medieval debates on the relation of the soul and its mental acts, and how they are connected to theories of consciousness.

Susan Brower-Toland: *Activity and Subjectivity: Olivi on Consciousness and the Soul*

In this paper, I explore the connection between Olivi's views about the nature of conscious experience, on the one hand, and his views about the nature of the soul, on the other. In particular, I argue that Olivi's account of the soul as essentially active and essentially reflexive entails a commitment on his part to a kind of innate self-knowing. I further show that, for Olivi, this primal psychological self-reflexivity plays an important role in explaining the subjective character of conscious states. For, on Olivi's view, it is it is only because the soul is itself the primal, self-reflexive source of its cognitive activity that it experiences itself as both the principle and first-person subject of its episodic states.

Therese Cory: *Albert on the One Nature of Intellect and Intelligible*

Albert's *De intellectu et intelligibile* extensively considers the way in which intellect and intelligible are one. He rejects the unity of composition (form and matter, or subject and accident), and settles on a surprising comparison to the relationship of light and color. I explain the significance of the analogy for the "one nature" that is intellect and intelligible, and draw some implications for learning as the progressive determination of a self-possessing intellectual consciousness.

Martin Klein: Actus vitalis*: Experience as Pre-Reflective Consciousness*

The aim of this paper is to show that the 14th century notion of 'actus vitalis' is remarkably similar to that of 'Erlebnis' in the phenomenological tradition. According to, e.g., Husserl, to have an experience is to say that one is in a mental state that is intentionally directed toward something and at the same time is conscious to oneself, without the subject reflecting on the mental state. Similarly, Walter Chatton and Hugolino of Orvieto use the term 'actus vitalis' to express pre-reflective self-consciousness. Against higher-order theories of reflection, Chatton emphasizes that an act is conscious because it is received "in a living subject" without being a reflected object for the subject. Against theories of inner awareness in terms of self-reflexivity of mental acts, Hugolino emphasizes that the experience of one's own acts must not mean that they have a self-representational structure.

Salle / Room 3.11

Aula 11: A Radical Poetics of Experience in Late Medieval England? Literature, Vernacularity, and Intellectual history (c. 1360-1425)

Special Session proposed by Marco Nievergelt
Sponsor: Marie Curie Fellowship
Chair: Fosca Mariani Zini

This panel examines the apparently sudden, and largely neglected explosion of interest in notions of 'experience' and 'experimentation' in vernacular writings produced in England at the end of the fourteenth century.

What were the catalysts for such a development, and what does this phenomenon reveal about the interactions between late medieval intellectual culture (natural science, theology, and philosophy) on the one hand, and vernacular, literary and religious/devotional culture on the other? Are vernacular writers simply 'influenced' by developments in Latin University culture, or do vernacular writers engage in more ambitious, creative, speculative, and philosophically productive reflections on the status of individual experience and experimental proof? And how might the existence of vernacular speculations on this topic invite us to transform the methodology of intellectual history as a discipline, or even invite us to revise existing definitions of what it means to "think philosophically" in the later Middle Ages?

This panel will examine a range of 'literary' vernacular texts from an intellectual historical perspective, including the work of some major canonical authors like Geoffrey Chaucer and William Langland. Our primary aim is to identify some possible avenues for further interdisciplinary research, inviting specialists in the history of medieval philosophy, science, and theology to join forces with literary scholars. We believe that only this kind of collaborative approach will enable us to fully grasp and unpack the philosophical and intellectual-historical significance – and potential 'radicalism' - of this surge of vernacular interest in experience and experimentation.

Marco Nievergelt: *'Experience' and 'Auctoritee' Reconsidered*

The binary opposition of *experience* and *auctoritee* is endemic in the poetic oeuvre of Geoffrey Chaucer. But whereas Chaucer's treatment of (textual) *auctoritee*, and the related question of Chaucer's authorial self-representation, have been studied extensively, Chaucer's understanding of the notion of experience has been almost totally overlooked by literary scholars. There are complex and revealing reasons for this imbalance: the assumption of literary scholars appears to have been that while authority is primarily 'textual'— and therefore necessarily constructed, evasive, and negotiable —*experience* is a largely self-explanatory, trans-historical and stable concept. Such a broadly essentialist understanding of *experience*, however, is at odds with the plural, slippery, and intensely debated status of *experience* in medieval philosophy, science, theology, and religious culture, grounded in a range of anthropological and epistemological assumptions that diverge in important ways from their modern counterparts. The status of experience was not only complex and disputed during the later Middle Ages, but the question comes to occupy a central place in scholastic discussions from the middle of the XIII century onwards, and it has been suggested that in the context of religious thought "*experientia* was the central theme of the (fourteenth) century". In my paper I will provide a broad survey of Chaucer's use of the semantic field of 'experience' in his poetry, with the aim of identifying a range of different resonances between Chaucer's own thinking on the topic and existing learned discourses and debates on experience that Chaucer appears to engage. The picture that emerges from this necessarily rapid survey is that of a poet whose interest in experience is endemic and nearly ubiquitous, and which informs his engagement with a wide range of other philosophical and scientific problems — ranging from the nature of sense perception to the epistemic status of the human imagination, the individual experience of moral choice (free will vs. predestination), the discrepancy between subjective experience and logical demonstration, and the significance of mathematical and alchemical experiments. A sustained reflection on different notions of experience, then, appears to function as a 'red thread' that binds together an otherwise eclectic range of broadly philosophical interests that crop up throughout Chaucer's rich and varied poetic *oeuvre*.

Mishtooni Bose: *Late-Medieval English Poetry, Religious Reform and the Emergence of Experience*

It can be argued that the emergence of new allegorical entities in literature constitutes a verifiable shift in collective thinking on any given subject. The aim of this paper is to trace the conceptual gains and losses attendant on the process by which Experience emerged in late-medieval English literature. As an allegorical entity, Experience appears in two late-medieval English poems: the anonymous *Why I Can't Be a Nun* and the epilogue to John Audelay's early fifteenth-century poetic sequence, suggestively-entitled *The Counsel of Conscience*. In both poems, however, Experience is co-opted as the voice of religious, and in particular institutional, reform. This phenomenon, arising in two unrelated literary contexts, provides an opportunity to reflect on how the concept itself was already subordinated, at its inception, to a particular reading of spiritual and ecclesiastical complexities. This paper will provide some reflections on the intersection of experience and religious reform in this context before going on to explore how Experience was reconceptualised in late-medieval secular drama.

Ryan D. Perry: *William Langland, Radical Experience, and the Rejection of Closure*

Radical thought—here taken as the attempted overturning of received structures of political organization and modes of understanding the world—is usually held to be behind one of the most important textual features of William Langland's *Piers Plowman*: the great Peasant's Revolt of 1381 seems to have caused Langland to revise his poem in order to distance its sentiments from those of the rebels. This paper argues that instance is not the only time Langland did something similar;

instead, a different but related sort of radicalism embodied in this act of revision is a constitutive feature of Langland's art, and not only because he revised the poem more than once. Indeed, following an influential reading of the poem as one that stages failure after failure of understanding, this paper characterizes Langland's poem as a demonstration of the radical power of thought as such, what Hegel would come to call its capacity to tarry with the negative. Time and again throughout the poem, Langland presents an idealized mode of understanding the world—be it the doctrines of Holy Church, the sacramental traditions of Clergy, the philosophical positions associated with scholasticism—and then proceeds to demonstrate how the radical thought inspired by experience undermines that idealized understanding. Formally, Langland's emphasis on the radical undermining potential of experience inspires two important facets of the poem: the forementioned tendency to revise and the poem's rejection of closure. While the paper will spend some time with Langland's tendency to revise—especially on the so-called autobiographical section that may well have been the last thing Langland wrote—the focus will be on the fact that the poem's "ending" is instead a new beginning. The experience of institutional failure that provides the content of the ending moments precedes the poem's final call for continued searching, a continuation that affirms thought's power to draw on the radical position of experience. Langland's poem rejects closure because of a philosophical position: living in the world is a mode of experimentation that radically and continuously challenges ideal modes of understanding in a cycle that continues for as long as we live in the world and try to make sense of it.

10h30-11h00: Coffee Break

11h00-12h15: 2e Session Plénière/ 2nd Plenary Session

Auditorium 250/Auditorium 150

Michele Trizio: *Four Radical Philosophers in the Greek Middle Ages*
Chair: John Demetracopoulos

My presentation discusses four different Byzantine understandings of radical thinking. I assume that when discussing radical thought in the Middle Ages one should address several problematic issues, all of which relate to the problematic distinction between what the medieval authors regarded as radical and what modern scholars regard as such. Assessing the former is somehow difficult due to modern expectations and understandings of radical thinking. I propose to solve the issue by expanding the notion of 'radicalism' according to internal criteria, i.e. inner criteria found in the Byzantine texts themselves. By accepting a broader understanding of radical thought, I identify four different notions of 'radicalism': 1) the radical way of life of the Byzantine philosophers; 2) the radical textual hermeneutics of the commentators; 3) radical philosophy as a path towards salvation; 4) radical understanding of human rationality.

12h15-14h Lunch

14h00-15h00: I. Special commission: Byzantine Philosophy

Auditorium 250

Chair: Katerina Ierodiakonou

15h00-16h30: Sessions ordinaires et spéciales / Ordinary and Special Sessions

Salle / Room 50

Aula 1:À la racine de la connaissance, du vouloir et de l'agir / II : À la racine des puissances de l'âme, de la sensation et de la mémoire

Special Session proposed by Tobias Hoffmann
Sponsor: Centre Pierre Abélard, Sorbonne Université
Chair: Antoine Côté

Charles Ehret: *L'unitarisme radical de Thomas d'Aquin : la forme substantielle comme* radix potentiarum

Thomas d'Aquin apparaît généralement comme un penseur conciliant à la recherche d'une voie moyenne, à égale distance des positions extrêmes. Il y a toutefois un point d'ontologie sur lequel sa pensée apparaît à la fois intransigeante, contre-intuitive et, au moins en son siècle, minoritaire : la thèse de l'unité de la forme substantielle, d'après laquelle tout être est composé de matière première et d'une forme unique qui détermine intégralement cette matière, à tous ses niveaux et en toutes ses parties. Cette thèse fut abondamment discutée en son temps et ces discussions abondamment commentées au nôtre. Mais on laisse généralement hors-champ ce qui, pour Thomas, est un corollaire immédiat de cette thèse : la distinction entre la forme unique et les pouvoirs multiples qui s'y enracinent – la forme substantielle n'étant pas, selon Thomas, un pouvoir ou un principe d'opération, mais la racine des pouvoirs (*radix potentiarum*). C'est lorsqu'elle est

développée dans cette direction que la thèse de l'unité de la forme substantielle devient radicale. Radicale, d'abord, parce qu'elle produit une rupture nette avec l'aristotélisme dans lequel elle prétend pourtant s'inscrire. Radicale, ensuite, parce qu'elle conduit à une conception extrêmement « mince » de la forme comme pur corrélat de la matière première. D'après l'*unitarisme* de Thomas, la forme ne se rapporte pas à un corps déterminé selon une certaine configuration de ses parties. Mais d'après l'unitarisme *radical* de Thomas, la forme ne se rapporte pas non plus à des opérations déterminées dont elle serait le principe. Relative en elle-même ni à la structure du corps ni à sa fonction, la forme devient, dans sa relation exclusive à la matière première, un pur principe d'identité. La contribution proposée cherchera à mettre en avant la radicalité de l'unitarisme de Thomas en établissant trois points :

1. La distinction entre l'essence de l'âme et ses pouvoirs est une façon parmi d'autres de défendre l'unité de la forme substantielle, défense que Thomas adopte pour des motifs principalement théologiques.
2. La distinction entre l'essence de l'âme et ses pouvoirs est d'abord une distinction entre essence et pouvoir, au sens où l'âme elle-même, dans sa définition aristotélicienne, n'entre jamais en jeu dans les arguments de Thomas. Ces arguments impliquent une conception essentialiste (et non fonctionnaliste) de la forme substantielle : elle fait d'un être purement et simplement ce qu'il est, en deçà de ce qu'il peut.
3. Thomas propose *in extremis*, dans la *Somme de théologie* (I, q. 77, a. 1, co.), un argument en faveur de la distinction entre l'âme et ses puissances censé l'asseoir sur des bases aristotéliciennes. Nous proposerons une analyse nouvelle de cet argument qui montrera qu'il ne peut se réclamer d'Aristote qu'à en couper l'essentiel – littéralement, puisque Thomas coupe, lorsqu'il la cite, la définition aristotélicienne de l'âme, afin qu'elle l'autorise à poser sa distinction.

À la lumière de ces trois points, il apparaîtra que l'unitarisme de Thomas, en tant qu'il intègre une distinction entre l'unique forme du composé et ses différents pouvoirs, est un cas exemplaire d'emportement théorique, qui conduit l'Aquinate à déformer subrepticement, mais profondément, le cadre de l'ontologie aristotélicienne dans lequel il travaille.

Jean-Luc Solère: *À la racine de la connaissance : activité ou passivité dans la sensation ?*

Thomas d'Aquin insiste souvent, à la suite d'Aristote, sur le fait que toutes nos facultés sensorielles sont passives, c'est-à-dire sont par nature en puissance et ne peuvent être actualisées que par l'action d'une chose sur elles, de sorte qu'une sensation est une passion et une altération. Cependant, il parle aussi régulièrement des « actions » ou « opérations » des mêmes facultés. Comment cela est-il compatible avec la passivité qui leur est attribuée ? Afin de résoudre cette apparente contradiction, une clarification des principes de base est nécessaire. Je montrerai qu'une sensation ne consiste pas simplement dans l'actualisation d'une forme dans la faculté, comme selon le modèle trop simple du sceau imprimé dans la cire. Outre la mise en première actualité (formation) et en seconde actualité (information) de la faculté sensible, il faut reconnaître un troisième niveau d'actualité qui prend place dans le moment même de la sensation : l'opération propre de la faculté, qui ne se réduit pas au changement apporté par la chose perçue comme cause efficiente et formelle. C'est là ce que Thomas appelle « le jugement du sens », par lequel la cause extérieure de la sensation devient véritablement un objet de connaissance.

Véronique Decaix: *La mémoire des damnés chez Pierre de Jean Olivi*

Cette communication présentera des travaux préliminaires sur la question de la mémoire *post-mortem*. Elle propose d'étudier la nature et l'étendue de la mémoire personnelle dans l'état de séparation de l'âme vis-à-vis du corps. L'enjeu est de déterminer si les âmes séparées de leur corps de chair sont capables de se souvenir de leur vie temporelle et de se réapproprier leurs propres

actes passés. Il en va de la définition du sujet par sa réflexivité, ainsi que du fondement de la morale et de la possibilité du châtiment des péchés. Le cas-limite de la mémoire des damnés permet d'interroger le rapport entre mémoire sensitive et mémoire intellectuelle, ainsi que d'éclairer le processus de la mémoire (le lien entre mémoire de l'objet, mémoire des actes, mémoire de soi). En effet, la mémoire personnelle (celle de notre vie, de nos souvenirs, de notre vécu), parce qu'elle relève de la partie sensitive de l'âme, comme l'a montré Aristote (dans le *De memoria et reminiscentia*), ne semble pas pouvoir subsister à la séparation d'avec le corps de chair. Cependant, une telle distinction trop stricte entre mémoire sensitive et mémoire intellectuelle devient problématique dans le cadre théologique, puisqu'il faut établir que l'identité personnelle des âmes puisse perdurer *in patria* pour fonder l'imputabilité durable de la faute, ainsi que son châtiment dans l'au-delà. Nous nous proposons d'étudier cette question à partir d'un cas particulier, celui de l'âme des damnés (les âmes pécheresses) et des démons (les anges déchus). Nous nous intéresserons plus particulièrement à la question 44 du deuxième livre du *Commentaire aux sentences* de Pierre de Jean Olivi où il se demande si « les démons peuvent apprendre ou oublier quelque chose » (« Queritur an demones possint aliquid addiscere et oblivisci », *Summa quaestionum in Secundum librum Sententiarum*, qu. 44, ed. B. Jansen, Roma, Quaracchi, 1922, p. 683-763). Dans cette question, Olivi développe une théorie active de la mémoire comprise comme une force de réflexion permettant de revivifier ses propres actes passés et de se les réattribuer. Il propose également, comme l'a déjà souligné Alain Boureau, une conception radicale de l'oubli en montrant sa fonction nécessaire et salvifique dans la vie psychique des créatures intellectuelles. À cet égard, la pensée d'Olivi mise en regard avec celle de Thomas d'Aquin (*Summa theologiae*, *De malo*) et de Bonaventure pour mettre en lumière son originalité. De cette étude ressort la force de la mémoire, non plus limitée à sa fonction passive de conservation des images passées, mais placée au centre et à la racine de la vie psychique et émotionnelle des individus rationnels.

Salle / Room 3.01

Aula 2: Radical Theology

Special Session proposed by Thérèse Cory, Claire Murphy, Dominic LaMantia and Andreas Waldstein
Sponsor: University of Notre Dame
Chair: Thérèse Cory

Richard Cross: *Two Novel Christologies from the Early Fourteenth Century: John Went, OFM, and Hugh of Lawton, OP*

The early fourteenth century was a time of intense theological innovation and experimentation. This paper explores two such instances: Went's view that the Incarnation consists merely in bringing about human activities (and thus that God could, paradoxically, have become incarnate without assuming a human nature); and Hugh's view that incarnation consists in a special kind of indwelling, and thus that God was incarnate in any substance that his body was collocated with: for example, the wall of the room of one of the post-resurrection encounters.

Dartanyan Edmonds: Salve Radix*: A Suarezian Defense of Mary as Co-Redemptrix*

This paper will explore the Mariology of Francisco Suarez. In particular, the paper will discuss Suarez's understanding of Mary's congruent merit and explore its relation to Christ's mediation of grace. To do this, I will examine Suarez's claims that Mary cooperated both materially and formally with Christ's obedience on the cross and situate these claims within the context of his patristic and medieval sources.

Jim Pennell: *Aquinas and Scotus on the Immoralities of the Patriarchs*

One of the most vexing questions for medieval philosophers was how God could permit—no less command—the Old Testament patriarchs to commit otherwise immoral acts such as filicide, genocide, and bigamy. This essay examines how St. Thomas Aquinas and Bl. John Duns Scotus grappled with this question, and what their solutions offer in terms of thinking about God's relation to the moral law. Most approaches to the question of this relation tend to be apologetically 'explanandum-focused,' arguing that certain given features of morality (e.g., its overridingness) cannot be explained except by appeal to the existence of God. But as Mark Murphy has noted, the benefit of thinking through the puzzle posed by the 'immorality of the patriarchs' is that it instead forces one to think along 'explanans-focused' lines about how God's nature makes him an explainer for morality. For just as natural miracles that violate the laws of nature push us to consider more precisely God's relation to these very same laws (giving rise to metaphysical theories such as occasionalism or concurrentism), the "moral miracles" posed by the immoralities of patriarchs similarly drive us to consider more precisely the nature of God's relation to the moral law. This essay proposes to begin thinking through this question by turning to what Aquinas and Scotus have said on the topic.

Salle / Room 3.02

Aula 3: Across the Arabic and Latin Borders: Language, Thought and Institution 1: What are the Roots of Social Institutions?

Special Session proposed by Nadja Germann and Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen
Chair: Nadja Germann

Language, thought, and institution: All three seem to be good candidates when one is looking for the roots of what makes human beings humans. Human beings are animals endowed with language and thought. Moreover, they are social beings that create institutions—ranging from basic human interactions, such as communication with one another, through social constructs, like parties and schools, to all-pervading norms, such as a community's law or religion; institutions, which become integral parts of humans' everyday lives. The two sessions propose to investigate these three candidates from a cross-cultural perspective, in order to reveal similarities and differences across the Arabic-Islamic and Latin-Christian intellectual spheres. They bring together researchers from the universities of Basel and Freiburg (Breisgau) working together in the fields of philosophy of language, logic, practical philosophy, and the history of universities.

Amin Nayebpour: *Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī's (d. 950) (Re-)Conceptualization of Religion*

This paper examines Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī's *Book of Religion* with a view to understanding his claim that "religion is an imitation of philosophy" (*Attainment of Happiness*). In particular, we shall see how poetry, broadly understood, is the essential means for communicating to the city the opinions and actions that constitute the common custom or law in which it must firmly believe. That is to say, I attempt to clarify the implications of the necessity for the first ruler of a religious community to "bring the inhabitants to imagine everything in the city [...] so that what is described will be examples (*mithālāt*) that the inhabitants will follow in their ranks and actions" (*Book of Religion*). And we shall see the importance of the fact that the inhabitants of a religious community—its citizens—as religious are said to be following these images in their ranks and actions: The images are not understood as images of things, but rather as the things themselves. Nevertheless, although Fārābī considers such poetic likenesses to be, strictly speaking, false, we must be careful not to

think they are misleading in the same way as sophistry is: poetic examples guide towards truth, whereas sophistry leads away from it.

Hisashi Obuchi: *Common Law (sharīʿa ʿāmma) According to the Muslim Philosopher Zayn al-Dīn al-Kashshī (d. before 1228)*

In his chapter on ethics, Zayn al-Dīn al-Kashshī briefly states that besides prophetic laws, there is a "common law" (*sharīʿa ʿāmma*) all human beings observe. His principal source here quite likely is Avicenna, who in turn consulted Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. However, while Avicenna, for instance, maintains that a generally approved belief (*mashhūr*) "becomes" common law (*Dialectic*), Kashshī defends that one "infers" common law from *mashhūrāt*. Moreover, whereas Avicenna, in line with Aristotle, considers the common law to be "unwritten," specific laws, by contrast, "written," in Kashshī this reference to the "written–unwritten" distinction does not occur at all. In this paper, I intend to assess the approach to ethics of Kashshī, a hitherto lesser-known, post-Avicennian, Muslim philosopher, by investigating his notion of the common law, its conceptual root(s), and role accredited to logic and thought.

Karsten Engel: *Knowledge, Education, and the University as Roots for Becoming a Human Being: The Case of Magnus Hundt (d. 1519)*

To realize all the potential granted to them by creation, human beings need sciences, education, and, thus, also the institution of the university. This remarkable view united many magisters at late medieval universities. One of them was the Leipzig Thomist Magnus Hundt. Not only have some of his university- political sources survived, but also treatises that provide the philosophical justifications for the positions defende in these sources. In my talk, I will take a closer look at his expert report on a planned university reform in Leipzig from 1502 and analyze the justifications he offers for his views on university politics in his philosophical treatises. In doing so, I will examine some remarks from his *Tractatus de definitione* (between 1486-89), as well as from his commentary on the *Parvulus philosophiae naturalis* (1500), and—above all—his statements on the theory of science from the *Compendium totius logicae* (1493). As will become clear, the roots of the institution of the university are also roots for being human in general.

Salle / Room 3.03

Aula 4:Radical Thought in Secular Masters

Ordinary Session
Chair: Stephen Metzger

Ramon Guijosa Caldero: *Las implicaciones teológicas de un concepto radical: estudio del término "speculator" y su continuidad en la filosofía de Arnau de Vilanova*

El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo el estudio del concepto arnaldiano de "speculator",que encontramos en el texto Tractatus de tempore adventus Antichristi. Hay que tener en cuenta que el pensamiento de Arnau, además de haber supuesto una oposición férrea a la teología parisina del siglo XIII, es, ante todo, una crítica radical a la situación sociopolítica de la cristiandad de su época, anticipando incluso temas que serán centrales en la reforma protestante. Eso tuvo grandes implicaciones en el pensamiento de Arnau: su filosofía se encuentra inserta en un juego dialéctico entre radicalidad y autoridad. Teniendo esto en mente, hay que ver que el concepto de "speculator", concretamente,designaen la filosofía arnaldiana una forma muy concreta de aproximación a las Escrituras: el "speculator" es el encargado de iluminarse en la Biblia y de ver en ella un cálculo apocalíptico. Su tarea va mucho más allá de ser un mero exegeta tradicional; sin él la humanidad se encuentra con un gran problema, ya que presenta un desconocimiento total de la palabra divina en

su tiempo. El trabajo, en consecuencia, se centrará en un análisis tripartito de lo que el concepto de "speculator" representa. En primera instancia, se tratará de explorar el núcleo de este concepto arnaldiano: su actividad no se sirve de la cognición humana, sino de la revelación. A partir de esta tesis se pueden ver interrelacionadas los conceptos correlativos de la filosofía arnaldiana, especialmente la cognoscibilidad de la llegada del Anticristo. En segundo lugar, se tratará de explorar la radicalidad de dicho concepto en el seno de su contexto teológico. Para ello ilustraremos la ferviente diputa que tuvo lugar con los teólogos profesionales parisinos en torno el 1300, año en el cual Arnau de Vilanova publicaba el texto de Tractatus de tempore adventus Antichristi, intentando matizar algunas de las objeciones que los teólogos parisinos hicieron a sus tesis anteriormente formuladas en el tratado De adventu Antichristi, siendo la más contundente de ellas la acusación de temeridad. Finalmente, en tercer lugar, se tratará de hacer un balance de lo que supuso para el pensamiento arnaldiano la formulación del concepto de "speculator". El objetivo de este último apartado es ir al foco de la cuestión en el tema de la radicalidad de la filosofía arnaldianay su relación dialéctica con la autoridad. Para ello, se usará como eje vertebrador la continuidad del concepto en cuestión en la obra del autor, con tal de ver su ulterior modulación en sus próximos tratados. En conclusión, el objetivo último de la presente exposición es mostrar cuáles son las implicaciones filosóficas de la formulación de un pensamiento radical. Se busca ofrecer un fresco histórico del debate teológico que unas "temerarias" palabras suscitaron en el centro de la teología parisina, y cómo la recepción de las críticas de los teólogos profesionales de París moduló el pensamiento del autor, especialmente su concepto de "speculator".

Francesco Binotto: *How to Justify the Contingency of Effects in Nature: the Radicality of Siger of Brabant's Solution*

One of the central tenets of Siger of Brabant's strategy for justifying the contingency of effects in nature is the principle according to which, in an essentially-ordered series of causes, the modality (*i.e.* contingency or necessity) of the ultimate effect follows the modality of its proximate cause, and not that of remote causes (M). To achieve a fully understanding of the relevance of (M) within Siger of Brabant's antideterministic strategy, I will compare the role attribute to (M) by Thomas Aquinas with that attributed by Siger. First, I will focus on Aquinas's position. I will show that in *De Veritate*, q. 23, a. 5 and *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 19, a. 8 Aquinas rejects the idea that (M) is a sufficient condition for explaining the contingency of effects for three reasons: 1) explaining the contingency of effects *only* by referring to the contingency of their proximate causes implies that God could not produce any contingent effect without the help of the contingent secondary causes; 2) justifying the contingency of effects *only* by the contingency of their proximate causes leads one to conceive that the contingent status of an effect is independent of God's will; 3) assuming that the contingency of an effect results from the fallibility of secondary (proximate) causes undermines the perfection of God's will, conceiving it as a contingent and impedible cause. Aquinas's strategy consists in anchoring (M) in God's will: in so-far-as God wants effects to happen according to a certain modality (*i.e.* contingency or necessity), He adapts the modality of secondary causes to produce such effects, namely He provides necessary secondary causes to produce necessary effects and contingent secondary causes to produce contingent effects. After that, I will draw my attention to Siger's account on (M). I will prove that in his *De Necessitate et Contingentia Causarum* Siger polarizes Aquinas's position, attributing to (M) the role of sufficient condition for explaining the contingency of effects: the contingency of an effect can be *completely* justified by the contingency of its proximate cause. Such a position ascribes to secondary proximate causes the justification of the contingency of effects. In conclusion, I will demonstrate that the difference between the role attributed to (M) by Aquinas, first, and Siger, later, stems from two assumptions, explicitly refused by Aquinas but embraced by Siger: 1) the Neoplatonic principle that from the one derives nothing else but the one (*ab uno simplici procedit immediate unum*); 2) the First divine cause is not a voluntary but a natural agent,

namely an agent that operates necessarily inasmuch as it cannot choose to produce its proper effect or not.

Olaf Pluta: Pura ratione naturali dictante ponendum est: *Radical Philosophical Thinking in the Late Middle Ages*

On December 19, 1513, at the Fifth Lateran Council, Pope Leo X issued a papal bull condemning and rejecting all those who assert that the human soul is mortal and who affirm that this is *true* at least according to philosophy. In fact, some philosophers maintained that natural reason dictates that the human soul is naturally brought forth from the potency of matter like all animal souls and is hence mortal and that this statement is *true* in the natural light of reason (*verum in lumine naturali*). My paper aims at uncovering the radical philosophical thinking behind this statement and also discusses the institutional context which allowed arts masters to make this bold claim in their university lectures.

Salle / Room 3.05

Aula 5*: *Radical Jewish Reading of Averroes' Commentaries?

Special Session proposed by Steven Harvey
Chair: Reimund Leicht

Charles H. Manekin: *"Radical Empiricist"? Gersonides on the Knowledge of First Principles*

Levi Gersonides' reliance on experience as a trustworthy source of astronomical knowledge is well-known, as is his frequent appeal to experience to refute claims against astrology, divination, etc. Recently, Ruth Glasner has argued that Gersonides adopts a distinctively "radical empiricist position" in that he holds that first principles, and even common notions of mathematics, are known solely through experience. My talk will consider his views in the context of the Arabic Peripatetics and of his other views in his commentary on Averroes' *Middle Commentary on the Posterior Analytics*.

Roberto Gatti: *Four-Handed Noetics: Averroes Reflected in the Mirror of his Jewish Commentator Gersonides*

Throughout the period 1323-1325, Gersonides worked intensively upon some relevant issues of Aristotle's noetics (along with that of his Late Antiquity commentators) and that of Averroes. During this period, he composed commentaries on Averroes' *Epitome of the De anima* and on Averroes' and his son's three letters on Conjunction, as well as writing the first book of his *The Wars of the Lord*, which is devoted to the same issues dealt with in these commentaries. This lecture will address the following question: What kind of picture does Gersonides present of the evolution of significant themes of Averroes' noetics, such as the status of the material intellect and the distinction between the intelligibles qua universals and the pure intelligibles. My purpose will be to show that through Averroes' first Letter on Conjunction, Gersonides was able to attain knowledge of the noetics of the last period of this Arab thinker, the one preserved in the Latin version of the *Long Commentary on De anima*, but which was not available to Hebrew readers in the fourteenth century.

Michael Engel: *Universality and Particularity in Averroes' Middle Commentary on the* De anima *and in Subsequent Jewish Discussions*

Within the Averroist/Aristotelian epistemological scheme, questions concerning knowledge may be formulated in ontological terms. The question "how does one know" is, to an extent, equivalent to "what are the conditions which enable one to receive an intelligible in whatever we designate as her intellect." Deborah Black, for instance, has pointed to this fact while commenting on a passage from Averroes' commentary on the *Parva naturalia*: "[T]he focus of Averroes' cognitive psychology is not primarily to explain conscious awareness of the contents of one's mind, but rather, to specify the conditions under which the object known is elevated to the appropriate degree of abstractedness."(Deborah L. Black. Models of the Mind : *Metaphysical Presuppositions of the Averroist and Thomistic Accounts of Intellection* (*Documenti E Studi Sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 15 (2004), p. 31). In addition, Aristotelian authors, including Averroes himself, often explicitly refer to intelligibles as universals, and to thinking, as opposed to the lower faculties of human perception, as the reception of a universal. In short, the question of intellectual comprehension forces the Aristotelian philosopher to explain – if not to do away with – the seemingly problematic union of a particular human being with particular powers of understanding, and a universal intelligible. While scholars have often referred to this discussion in Averroes' long commentary on the *De anima*, I will focus on Averroes' earlier treatment of the subject in his paraphrase of that work, following the footsteps of Herbert A. Davidson while referring to understudied aspects in Averroes' discussion. In the second part of my talk, I will examine the impact of this discussion on subsequent generations of Jewish authors in the 14th and 15th centuries who touched upon epistemological issues in their philosophical treatises. More particularly, I will examine how the relation between a particular image and a universal intelligible served as a key factor in manifesting certain radical interpretations of immortality theories by Jewish Aristotelians in the late Middle Ages.

Salle / Room 3.06

Aula 6:Durand of St.-Pourçain

Ordinary Session
Chair: David Piché

Peter John Hartman: *The Relation-Theory of Mental Acts: Durand of St.-Pourçain and Richard Drayton on Mental Acts*

Sometimes I change my mind. Earlier, I was thinking about a rose, but now I am thinking about the raven outside my window. My mind changes and it undergoes discrete mental episodes or acts. In his early works (before 1309) Durand of St.-Pourçain had held the radical view that a mental act neither is nor requires a quality added to the soul and its innate powers. Episodic mental change is not a kind of qualitative change, but rather it is a mere relational change that occurs when a suitable object comes to be suitably present to the soul and its powers. On this view, a mental act is a mere relation. Call this the relation-theory of mental acts. Durand's view came to be censured by his order (the Dominicans) in 1314 and again in 1316, and he subsequently dropped it from his more mature writings. However, it was discussed by later thinkers, including Gregory of Rimini, who, when presenting it, includes several arguments for it that cannot be found in Durand's extant writings. As it turns out, these arguments can also be found in Walter Chattonand Adam Wodeham, both of whom are reporting the position that Wodeham's editors attribute to one Richard Drayton (1320s), whose writings are lost. Both Chatton and Wodeham argue, among other things, that such a position runs up against certain articles condemned already in 1277. What is more, this view is the view that John Mire-court (who plagiarizes it from Wodeham's text) comes to be censured for holding as 'plausible' in 1347. So the relation-theory of mental acts is censured or condemned at least four times: 1277, 1314, 1316, and 1347.Mirecourt's version of the view, further, seems to have

fueled the attacks on it we find in John Buridan and Nicole Oresme, among others, where it comes to be associated with the 'ancients before Aristo-tle' (particularly Parmenides, Melissus, and Democratus), on the one hand, insofar it can be extended so as to deny that any non-relational accidental change requires a new non-relational accident added to the subject of that change, that is, that there are no non-relational accidents, and Plato and Macrobius, on the other hand, insofar as it denies that there is any 'new' quality added to the soul, and so seems to be committed to innate ideas. In this talk, I will first set out the view itself, looking both at Du-rand and Drayton's version of it. I will then look at these two objections that later thinkers raised against it, and show how Durand and Drayton might have responded to them.

Guy Guldentops: *Durand, Denys, Diego et quelques autres aïeux de Pangloss, ou l'optimisme radical*

Il est bien connu qu'un certain mépris du monde caractérise la théologie chrétienne: selon la 1reÉpître de Jean (5, 19) «le monde entier se trouve sous le pouvoir du Mauvais», et Pierre Lombard, qui paraphrase Cassiodore, ajoute que « le monde est le lieu des maux». À la fin du Moyen Âge, l'humaniste Coluccio Salutati résume cette antimondanité, quand il dépeint le monde comme «le lac des misères», tout au plus comme « l'auberge de notre pèlerinage». Il serait facile de citer bien d'autres passages qui expriment une vision du monde qu'on désigne souvent comme « le pessimisme médiéval». Or, s'il est vrai, comme l'a fait remarquer Jean Delumeau, que « le miracle de la civilisation occidentale est qu'elle vécut toutes ces peurs [spécialement les multiples horreurs qui terrifiaient l'Europe du XIVe jusqu'au XVIIe siècle] sans se laisser paralyser par elles», c'est probablement aussi parce qu'un grand nombre de penseurs médiévaux défendaient ce qu'on pourrait appeler un optimisme radical. Cet optimisme repose principalement sur cinq thèses qui remontent à la philosophie ancienne (et à la Bible): (1) la thèse centrale de la métaphysique platonicienne selon laquelle « le dieu a voulu que toutes choses fussent bonnes»; (2) la thèse aristotélicienne qu'« il vaut mieux être que ne pas être»; (3) une conception téléologique de la nature, culminant dans un anthropocentrisme chrétien; (4) une théorie perfectionniste du cosmos; (5) le clair-obscur cosmo-théologique, qui considère le mal comme un élément intégral de la beauté de l'univers. Dans notre contribution, nous examinerons la question de savoir si le monde est parfait et/ou si Dieu pourrait améliorer le monde (évidemment, cette question est reliée au problème du mal). En particulier, nous analyserons les réponses de Durand de Saint Pourçain en les comparant avec celles de quelques-uns de ses opposants (on pourrait aborder notamment Durandellus, Pierre Auriol, Denys le Chartreux, Diego Ruiz de Montoya et Sante Mariale). Cette analyse montrera que, même si Bonaventure Columbia raison de souligner l'unanimité fondamentale des scolastiques dans ce débat, il faut néanmoins noter des différences assez importantes entre leurs positions respectives.

Francesca Bonini: *Durandus on the Incarnation: Issues and Radical Text-Corrections in his* Sentences *Commentary*

Durandus de Sancto Porciano can be counted among those medieval authors who expressed "radical" views on several theological problems. The first redaction of his *Sentences* commentary, where he did not follow Aquinas' authority, caused the reaction of his order, Peter of Palude's harsh criticism, and the well-known condemnation.

Among the condemned articles we find some passages from the third book of his *Sentences* commentary, where Durandus deals with incarnation. Durandus' theses and his radical corrections to the text will analyzed.

Salle / Room 3.07

Aula 7:John Duns Scotus and the Will

(Special Session proposed by Francesco Fiorentino/1
Chair: Francesco Fiorentino

Paola Muller: *Freedom, Will, and Time in John Duns Scotus*

In the definition of the will's freedom as "power to act or not to act" the temporality problem is implicit: if one defines freedom as the power A and notA before the action and wants to maintain that the action remains free even in the very moment in which one acts, one must abandon the idea of the indivisibility of the very instant in which one acts, based on the modality's statistical model, proper to the Aristotelian perspective. This implies that a will can only act freely if it exists in a certain duration so that it can pass from a state A to a non-A state in a succession of instants. This implies the (conditional) necessity of the present and the indeterminacy of the future, the *locus* of contingency. Studies in the history of logic have shown that at the end of the 13th century a new conception of the modality is inaugurated, whereby contingency is no longer defined by successive states of a temporal axis, but in a synchronic way whereby the same instant can be subdivided according to the *signa*. It is John Duns Scotus who applies the theory of change and the coexistence of opposites in the same instant to the theme of will and free will. He redefines contingency in non- Aristotelian terms, finding the reason not so much in the temporal precedence of the cause over the effect, but in how contingently the cause exercises its causality. Is the indeterminacy of the will, i.e. the power of opposites *in illo istanti et pro illo istanti* logical or real? Since freedom represents the will's capacity to determine the end and to act (or not act) in accordance with it, is there room for indifference?

Francesco Fiorentino: *Social Peace, Private Property and Free Agreement according to John Duns Scotus*

The Holy Scriptures describe the Edenic state in which the goodness of man implies the communion of goods without any positive norm; but Adamite sin, by changing the human nature instituted into the fallen one, favors the distinction of goods and therefore private property in the postlapsary state. Thomas Aquinas leads private property back to natural law expanded by addition so as to create a secondary natural right, that is, deduced from the primary one with the use of natural reason, eternal and unchangeable with human right which is hierarchically inferior; this secondary natural right, in the intentions of Thomas, is aimed at limiting human lust. At the end of the thirteenth century, the nascent legislation on economic exchanges, modeled on *charitas*, contributed to profoundly innovating the sphere of the valuation of goods. This innovation becomes perceptible in John Duns Scotus who, in the distinction 15 of the fourth book of *Ordinatio* and *Reportata Parisiensia*, sees the exchange of the market as a form of mutual assistance, with the free and voluntary regulation of the right price, and inserts the private property in positive law, freely established by the social community following the decay of man; this norm arises after the revocation of the natural law of the community of goods. Some studies have focused on private property law in Scotus (cfr. F. Bottin, *Giovanni Duns Scoto sull'origine della proprietà*, in «Rivista di Storia della Filosofia», 52 (1997), pp. 47-59; A. J. Lisska, *Aquinas's theory of natural law. An analytic reconstruction,* Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996; R. Lambertini, *Il consenso delle volontà: Filippo, Bonifacio e il pensiero politico del Dottor Sottile*, in G. Lauriola (ed.), *Antropologia ed etica politica*, Levante, Bari 1995, pp. 32-233; G. Stratenwerth, *Die Naturrechtslehre des Johannes Duns Scotus*, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Göttingen 1951). However, some questions remain to be focused: the legislative void, originating from the revocation of the natural law in the postlapsary state; the emergence of the positive norm of private property; the foundation of this rule on prudence and authority; the definition of prudence as *affectio iustitiae*, which falls within the sphere of the will and not that of the

intellect; the definition of the legislator's authority following the *pactum* theory; the *pactum* theory as mutual consent and free choice of the will of strangers and bearers of subjective rights; the revocability of the rule of private property for the protection of social peace and the care of what is proper; the safeguarding of the possession of the poor thanks to this norm. This contribution aims to precisely focus all these questions so as to reconstruct Scotus' original and innovative thought regarding social peace, private property and mutual consent. In this way, the radicalism of Scotus's thought will emerge, inaugurating a new conception of law that is autonomous from natural law and divine precepts, separated from the moral value of the law and based on the free and voluntary agreement of the contracting parties.

Ernesto Dezza: *Hell: the Radical Impossibility of Freedom of the Damned according to John Duns Scotus*

In the context of medieval eschatology, John Duns Scotus's comment on distinction 44 of the fourth book of Peter Lombard's *Sentences* stands out for its approach to the problem of the will of evil spirits and the damned. Instead of raising questions about the location of hell or the typology of torments, as does, for example, Bonaventure, Scotus focuses his and our attention exclusively on the radical coercion of the freedom of the damned, who are prevented from exercising their will in order to leave the place of their conviction. Scotian analysis focuses on the sadness that characterizes their condition, due to being forcibly bounded in hellfire and forced to consider it eternally as the only object of knowledge of their torment. They cannot do otherwise, because a cause superior to them, that is the divine will, prevents them from orienting their volition in the opposite direction to the object by which they are delimited and towards which they are obliged to direct their understanding. Hence, they cannot decide either hellfire can be a pleasant object for them or not: they are deprived of the freedom of willing and unwilling. Because they cannot dominate the object to which they are subjected, they find no peace. In the paper, this Scotian theory will be explained, seeking its motivation, and inferring its consequences also for the analysis of the human condition *pro statu isto*.

Salle / Room 3.08

Aula 8:Averroes and al-Farabi in Arabic, Hebrew and Latin

Special Session proposed by Richard C. Taylor and Luis López-Farjeat
Sponsor: *Aquinas and 'the Arabs' International Working Group* (AAIWG)
Chair: Richard C. Taylor

Fouad Ben Ahmed: *An Islam without Theology: Does Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 1198) Have a Radical Position towards Muslim Theologians?*

Any reader of Ibn Rushd's works, al-Kashf ʿan manāhij al-adilla fī ʿaqāid al-milla, Faṣl al-maqāl, Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, as well as some of his other works, may be surprised by his drastic criticism of Muslim theology (kalām) and theologians (mutakallimūn). He does not recognize the authenticity of theology as a religious discipline alongside other disciplines, nor the scientific character of its discourse. Theologians in the writings mentioned above are neither among the elite (khawāṣ) and scholars (ʿulamāʾ), nor among the jumhūr and common people (ʿawām), but rather they are depicted as "parasites", a source of the evils inflicted on the sharia. They are either diseased, their moods are not moderated, unlike the rest of the normal people, or they are false physicians and theology is more like the art of sophistry with which theologians try to impose their misguided interpretations on common people as being right. The result is that Ibn Rushd considers theology as a useless science. Even more, the harm it has caused to the sharia is far greater than its alleged benefit. In this paper, I will discuss the details Ibn Rushd's harsh position on theology and theologians and try to understand it in its context. Was this radical position of Ibn Rushd a decisive

one? Did he really conceive an Islam without theology and theologians? This is what I will investigate.

Yehuda Halper: *Dialectical Arguments and Radicalism: From Averroes to his Hebrew Interpreters*

Averroes ends his Decisive Treatise by praising God for providing a middle way to attaining knowledge of Him that is more than simply accepting the simple meaning of the Quran, but less than the method of the Mutakallimūn which he says is a tashghīb, "overturning," "inciting to discord," "stirring up change," or, in today's terms, "radicalism." Earlier in the work, Averroes identifies the Mutakallimūn with the use of dialectical arguments in interpreting the Quran and levies great criticism against using such arguments with the general public. Those unable to use dialectic arguments properly are apt to make mistakes in their understanding of God and be led to heresy (kufr). Since those who lead other to heresy are heretics, the radical Mutakallimūn can also be charged with heresy. This condemnation of radical dialectical arguments also extends to Averroes Commentary on Plato's Republic, where Averroes portrays an ideal state that not only has no Mutakallimūn, but also has no place for dialectical arguments, even in support of propositions that can be demonstrated, except for training potential philosophers. Such philosophical training is kept among potential philosophers and attempted with caution. That is, Averroes' ideal state is weary of and seeks to avoid the potential radicalism of dialectical arguments. Further, in his Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, Averroes focuses primarily on using dialectic to train philosophers. While he notes that dialectical arguments can appear stronger in the eyes of the public than poetic or rhetorical arguments, he refers those seeking to understand the political uses of dialectic to his political work, i.e., to his Commentary on Plato's Republic. Averroes, that is, considers dialectical arguments to be potentially radical if used among the public and seeks to avoid their political application. Though otherwise faithful, Hebrew commentators on Averroes had an opposite view of dialectical arguments. While Averroes saw dialectical arguments as connected to radicalism and leading to heresy, his Hebrew commentators saw such arguments as conservative and useful for protecting traditional values against heresy. Such uses are manifest in Jacob Anatoli's calls to learn dialectic to combat Christians and Jewish heretics and in Shem Tov Falaquera's use of dialectic to promote philosophical inquiry among the Jewish public. Indeed, even Averroes' reference to the tashghīb of the Mutakallimūn came into the anonymous Hebrew translation as rom hamedabrim, "the exalted state of the speakers." Additionally, Joseph Ibn Kaspi does not include Averroes' criticisms of dialectic in his summary of the Commentary on Plato's Republic. Further, an anonymous super-commentary on Averroes' Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Topics includes extensive discussions as to how to apply dialectical argumentation to the beliefs of the public. Indeed, the commentator is most concerned with preserving traditional beliefs against radicalism and sees dialectic as a means to do so.

Tracy Wietecha: *Radical Thinking about Ethics? Albert the Great on the Relationship between Ethics and Metaphysics*

Albert the Great is the only Dominican, that we know of, to have written two commentaries on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: the earlier Super Ethica (1250 – 1252) and the later Ethica (ca. 1262). The defining difference between these two commentaries lies, I argue, in how Albert envisions the place of ethics within his greater scientific corpus. Beginning in 1251 with his commentary on Aristotle's Physics, Albert the Great began his project of commenting on the Aristotelian natural sciences of living beings. Through this commentary project, Albert set down – in both theory and practice – an ordered scientific program of study which would lead to the telos or end of the human being in the perfected intellect of acquired intellect. Thus, the natural sciences, which lead to the study of metaphysics, are directly conducive to the attainment of human happiness in this life. Further, the telos of the human being, from which happiness ensues, is a self-

perfective telos. It is something human beings can reach through their own efforts. But, it is not only something human beings can do, but also something it seems that human beings ought to do. This ethical question, that arises from Albert's ordered scientific program of study, is not a question of the division of the sciences. Albert made a clear three-fold division of the sciences in his Physica: the rational sciences (such as logic), the real sciences (mathematics, natural sciences, and metaphysics), and the practical sciences (ethics and politics). It is rather a question of relationship, a relationship which Albert made more evident throughout his commentary project. For instance, Albert connects ethics and noetics for the first time in his commentary on De anima (ca. 1254). By the time he writes *Ethica*, Albert identifies contemplative happiness with the acquired intellect, the self-perfective telos of his scientific program of study. As a practical science, ethics plays an instrumental role; it is an aide to proper character and moral formation needed to undergo the long and arduous path of scientific study. As such, it seems that ethics should be studied before metaphysics. In *Ethica*, however, Albert appears to embrace a kind of radical thinking about ethics. No longer concerned with establishing ethics as a doctrina, as he was in his earlier *Super Ethica*, Albert begins his second ethical commentary by following the lead of Avicenna. Albert reinterprets Avicenna's description of ethics as the "last part of metaphysics," in order to establish the relationship between ethics and metaphysics. In this paper I argue that the defining feature between Albert's two ethical commentaries is how Albert views the relationship between ethics and metaphysics. In *Ethica*, Albert views ethics as about perfection – perfection of the human being in the acquired intellect. The science of ethics is to be studied after metaphysics.

Salle / Room 3.09

Aula 9:Radical Controversies

Ordinary Session
Chair: Alexander Fidora

Gunay Heydarli: *Religious Debates and Exchanges in the Safavid Empire: Polemical Treatises in Defense of Christianity and Islam*

In the 17th century the representatives of four missionary orders penetrated into the Safavid lands as ambassadors. Safavid Shah Abbas I gave them permission to receive military assistance against the Ottoman Empire[1]. These missionaries were involved in religious debates with Shia and Armenian clergymen. These disputes led to the emerging of treatises on Christianity and Islam. During this period the ambassadors coming from European countries had presented Bibles as a gift to Shah Abbas I. The Carmelite Juan Tadeo san Eliseo started a new project to translate the Psalms and Gospels in Persian. At the same time the Zayn Al-Abidin Al-Alavi wrote the treatises on refutation of anti-islamic works. "Lavami-yi rabbaniyyah fi radd al-shubah al-Nasraniyyih (Divine Clarifications for the Confutation of Christian Doubts)" was written in response to an anti-islamic treatise from Pietro della Valle[2]. Al-Alavi also wrote "Misqali safa" against Jeromo Xavier's treatise[3]. On the other side Bonaventura Malvasia and Filippo Guadagnoli were the first authors to refute Al-Alavi's work in Rome. Guadagnoli's work "Apologia" was criticized by Pietro della Valle due to lack of knowledge of Muslim sources[4]. From the sources it is clear that some friars from the Augustinian Order converted to Islam. For example, Antonio de Jesus converted to Islam and was named Ali Qulu Jadid al-Islam. The Carmelite friars sent a letter to the Pope in Rome asking them to allow them to write and translate a work that contradicts Ali Gulu Jadid's comments and to hand it over to the Safavid shah[5]. Ali Gulu Jadid al-Islam in his "Sayf al -muʾminin" criticized Guadagnoli "Apology", accusing him of ignorance of Arabic philology and spreading these misconceptions from Rome to India, Uzbekistan and the Maghreb countries as "assistants to Satan." In comparison with Guadagnoli, It should be noted that some Christian polemicists approached the Qurʾan differently. They did not call it "proscribed" and "dismissive". For example, Paul of Antioch cites that verses of Surah al Maʾida (5:48) and Surah Yunus (10:94) are evidences of divine origin of the

Qurʾan. The Dominican friar, Paolo Piromalli wrote a treatise in Persian called "Risala der bayan-itikadat wa madzhab-i kalimat Allah-i isavi" and introduced it to Shah Abbas II[6]. In this research paper, we will find answers to these questions: How did religious debates contribute to intercultural development? Why were there controversial issues between Christian and Muslim scholars?

Mokdad Arfa: *Des métaphores sexuelles pour illustrer l'idée de radicalité dans la pensée islamique médiévale*

L'une des questions principales posées à cette rencontre est celle de s'interroger sur la pertinence de l'application du concept de radicalité à la philosophie médiévale. Dans un contexte islamique, nous répondons à cette question par l'affirmative, et ce, dans les deux sens du terme: celui de l'ambition de la fondation ultime qui veut en référer aux racines et aux principes, et celui de la qualification d'une démarche qui veut dégager les positions limites, s'y tenir et en assumer les conséquences. Les domaines qui sont susceptibles d'être considérés sous cet angle sont multiples et variés. En montrant l'étendue et la richesse de l'enquête éventuelle, nous nous contenterons de donner quelques exemples qui illustrent l'idée. Nous évoquerons des théories puisées dans ʿIlm al-Kalām (Théologie musulmane) par lesquelles les Mutakallimūn entendaient apporter des solutions aux problématiques classiques dans la discipline. Cela correspondait à autant de positions doctrinales prises sur les mêmes lieux théoriques. Les historiens classiques n'ont pas manqué de procéder à la classification de ces positions et de préciser leur variation en les positionnant sur une sorte d'échelle censée jauger leur teneur en radicalité. Par l'application de cette échelle, on se contentait dans la plupart des cas de mesurer la variation intra-disciplinaire sans dépasser les limites de la discipline. Des fois, on cherchait à être trans-disciplinaire, en convoquant simultanément plusieurs disciplines, dont la falsafa (philosophie), en sollicitant leur réponse à la même question et en signalant les différends entre les protagonistes. Le sérieux qu'ils affichaient dans leur quête des principes pour garantir à leur classification objectivité, rigueur et exhaustivité, s'accompagnait de notes d'humour en usant de métaphores sexuelles dans une intention dépréciative.

Görge Hasselhoff: *Ramon Martí as a Radical Thinker*

The Catalan Dominican friar Ramon Martí (ca. 1220 - ca. 1294) wrote several polemical treatises against Islam and Judaism. It is remarkable how many non-Christian sources he employed to underline his arguments. Nonetheless, his first writings, an explanation of the Apostolic Creed, a treatise on Mohammed and a treatise against Judaism, were written in Latin only. Yet, in his last and most mature work Pugio Fidei (Dagger of Faith, ca. 1278-94) he not only employed Latin translations of hitherto unavailable Arabic or Hebrew sources. In arguing against "all enemies of Christianity" he instead quoted Hebrew, Aramaic, and Arabic sources accompanied by Latin ad-hoc translations. Already that makes him a radical theophilosophical writer. In my talk I will present several examples from the Pugio to demonstrate that Martí is not only radical with regard to formal questions ("radical writer"), but also in the choice of sources and the line of argument with regard to the knowledge of God and anthropology ("radical thinker").

Salle / Room 3.10

Aula 10: Radical Thinking about the Nature of Evil

Special Session proposed by T. Parker Haratine
Sponsor: University of St. Andrews
Chair: T. Parker Haratine

Eileen C. Sweeney: *The Source of Moral Evil: Passion vs. the Will*

Augustine's *Confessions* puts forward a complex moral psychology. I explore the tensions in the Augustinian account of the source of moral evil reflected in later medieval accounts of sin as rooted either (i) in the passions of the sensitive appetite or (ii) in the will in sins of 'malice.' The emphases in the later accounts of Aquinas, Ockham, and Suárez reflect different aspects of Augustine's account of the genesis of sin, which are in turn rooted in his account of evil as privation.

Christina Van Dyke: *This Hurts Me More Than It Hurts You: Catherine of Siena on Evil and Sin*

Catherine of Siena begins her *Dialogue* (1377-78) with the observation that the best way for someone to acquire truth is "humble prayer, grounded in the knowledge of herself and of God." In this paper, I argue that the contrast between humble knowledge of self (self-knowledge) and prideful love of self (selfishness) is central to Catherine of Siena's account of sin and its effects.

Thomas Williams: *"Be anxious for nothing": Anselm on Fearing Evil*

In On the Fall of the Devil Anselm considers the paradox of fearing evil. Evil is nothing (in some sense), and yet (again in some sense) we are right to fear it. I explore this paradox in detail, drawing from a wider selection of Anselm's writings, and examining the function and limits of the privation theory of evil as Anselm understands it.

Salle / Room 3.11

Aula 11: Roger Bacon's Conception of Error

Special Session proposed by Elena Băltuță
Chair: Elena Băltuță

The principal goal of our panel is to reconstruct Roger Bacon's conception of error. We will do this from the perspectives of sensory cognition, theology, and medicine. The talks are built on the assumption that what Bacon conceives of errors reveals what he thinks of knowledge, be it in the domain of sensory cognition, theology, or medicine. Elena Baltuta analyses Bacon's conception of error in the case of sensory cognition. She then uses the outcome to reconstruct his conception of perceptual knowledge. Giora Hon focuses on the way in which Bacon approaches the issue of theological errors and offers a comparative analysis between his and Francis Bacon's notions of error. Hon's main goal is to reconstruct what knowledge is for the two Bacons and to show how the field of knowledge developed over the ages. Meagan Allen provides a detailed analysis of Bacon's conception of errors and their classification in *De erroribus medicorum*. Her main goal is to reconstruct the relation between Bacon's conception of error and his approach of *prolongatio vitae*.

Giora Hon: *Causes of Human Errors. From Bacon to Bacon. A Changing Perspective*

Roger Bacon (1220–1292) and his namesake some three and a half centuries later, Francis (1561–1626), were concerned with human errors and their sources. The celebrated scholars developed two different theories of error. The different conceptions of error underlying the respective theories reflect in an illuminating way the changing understanding of what knowledge is about.

Specifically, at stake were—in the case of Roger Bacon—errors pertaining to theology, and—in the case of Francis Bacon—errors pertaining to the emerging scientific knowledge. However, while the differences are striking, the paper will aim to show the surprising similarities. A few philosophical claims about the nature of error will be drawn from this comparative historical study.

Elena Băltuță: *Understanding Knowledge by Understanding Error: Roger Bacon's Notion of Error in* Perspectiva

Even if our eyes are healthy, we cannot see in the dark or on a thick foggy day. We cannot see Galaxies that are beyond our observable universe, we cannot see Uranus with our own eyes any more than we can see the colonies of diatoms that populate the waters or any of the objects around the corner of the room in which we happen to be. All these examples represent in fact the eight conditions necessary for accurate visual perceptions presented by Roger Bacon in his *Perspectiva*. However, even if these conditions are met, visual error can still creep in through the psychological door. According to Bacon, we have two kinds of senses divided according to the kinds of sensibles they perceive. The particular senses, the common sense, and the imagination perceive the so called external sensibles, while the estimation, the memory, and the cogitative power perceive the internal sensibles. In the use of all these senses, we do not simply perceive the sensibles, we also discriminate or form judgments about them. It is due to such psychological operations that we can fall into error. My talk is built on the premise that negative explanations (x is not the case) are just as useful tools as positive explanations (x is the case). With this premise in mind, I aim to trace the contours of perceptual knowledge as they emerge from Bacon's analysis of errors in *Perspectiva*. First, I discuss his classification of errors by taking into account the various violations of the eight conditions of perception. Secondly, I analyze the various types of errors that emerge from the psychological operations. Thirdly, I extract a definition of error. Fourthly, from this definition I infer the features of perceptual knowledge.

Meagan S. Allen: *The Classification of Errors in Roger Bacon's* De erroribus medicorum

One of the many areas of interest to the Franciscan polymath Roger Bacon was the *prolongatio vitae*, or extreme prolongation of human life. With the correct knowledge, one could extend human life by decades, even centuries, reaching even the lifespans of the Old Testament Patriarchs. According to Bacon, there were a number of different fields that taught how to prolong human life, with varying degrees of success. The first, of course, was the field of medicine. But medicine neglected many things that are necessary for its completion, to the detriment of the doctors and their patients. For this reason, Bacon wrote *De erroribus medicorum*, in which he claimed to lay out the 36 errors of the doctors. In fact, there was a certain amount of distrust towards the medical profession in many of Bacon's works. Though he did not complete his task of identifying 36 unique errors, the entire work was devoted to pointing out the various failings of the medical profession, largely focusing on what related fields and skills practicing physicians are ignorant of. In this talk, I will explore the nature of these errors, how Bacon chose to classify them, and what, if anything, his understanding of what constitutes "error" demonstrates about his approach to the *prolongatio vitae* as a whole.

16h30-17h00: Coffee Break

17h00-19h00: Sessions ordinaires et spéciales/ Ordinary and Special Sessions

Salle / Room 50

Aula 1:Radical Fourteenth-Century Jewish Philosophical Teachings

Special Session proposed by Steven Harvey
Chair: Daniel J. Lasker

Silvia Di Donato: *Du côté de la philosophie: Yedaya ben Abraham Bedersi et la réception de l'Epître de l'intellect d'Al-Farâbî*

This communication aims to take into account the paraphrase of Al-Farabi's *Epistle on the intellect* by Yeda'ayah ben Abraham Bedersi ant to explore the philosophical influence it shows and its doctrinal goal, given the historical and doctrinal context in which it was composed notably giving the controversy on philosophy (opposing traditionalists and 'radical' philosophers), but also given the intention of the book, expressed in the introduction, to make fundamental texts on the soul available for Hebrew readers. It shall be the occasion to consider if and to what extent radicality could be noticed in such a work, through its purpose, its topic, the way its author uses the doctrinal and textual background that he belonged to, even in the simple aim of making available some fundamental texts and ideas. Indeed, could the idea of radicality indicate any aspects of the doctrinal tension of that period or is it an artificial (albeit useful) academic categorisation *a posteriori*?

Eric Lawee: *Byzantium in the Late Middle Ages: A Last Redoubt of Medieval Hebrew Philosophic Biblical Scholarship*

From the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries, segments of Byzantine Jewry underwent a philosophic turn facilitated by the arrival of new methods and ideas from Muslim Spain and southern France. My paper surveys this unknown—and certainly too little studied—development, focusing on works of biblical interpretation. To illustrate trends that arose with the impact of western European Sefardic-Provençal rationalism in the Byzantine East, I give special attention to *Revealer of Secrets*, a radically rationalist Torah commentary by a fourteenth-century Maimonidean Eleazar Ashkenazi ben Natan Ha-Bavli. The work disappeared in the plunder of Jewish cultural treasures in Vienna by the Nazis. Assumed to be lost, it has recently come to light in its current home, the Russian State Military Archives. More broadly, the paper proposes and very briefly illustrates analytic categories salient to exploration of Hebrew philosophic exegesis in the Byzantine sphere, including:

- the manner in Abraham Ibn Ezra and Maimonides pointed biblical commentary in new directions. For example, Eleazar Ashkenazi seeks a remedy for what he takes to be the theological and moral scandals that arise when the the Binding of Isaac narrative in Genesis 22 (Akedah) is read according to its plain sense. He finds his solution in a technique favored by many radical rationalists from which critics of philosophy strongly recoiled: the assignment of narratives traditionally understood as describing events in the external world to the sphere of prophetic visions.
- categorization of interpretive techniques favored by radical rationalist commentators such as philosophic allegory, postulation of scriptural hyperbole, and naturalistic explanation of seemingly supernatural events.
- eschewal by Byzantines exegetes of the studied obfuscation often practiced by Maimonides and western European philosophic writers. This exotericism is often accompanied by acerbic rhetoric directed at "enemies" of philosophy. For example, the defender of Ibn Ezra and Maimonides, Zeharyah ben Moshe, claims that Nahmanides "confabulated insolently with regard to the sage [ibn Ezra]"; that Nahmanides has "lying lips," is full of "pride and contempt," and more.

- related to this last point: frontal assaults on the most venerable Bible commentators of the earlier Jewish Middle Ages, Rashi and Nahmanides.
- opposition to radical philosophy in the East as expressed in works of biblical commentary. For example, Judah ben Shemaryah, the first known Ashkenazic scholar to immigrate to Crete, curses "the philosophers" for denying the world's createdness and holds Maimonides culpable for "leaning" in their direction.

In sum, the paper provides a tour d'horizon of philosophically inspired Byzantine Hebrew biblical interpretation, a phenomenon that awaits its scholarly redeemers.

Yair Shiffman: *Ibn Ṭufayl, Moshe Narboni, and Their Radical Political Philosophies*

Ibn Ṭufayl, in his philosophical novella, *Ḥayy Ibn Yaqdhān*, tells us the story of Ḥayy, who was raised by a gazelle on a secluded island and on his own comes to learn physics and metaphysics and eventually to attain ultimate human intellectual and mystical perfection. Near the end of the tale, Asal, a religious scholar seeking solitude travels to the island and encounters Ḥayy, whom he teaches about his religion. Ḥayy wonders why this religion teaches its truths via similitudes and parables and avoids clear disclosure of its truths. He eventually learns why this is so and he and Asal spend the rest of their life on the secluded island in true worship of God.

Among the philosophical questions that arise from *Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān* are:
- Is the ultimate human perfection philosophical, mystical, or political?
- Can the multitude achieve highest human perfection? Is religion their best guide to the perfection they can achieve?
- What is the role of the philosopher in the city?
- Is human society needed for the attainment of highest perfection? Or can it be achieved in solitude?
- Is the best life for the philosopher to be found in seclusion, apart from the city?

My lecture will focus on the fourteenth-century Jewish Aristotelian philosopher, Moshe Narboni, and his Hebrew commentary on Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān*. I will suggest to what extent his answers to these questions agree or part from those of Ibn Ṭufayl and, in particular, to what extent he adopted the radical political teaching regarding the solitary life.

Warren Zev Harvey: *Crescas' Theory of Creation*

All the medieval Aristotelians held that the world was created spatially finite, but they were divided as to whether it was also created temporally finite. The conservatives held it was created temporally finite, while the radicals held it is eternal *a parte ante* and *a parte post*. Crescas was an anti-Aristotelian and anti-Maimonidean philosopher, who explicitly proclaimed a theologically conservative agenda of basing Judaism on prophecy and tradition, not on Aristotle. His three prime Aristotelian targets were Averroes, Maimonides, and Gersonides. Against all the Aristotelians, Crescas argued for a spatially infinite universe, in which are continually created infinite worlds. Surprisingly, he sided with the radical Aristotelians, and argued for an eternal universe. Isaac Albalag, the radical Aristotelian philosopher, had argued that a God who creates an eternal universe is greater than one who creates a temporally finite one. Crescas went one big step further. He argued that God's infinite greatness requires that He be conceived as having created a universe that is infinite in both space and time (*ḥiddush temidi*). A God who creates a finite world has created something imperfect. Crescas' theory of creation (*Light of the Lord*, IIIa, 1) was based on his radical critique of the Aristotelian theories of space and time, and his forceful and detailed rejection of the Aristotelian *horror vacui* (ibid., I, 2, 1).

Salle / Room 3.01

Aula 2: Hétérodoxies ibériques et au-delà. Pour revisiter Menéndez Pelayo/1

Special Session proposed by José Meirinhos and Pedro Mantas-España
Sponsor: Instituto de Filosofia da Universidade do Porto
Chair: Paula Oliveira e Silva

Pedro Mantas-España: *Radical Thought. Roots of the Spanish Tradition against Heterodoxy*

As stressed in the 'SIEPM XV International Conference' call for papers, *radical* alludes to 'innovative, different, ground-breaking' thought. Indeed, Medieval y Renaissance heterodoxies sometimes acted as ground-breaking, as innovative paths for the introduction of new ideas or the recovering of silenced ones. However, heterodoxy was and still is largely repressed, sometimes simply ignored. The Spanish tradition of contesting and repressing heterodox is well known. We search for perceptible roots of the Spanish tradition against heterodox. In our searching for those 'roots' we cannot but recall Menéndez Pidal's *A History of the Spanish Heterodox* and his extreme ideological analysis of the 9th century Mozarabs of Córdoba – *radical* in the saddest sense of the word.

Martin González Fernández: *Heterodoxias: crítica de ibn Hazm de Córdoba a los sabeos de Harram*

En el tomo II del *Físal* (Al-faṣl fī-l-milal wa-l-ahwāʾ wa-l-niḥal, o «Historia crítica de las religiones, sectas y escuelas»), del polígrafo andalusí Abenházam (Ibn Ḥazm o Abén Ḥazam), (Córdoba, 994—Montíjar, Huelva,1064) se inicia un examen crítico de aquellos sistemas que pueden amenazar el credo islámico, que son, básicamente, para él, escépticos (o sofistas), politeístas y monoteístas no alcoránicos. Se ocupa de los dos primeros tan sólo en este volumen. Y entre los politeístas, analiza dos ramas, una de ellas son los sabeos de Harram, o mandeos, muy vinculados a la *philosophia orientalis* de Ibn Sīnā, latinizado Avicena. Reconstruiremos esta crítica, y otras dimensiones filosóficas relativas a este pueblo y cultura (sus conexiones enigmáticas con universo zandāqā).

José Meirinhos: *Thomas Scotus, un penseur radical à Lisbonne au XIV^ème^ siècle*

Alvarus Pelagius dans son *Collyrium fidei aduersus haereses* ataque violament Thomas Scotus, auteur du reste inconnu, par sa défense de 14 erreurs de nature disparate. Dans cette communication on essaye de comprendre les positions de Thomas Scotus filtrés par le langage juridique et censeur de Alvare Pelage. Deux ensembles de positions sont analysés en détail, ceux qui concernent la philosophie (éternité du monde et de l'espèce humaine, mortalité de l'âme, supériorité de la philosophie) et l'accusation de blasphème assumant le point de vue des juifs dans l'interprétation des textes bibliques. Alvare craint surtout l'interférence des arguments de Thomas dans la société chrétienne et il ne le considère jamais un philosophe. Pour Alvare ses positions font de lui plutôt un adversaire radical de la religion, même pas un incroyant, surtout un hérétique destructeur de la croyance chrétienne. Ce seul fait est-il suffisant pour mettre en question la valeur et l'exactitude de son témoin sur Thomas Scotus ? Le décryptage de la pensée de Thomas Scotus dans l'envers des accusations d'Alvare est un champ miné d'hypothèses plus ou moins invérifiables, mais que on essayera de systématiser dans cette contribution.

Mário João Correia: *Humanistas e escolásticos: o valor humano das subtilezas terminológicas em Luis Vives e Pedro Luís*

Em "Historia de los heterodoxos españoles", Menéndez y Pelayo dedica todo o livro IV ao luteranismo. Este livro começa curiosamente com um tratamento verrinoso da figura de Erasmo, que teria deixado a porta escancarada para a entrada triunfal do luteranismo para, por fraqueza de caráter e calculismo político, nunca nela entrar. O historiador espanhol contrasta-o com outros humanistas, encontrando sempre um melhor exemplo, quer do ponto de vista da competência, quer do ponto de vista moral, para cada uma das facetas pelas quais Erasmo é louvado. No que diz respeito às qualidades filosóficas, invoca Luis Vives como uma versão muito superior daquilo que seria uma proposta filosófica humanista. Partindo desta referência a Vives, o intento desta comunicação é pôr em questão duas problemáticas paralelas, uma de cariz mais historiográfico e geral, outra mais teórica. Pretende-se, por um lado, questionar até que ponto humanismo e escolástica constituem uma espécie de binómio. Por outro, partindo das críticas de Vives às vãs subtilezas terminológicas dos dialéticos (*In pseudodialecticos*, 1519, e *De disciplinis,* 1531), explorar-se-á o modo como essas ditas "subtilezas" são usadas na escolástica ibérica tardia para aflorar problemas eminentemente existenciais, como o é a constelação de problemas em torno da liberdade humana, da contingência ou necessidade do mundo, da ação divina e da graça. Para o fazer, chamar-se-á à colação um conterrâneo mais tardio de Vives, a saber, o jesuíta Pedro Luís (1538-1602), ele próprio filho de um humanista, Pedro António Beuther (c. 1490/5-1554). De facto, é sintomático que, no final do seu inédito comentário à *Metafísica,* surjam intencionalmente juntas as questões sobre a possibilidade de uma unidade inferior à numérica (esses "desatinos em tão violento contraste com toda a norma de falar e de sentir", nas palavras de Vives), e as questões sobre a relação entre proposições necessárias e a eventual eternidade da verdade. É também sintomático que uma das grandes problemáticas teológicas que repetidamente tratou e aprimorou foi, justamente, a questão que dominará o século XVII : a defesa da doutrina molinista da ciência média na tentativa de acomodar corretamente a liberdade humana e a presciência e providência divinas, no difícil equilíbrio de uma ortodoxiaentre o luteranismo e o pelagianismo.

Salle / Room 3.02

Aula 3: Arabic Philosophy

Ordinary Session
Chair: Fouad Ben Ahmed

Jens Ole Schmitt: *Ibn Abī ʿl-Ashʿath on Sleeping and Wakefulness*

The Arabic philosophical zoographer and physician Ibn Abī ʿl-Ashʿath (10th ct., Iraq) is primarily known for his *Book on Animals* (*K. al-Ḥayawān*), which offers a unique approach to the classification of animals (namely, into three groups, ruling, ruled, and neither ruling nor ruled) as well as dealing with them according to their humoral mixture. However, Ibn Abī ʿl-Ashʿath also left a hitherto neglected short *Epistle on Sleeping and Wakefulness* (*R. fī ʿl-nawm wa-l-yaqaẓ*), which is preserved in at least one known manuscript. As al-Kindī is mentioned several times in the *Animals*, and al-Kindī also wrote an epistle on that topic, which is influenced by the *Parva Naturalia* tradition, an indebtedness to al-Kindī was initially assumed. So far, however, the overlap with al-Kindī is less than expected, rather, Ibn Abī ʿl-Ashʿath refers to Galen and Hippocrates by name as well as even to Aristotle's treatise of the same title. The paper will compare the text of Ibn Abī ʿl-Ashʿath's epistle with these authors in terms of structure and content and look for its possible sources. The main topics discussed in the text will be briefly summarized, which are especially the relation between sleep and the brain (rather than the soul), the role of the heart and the animal spirit, that is, pneuma, for sleeping, sleep's specific relation with the rational (rather than the animal) soul,

sleep's distinction from death, and its connection with certain humoral qualities. The paper will further try to show that Ibn Abī 'l-Ashʿath made important contributions by a shift toward a centrality of the brain under the influence of Galen, similarly with, though independently from, Avicenna, and in opposition to the traditional Aristotelian scheme, even though he refers to the latter by name.

Almuth Lahmann: *The Imagination as Related to Internal Senses in al-Ṭabarī, Sa'adyah Gaon and Suhrawardī*

The thesis of my dissertation « Der sich Erhebende (*an-nāhiḍ*) in der Ethik Saʿadyah Gaons. Physik und Metaphysik » (2020, unpublished) argues for Sa'adyah Gaon's (882-942) philosophical approach to his ethics. This systematic approachis based on his notion of the rising one (al-nāhiḍ) as the ideally moral person, by applying principles of moral philosophy and epistemology for exploring the borders and permeabilities between the realms of natural philosophy and metaphysics. This paper builds on these results and will present his notion of internal senses as a thorough and sweeping position, in which modelled aspects of the Arabic Aristotelian (Taylor 2020) tradition stand up to the doorway of the philosophy of Illumination. The paper will trace the conceptions of imaginary faculties and internal senses and their relations fromal-Ṭabarī's *Firdaws al-ḥikma(*Paradise of Wisdom), over to Sa'adayh Gaon's *Kitāb Ṭalab al-ḥikma* (Search of Wisdom; which is his translation and commentary on Proverbs), and Ibn Sīnā's notion in his *al-Shifāʾ* to *Suhrawardī's Risāla fīḥālat al-ṭufulīya* (On the State of Childhood). First, the paper argues that works from the medical ethical tradition like at-Ṭabarī and al-Ruhāwī's *Adab al-ṭabīb(*Medical Ethics) have been Sa'adyah's sources in developing his notion of generative senses, critically adapting the notion of internal senses. Yet, whereas the named physicians locate internal senses in the brain, Sa'adyah follows Aristotle and locates them in the heart. Hence, the question arises of how the location of the internal senses affects the relation to the imaginary faculties. Since the *wahm*(estimative power) by Ibn Sīnā, Sa'adyah seems to have applied it in a similar manner, thinking of it as a pondering movement between different imagined options within speculative thought. Though, this differs from imaginations concerning poetics and moral epistemology. In his translation of Proverbs (*Amthāl*), Sa'adyah aims at the developing the conception of stimulating certain moral awareness and action in his commentary, drawing also on poetical syllogism. Finally, the paper investigates the changing relations between internal senses and imagination in Sa'adyah's and Suhrawardī's epistemology. Conclusively, the paper will discuss the following theses:
1. The relation of the thinkers I will refer to is their holistic perspective, which is the background of their notions of the internal senses in general and imagination in particular.
2. Their holistic perspective is founded in their adaption of the notion of micro-macrocosm and the way(s) how these cosmoses were permeated. Whereas for most thinkers the notion of macrocosm embraces the creation, the microcosm is mainly thought of certain animalistic species.
3. The localization of the internal senses as intermediary and processing faculties of sensation and cognition seem to determine epistemic limitations. Imagination is linked to linguistic limitations.
4. Sa'adyah Gaon and Suhrawardī centrally aim, though in different manners, at the productive human capacity of imaginative powers.

Taneli Kukkonen: *Al-Ghazālī as a Radical Thinker*

Shallow and outdated narratives once portrayed al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) as the enforcer of a stifling Islamic orthodoxy, pitted against the supposed radicalism of an idealized freethinking rationalism among the classical Arabic philosophers. Recent scholarship has assailed this outmoded view from two directions: Firstly, it has been shown that al-Ghazali was in fact deeply engaged with the rationalist philosophical project, and second, his relationship with the prevailing religious

disciplines of Islamic law and theology was complex, sometimes bordering on hostile. (It is to be noted that historical Muslim scholars were very well aware of both these facts.) On my reading, al-Ghazālī was a radical thinker of a different order. His most radical work is the one that has the most radical title, *The Revival of the Religious Sciences*. Al-Ghazālī's commitment to the value and rhythms of everyday Muslim life, its inherent dignity and its hidden depths, is what sets him apart from the intellectuals of the age and distinguishes him as truly 'radical'--that is, as someone willing to follow through on the implications of some deeply held first principles (here, the singular value of the Prophet's mission and its compatibility with the project of science).

Jouini Souad: *L'explication philosophique des miracles d'après l'épitre d'Avicenne « Risālā fi Al-Mūājizāt Wal-Kārāmāt »*

Ibn Sina prend en charge l'étude philosophique de certains dogmes religieux tels que la prophétie et le miracle, qui constitue l'objet de notre travail. Mais il est important de noter d'abord la présence de ce matière dans la tradition islamique, dans ce sens, Al-mūtakalimūn (les théologiens) se limitent à considérer les miracles comme une assertion de prophétie, ainsi qu'il était mentionné au sein d'Al-milla (la religion).
Ibn Sina écarte la lecture élémentaire des miracles et va plus loin en nous ramenant aux racines, il dévoile le mystère des choses exceptionnelles en lui donnant une exégèse rationnelle. Dans son fameux épitre **« Risālā fi Al-Mūājizāt Wal-Kārāmāt »**, le philosophe renvoie aux principes philosophique pour rendre compte d'un dogme religieux : les miracles de prophètes. Il mène par cette élaboration une lecture radicale d'une croyance théologique.
Dans ce travail, nous nous proposons de montrer comment Ibn Sina rend compte l'explication philosophique des miracles, et comment il a pu articuler les prolégomènes physique et métaphysique à saisir ces rares phénomènes. Avec Cette approche philosophique, nous soulignons l'apparition lumineuse de l'idée de radicalité chez Ibn Sina par rapport aux lectures faites autour du sujet signalée.

Salle / Room 3.03

Aula 4: Radical Poetry

Ordinary Session
Chair: Andrea Robiglio

Paulo Ricardo Martines: *The Primacy of Moral Philosophy According to Dante Alighieri: the* Transmutazione *of Thought*

In the first pages of his *Convivio*, Dante Alighieri invites all men of good faith to sit at the table of Philosophy. After a crucial spiritual crisis due to Beatrice´s death, the Florentine poet becomes dedicated to philosophical studies, finding comfort in the reading of Boethius and Cicero, in the "sweetness of their discourses", a prediction of his new love for the *donna gentile*. His new philosophical project is an innovation from the linguistic point of view since he employs the Tuscan dialect as the language for the transmission of Philosophy. Likewise, its novelty also occurs from the philosophical point of view since he makes moral philosophy the center of his thoughts in search of happiness. Moral philosophy will allow Dante to think of human happiness as that which is in accordance to rational humanity, or rather, of the man who seeks a good living in his daily life (*in hac vita*) as political animal and citizen. The new philosopher has not merely to discuss human well-being, but also exercise the moral virtues which are indispensable for happiness for human existence. Philosophy is good for those who make life worthy of living. Current paper shows that the inversion worked out by Dante – the use of Italian instead of Latin and Moral Philosophy as primary science instead of Metaphysics – should be thought through the term *transmutazione*, in its full meaning for change and transformation, undertaken fully in love. Dante expresses his "natural

love of his own language" when it is partaken by all people and by amiable virtues whose "morality is the beauty of philosophy", in so far as it employs the moral virtues for the full exercise of the correct appetite. Such transformation puts him on a new track where philosophy, as "an exercise in meditation" will be its highest expression.

Fosca Mariani Zini: *La* militia *radicale du langage (XIV^e^-XV^e^ siècles)*

A partir di XIVe siècle, les modalités blessantes et méchantes de la parole se développent dans les échanges entre les érudits de l'université et de la cour : invectives, antidotes aux poisons de la parole, mensonges, calomnies, attaques *ad personam*. Bien évidemment ces dispositifs et bien d'autres, comme les insultes, sont répertoriés et étudiés dans toutes les époques, en concomitance avec l'interprétation des origines, des propriétés et des effets des « passions tristes » (envie, jalousie, haine, colère). En effet, aussi bien les paroles blessantes que les passions ont une histoire propre. Or, l'inflexion méchante du langage dans certains cercles d'érudits (XIV-XV siècles) me semble caractérisée par trois aspects saillants: i. le déplacement des procédés rhétoriques de l'éloge et du blâme vers les procédures dialectiques puisque l'invective, le blâme, le mensonge etc. sont considérés comme une partie intégrante de la preuve argumentative ; ii. la radicalité de l'agressivité des *mala dicta* qui contraste avec la conviction assumée, selon laquelle le langage est producteur de la *douceur* cicéronienne et, partant, d'une civilisation apaisée ; iii. la démoralisation progressive des « péchés » de la langue. Ces traits peuvent dépendre assurément des coordonnées historiques spécifiques, parmi lesquelles on peut rappeler la compétition des érudits sur le marché du travail, étant donné l'essor de nouvelles compétences : connaissance du grec, capacités philologiques, fonctions diplomatiques. Toutefois, nous voudrions suggérer que, de Pétrarque à Lorenzo Valla, la radicalité des paroles méchantes dans l'ordre de l'argumentation dépend de deux changements conceptuels : d'une part, d'une conscience progressive de la nature historique et contextuelle de la langue, d'autre part, de l'exigence cognitive d'élaborer une logique à trois places (vérité, fausseté, mais aussi vraisemblance) laquelle conduit à donner une importance significative à l'efficacité de la parole.

Loren Cuadros: *Sobre o percurso da poesia católica: do discurso antiliterário medieval ao contemporâneo e a expiação dos recursos literários nos primórdios da Era Moderna*

A presente comunicação visa abordar a crise enfrentada pela literatura católica na contemporaneidade. De maneira geral, as perspectivas teóricas de base cultural vigentes tendem a ignorar ou mesmo censurar tais obras em detrimento de sua qualidade estética devido à oposição que apresentam em relação ao discurso cristão, considerado opressor e limitador da subjetividade. Em um primeiro momento, apresentamos brevemente a noção de "antiliteratura", introduzida pelo autor francês William Marx (2020), bem como algumas de suas considerações a respeito da disputa que se desenvolveu ao longo dos séculos entre os discursos relacionados às diferentes formas de obtenção do conhecimento. Em seguida, passamos à discussão da marcante presença da "antiliteratura" no contexto do cristianismo da Idade Média e de sua associação a autoridades tais como Santo Isidoro de Sevilha e São Gregório Magno. A eventual "redenção" da poesia (expressão que no momento histórico em questão faz remissão à arte literária como um todo) católica por meio dos escritos de Santo Tomás de Aquino é então abordada, seguida de algumas observações sobre a controvérsia inerente a esse posicionamento, posto que, em seu trabalho filosófico, o Doutor Angélico define a poesia como uma atividade secundária quando comparada a outros esforços intelectuais mais estritamente ligados à racionalidade. As asserções do autor da Suma Teológica exerceram grande influência sobre o pensamento cristão da aurora da Era Moderna, refletindo na qualidade estética de escritos como os de Santa Teresa D'Ávila, Santo Inácio de Loyola, São João da Cruz e outros autores de grandes obras devotas. Na sequência, questionamos o predomínio das teorias culturais nas humanidades contemporâneas e conduzimos a análise de

alguns excertos do Poema à Virgem, de autoria de São José de Anchieta, com o intuito de exemplificar o valor estético potencialmente apresentado por construções literárias de cunho cristão. Ainda desenvolvemos uma comparação entre as postulações referentes à poesia encontradas em escritos produzidos no contexto da filosofia cristã medieval e no Alcorão, uma vez que em ambas as circunstâncias uma espécie de "poder desviador" em relação à verdade é atribuída à figura do poeta. Assim, é possível afirmar que, durante um longo período, um grande embate filosófico foi travado em torno da presença do lirismo nos escritos cristãos e a retórica de Santo Tomás de Aquino foi responsável por fornecer uma impactante contribuição em favor do emprego dos recursos literários como modo de enfatizar a veneração e/ou a doutrina presentes nessas obras. Contudo, na contemporaneidade, observamos a ascensão de um novo discurso antiliterário entre os estudiosos no que concerne às construções literárias cristãs, que são pouco exploradas no âmbito acadêmico apesar de sua riqueza estética. Por fim, a presente comunicação busca ainda ressaltar que o estabelecimento de uma verdadeira interdisciplinaridade – entre campos como os da Filosofia, da Teologia, das Letras, da História, da Antropologia etc. – se faz crucial de modo a obstar a restrição progressiva do estudo de tais obras à esfera das pesquisas teológicas. Partindo do cenário brasileiro contemporâneo, acreditamos que tais considerações podem ser estendidas também a outros polissistemas culturais do mundo.

Salle / Room 3.05

Aula 5: Albert the Great I

Ordinary Session
Chair: Isabelle Draelants

Paloma Hernández-Rubio: *A New Proposal on How Pygmies' Language Works According to Albert the Great*

In *De animalibus* XXI, 1, 2, Albert the Great talks about an interesting species of non-rational animals: the Pygmies –which are not the present African people, but rather a mythical tribe described by Herodotus. According to Albert, although Pygmies do not have intellect or reason, they have speech (*locutio*). Since Pygmies cannot grasp quiddities, they cannot talk about universal things, nor can argue among them. Moreover, their speech is always directed toward individual things (*ad res particulares*). In recent years, Anselm Oelze tried to imagine how this speech could work. Since Albertian Pygmies' speech is directed to individual things, Oelze assumes that Pigmies' language works without universal *concepts*. Hence, this language would have as many words as the individual things they want to refer to, that is, this language would have words for proper names only. As Oelze correctly notes, this would be useless language. In this talk, I will present an alternative interpretation of how the Pygmies language would work. First, I want to establish that explaining how the sensitive soul can grasp individual things involves a complex building process that works employing predication. To do that, I will expose the process of grasping individuals according to *De homine* and *De anima*. Second, I will show that Albert makes no difference between phenomenal and conceptual content, and in consequence, he does not identify 'universal' with 'conceptual' content. Hence, grasped sensitive qualities are predicated on the individual thing like on a subject. From this, I will show how Pigmies' language would be.

Julie Brumberg-Chamont: *L'homme sans logique (philosophie): une vie de bête*

Cette communication revient sur l'idéal de vie philosophique porté par les artiens (et quelques théologiens comme Albert le Grand), et sur ses conséquences anthropologiques. Un accent particulier est mis sur la logique comme 'premier grade' de la félicité pour l'homme. Cet idéal, qui s'observait déjà au 12e siècle, a été souvent abordée dans sa dimension éthique, à partir du thème des genres de vie, puis en lien avec la doctrine du livre X de l'Éthique, avec le souci de bien

démarquer la pensée médiévale de la pensée renaissante et moderne, où l'idée d'une inégalité 'biologique' entre les hommes apparaît. Nous souhaitons mettre à jour la radicalité de l'élitisme de certains philosophes du 13e siècle, en lien avec la restriction du sens de 'philosophie' qui s'observe, en passant du 12e siècle au 13e siècle. Sur la base indépassable d'une âme égale infusée en chaque homme, cet élitisme se fonde sur la distinction entre raison et 'usage de la raison' et sur une certaine conception de la 'seconde perfection' de l'intellect, pour radicaliser de la doctrine d'Averroès à propos de l'appellation homonyme des hommes qui ne pourraient actualiser leur intellect par l'acquisition des sciences spéculatives. L'inégalité noétique se meut en inégalité essentielle, dès lors que la simple possession d'un intellect possible en puissance suffit pour entrer dans l'espèce d'homme, mais pas pour être pleinement humain. Les groupes concernés par cette rétrogradation anthropologique sont assez vastes, des 'pygmées' d'Albert et des 'débiles mentaux' (*moriones*) aux hommes sans éducation (*idiota*) et aux hommes rustiques (*rustici*), voire sauvages (*silvestres*), en passant par les femmes, les individus bestiaux, les esclaves naturels, les infirmes, ainsi que, de façon momentanée, les enfants, modèles d'une humanité 'retardée' dans son progrès vers l'intelligence.

Colleen McCluskey: *The Use of Climate Theory in Albertus Magnus's Natural Philosophy*

The idea that climate in a particular geographic location could determine or influence one's physical characteristics and mental character figured prominently in racial theories developed in the European early modern period prior to an understanding of genetics and inheritance. In recent years, scholars of the medieval period have begun to trace the origins of this idea back to the European Middle Ages. This project is radical in two senses, first, in the sense of the Latin root, *radix*. Philosophers of race have traditionally argued that racial theories originated in the early modern period when Europeans expanded their global explorations and routinely encountered peoples who did not look like them. Recent work in medieval studies challenges this view, arguing that Europeans explorers interpreted their experiences through a lens of racial difference generated in the medieval period.

My part of this project is radical in another sense. Much of the work already produced has been done by literary theorists and intellectual historians focused primarily on vernacular texts. I aim to complement our understanding of how racial terms functioned in the medieval period by examining the discussion of racial characteristics in Latin texts. My investigation of Albertus Magnus continues the work I began in my paper on Peter Abelard's use of racial terms.

I examine Albertus Magnus's discussion of the effects of climate on racial and gender characteristics in his work on natural philosophy. First, I look at his discussion that heat from the sun (or its corresponding lack) plays a role in determining skin color and other traits. Secondly, I consider his argument that climate affects the reproductive process in females.

I start with what current scholars call climate theory. Climate theory involves the idea that physiological traits such as body shape, skin color, hair texture, as well as psychological traits such as character are determined by the climate and broader environment in which one resides. Next I examine two texts from Albert's work on natural philosophy. *De natura loci* contains a fairly detailed account of the physical and psychological properties in the peoples of the northern and southern climes. It also contains some interesting ideas on pregnancy and childbirth in black and white women. Albert continues his discussion on this topic as well as a further discussion on female sexuality in his text, *De animalibus*. Both texts help to reveal Albert's basic racial attitudes.

It is important to examine the medieval context in order to understand the later development of racial theories and the resulting problematic hierarchies. As scholars of the European Middle Ages are demonstrating, thinkers in the early modern and modern European periods built upon ideas developed in the earlier era. Albert's work is especially important as he was one of the most influential thinkers of his time.

Salle / Room 3.06

Aula 6:William of Ockham / II

Ordinary Session

Chair: Joël Biard

Susan Brower-Toland: *Ockham's Metaphysical Commitments*

Ockham claims to admit (at least in the natural order) only two kinds of entity: individuals in the category of Substance and individuals in the category of Quality. But there are longstanding debates among Ockham's commentators over the following two questions: (i) do Ockham's metaphysical commitments, in point of fact, go beyond the introduction of individual substances and qualities? And (ii) if so, does this represent a failure of his reductionist program? In this paper, I argue for an affirmative answer to the former question, but a negative answer to the latter. In particular, I argue that in addition to his commitment to individual substances and qualities, Ockham also expressly endorses a further, *non-ontic* commitment—namely, to their spatial or local arrangements. To make this case, I focus on his account of spatial location. I argue that, while Ockham staunchly resists the reification of location, he is, nevertheless, committed to the primitive *reality* of spatial orderings. Yet, while this is a genuine *metaphysical* commitment, it is not an *ontological* commitment and, hence, does not conflict with Ockham's reductionist ontology.

Davide Falessi: *William of Ockham on Continuity and God's Power: a Radical Rejection of Indivisibles in a* continuum

The debate about continuity, which takes a relevant part in medieval accounts of physics, is centered around an inquiry into the structural elements and properties of a continuum: what is the structure and the composition of a continuum? What role do indivisibles, such as points in the line, have in a continuum? William of Ockham provides a clear and drastic solution which is quite different both from modern and Aristotelian accounts of continuity. The main target of Ockham's rejection is a realist definition of indivisibles as res with a well-defined and an autonomous ontological status. Therefore, the realist account distinguishes indivisibles from the corresponding divisibles: e.g., points belong to a line as its extremities but their properties and features are different from those of a line so that they can be considered as different and independent items. According to Ockham, there are not indivisibles at all, but we must reduce them to divisible things, such as lines, and also the term "indivisible" can be removed from our language about continua. Ockham sets up two different kinds of arguments against indivisibles. The first one shows that it is impossible to posit indivisibles because their existence contradicts some basic assumptions, which Ockham thinks that his possible opponents also would accept. The second kind of arguments shows that it is superfluous to posit indivisibles, so that we can use "Ockham's Razor" to remove them from our ontological building. The main purpose of my presentation is to provide a detailed analysis of the second kind arguments. A first step of Ockham's arguments is claiming that a well-defined description of separability and a straightforward definition of its requirements allow to reject indivisibles as Ockham wants to demonstrate that, if indivisibles were such distinct things, then a line could exist without any of its points. To reach this conclusion, Ockham sets up precise criteria of separability that define when two things can exist one without the other. These criteria are applied within a theological context that appeals to the notion of God's power: God's power is directly related to the separability of two entities so that if all the requirements above mentioned are satisfied, then God can create a line without points. However, many objections can be provided against this claim and Ockham himself pinpoints one of them. I shall analyze this objection and how Ockham deals with it, pointing out a general principle regarding God's power and its relation with natural agents. Finally, given these general requirements concerning the notion of separability and God's power, I shall explain in which way Ockham argues that the continuity and the finiteness

of a line do not require indivisibles. These corollaries take into account metrical and topological properties of a line and show that we can account for all the phenomena in the line without admitting indivisibles.

Lydia Deni Gamboa: *Ockham's Theory of Complex Apprehensions*

For Ockham there are different apprehensive acts related (*respectu*) in different ways to propositions: on the one hand, the complex apprehensive acts terminated by propositions, and on the other hand, the judicative acts in virtue of which an intellect either assents or dissents to a proposition, or even doubts that a proposition is true or false. According to this distinction, (i) an agent may form a proposition and give an assent to it without ascribing any true value to it, or, (ii) an agent may form a proposition and give a true value without assenting to it, or (iii) an agent may form a proposition and give it an assent and ascribe it a true value. These tree options are suggested in the *Quodlibeta Septem* V, q. 6, where Ockham claims that there are neutral propositions and that there are two different sorts of assents. I would like to reveal, departing from Claude Panaccio, Ernesto Perini-Santos and Susan Brower-Tolland, that these three options are also suggested in the Prologue to the *Ordinatio*, q. 1, where Ockham claims that there are neutral propositions, although he hesitated about the real distinction between a judicative act and a complex apprehension. In addition, I would like to reveal that in his early and mature writings, Ockham suggests that judicative acts have two different roles: (1) to give a true value to a proposition, and (2) consciously think and report about an already formed mental proposition. According to (1), the terms "true", "false" and "dubious", in propositions like "This proposition *p* is true/false/dubious" can be seen as connotative names and as second intentions and, in this way, they stand in personal supposition for *p*, which seems to be an innovative way of analyzing these terms in medieval philosophy. According to (2), an agent associates a mental language with a conventional language and, consequently, an agent becomes aware of her thoughts, which are de objects of a judicative act.

Günther Mensching: *Die Radikalität des Ockhamschen Denkens und ihre Auswirkung auf die Lehre von der Kirche.*

Der Codex iuris canonici definiert die katholische Kirche als eine Hierarchie. (Can. 330 ff.) Diese bis heute gültige Bestimmung steht in Übereinstimmung mit der Tradition, die sich von Pseudo-Dionysios Areopagita herleitet. Ihr liegt eine konsequent realistische Auffassung von der spirituellen Substantialität des gestuften Aufbaus und der Ämter der Kirche zugrunde. Von der obersten Spitze, dem Nachfolger des Apostels Petrus, über die in apostolischer Sukzession geweihten Bischöfe und Priester bis zur Basis, den getauften Laien, stellte die Kirche einen essentiellen Kosmos dar, in dem das Allgemeine, Umfassende das Höhere darstellte, eine Ordnung der Tradition und des Gehorsams, die nicht unterbrochen oder umgekehrt werden durfte. Im späten Mittelalter geriet diese Ordnung ins Wanken und wurde in der Reformation vollends in Frage gestellt. Wilhelm von Ockham und ihm geistig verwandte Denker entwickelten ekklesiologische Überlegungen, die auf eine Fundierung der Kirche durch den Willen der Einzelnen, der Gesamtheit aller Getauften hinausliefen. Gedanken dieser Art entsprangen aus dem radikalen Nominalismus, den Ockham aus seinen metaphysischen Lehren auf Kirche und Staat übertrug. Der Beitrag will am Beispiel der Lehre von der Kirche zeigen, wie dieser epochale Wandel vom radikalen Nominalismus ausgelöst wurde und sich bis zu den Theoretikern der Reformation fortgesetzt hat. Das Beispiel soll die Rolle des radikalen Nominalismus für die geistige und politische Formation der Moderne erhellen.

Salle / Room 3.07

Aula 7:Bonaventure

Ordinary Session
Chair: Olivier Boulnois

Andrea Di Maio: *Bonaventure entre défense de la radicalité et refus des radicalismes*

Bien que les termes radicalis et radicalitas au Moyen-Âge n'aient pas la signification moderne, il est facile d'envisager dans les luttes doctrinales à l'intérieur de l'université de Paris entre les années 1250 et 1277 des positions analogues à la radicalité et aux radicalismes au sens moderne. Dans ce contexte, Bonaventure – théologien attentif à la philosophie et actif interlocuteur dans les débats culturels qui enflammaient l'université de Paris ; très favorable à l'idée du de progrès, bien que modéré et lié aux institutions ; homme de pouvoir en tant que ministre général de l'ordre des frères mineurs pendant presque 17 ans, et inséré aussi bien à la cour du roi de France que dans la vie de l'église universelle – est une figure emblématique : fasciné par la radicalité évangélique de François d'Assise, la vie selon la forme de l'évangile, "sine glossa" tout à fait idéalisée, il était parallèlement hostile aux radicalismes opposés des artistae (improprement dits « averroïstes ») et des « joachimites ». Les premiers proposaient le retour radical à la philosophie d'Aristote et la quête seulement rationnelle et immanente du bonheur ; les deuxièmes proposaient l'anticipation radicale de la condition eschatologique, avec le dépassement de chaque institution. À l'intérieur même de l'ordre franciscain, Bonaventure devait faire face aussi bien à des frères trop fascinés par les sciences profanes, qu'aux frères se disant spirituels. D'un côté, il devait défendre les mendiants de l'accusation de radicalisme (comme dans les quaestiones de perfectione evangelica et l'apologia pauperum), et de l'autre, il devait défendre le gouvernement de l'Ordre de l'accusation d'avoir perdu sa radicalité originelle (comme dans l'epistola de tribus quaestionibus). Bonaventure a plutôt conduit son œuvre d'élaboration culturelle et de gouvernement dans l'idée d'un juste milieu entre extrêmes opposés (par exemple, la juste studiositas entre curiositas et ignavia…) et a qualifié chaque extrémisme d'impugnatio, comme dans les Collationes in Hexaëmeron : « Praecessit enim impugnatio vitae Christi in moribus per theologos, et impugnatio doctrinae Christi per falsas positiones per artistas ». Selon lui, les théologiens séculiers qui disaient que le Christ avait une bourse, et donc condamnaient les mendiants qui prétendaient vivre sans argent, contestaient la pratique de vie du Christ, et les philosophes (qui enseignaient l'éternité du monde et l'unicité de l'âme intellective humaine) contestaient sa doctrine. La source de cette contestation est selon lui la dissentio, c'estàdire la dissidence. À côté d'un dissensus seulement apparent, concernant l'expression et non l'intention (comme, celui entre les Latins et les Grecs à propos de la procession de l'Esprit), Bonaventure dans le sermon Unus est magister vester, en interprétant un ordre de Saint Jacques (« Ne soyez pas nombreux à devenir des maîtres »), considérait comme dangereux le dissensus qui provient de la présomption : « dissentio sententiarum ortum habet a praesumptione ».

Filipa de Almeida Alfonso: *From Good to Trinity: Bonaventure's Conception of God in* Itinerarium *VI*

In the VI chapter of *Itinerarium mentis in deum*, Bonaventure of Bagnoregio seeks to conceive God through the concept of good. Linking the Neoplatonist notion of good – as *diffusivum sui* – to Anselm's notion of God – as that than which nothing *better* can be thought –, and also to Aristotle's theory of the twofold way of perfect production, the Franciscan author presents a logical derivation of the very mystery of divine Trinity. In fact, if God is the highest good, and goodness is self-diffusive, God must diffuse itself perfectly. Since diffusion requires two poles – the diffusive and the diffused –, God comprises a plurality. Now, creation cannot account for the necessary diffusion

from God, for this would result in a dependence of God's perfection towards its creation. So the plurality entailed by God's self-diffusiveness must be intrinsic, leading to the plurality of the divine persons. However, this argumentative path only leads to a divine dyad (of the diffusive, and the diffused persons). Then again, once Bonaventure resorts to Aristotle's conception of the two perfect ways of production – production by nature, and production by will – the medieval philosopher is lead to infer that God's perfection requires, not one, but two different diffusions, each one according to each way of perfect production. In the end, we are lead to conclude that, if God is that than which nothing *better* can be thought, then God is necessarily triune. The question of Trinity is a major topic in Christian thought, and it is certainly crucial in Bonaventure's own thought, which is usually classified as a Trinitarian theology. We may find in Bonaventure's writings several distinct approaches to the conception of Trinity, that resort to different authorities: Augustine, Anselm, Richard of Saint Victor. Nonetheless, in *Itinerarium mentis in deum* we believe we may find Bonaventure's original philosophical contribution to the understanding of Trinity.

Isabel Maria Leon Sanz: *La teoría bonaventuriana de la iluminación y el fundamento radical del conocimiento intelectual*

La doctrina bonaventuriana de la iluminación cognoscitiva se sitúa directamente en relación con la raíz de la certeza del conocimiento humano; y se conecta con el estudio del límite del intelecto y de las condiciones a priori que hacen posible su operación. Para S. Buenaventura, ni los principios gnoseológicos de origen aristotélico ni los de tradición platónica consiguen dar una solución definitiva a la cuestión de cómo justificar la necesidad e inmutabilidad de los conocimientos científicos. Considera además que la ciencia no es un conocimiento último, sino que es necesario trascender hacia la sabiduría para ampliar los horizontes del intelecto y alcanzar el fundamento integrador de la realidad y de las propias aspiraciones humanas. Estas ideas se muestran en toda su radicalidad cuando S. Buenaventura reflexiona sobre la ciencia de Cristo, en quien la inteligencia humana se sitúa en la mayor proximidad y comunicación con el *Verbum*, suma Verdad expresiva de todo cuanto existe, permaneciendo íntegra y potenciada hasta el extremo su capacidad operativa natural (cfr. *In III Sent.*, d. 14, *De scientia Christi*, qq. 4-7).

Elisa Chiti: Raptus, ecstasis, excessus mentis: *pensiero radicale tra teologia bonaventuriana e mistica speculativa*

An analysis of the boundary between raptus, ecstasis and excessus mentis allows us to draw a line that unites theology and speculative mysticism, with interesting results. The mystical state described with regard to the co-redemptrix Virgin in sermo VI de assumptione beatae Virginis Mariae constitutes a good starting point. For the clarity of knowledge, which is certainly not that uncertain and confused, deriving from the suspension of human faculties, comparable to what has been noted for the state of ecstasy, this mystical state of Mary seems contiguous to the condition of the "raptus", but Bonaventure points out in this regard that all this depends on the transformation of human faculties into deiform faculties. Compared to the ecstasis of Dionysian ancestry, the suspension of the intellectual faculties is therefore avoided and therefore it is a passivity that excludes, at the same time, the exhaustion of human faculties, of powers, which are instead aligned on divine productivity. A state seems to be described that has the characteristics of the raptus, as regards the clarity of knowledge, the non-suspension of human powers, of the intellectual faculties, but also the characteristics of ecstasis as regards the continuity and inalterability of this condition, which for this reason is defined "per modum quietis". The theme of stillness and the transformation of human nature closely unites the Bonaventurian theology of the via media and the speculative mysticism of Margherita Porete and Meister Eckhart; in particular, I will focus on the mystical proposal detectable within Margherita Porete's Miroir, which tends to radicalize Bonaventure's solution even more, completely overcoming a distinction / articulation between raptus and ecstasis.

The Poretian mystical state derives directly from a transformation operated by God / Love which transforms the Soul into itself and which acts as an esclar, which does not however produce a visionary activity, but a real vision of God himself within of the annihilated Soul. In this way it is possible to see how mysticism reaches the overcoming of the impasse produced within even more radical theological reflection. The reflection on the visio beatifica, with the aforementioned radical solutions, constitute relevant points for delineating the new radical thought that develops between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and which can be grasped in the following points: 1. Loss of the distinction between subject and object; 2. Permanent state of the transformation of human nature, which determines the overcoming of the areas of raptus and ecstasis, treated as distinct theological fields; 3. Possibility of a temporary return to contemplative states, a process that characterizes mysticism as a phenomenology; 4. Speculative mysticism is presented as a deontological path, which modifies not only the anthropological aspects of the subject it knows, but also the gnoseological aspects (powers of the soul, annihilation of the will, etc.). In light of the facts set out above, it is possible to recognize a peculiar orientation in speculative mysticism within the debate on the visio beatifica, albeit outside the universities.

Salle / Room 3.08

Aula 8:Metaphysics

Ordinary Session
Chair: Andrei Marinca

Geneviève Barrette: *Godfrey of Fontaines and Hervaeus Natalis on the Distinction between Essence and Being: A Metaphysical Shift*

In his *De esse et essentia*, Hervaeus Natalis presents and discusses five quodlibetal questions in which Henry of Ghent defends his intentional distinction between essence and being. Since Henry's main opponent is Giles of Rome, Hervaeus also considers the Augustinian master's take on the distinction. The Dominican rejects both the Gandean and the Egidian position, and adopts the semantic distinction of Godfrey of Fontaines. The most substantial studies on the distinction between essence and being in Hervaeus Natalis either ignore the filiation between the Dominican's position and that defended by Godfrey of Fontaines a few years earlier (de Rijk 2013, Seńko 1961), or characterise it only roughly (Allen 1958). Allen (1958) identifies four general aspects linking the positions of Godfrey of Fontaines and Hervaeus Natalis: (a) the rejection the real distinction, (b) the opposition to Henry of Ghent's take on the distinction, (c) the reduction of created being to the essential order (substance, accident, matter and form), and (d) the grammatical character of their takes on the distinction.Although these elements are clearly present in Hervaeus Natalis and Godfrey of Fontaines, I aim to show here that the convergence of Godfrey's and Hervaeus' takes on the distinction is more fundamental than characterised by Allen. I will do so by identifying two ontological principles underlying Hervaeus' critique of opposing opinions that are also mobilised by Godfrey: (1) the strict opposition between being in potency and being in act, and (2) its corollary, the modal uniformity between *esse* and *essentia*.I will argue that these principles are the fundamental elements of Godfrey's and Hervaeus' common take on the distinction, in that the two masters' refutation of Henry's and Giles' positions, as well as the common aspects of Godfrey's and Hervaeus' positions identified by Allen, derive from these principles. Identifying these two ontological principles underlying Godfrey and Hervaeus' critique of Henry and Giles will highlight that the opposition between, on the one hand, Henry and Giles, and, on the other hand, Godfrey and Hervaeus, is due to a metaphysical shift. The shift is from an approach that ascribes some kind of reality to non-extra-mental entities, and an approach that recognises only the existence of singular entities in act. Thus, I will maintain that the Gandean and Egidian positions proceed from ontological assumptions that are different from those that underlie Godfrey and Hervaeus' distinction, and that Godfrey and Hervaeus reject the Gandian

and Egidian positions precisely because of these assumptions. A payoff of so identifying the assumptions that underlie Henry's and Giles' positions is that it sheds some light on Hervaeus' rejection of Aquinas' take on the distinction, a rejection that is all the more puzzling given that Hervaeus was an otherwise fierce defender of the renowned Dominican doctor. It shows the depth of this rejection by making plain that the assumptions on the basis of which Hervaeus rejects Henry's and Giles' positions are ones also shared by Aquinas, such that Godfrey and Hervaeus' refutation of Henry and Giles also applies to Aquinas.

Enrico Postiglione: Telos *vs Providence: Radical Aristotelianism and Christian Philosophy in the 13th Century*

As of the first half of the 13th century, a large number of Aristotle's works concerning physics, metaphysics and the problem of soul/mind, had not yet been translated into Latin. Before then, knowledge of Aristotelianism was partial and distorted, resulting in a heterogenous set of misunderstood arguments, false attributions (see for example, the *Liber de causis*) and platonic interpretations describing Aristotelianism as a platonic-rooted doctrine. Yet, as long as more copious (and more accurate) translations of Aristotle and his commentators (including Avicenna, Averroè, and more distant sources such as Alexander, Simplicius and Philoponus) became widespread, Aristotle's naturalistic account of reality was increasingly hindered. Already on 1210, in Paris the study of both Aristotle's philosophy and the commentators belonging to its tradition was prohibited. In order to justify such a harsh (and groundless) reaction on the part of clerical cultural establishment of the time, Aristotle's metaphysics should imply an extremely radical dimension, at least in comparison with the tenets held by the 13th century Christian intellighenzia (see for example, Bonaventura's *De donis Spiritus Sancti*): but what's so radical in Aristotle naturalistic enterprise? This paper addresses the inherent and necessary incompatibility between Aristotle's hylomorphism and the main philosophical tenets of the middle-age Christianity. Focusing on the mortality of the soul, idea of happiness of the species, and especially on the telos/providence divide, this paper results in a comparison of medieval texts with the their Aristotelian sources of references and aims to show that the gradual acceptance of Aristotelianism (leading, in the middle of the century, to an official inclusion of its study in almost every European university) was made possible by a significant reinterpretation of the main Aristotelian theses which resulted in a reconciliation between Aristotle and the Christian perspective. While this reconciled version of Aristotle became the cornerstone of medieval philosophy and theology replacing the purely Platonic tradition, different (or rather, genuine) versions of Aristotelian arguments were still object of condemnation (1270 and 1277). It may be the case that, by cleaning the air of stratified interpretations aimed at reconciling hylomorphism with the needs of (some of) its medieval readers, the radical metaphysical implications of it might appear in a stronger and clearer way. In such a case, an historiographic survey might well inform the contemporary debate on the relevance and potentialities of hylomorphism.

Yassir Mechelloukh: *Métaphysique et contexte insulaire chez Ibn Ṭufayl: une rupture radicale ?*

Né à Guadix en 1110 et mort à Marrakech en 1185, Ibn Ṭufayl est un des plus célèbres représentants de la philosophie médiévale arabe en *al-Andalus*. S'il ne nous a laissé qu'une seule œuvre, celle-ci est particulièrement originale et a fait l'objet d'une réception non négligeable en Europe aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles. Cette œuvre est la *Risāla Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓan*, écrite dans la deuxième moitié du XIIe siècle et traduite en 1671 sous le titre latin *Philosophicus Autodidactus*. Il s'agit d'un roman philosophique dans lequel Ḥayy, personnage principal de l'oeuvre, grandit sans père ni mère. Il est recueilli et éduqué par une gazelle sur une île où il cohabite avec les animaux. Son parcours se décline en sept étapes durant lesquelles il apprend, de manière autodidacte, l'ensemble des techniques, des connaissances et des sciences. Dans son récit, Ibn Ṭufayl croise,

rassemble et convoque diverses traditions à la fois philosophiques et théologiques. Mais ce qu'il y a de radical tient à l'originalité de la mise en récit. La solitude, qui s'accompagne d'une mise en contexte insulaire, paraît subie au début du récit avant de devenir une véritable décision philosophique. L'île symbolise, dans l'œuvre, non seulement l'échec du politique mais constitue aussi le lieu privilégié d'une réflexion métaphysique dont la finalité ultime est la conjonction (*ittiṣāl*) avec Dieu. Nous chercherons, dans notre communication, à comprendre ce que fait le contexte insulaire à la métaphysique, et en retour, la spécificité de cette métaphysique conçue sur une île. Ibn Ṭufayl paraît concevoir la possibilité d'une métaphysique sans langue, sans corps, sans humanité complète. C'est cela que nous essaierons d'interroger.

Salle / Room 3.09

Aula 9: Medieval Radical Thinking in Modern Historiography

Ordinary Session

Chair: Maarten Hoenen

Iñigo Atucha: *Histoire d'une rupture radicale : François Picavet et Etienne Gilson*

En 1913, lorsqu'il publie aux éditions Alcan ses *Essais sur l'histoire générale et comparée des théologies et des philosophies médiévales*, François Picavet est directeur des études à l'École pratique des hautes études à la section des sciences religieuses et chargé de cours en histoire des philosophies médiévales à la Faculté des lettres de la Sorbonne. Il se trouve alors au cœur du dispositif institutionnel universitaire français. Ses écrits et son enseignement touchent à de nombreux aspects de la pensée médiévale, que François Picavet s'efforce d'enchâsser dans une continuité étroite avec, d'une part, l'Antiquité et, d'autre part, la Renaissance et la Modernité. Rien d'étonnant dès lors que le chapitre XVII de ses *Essais sur l'histoire générale et comparée des théologies et des philosophies médiévales* s'intitule « Descartes et les philosophies médiévales » (p. 329). Descartes y est décrit comme un philosophe original, mais pétri de culture médiévale : sa « philosophie scientifique » est novatrice, mais elle prolonge sur bien des aspects « l'œuvre des générations antérieures, des Grecs et des Byzantins, des Arabes et des Latins du XIIIe siècle » (p. 338). Cependant, au cœur de ces pages, une remarque attire l'attention : *On a eu raison de signaler les travaux de Freudenthal en 1887 et de Hertling (1899) quand on a voulu nier que le principal titre de gloire de Bacon et de Descartes a été de « constituer une philosophie radicalement détachée de toutes les philosophies antérieures et d'en construire l'édifice entier à nouveaux frais ». Mais on aurait pu en relever bien d'autres, même en Allemagne, et on a eu tort d'oublier toutes les recherches qui avaient été faites antérieurement en France et celles qui commençaient alors à l'École des Hautes-Études pour ne plus être interrompues. (p. 336).* L'historiographie de la continuité philosophique semble ici se jouer en Allemagne, notamment dans l'étude de Jacob Freudenthal, *Spinoza und die Scholastik* (1887), et dans celle de Georg von Hertling, *Descartes Beziehung zur Scholastik* (1899), mais aussi et surtout en France, à l'École des hautes études. Et on croit deviner, en lisant entre les lignes, que François Picavet désigne sans doute ses propres recherches. Ce qui se joue aussi, c'est le « titre de gloire » qu'une historiographie contestable attribue à Francis Bacon et René Descartes en vertu de leurs philosophies « *radicalement* détachées de toutes les philosophies antérieures », et il faut sans doute lire : détachées en particulier des philosophies médiévales. Mais François Picavet semble désigner quelqu'un à travers le pronom indéfini répété avec insistance dans ce passage. Ce « on » auquel il reproche de ne pas mentionner les travaux menés à l'École des hautes études est associé à une citation : Picavet reprend ici sans le dire la première phrase de l'introduction de la thèse complémentaire d'Étienne Gilson, soutenue le 29 janvier 1913 devant un jury au sein duquel siégeait François Picavet, toujours lui, et publiée sous le titre *Index scolastico-cartésien.* Au-delà de la mise en scène professorale d'un reproche adressé à un jeune thésard anonyme, ma contribution cherchera à appréhender la portée de cet épisode microhistorique où deux universitaires se croisent et semblent s'ignorer, sur fond de leur récusation commune d'une rupture radicale qui

viendrait désarticuler pensée médiévale et pensée moderne. Car ce rendez-vous manqué dépasse le domaine de l'anecdotique, il témoigne des enjeux personnels, intellectuels et institutionnels liés à l'historiographie philosophique en ce premier tiers du XXe siècle. Dans ce cadre précis, il permet d'esquisser une histoire de l'incidence de l'idée d'une césure radicale qui viendrait isoler la pensée médiévale. Et il touche enfin à la mémoire de l'histoire de la philosophie médiévale : car si Picavet omet de mentionner le nom du jeune Gilson dans le corps de son texte, celui-ci aura à cœur, dès 1921, au moment où il lui succède à l'École pratique et à la Sorbonne, de faire disparaître les traces et d'exercer une influence majeure sur la postérité pour le moins fugace de son prédécesseur.

Laura Silva de Souza: *Curiosidade como canal de transgressão em* O Nome da Rosa *de Umberto Eco*

A presente comunicação visa abordar o vínculo entre interdito e transgressão no romance *O Nome da Rosa*, de Umberto Eco, investigando a curiosidade como a forma pela qual a transgressão se manifesta frente aos interditos impostos na ficção de Eco. Entende-se que a curiosidade é retratada tanto quanto transgressão, resultado do interdito e também como forma de excesso, no caso, de saber, sendo ela analisada como *curiositas* e como *studiositas*. Ainda, compreende-se que, no romance, a curiosidade como manifestação de excesso e transgressão leva à morte. Inicialmente, pretende-se discutir a curiosidade como vício/ virtude tendo como base o romance de Eco e a percepção das personagens – em especial Guilherme de Baskerville e Jorge de Burgos - sobre esse tema e o posicionamento de filósofos como Santo Agostinho e Isidoro de Sevilha. No romance, cujo enredo se passa em 1314, a personagem narradora explica que pouco sabia sobre a "virtude" curiosidade; contudo, a essência virtuosa dessa vontade de saber nunca foi universal e, na Idade Média, ela era vista, majoritariamente, como vício, passando a ser entendida como um desejo nocivo, um desejo cujo o objeto apela à mente. Santo Agostinho conectou curiosidade a um tipo de anseio da alma, chamando-a de concupiscência dos olhos em oposição à concupiscência da carne, prevenindo sobre o seu perigo de afastar o homem de Deus ao mesmo tempo em que reconhece que o mundo está coberto de insaciáveis curiosidades que podem contaminar a autêntica busca pela verdade. Após essa discussão, buscar-se-á distinguir o desejo de conhecimento entre *curiositas* e *studiositas*, termos usados por Tomas de Aquino. A última, considerada uma virtude, exalta o exercício de restringir o desejo de saber de forma a não o tornar imoderado, valorizando o comedimento e o busca ordenada pelo saber da verdade divina, sendo, assim, ligada a virtude da temperança, enquanto que a primeira, além de representar o desejo descomedido por conhecimentos alheios a Deus, tende a levar o sujeito ao vício da vaidade, desejando conhecer apenas para gabar-se da posse de tal conhecimento. Mas qual deles, virtude ou vício, se mostrou mais presente na obra de Eco? Esta comunicação procurará demonstrar que a vontade de saber dos monges no romance *O Nome da Rosa* estava ligada à *curiositas* e não a sua virtude oposta e o que legitimava a imoderação dos monges, ou seu excesso de vontade de conhecimento, era o próprio ato de transgredir seu interdito, entendendo-se que o proibido, ao invés de domar o desejo, o aviva, dá coragem ao sujeito e que acarreta, consequentemente, uma punição, executada pelo próprio objeto de desejo.

Isabelle Mandrella: *Blumenberg et la pensée radicale* (Ursprünglichkeit) *de l'ontologie médiévale*

Dans sa dissertation „Beiträge zum Problem der Ursprünglichkeit der mittelalterlich-scholastischen Ontologie" de 1947 – publiée sous forme de livre seulement en 2020 – Hans Blumenberg nous présente ses premières reflexions sur la philosophie médiévale; réflexions qu'il reprendra dans ses œuvres postérieures. Il la caractérise comme pensée radicale et originale („ursprünglich"), surtout par rapport à la philosophie de l'Antiquité. Cette défense s'explique par l'arrière-plan de la dissertation : La discussion avec Heidegger et sa célèbre thèse de „l'oubli de l'être" („Seinsvergessenheit") et du manque de „Ursprünglichkeit" qui se propagent dans l'histoire de la philosophie – après son point culminant dans l'ontologie antique – et qui mènent finalement

au déclin de l'ontologie. En argumentant contre cette position Blumenberg souligne la radicalité et l'originalité de l'ontologie du Moyen-Âge. Elle n'est ni la simple continuation de l'ontologie antique ni son déclin mais une ontologie transformée sous les conditions originaires chrétiennes. Le contexte chrétien pose les philosophes médiévaux devant de nouveaux problèmes mais aussi de nouvelles possibilités de s'exprimer – bien entendu: philosophiquement – sur les questions fondamentales ontologiques. Cela concerne surtout l'idée de la création du monde *ex nihilo* par un Dieu tout- puissant, doué d'une libre volonté. Blumenberg montre comment cette conception mène à des réflexions philosophiques sur le concept de l'étant, les théories de l'univocation et l'épistémologie de l'illumination. C'est surtout dans la pensée de Jean Duns Scot que Blumenberg voit des transformations ontologiques d'importance éminente. Pour prouver la pensée radicale du Moyen-Âge contre la critique de Heidegger, Blumenberg présente d'abord les arguments que celui-ci, surtout dans „Sein und Zeit", rassemble contre l'originalité de l'ontologie médiévale. Le résultat de son analyse des textes heideggeriens fourni quatre façons d'interprétations ontologiques traditionnelles que Heidegger rend responsable de „l'oubli de l'être" déjà mentionné : L'interprétation de l'être en tant qu'être créé („Hergestelltsein"), en tant qu'existant („Vorhandenheit"), en tant qu'essence („Wesenheit") et en tant qu'objet („Gegenständlichkeit"). Le point commun de tous les quatre se trouve dans la priorité de l'étant avant l'être. Blumenberg ne nie pas que ces quatre interprétations étaient sans doutes présentes dans la philosophie du Moyen-Âge. Mais à son avis l'ontologie médiévale est plus complexe et la fixation à l'étant en tant que créé, existant, essence et objet telle que Heidegger le lui reproche, ne lui convient pas, mais a une portée trop courte. Par contre, Blumenberg arrive à montrer de façon impressionnante comment les penseurs médiévaux – entre autres Thomas d'Aquin, Bonaventure et Jean Duns Scot – rompent avec les quatre catégories de l'être que Heidegger leur attribue. L'originalité et la pensée radicale de la philosophie médiévale se manifestent juste là: Dans leur manière de transformer l'héritage antique et d'établir leur propre ontologie – non seulement de l'étant, mais aussi de l'être. Dans l'histoire de la philosophie, la philosophie médiévale présente donc une propre pensée radicale qui non seulement renouvelle et transforme l'ontologie mais aussi lui donne une conception décisive dont nous suivons les traces jusqu'à aujourd'hui.

Luz Ascarate: *La radicalité des possibles: Une révision phénoménologique des racines de la métaphysique de Marius Victorinus à Francisco Suárez*

À partir des récentes études généalogiques des notions de puissance, d'en-puissance et de possible (Aubry, 2008, 2020 ; Trego, 2019 ; Lefevbre, 2018), nous essayerons de retracer les changements ontologiques qui, dans la philosophie du Moyen âge, sont parvenus à donner naissance à la métaphysique. Si la métaphysique est aujourd'hui une discipline spécifique de la philosophie, c'est parce qu'elle s'est dissociée de la théologie naturelle en tant que philosophie première. Cette dissociation a eu lieu progressivement dans l'histoire de la philosophie, de l'antiquité tardive à l'aube de la modernité. Notre hypothèse est que la spécificité de la métaphysique comme science de l'être résulte de **la progressive radicalisation du concept de possible**, lequel, désignant le fondement en-puissance de tout ce qui est, dans le commencement de la philosophie même, finit par se soumettre à l'idée d'un **Dieu tout-puissant** dans la philosophie du Moyen Âge et, postérieurement, aux lois de l'efficient dans la modernité. Dans la méthode phénoménologique, de sa fondation à ses représentants post-husserliens, la possibilité a eu la primauté sur l'effectivité (Husserl, 1913 ; Walton, 2008 ; Dufourcq, 2011 ; Serban, 2016). Nous n'exagérons donc pas en affirmant que le possible acquiert de nouveau, dans cette tradition, sa dignité ontologique. Au moyen des outils méthodologiques de la phénoménologie, nous réviserons ainsi la naissance de la métaphysique comme science spécifique. Pour ce faire, nous nous pencherons sur les changements conceptuels impliqués dès le mysticisme de **Marius Victorinus** – qui transforme l'en-puissance aristotélicien et la toute-puissance plotinienne dans l'idée d'une substance trinitaire – au **thomisme de Suarez** – qui finit par exclure progressivement le possible de l'ontologie,

exclusion à partir de laquelle il dissocie l'essence de l'existence. Sur la base de cette dissociation, une nouvelle métaphysique prendra place, avec comme l'une de ses conséquences la primauté de la causalité efficiente, ce qui rend ainsi possible les dissociations métaphysiques de Descartes. Cette métaphysique persistera chez les philosophes « non-professeurs » de la modernité (Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Malebranche) et sera remise en question par Wolff, sans succès, car Kant, qui le considérait comme un dogmatique, laisse de côté les efforts de Wolff pour comprendre la métaphysique héritée de la scolastique. Plusieurs études, d'inspiration heideggérienne, ont déjà cherché à relire phénoménologiquement le Moyen âge. Notre lecture se situe toutefois aux antipodes de celle de Heidegger, dans le sens où nous demeurons à l'intérieur des bornes de la phénoménologie transcendantale, et en nous donnons moins de libertés herméneutiques dans l'exégèse des textes. Nous souhaiterons ici contribuer modestement à réaliser le vœu d'Etienne Gilson qui, critiquant le manque de rigueur des phénoménologues en histoire de la philosophie, voulait voir aboutir, à notre époque, une métaphysique capable de fonder et guider le projet phénoménologique afin de donner à la métaphysique la phénoménologie à laquelle elle avait droit, même si l'unification de la métaphysique et de la phénoménologie ne pourrait être l'œuvre d'un seul (Gilson, 1972, p. 22). Nous sommes convaincue que ce projet d'unification contribuerait au renouvellement, urgent, de la philosophie première.

Salle / Room 3.10

Aula 10: Radical Theories of Cognition

Special Session proposed by Thérèse Cory, Claire Murphy, Dominic LaMantia and Andreas Waldstein
Sponsor: University of Notre Dame
Chair: Dominic LaMantia

Thérèse Cory: *Determination and Termination: Expanding the Model of Mental Causation in Albert and Olivi*

Thirteenth century authors have many reasons to worry about the possibility of mental change: the Augustinian view that the soul cannot be acted upon by bodies, or the Aristotelian dictum concerning the impassibility of intellect. For two authors, the solution is radical: namely, breaking open the cohesive package of the standard four causes to insert something else that can better accommodate mental change. Albert offers a notion of intellectual determination that does not align with the standard notion of formal causality. Olivi, in contrast, appeals to a "terminative cause" of mental acts, which is decidedly not an efficient cause. In both cases, the four-cause framework turns out to be inadequate to handle mental causation and change. I suggest that further inquiry is needed into the technical notions of mental *determinatio* and *terminatio* in the thirteenth century, and the ways in which they disrupt the four-cause account.

Claire Murphy: *Remotely Rooted in Reality: Mathematical and Logical Beings in Aquinas's* Sentences *Commentary (I, d.2, q.1, a.3)*

Inserted into the manuscript of Aquinas's *Sentences* commentary during his sojourn in Rome (a decade after the commentary's initial composition) lies a *quaestio disputata* concerning the distinct *rationes* of the various divine attributes. Among the points Thomas makes in this question is that a *ratio*, that is, the intention or signification of a concept, can only properly be said to exist in reality when the concept to which it belongs is a likeness of something outside the soul: as, for example, the *ratio* of a tree. Yet not every *ratio* which fails to meet this criterion is utterly false or unreal, argues Thomas; there is a middle class of intentions between those of pure likenesses and those of chimeras. Members of this middle group, which includes logical intentions such as genus and

species as well as mathematical objects, have both a "proximate foundation in the intellect," as they arise from some mode of our understanding, and a "remote foundation in reality." Little attention has been paid to this text in recent scholarship, beyond that of a few scholars writing on the extent of Aquinas's mathematical realism. I argue, however, that the import of this text extends beyond mathematics, carving out conceptual and metaphysical space for a class of beings that are real in a derivative sense, but whose being is a result of the mind's self-reflective activity. The intellect "arrives at" or "hits upon" (*invenit*) these intentions in its considerations of beings in the world around it, and thus, says Aquinas, such intentions are "not false"; though they may not have any clear referent in the natural world, they arise from an act by which the intellect knows, and thus truly shares in being with, some real object. Aquinas's insistence upon such intentional beings' roots in reality, remote though they be, suggests that he wants his model of knowledge, even in the case of concepts that are not simply likenesses of beings *extra animam*, to be a fundamentally metaphysical one.

Samuel Pell: *Conceptions as the Offspring of the Intellect: Towards a Naturalistic Interpretation of Aquinas' Cognitional Theory*

In his theory of cognition, Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between the impressed species, which is the principle of the act of understanding, and the expressed species, which is its term. While the impressed species is an accidental form that inheres in the intellect following an act of abstraction, the expressed species is a concept the intellect forms for itself to judge external things. Recent scholarly literature has focused on developing a precise metaphysics of the impressed species, but a metaphysical study of the expressed species has been largely neglected. It seems to be widely assumed, however, that the expressed species is a quality inhering in the intellect whose formal content is identical to that of the impressed species. This understanding of the expressed species, though, would render its presence in the intellect rather redundant. Moreover, this interpretation would seem to be inconsistent with the phenomenon of confused cognition – in which the impressed species corresponds to a thing's quiddity, but that quiddity is not adequately expressed in a definition.

In this paper, I will call attention to a rather obscure text in which Aquinas compares the act of conceiving in the intellect with the act of conceiving a child – with the thing known corresponding to the father, the intellect to the mother, and the conception of the intellect to the embryo. I will argue that we ought to take this text as establishing a real metaphysical parallel between cognition and reproduction, with the impressed species standing to the expressed species as the semen's formative power stands to the embryo's successive substantial forms. Clearly, the analogues do not share perfect metaphysical resemblance, and Aquinas does not develop the comparison to the level of specificity I am proposing. Nevertheless, the analogy allows us to understand how the impressed species can correspond to a thing's quiddity throughout confused cognition, even as the expressed species comes to resemble that quiddity gradually and by degrees. Moreover, it allows us to interpret Aquinas' rather compressed remarks in Summa Theologiae I.85.3.ad1, where he argues that knowledge follows the same general-to-specific pattern of development that is observed in the generation of animals.

Salle / Room 3.11

Aula 11: Hylomorphism in the Later Middle Ages: Contrasting Perspectives 1

Special Session proposed by Nicola Polloni
Sponsor: *Studying Medieval Hylomorphism Whole*, KU Leuven Internal Funds, C14/20/007
Chair: Nicola Polloni

Virginia Scribanti: *The Radical Unity of the Human Compound: William of Alnwick on the Intellectual Soul*

The personal secretary of John Duns Scotus, William of Alnwick (c. 1275-1333), is often described as faithful to his master's views. However, although he generally deals with themes typically linked to Scotus' thought (e.g. the univocity of being, the formal distinction, the principle of individuation), Alnwick does not hesitate to criticise him when Scotus' conclusions do not agree with his own. This is particularly evident with Alnwick's use of Thomas Aquinas's arguments to explain that the intellectual soul is the form of the body, even though it is not itself corporeal. The rational soul represents the boundary between the corporeal and the incorporeal, so that it informs the body, but it can detach from the body after death. Alnwick deploys these arguments to justify both the radical unity of the human compound (as specific hylomorphic compound) and the immortality of the soul. My paper will address a series of questions directly linked to Alnwick's theory of the soul and its indebtedness to Aquinas, while showing also the differences in their solutions. What are the reasons behind Alnwick's commitment to Aquinas' thesis on the intrinsic unity of soul and body? What is the resulting consideration of the soul-body problem stemming from Alnwick's stance? And how can this solution be reconciled with the theory of the plurality of substantial forms, which was a main tenet of the Franciscan school and, particularly, Duns Scotus? My paper will explore Alnwick's position, considering both philosophical and theological aspects that influenced his thought. In particular, I will discuss how the deliberations taken at the Council of Vienne (1311-1312) and Alnwick's closeness to the Averroistic milieu of the Faculty of Arts in Bologna (1321-1323) had a crucial impact on his definition of the soul in its relationship with the body. I will argue that both factors facilitated Alnwick's decision to accept Aquinas' stance on human hylomorphism and to coordinate such an account with the theory of the plurality of substantial forms. In this context, it is worth noticing that, although Alnwick explores a number of themes related to the intellectual soul that are not immediately related to each other, there is an underlying coherence to his thought. Making use of doctrines and arguments from different philosophical traditions (often considered incompatible with each other because of the radicalness of the conclusions they lead to), Alnwick's aim was to produce a theory able to reconcile the substantiality of the intellectual soul, its intrinsic unity with the body, its individuality, and its immortality, notwithstanding the specific stancess or arguments to which his own Franciscan Order was traditionally bound.

Russell L. Friedman: *John of Jandun on Prime Matter and its Potency*

In his commentary on I *Physics*, q. 25 (ed. 1551, ff. 23ra-25va), the Paris Arts master John of Jandun (d. 1328) deals at length with the issue of the relation between prime matter and its potency, asking "whether matter's potency is essentially the same as matter's substance" (*An potentia materiae essentialiter sit idem cum ipsa substantia materiae*). On the one hand, prime matter's potency – its ability to take on the entire spectrum of material substantial forms – seems to be its most prominent characteristic, and this might indicate that matter's potency belongs to its essence. On the other hand, prime matter's potency seems to come and go, altering significantly when the matter is under different substantial forms; this might argue for prime matter's potency possessing some type of accidentality. Jandun's own position on the issue is what you can label "Averroan" (and Jandun explicitly links his view to Averroes'). According to Jandun, matter's potency is a sort of necessary

accident, specifically matter's relation towards the substantial form and the active power that brings it about in the matter; for Jandun, the prime matter itself is a type of substrate for that accident. This paper will 1) explain Jandun's position, 2) analyze several of his arguments for his position, and 3) consider his grounding of the view in Averroes' texts, particularly the Commentator's *Physics* commentary and *De substantia orbis*. In the process, I'll try to show what Jandun himself, on the basis of criticism of views like his, thought might be considered radical in his view and why; I'll also address whether anything can be considered radical about his reliance on Averroes. In this way, I'll try to show some of the many-layered historical and philosophical background to Jandun's extensive treatment of this central issue in later medieval matter theory.

José Filipe Silva: *Matter, Radical Thought and Elusiveness*

Radical thought is often consider as referring to marginal(ized) conceptual positions that question the status quo and the received interpretations on a given topic. On occasions, that marginalised thought comes to replace the dominant strand and novelty is transformed into conservative wisdom. But what defines dominance and radicalism? In my talk, I wish to challenge a traditional understanding of these notions by focusing on the notion of matter in the second half of the thirteenth century in Oxford (and Paris). In 1277, several articles/theses about matter were prohibited, but uncertainty remains about both who was defending those articles and who supported the view behind the prohibitions. With that in mind, I will question whether in (this instance of) academic censorship thought was targeted because it was radical or because it was elusive, and thus what constitutes 'radical thought'.

Serena Masolini: *A Matter of Censorship: Active Potency and Privation in Mid-Thirteenth Century England*

The list of prohibited doctrines on natural philosophy issued on 18 March 1277 by Robert Kilwardby "with the agreement of all the masters and non-masters of the University of Oxford" includes the theses that "no active potency exists in matter" (art. 3) and that "privation is pure nothingness and exists in celestial and inferior bodies" (art. 4). With all due qualifications, it is indeed a common thread of the English tradition, from Roger Bacon to Kilwardby himself, to maintain that matter, in its meaning of physical principle of change, is to a certain extent endowed with formal elements. Among the main positions supported by the English masters are the doctrine of *potentia activa*, stating the presence of active potencies ('diminished' or 'incomplete forms') within physical matter, and the doctrine of *materia formata*, according to which the substrate of generation and corruption is not prime matter but matter as endowed with basic formal determinations such as corporeity and extension. The aim of this paper is to reconsider the theories on the nature of physical matter of mid-thirteenth century English masters *vis-á-vis* the Oxford prohibitions of 1277. It will analyze the positions on active potency, formed matter, and privation found in a selection of anonymous commentaries on the *Physics* dated 1240-1270, it will ascertain the range of doctrinal divergences emerging from the texts, and, on this basis, it will try to make some hypothesis on the institutional meaning of Kilwardby's act of censorship in this regard.

Mercredi /Wednesday 24-08-2022

9h00: *Start of Voting: Room 100*

9h00-10h30: Sessions ordinaires et spéciales/ Ordinary and Special Sessions

Salle / Room 50

Aula 1:Radical Thinking in Albert the Great / II

Special Session proposed by Alessandra Beccarisi and Alessandro Palazzo
Chair: Alessandra Beccarisi

Stefano Perfetti: *Natural-Philosophical Radicalism in Albert the Great's Biblical Exegesis*

It is well known that oftentimes Albert the Great expresses methodological disclaimers, to stress the importance of keeping the philosophical and theological investigation separate. Despite this, in many passages of his biblical exegeses he extensively resorts to philosophical notions (logical, natural, metaphysical and ethical). He uses them (i) both as criteria to define the architecture and the argumentative flux of the biblical book; (ii) and as tools for a conceptual analysis of terms and notions present in the verses under scrutiny. Similarly, he resorts to philosophy in crucial areas of his own *Summa theologiae*. Through an analysis of key texts, I intend to show how for Albert the Great philosophical conceptual analysis is the radical, transversal and indispensable tool, which allows dialogue and inter-translatability between patristic traditions, university thought and extra-scriptural referential reality.

Anna Rodolfi: *Maître Albert polemiste. Acceptions de la radicalité dans la pensée d'Albert le Grand*

Albert le Grand a été longtemps considéré comme un penseur éclectique chez qui le besoin de systématicité s'imposait au détriment de la distinction des sujets et des méthodes, notamment entre la philosophie et la théologie. Une considération plus attentive permet au contraire de vérifier que chez lui la question de la méthode d'enquête est centrale. Il la traite d'ailleurs ouvertement, en mettant à point une distinction complexe et assez nette entre la perspective théologique (*sancti*) et la perspective philosophique (*philosophi*). Est-ce que cette netteté autorise à voir dans son approche une position épistémologique « radicale » ? Et éventuellement dans quel sens de ce mot ? A travers l'examen de quelques cas spécifiques (angélologie, connaissance de Dieu, prophétie, éternité du monde, etc.), ainsi que de quelques réactions de ses contemporains, nous essaierons de montrer que la « radicalité » chez Alberto prend d'abord le sens littéral d'un retour aux racines, des méthodes, des problèmes, des textes.

Alessandro Palazzo: *Use and Meaning of Myth in Albert the Great and Henry of Herford*

Henry of Herford is a Dominican encyclopedist from the 14th century whose work, the *Catena aurea entium*, is renowned as an important document of the dissemination of Albert the Great's natural philosophy. This still unedited work, structured into ten Books, which are in turn subdivided into treatises and collect thousand of quaestiones, has sofar sparked very limited interest from scholars, who have focused their attention on medical theories (Iolanda Ventura), natural philosophy (Alessandro Palazzo), and the reception of the ps.-Hermetic *Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum* (Paolo Lucentini and Ilaria Parri). Of particular interest is Book 1, which carries out a systematic comparative analysis of both the Christian God and the gods and heroes of classical

mythology. This is an original move whose radicality can be properly assessed only if placed within the Scholastic context of the 13th and 14th centuries. The aim of the paper is to investigate, on the basis of a few examples taken from Books 1 and 8, the meaning and function of myth within the *Catena aurea entium* and its relationship to theology and science. Moreover, as is well known, myth and the auctores also play an important role in the natural philosophical works by Albert the Great. The paper is also intended to compare Albert's use of mythology with Henry's innovative views.

Salle / Room 3.01

Aula 2: Cosmologie radicale (XIII^{e}–XIV^{e} siècles)

Special Session proposed by Maria Sorokina
Chair: Maria Sorokina

Eleonora Andriani: *Rooted in the Sky. Angels and Demons in Michael Scot's Cosmology*

Michael Scot (1175?–1235?) – an Arabic-Latin translator, philosopher, encyclopaedist, astrologer, and scientist – is considered one of the leading intellectuals in Western Europe during the first third of the thirteenth century. His wide cultural interests and his reputation as a court magician and astrologer have earned him an extraordinary place in history but also in legend, through his association with his patron, Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen (1194-1250). It is at the request of the emperor that he composed his 'introduction to astrology', namely the *Liber introductorius*. This work includes three books: the *Liber quatuor distinctionum*, the *Liber particularis* and the *Liber physionomie*. The *Liber introductorius* is preceeded by a *Prohemium*, which discusses various subjects that are dealt with in greater length in the three books constituting the *Liber introductorius*. This *Prohemium* is structured into thirteen chapters of various lengths. These chapters cover issues considered by the author to be of vital importance to the study of astrology. Indeed, the opening preamble to the *Prohemium* states that anyone willing to become an astrologer or a man of high learning, able to answer and provide astrological judgements to querents through the art of astronomy, should be acquainted with some necessary preliminary notions. Interestingly, most of the *Prohemium* of this introduction to astrology focuses on theological topics and no less then five chapters are entirely devoted to the angelic nature and its hierarchies, which obviously includes bad angels, namely demons. The whole *Liber introductorius* is brimming with references to angels and demons. Indeed, spiritual beings are an integral part of Michael's universe and they can appear in different shapes. According to Michael Scot, angels, both good and bad, can assume bodies from the ether or air that are visible and appear to men. Angels and demons can even engage in fights and men can recognise this simply by looking at the shapes of the clouds in the sky. Legions of damned spirits rule two kinds of winds, both of which are harmful, unpleasant and particularly dangerous to mankind. Michael Scot never fails to stress the point that life on earth is dramatically affected by the agency of spiritual beings. In Michael's work, astrological and theological themes are inextricable. Astrological thinking in the early thirteenth century involved looking at the sky both for astronomical observations and for hints of spiritual agency. In my paper I will argue that spiritual beings play a crucial role in Michael Scot's work, so that they must be considered a radical feature in his cosmological framework. This provides an opportunity to reflect on the prevalence of theological issues as inherent in scientific thought. My paper will explore these matters by analysing some passages from the *Prohemium* and the first two books of the *Liber introductorius*.

Maria Sorokina: *La cosmologie radicale de Gérard Odon*

Dans le livre II de son commentaire des *Sentences*, le franciscain Gérard Odon (Gerardus/Guiraldus Odonis, *ca.* 1285/90-1349) fait toute une série de déclarations allant à l'encontre de *l'opinio communis* sur la cosmologie: la sphère du feu n'existe pas ; la sphère de la terre est naturellement supérieure à celle de l'eau; les orbes célestes se meuvent eux-mêmes, sans aucune aide des intelligences; les corps inférieurs et les corps supérieurs sont faits de la même matière et, par conséquent, les planètes et les étoiles sont corruptibles. En analysant dans cet exposé l'argumentation de Gérard Odon, j'aborderai deux questions. Premièrement, il s'agira de saisir les raisons qui l'ont conduit, sur tous ces sujets, à entreprendre une révision radicale de la cosmologie aristotélicienne : ce seraient, entre autres, l'inutilité apparente de certains phénomènes (à quoi servirait la sphère du feu ?) ou encore la contradiction entre la philosophie naturelle et l'exégèse chrétienne. Deuxièmement, il conviendra de cerner la façon dont Gérard Odon considère sa propre position : la voit-il comme une rupture avec Aristote ou, au contraire, comme un retour aux racines ?

Aurora Panzica: *Pas que des astres dans les cieux : la Voie lactée, les comètes et l'éclatement de la cosmologie aristotélicienne*

Phénomènes atmosphériques pour Aristote, les comètes et la Voie lactée ont été l'objet de longues discussions parmi les penseurs grecs, arabes et latins. Si la nature changeante et hétérogène de ces corps semblait en effet entamer la simplicité et l'immutabilité qu'Aristote attribuait à la matière éthérée, leur vision, qui n'était pas sujette au phénomène de la parallaxe, commun à tous les phénomènes atmosphériques, semblait une preuve irréfutable de leur appartenance à la sphère céleste. Sans craindre de contredire à l'autorité d'Aristote, les commentateurs tardo-antiques situeront donc la Voie lactée dans la région céleste. Sous l'influence de cette tradition, Ibn al-Bitriq, traducteur des *Météorologiques* en arabe, a corrigé le texte d'Aristote en y introduisant la théorie de la nature céleste de la Voie lactée, théorie correcte au plan scientifique mais qui ne correspondait pas à la pensée d'Aristote. C'est sous cette forme altérée qu'à partir de la fin du XII^{e} siècle, les Latins ont connu l'analyse aristotélicienne de la Voie lactée. Lorsque, un siècle plus tard, ils ont eu accès à la traduction gréco-latine des *Météorologiques*, ils se sont trouvés face à deux versions discordes du texte d'Aristote. De là la nécessité de choisir entre les deux et d'expliquer la contradiction. Contrairement à l'opinion d'Edward Grant, selon lequel les penseurs médiévaux auraient suivi Aristote en faisant de la Voie lactée un phénomène terrestre, cette théorie ne se retrouve pas dans la version arabo-latine des *Météorologiques* d'Aristote et n'a pas été soutenue par les commentateurs de ce texte. Quant aux commentateurs de la *nova translatio*, parmi les dizaines de commentaires sur les *Météorologiques* que j'ai consultés, j'ai identifié seulement trois maîtres du XIII^{e} siècle, à savoir Raoul le Breton et les anonymes parisiens de la Bibliothèque Nationale (Paris, BnF, latin 14698) et de la Bibliothèque Mazarine (Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3493), qui ont accueilli la théorie aristotélicienne de la nature sublunaire de la Voie lactée. Il reste que si l'argument du manque de parallaxe, fondé sur les lois de l'optique, offrait aux penseurs médiévaux des arguments forts pour s'opposer à la théorie aristotélicienne de la nature atmosphérique de la Voie lactée, il faudra attendre encore quelques siècles pour en avoir la preuve expérimentale : ce n'est qu'en 1610 que Galilée, pointant sa lunette astronomique vers le ciel, constata que la Voie lactée était effectivement constituée par une myriade d'étoiles. L'autorité d'Aristote a résisté plus longtemps dans le cas des comètes. Si les commentateurs grecs, arabes et la plupart des Latins ont refusé d'accorder la citoyenneté céleste aux astres chevelus, Nicole Oresme, dans la première rédaction des *Questions sur les Météorologiques*, a développé l'argument de la parallaxe pour fonder son hypothèse de la localisation supralunaire des comètes – une hypothèse qui allait à l'encontre des présupposés de la cosmologie aristotélicienne. Pour que l'intuition d'Oresme soit confirmée, il faudra attendre plus de deux siècles: ce n'est qu'en 1577 que l'astronome Tycho Brahe, sur la base de l'étude de la parallaxe de la comète de 1577, restituera définitivement ces corps à la région céleste.

Salle / Room 3.02

Aula 3: Al-Farabi and his Influence

Special Session proposed by Richard C. Taylor and Luis López -Farjeat
Sponsor: *Aquinas and 'the Arabs' International Working Group* (AAIWG)
Chair: Luis X. López-Farjeat

Rosabel Ansari: *An Unreal World: al-Fārābī, Radical Eleatic Metaphysics, and Ordinary People*

Upon al-Fārābī's reconstruction, Eleatic metaphysics consisted of the radical denial of the world as we perceive it. According to this view, which al-Fārābī ascribes to the Presocratics Parmenides of Elea and his student Zeno, there is no movement, change, differentiation or multiplicity in the world. This radical form of ontological monism is discussed across many of al-Fārābī's logical, programmatic and metaphysical texts, including the Book of Dialectic (Kitāb al-Jadal), The Situations of Sophistry (Al-Amkinah al-Mughliṭah), Philosophy of Aristotle (Falsafat Arisṭūṭālīs), Book of Letters (Kitāb al-Ḥurūf), Book of One and oneness (Kitāb al-Wāḥid wa-l-waḥdah). Yet, as al-Fārābī tells us this, this view is both repulsive and contradicts what is manifest and selfevident. As such this paper will explore al-Fārābī's explanation for how such a radical view can take hold among ordinary people. Although al-Fārābī provides a significant philosophical refutation of Eleatic monism, his concern is not just with proving its falsity. Al-Fārābī also discusses how ordinary people might be misled into holding this position, thereby illustrating a concern for the broader socio-political implications of Eleatic monism in addition to its logical and metaphysical refutation. Al-Fārābī gives two reasons for why people are misled into holding the position of the Eleatics, both relating to psychology and politics. Firstly, he tells us that the fame (šuhrah) for proficiency in the sciences of those who uphold the Eleatic position causes the soul to doubt what is commonly accepted and believe that they must know something others do not. Secondly, Fārābī tells us that the arguments for Eleatic monism are based on doubt-inducing terms (asmāʾ mušakkikah), such as 'being' (mawǧūd). According to al-Fārābī such terms, developed from Aristotle's pros hen homonymy, are equivocal but have related meanings and as a result they cause individuals to doubt whether they are used equivocally or univocally. Al- Fārābī tells us that the proponents of Eleatic monism exploit this ambiguity by using fallacious arguments that equivocate on 'being', while leading their interlocutors to understand the term univocally, and thereby construing the world as a single being in which there is no non-being. These explanations for why ordinary people might accept the fallacy of Eleatic monism are primarily psychological. Both the fame of its proponents and the language of the argument cast doubt in the soul. As such, these explanations offer a reflection on the human psychology of doubting what al-Fārābī considers to be the manifest, self-evident fact of the world's reality as we perceive it. These explanations are also political in so far as they give rise to questions concerning authority. Their fame for proficiency in the sciences endows the proponents of Eleatic monism with authority, and it is this authority that underlies the sowing of doubt.

Terence J. Kleven: *Al-Fārābī's Several Introductions to the Organon: Sorting out the Significance of the Manuscript Traditions of Istanbul, Tehran, and Diyarbakır*

Al-Fārābī wrote many philosophical treatises which are found in various manuscripts in the libraries of several countries. These treatises are not always in the same order, which is also true of his several introductory treatises on logic. For example, there are two manuscripts from Istanbul, MS. Suleymaniye Hamidiye 812 and MS. Bratislava 231 TE41, both copied in the early eighteenth century and both of which contain a series of twelve treatises which are introductions to and commentaries on the Organon of Aristotle. We know these manuscripts were copied in an academy whose head was Aʿsad al-Yanyāwī. In this manuscript tradition, there are three short treatises

placed before al-Fārābī's commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* (called in Arabic *Kitāb al-Maqūlāt*) which are introductions to this sequence of treatises; these three treatises are the *Letter with which the Book Begins* (*Risāla ṣudira bihā al-kitāb*), the *Five Aphorisms* (*Ḫamsa fuṣūl*), and a commentary of Porphyry's *Eisagoge* (*Kitāb Īsāʿūjī ayy al-madḫal*). In two manuscripts from Tehran, however, both from the late seventeenth century, the treatise which precedes his commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, as well as other commentaries on the Organon, is the *Book of the Utterances Employed in Logic* (*Kitāb al-alfāẓ al-mustaʿamala fī al-manṭiq*). These Tehran manuscripts are MS. Karaman 211 and MS. Majlis Shurray Melli 595. There is also a third manuscript from Istanbul, MS. Feyzullah Afendi 1882, which, as Muhsin Madhi judges, is closer to the Iranian manuscript tradition than the two main manuscripts we have listed from Istanbul. Mahdi also discovered a manuscript in a library in Diyarbakır (MS. Diyarbakır 1970) with five of al-Fārābī's treatises in it, the fifth of which is the *Utterances*. In Muhsin Madhi's published edition (AH 1388 / AD 1968) of the *Utterances*, he argues for a priority of this Diyarbakır manuscript for this treatise because it reveals that the Iranian manuscript tradition constitutes a 'paraphrase' of the *Utterances*, and, moreover the Diyarbakir manuscript also contains better readings of the treatise of the *Utterances* than are found in the manuscripts of the Iranian tradition. Madhi also draws attention in the introduction of his critical edition to the *Utterances* to several references in the *Utterances* to another treatise which al-Fārābī intends should be read prior to the *Utterances*; Mahdi shows, through al-Fārābī's references, that this other treatise is the *Book of the Indication of the Way to Happiness*. The identification of this treatise means that both the *Indication* and *Utterances* are introductions to logic and are intended to be read in this order before the beginning of logic in the *Categories*. The aim of the inquiry of this paper is 1) to evaluate and confirm the link that Madhi makes between the *Indication* and the *Utterances*, and 2) to explain the consequences of a proper understanding of these several introductory treatises in these two manuscript traditions, one in Istanbul, the other primarily in Tehran, for an appreciation of al-Fārābī's account of Classical Philosophy, especially with respect to the nature and place of logic. We argue in particular that, while the three short treatises, the *Letter*, the *Five Aphorisms*, and the *Book of the Categories* present an excellent, even if shortened, account of what is necessary for an introduction to logic, the *Indication* and *Utterances* provide a fuller exposition of what is needed prior to the study of Aristotle's Organon. We argue further that both of al-Fārābī's introductory accounts of logic embed logic deeply in the examination of expressions, even the grammar, of the language of a people, and that his accounts also place logic in the larger context of the ordering and rank of the philosophic sciences, that is, logic is not allowed to be separated from Philosophy as a whole. The 'radical' nature of al-Fārābī's philosophical *oeuvre* is only apprehended through a recognition of the thoroughness and critical evaluation of his reading of Plato and Aristotle, and these qualities make him one of the finest sources of Classical Philosophy for an understanding of Plato and Aristotle, as well as a critic who is able to establish his own philosophical position in distinction from them. According to the astute critical judgement of T. S. Eliot, the greatest creative artists are those who fully absorb the best that is thought and known from their predecessors and only after he or she has acquired this comprehensive and thorough account of his or her predecessors do the great artists decisively refine, modify, and make innovations on tradition (see T. S. Eliot, "Tradition and Individual Talent," first published in AD 1919). It is in this sense that al-Fārābī goes to the 'root' (أصل , *racine*) or the 'base' (أساس , *radices*) and is monumentally at once both traditional and creative.

Salle / Room 3.04

***Aula 4: Medieval Debates and the Practice of* Principia**

Special Session proposed by Monica Brinzei
Sponsor: ERC-DEBATE project, n° 771589
Chair: Alexander Fidora

Nancy Spatz/Andrew Sulavik: *Natural Science, Aquinas, Aristotelian Ethics and the Division of the Books of the Bible in a Parisian* Principium *on Theology, ca. 1310*

A principial sermon *Recommendatio and Divisio sacre Scripture* attributed to Peter Auriole, Paris, BnF, Latin 14566, ff 2-7, using a theme from Eccli 24:25 *In me omnis spes vite et virtutis* explains how our intellect and morals, impaired by the Fall of Adam, are restored and healed through the study of the Bible. The sermon is notable for numerous illustrations drawn from astronomy and medicine. Its *resumption* on the division of the books of the Bible, extensively cites Thomas Aquinas' teachings on the virtues verbatim, pairing the virtues with each of the books of the Bible. This *resumptio* is notable for its authoritative use of Aquinas and its innovative way of dividing the books of the Bible, which distinguishes itself radically from how former masters divided the books of the Bible in preceding extent theological *principia*, a tradition dating back at the University of Paris to Stephen Langton's time there.

William Duba: Radix sapientiae: introitus *and* principium *on the* Sentences *in the 13th Century*

Ninety years ago, Chenu completed what remains the most complete study of ms Paris, BnF, Latin 15652, a collection of student *reportationes* from lectures on the *Sentences* at the University of Paris, ca. 1240. From this study, he observed that lectures on each book of the *Sentences* began with a speech, known as an *introitus*; only in the 1250s did these speeches get the name *principia*. A closer look at the sources suggests a new origin story for principia on the *Sentences*.

Madalina Pantea: *Quoting Augustine at the Faculty of Theology from Krákow in the 15th Century – the case of Nicolaus Kozłowski's* Collatio in III Principium Sententiarum

Nicolaus Kozłowski was among the most important Masters from the University of Krákow. After he finished his studies in Prague at the Faculty of Liberal Arts, under the supervision of Jerome of Prague, Kozłowski returned to Krákow, where he served as a rector of the University in 1410. The aim of this paper is to investigate the manner in which Kozłowski is quoting Augustine in his *Collatio in III Principium Sententiarum*. At first glance it seems that the authority of the Bishop of Hippo played a crucial role in his *Collatio*, since in the *prothema* is using a passage from the treatise *De Trinitate*. But does he quote Augustine to give strength to his arguments or he is using the quotations in a rhetorical manner? Also, we have to consider if we can apply to this *Collatio* the controversial etiquette of "Augustinianism".

Salle / Room 3.05

Aula 5: Arabic Philosophy / I

Ordinary Session

Chair: Emma Gannagé

Lucie Tardy: *La science de Dieu : tentative d'identification d'une solution rushdienne au problème des attributs divins*

La querelle divisant, au sein du *kalam*, les mu'tazilites et les ash'arites est résumée ainsi par Averroès dans le *Kashf ʿan manahij al-adilla fi ʿaqaʾid al-milla* : « les attributs (divins) (*sifat*), sont-ils l'essence ? Sont-ils ajoutés à l'essence ? Autrement dit, sont-ils des attributs de l'essence ou attributs entitatifs (*ma'nawiyya)*?» Dans ce traité de contre-théologie, Averroès refusera l'une et l'autre de ces possibilités. D'un côté il réfutera l'existence réelle de plusieurs entités elles-mêmes divines car co-éternelles à Dieu : ce serait, de la part de l'ashʿarisme, menacer Son unicité (*tawhid)* autant qu'assimiler Dieu à la créature composée d'essence et d'accidents. De l'autre, il reprochera aux muʿtazilites de nier l'existence de tels attributs que le dogme appelle explicitement à reconnaître, et ce, en forçant l'identification ontologique entre essence et attributs. Il faut donc selon Averroès maintenir *au sujet* de Dieu une forme de pluralité, sans toutefois que soit admise, *en* Lui une composition ontologique. Ni la science, ni la puissance, ni la volonté de Dieu ne sauraient exister séparément de Son essence, pas plus qu'elles ne sauraient S'y identifier complètement. Quel concept Averroès mobilise-t-il pour défendre une telle réponse ? Il serait tentant d'affirmer qu'Averroès adopte sur ce point la position q u e l e s ashʿarites imputent traditionnellement aux *falasifa.* Celle-ci consiste, selon les *mutakallimūn*, à nier les attributs de Dieu en les réduisant à Sa seule science. Si Averroès n'adopte jamais explicitement cette thèse dans le *Kashf*, certains indices textuels tendent cependant à montrer que la science joue un rôle à part au sein des attributs divins. Définie comme la précondition de l'existence des autres attributs, c'est bien à elle, semble-t-il, qu'ils renvoient en dernière instance, logiquement aussi bien qu'ontologiquement. La définition aristotélicienne de la science implicitement mobilisée par Averroès offre une résolution originale au problème épineux de l'éternité et de la pluralité des attributs dans leur relation à l'essence, résolution irréductible à la négation pure et simple des attributs qu'a voulu y voir l'ashʿarisme. L'étude du cas de la science au sein des attributs divins sera l'occasion de dégager l'originalité de la position d'Averroès à l'égard du muʿtazilisme mais aussi des autres *falasifa,* auxquels on a tôt fait de l'assimiler. Elle permettra, enfin, d'expliciter quelques traits de la logique et de l'ontologie aristotéliciennes mobilisées implicitement par Averroès dans sa réponse aux *mutakallimūn*.

Said El Bousklaoui: *God's Will between Radical Negation and Affirmation in Islamic Theology*

This paper examines different views on the attribute of divine will between negation and affirmation as provided by different Muslim theologians. It mainly focuses on two radical opposite views regarding God's will: the first totally denies the reality of divine will, and the second affirms that Will is a real attribute of divine essence with all its physical and non-physical dimensions. The first camp includes some Muʿtazilites, Shiʿites, and philosophers who claim that God's will is nothing but His knowledge or His command or His Action or His creation, while the second is represented by some anthropomorphists and Karramites scholars who ascribe to God a real will being in a place (fī maḥall). The paper explores the 'rational' arguments provided by each camp and shows how they both paved the way to at least two other views that stand in midway between the two previous radical views. It also illustrates how these views are grounded in a long history of philosophical discussions about divine will (from Plato to Ibn Sīna) on the one hand, and how this issue is connected to other theological and philosophical issues (such as the essence of God and His relation to the world) on the other.

Kahina Bordji: *La radicalité de la* fitra: *la nature humaine d'après Fârabi*

Cette présente contribution se propose de traiter du concept de *fitra insaniyya,* conçue entant que nature humaine originaire. Fârâbî a recours à ce concept au fondement de sa pensée. Ce concept permet de rendre compte d'une nature spécifiquement humaine, en même temps qu'il renvoie à l'idée d'une prédisposition à la connaissance: « Les hommesont tous une norme originelle commune, *fitra insaniyya,* qui fait qu'ils sont chacun disposés à la réception des intelligibles (premiers).» Par conséquent, la *fitra* se veut irréductible à la *phusis* aristotélicienne. Quand la *phusis* touche à l'ensemble des êtres naturels, champs d'application large, la *fitra* nous dévoileune disposition première, en arabe *istiʿdâd,* qui elle se veut restreinte, et ainsi propre à l'homme. Il existe au demeurant un autre terme pour désigner la nature en arabe, celui de *tabîʿa*, dérivé de *tabʿ,* signifiant empreinte, faisant ainsi référence à la forme s'imprimant dans la matière. Ce second terme vise un sens de la nature tournée vers des considérations liéesà la physique. Farabi, en tant que métaphysicien, ne le développe guère. Nous faisons l'hypothèse, que la *fitra* farabienne joue un rôle de racine, bien différente decelle de *phusis* et de *tabîʿa,* et c'est cette spécificité, aux fondements de sa philosophie, que nous nous proposons d'exhiber. L'intellectualisation de l'homme ne peut être appréhendée qu'à partir de ce commencement incarné par une nature universelle, première en soi. Autrement dit, que serait l'actualisation noétique auquel se livre l'homme,sans les prémisses qui nous sont révélées par la *fitra* ? Nous comprenons dès lors cet attachement remarquable à la forme la plus pure du concept, en d'autres termes uneapproche touchant aux fondements. L'idée de radicalité semble ainsi fortement présent dans la philosophie de Fârâbî, et ceci au nom d'une préoccupation théorique constante: celle de penser l'origine de l'homme par le biais de la *fitra.* Nous sommes en effet constamment reconduits à cet état dans lequel se trouve l'homme lors de sa venue au monde.L' être rationnel a été créé, et conjointement à cette naissance, *ma'a' l-insân,* des connaissances premières sont engendrées. Autrement dit, la *fitra* devient une caractéristique de l'être incontournable, unattribut commun à tous les humains. Apparait donc ici, un intérêt particulier pour l'hommedans son aspect le plus véritable. Cette valeur universelle nous révèle une pensée farabienne profondément soucieuse des origines. Celui que l'on surnomme le second maitre, le premier étant Aristote, se livre à une pensée touchant à ce qu'il y'a de plus propre à l'homme, en d'autres termes: qu'est-ce qui fait qu'un homme est un homme ? Afin de répondre à cette question,Fârâbî se consacre à une véritable enquête, dont les enjeux nous sont d'emblée précisés, celui de la quddité, *mâhiyya,* de l'être rationnel.

Salle / Room 3.06

Aula 6: Radical Visualizations of Knowledge: Scientific Resemblance, Diagrammatic Thinking, and Digital Environments

Special Session proposed by José Higuera Rubio
Sponsor: Instituto de Filosofia da Universidade do Porto/Project from Data to Wisdom
Chair: José Higuera Rubio

The astonishing work of Opicinus de Canistris -early 14th century- is one of the most appealing collections of medieval knowledge visualizations. Opicinus was stereotyped as a "fool", but his work represents a challenging combination of iconic resemblance of nature and the subtle abstraction of geometrical diagrams, but if we look back to medieval visual culture, there are many examples of iconic representations and diagrams. The focal point of this session is the medieval wavering between the resemblance of perceptive experience and the abstract models of geometry that demonstrate physical phenomena. Opicinus is not the first witness of that superposition of resemblance and abstraction in which iconicity is used to go further into underlined symbolic interpretations. Medieval encyclopedism assumed time as a sacred determinism and tried to explain the cycles of planetary motion as the accomplishment of holy rules (Opicinus' work includes

complete descriptions of observational astronomy). Likewise, descriptions of light phenomena, abstracted through geometrical diagrams, have their counterpart in the inspirational spreading of light from the first Being located in the eighth sphere.
This session will handle the ambiguity of medieval visualizations through the examples of radical philosophers: the imagery tradition behind Medieval Encyclopedism, the foundational diagrammatic reasoning from Arabic authors, and the possibility of commenting, exploring, and comparing all this diagrammatic heritage through the application of digital tools (FDTW-project).

José Higuera Rubio: *Radical Imagery of World Experience: Gossuin de Metz and Opicinus de Canistris*

The colourful and geometrical diagrams found in medieval encyclopedism usually depict the lunar phases and the sun's path along the zodiac. These cycles became the contextual background of philosophical and scientific speculation in the Middle Ages. However, the history of philosophy has dismissed these colourful images of the world (Weltanschauung) and silently left behind this "radical" imagery. Therefore, literary and art studies are constantly pointing out how medieval thinking keeps a narrow connection with visualizations as an under-explored tools of knowledge spreading. The "radical imagery of the world" shows a colourful resemblance to substantial composition and, in parallel, the accurate abstraction of elemental dynamics in the human body and psychology. Colourful plates and geometrical diagrams represent different levels of world readings: close and distant. The first is an intimate glimpse of minimal parts of natural bodies, while the second is a cosmological view. Gossuin de Metz and Opicinus de Canistris represent these ways of radical reading through their expressive diagrams in which an ideal observer gathers the generalities of medieval knowledge. The question is how the different readings of levels' interactions work and whether those readings modified the premodern world image, from radical imagery to abstract diagrammatic thought.

Celeste Pedro: *What's in an Ontology? Reading and Communicating Visual Information*

From Data to Wisdom is a project built on medieval and early modern diagrams. These diagrams survived on different material supports, from drawings in manuscripts and engravings in print, to sculpted façades or scientific tools. FDTW has been focused on 2D diagrammatic shapes, with which an image database was created using IIIF manifests to store curated digital information (metadata and annotations). At a global level, coverage is forming towards the necessity of a true international image interoperability. The task lacks only a broader consensus around definitions, and most importantly, best practices are still largely localized. The goal was to then use the manifests to create a data visualization tool. The applications of such tools to research and education are immense and the technology is being perfected by the minute. For the project, this meant that investing on visual ontologies concerning metadata and annotations to be used in the database and by the digital tool was a necessary endeavor too. The project used both attested platforms and original applications (rooted more on imagetic attributes and less on verbal information) that allow higher degrees of experimentation and enquiry. The communicative effectiveness of the use of ontologies is bound to the conditions of human interpretation and to computer reading; one of the tasks was to account for distinct levels of knowledge representation and visual perception, and how they interplay in symbolic systems, the other was to feed the digital 'machine' with derived pragmatic sets of ontologies, with meaningful semantics, that could, because of it, be subjected to personal conceptualizations. This communication will guide the audience through the methodologies FDTW used in the process of development of the database and the digital tool, with a special focus on the questions and decisions regarding the creation of visual ontologies, their applicability, and their implications.

Roberto Limonta: *The Radical Sign: The Semiotics of Calligram in Opicinus de Canistris*

Opicinus de Canistris, a Pavian cleric lived between 1296 and 1352, was a *scriptor*, miniaturist, cartographer *sui generis*, writer, theologian, philosopher. This fluctuating identity corresponds to an heterogeneous secundary literature, from psychoanalysis (Jung 1943, Kris 1952) to anthropology (Gurevič 1993), from iconology (Saxl 1915; Solomon 1936) to a biographical and pathological approach (Laharie 2007), from history of arts (Whittington 2014) to history of philosophy (Randi 1989), until the most recent *Dialectique du monstre* (Piron 2015). Although well-founded on Opicinus' work, this kaleidoscope of perspectives risks losing sight of his equally significant unitarian sense. To avoid overinterpretations, this contribute will propose a semiotic reading of Opicinus' work, intending it in the light of the set of rules – however so personal – of a code of signs. Even if caution is called for applying modern categories to a medieval man, this approach seems to be useful to decant interpretative layers, bringing to light the underlying symbolic mechanism that acts as a semantic engine of Opicinus' thought. Using tools as the semiotic concept of "idiolect" (Eco 1968), the analysis will focus the topic – pivotal for the Pavian cleric – of the structural homology between individual and collective body. In this case, this relationship of analogy is radical, grounded on the root of Opicinus' individuality, that is his own body, and on the symbolic references that make it a map of the world, so that his contingent body image becomes a sign of an absolute meaning: «Ego infirmus ex corpore meo testificor dispositionem Europe. Umbilicus mee Papie […]) aliquantulum profundior quasi foramen assimilatur Venetie Castellane. Condensitas pilorum colli mei est copia vinearum Wasconie» (Vaticanus Latinus 6435, 32v). The paper will try to define this idiosyncratic semiotic code against the background of the relationship microcosm/macrocosm, *topos* of the medieval *forma mentis*. Opicinus' model can be described as a metaphysical pansemiosis (Eco 1987): all the world is a semantically saturated space, where every thing is symbolically meaningful. His papers and charts – a singular bricolage of glosses, diagrams, maps, acrostics – are characterized by this *horror vacui*: every word, every drawing, every part of his sheets of parchments is significant and polysemic. So, the analysis will focus on the figure of calligram, because it shows as the Opicinus' conceptual imaginery works. The written words are arranged *per figuram* and they act as a visual object; on the other hand, the graphic signs produce a paratext of glosses. This interweaving of verbal and visual codes operates on different cognitive levels: the *visio*, that grasps all the things of the world *sub specie aeternitatis*, as a metaphysical unit; the linguistic knowledge, that temporally proceeds by definitions and differences. In his anthropomorphic maps and autobiographical writings, therefore, the body works as a calligram: through this formula, a semiotic model takes shape, keeping together word and image, spirit and flesh, cultural references and bizarre etymologies, high and low culture, political conformism and palingenetic utopias.

Salle / Room 3.07

Aula 7: Duns Scotus

Ordinary Session

Chair: Dominique Demange

Jean-Baptiste Letang: *La racine de tout mérite. L'*affectio justitiae *chez Duns Scot.*

La reprise par Duns Scot de la distinction anselmienne entre *affectio commodi* et *affectio justitiae* a déjà fait l'objet de plusieurs publications[1]. Nous souhaitons attirer l'attention sur l'*affectio justitiae* dans l'œuvre du Docteur Subtil, et plus particulièrement sur l'expression « racine de tout mérite » qui sert à la décrire dans la *Reportatio*. Penser la grâce ou la charité comme la racine de toute vertu et donc de tout mérite est assez commun, mais l'insistance sur l'*affectio justitiae* permet d'envisager la racine de la vie morale par le prisme particulier d'une notion mieux connue dans sa version originale anselmienne que dans sa reprise scotienne. Mais dans quelle mesure cette reprise est-elle fidèle à la

pensée du Docteur Magnifique? Si l'*affectio commodi* a été assimilée par Duns Scot à l'attachement naturel à soi[3], il semble que l'*affectio justitiae* désigne l'attachement à Dieu, premier objet naturellement digne d'amour, et dont l'amour est le premier dont on puisse – paradoxalement – tirer quelque mérite, comme l'indique le passage déjà cité de la *Reportatio*[4]. Outre l'étude de l'histoire d'une notion anselmienne chez Duns Scot, notre intervention proposerait de présenter, à partir de la formule scotienne qui fait de l'*affectio justitiae* la «racine de tout mérite» ce que la pensée radicale peut avoir de paradoxal en matière de morale. Le mérite doit en effet s'enraciner dans autre chose, à savoir la grâce ou l'*affectio justitiae*, qui est posée par Dieu dans la volonté humaine comme sa tendance la plus haute, et donc la plus vertueuse. Mais dans quelle mesure cette *affectio* est- elle aussi naturelle ? L'amour de Dieu relève chez Duns Scot du droit naturel ; or si la racine de tout mérite est elle-même naturelle, cela ne déradicalise-t-il pas la dichotomie droit naturel / droit positif ordinairement attribuée à Duns Scot?

Emanuele Sorichetti: Radicaliter *o* formaliter*? Essenza e attributi divini nella teologia trinitaria di Giovanni Duns Scoto*

In *Ordinatio*, I, d. 13, q. un. Giovanni Duns Scoto si preoccupa di distinguere la spirazione dello Spirito Santo dalla generazione del Figlio. Perché lo Spirito Santo non può dirsi «generato»? In cosa differiscono le due produzioni trinitarie? Come ha mostrato R.L. Friedman, Scoto rifiuta l'approccio *relazionale* della tradizione domenicana e adotta un approccio *emanazionale* alla Trinità. Attraverso un uso forte del «modello psicologico» di Agostino d'Ippona, le persone si distinguono in base al modo in cui sono «emanate» o «prodotte»: il Padre è non-prodotto, il Figlio è generato dall'intelletto *naturaliter*, in quanto 'Verbo', lo Spirito Santo è spirato dalla volontà *libere*, in quanto 'Amore'. Nella *distinctio* 13 Scoto, prima di presentare la sua soluzione, passa al setaccio le diverse *opiniones* del dibattito teologico a lui contemporaneo, soffermandosi in particolare sulla posizione – attribuita dai curatori della *Editio Vaticana* a Thomas Sutton, ma non lontana dalle posizioni dell'Aquinate – secondo cui l'essenza divina, totalmente indistinta, è il principio unico e immediato di entrambe le produzioni trinitarie. L'essenza, contenendo virtualmente i due atti, generazione e spirazione, sarebbe «in qualche modo quasi radice e principio» (*quodammodo quasi radicem et principium*) delle perfezioni riconducibili agli attributi, intelletto e volontà. Il Dottor Sottile intende mostrare come, *sic stantibus*, le due produzioni trinitarie rischino di essere *uniformes*. Distinguerle è dunque necessario, ma senza porre una disparità o una distinzione reale tra gli attributi. Questi sono parimenti infiniti (*utrumque est infinitum*), mentre, in quanto principi produttivi, individuano due modi di produzione formalmente distinti (*alterius rationis, et in formalitatibus aliis*). Ma – si domanda Scoto – da dove viene questa produttività dei principi? O, detto altrimenti, che rapporto intercorre tra essenza e attributi nel 'modo' dell'infinità ? Parlando della volontà, egli afferma ad esempio che la sua «indeterminatezza» (caratteristica che la distingue dall'intelletto) deriva *in senso radicale* dall'essenza (*indeterminatio radicaliter ab essentia*), ma specifica che *in senso formale* essa appartiene al carattere proprio della volontà (*formaliter autem ex ratione voluntatis propria*). Scoto si premura così di riconoscere un valore fontale e radicale all'essenza, ma senza trascurare la non-identità formale dei due principi. Questi sono infiniti e produttivi non solo *radicaliter* (o *fundamentaliter*), in quanto quasi-radicati nell'essenza divina, ma anche *formaliter*, conservando le loro peculiarità, in quanto principi di due produzioni irriducibilmente distinte (*naturaliter* e *libere*). Scoto chiarisce così, contro l'*opinio*, che un'essenza come radice e fondamento dell'infinità non è incompossibile con la presenza (cooriginaria) di *attributa divina* che sono *aliquid quasi circa essentiam*. L'essenza è infinita *in se et omnino a se*, poiché non riceve da null'altro la sua infinità; l'attributo, invece, è infinito *per se et in se, sed non omnino a se*, poiché acquisisce infinità, appunto, dall'essenza. Intelletto e volontà, pertanto, possono essere *formaliter infinita et in se et per se, sed radicaliter in essentia sicut in fundamento*. Agli attributi spetta dunque contribuire alla produzione attraverso le loro perfezioni proprie (formali), mentre all'essenza *concedatur aliquo modo habere rationem perfectionis radicalis et fundamentalis*. È proprio intorno al diverso ruolo di essenza e attributi divini e al loro concorso nella produzione trinitaria che

vorrebbe concentrarsi il mio intervento, approfondendo questa 'oscillazione' tra *radicaliter* e *formaliter*. Cuore della comunicazione sarà il pensiero teologico di Scoto, a partire dal contesto dottrinale dal quale egli si lascia sfidare e interpellare.

Salle / Room 3.08

Aula 8: La pensée radicale dans les commentaires à l'*Ethique à Nicomaque */ I

Special Session proposed by Valeria Buffon and Irene Zavattero
Chair: Irene Zavattero

Valeria Buffon: *Les stratégies concordistes des artiens et leur conséquences à long terme: un rapport de leur toute première interprétation du 'libre arbitre' chez Aristote*

Les premiers commentaires de l'Éthique à Nicomaque n'avaient aucune intention d'aboutir à une quelconque pensée radicale ou ce que Van Steenberghen a appelé, pour les années 1270, aristotélisme radical. De fait, ils étaient pris dans la mentalité de leur temps où la pensée théologique des grands maîtres, tels Philippe le Chancelier, Hugues de Saint-Cher, ou Jean de la Rochelle, montrait l'avant-garde de la recherche universitaire. C'est suivant ces maîtres théologiens et utilisant des textes des pères de l'église, tels Augustin et Jean Damascène, qu'ils ont interprété que la prohairesis aristotélicienne (EN III, 2) comme s'identifiant au libre arbitre. Nous nous demandons si ce geste, apparemment anodin, a mis en branle un mécanisme d'assimilation, qui, une fois démantelé par une exégèse plus précise a donné lieu à une des nombreuses interprétations radicales de la philosophie aristotélicienne, celle de la prééminence de l'intellect sur la volonté. Ce sujet de recherche est vaste, et a été relevé par plusieurs chercheurs. Notre apport se limitera à montrer la toute première interprétation des artiens parisiens sur la prohairesis, traduite par Burgundio de Pise (ca. 1150) comme « eligentia ». Parmi les artiens, les uns identifient cette « eligentia' » au libre arbitre, comme c'est le cas de l'anonyme *Lectura cum questionibus in Ethicam Nouam et Veterem*, les autres ont leurs réserves quant à cela, comme c'est le cas de la *Lectura abrincensis*. À ces opinions nous ajouterons celle de Robert Kilwardby, ainsi que celle du commentaire dit « de Paris ». Nous constaterons les relations de nos maîtres aux théologiens de l'époque récemment étudiés par Riccardo Saccenti, Irene Zavattero et Lydia Schumacher.

Irene Zavattero: *Les commentaires à l'*Ethique à Nicomaque*: une exégèse radicalement aristotélicienne ?*

« On ne s'attend peut-être pas à trouver, dans un commentaire de l'Ethica noua, autre chose que la philosophie d'Aristote. On découvre pourtant dès l'abord chez notre maitre ès arts une doctrine, cohérente et non sans profondeur, qui ne doit rien à Aristote, qui est même aux antipodes de la pensée du Philosophe ». À partir de ces mots que René Antoine Gauthier formulait à propos du Commentaire de Paris (1235-1240), l'un des premiers commentaires à l'Éthique à Nicomaque (EN), je me propose d'élargir l'enquête aux autres commentaires de la même époque, mais aussi à ceux de la deuxième moitié du XIIIe siècle et du XIVe siècle, pour vérifier la « radicalité aristotélicienne » de leur exégèse. Le but est de vérifier si les commentateurs, maîtres ès arts et théologiens, restèrent adhérents à la pensée d'Aristote ou bien si s'en éloignèrent en mêlant d'autres doctrines aux « antipodes du Philosophe ». Pour le faire, j'analyserai le traitement réservé par les exégètes à deux concepts clés de l'EN : felicitas et boulesis (voluntas). Bien consciente que les textes sont à étudier dans leur complexité et que je ne pourrai qu'offrir des échantillons de l'interprétation des commentateurs, il me semble que tracer l'« histoire » des concepts de 'bonheur' et de 'volonté' à l'intérieur de l'exégèse de l'EN puisse donner une première idée de la façon dont les commentateurs latins ont abordé la pensée éthique d'Aristote.

Riccardo Saccenti: *Teaching Ethics: The ms. Pisa, Cath. 124, the Moral Lexicon and the Philosophical Debate at the Midth of the 13th Century*

Burgundio da Pisa's Latin translation of the Nicomachean Ethics had a crucial role in the structuring of the philosophical teaching in the early Faculty of Arts. This text has been certainly a gateway to the Aristotelian moral thinking, but it also allowed the opportunity to work on the language and ideas connected with ethics. Already in the 1240s it was part of a structured philosophical corpus which was the basis for the teaching of the Masters of Arts, particularly in Paris. A manuscript preserved in the Biblioteca Cathariniana at Pisa (Pisa, Biblioteca Cathariniana 124) offers a clear picture of such a corpus and of the place the Ethica Nova and Ethica Vetus have in it. The paper aims at presenting and analysing this manuscript, which contains a detailed series of tabulae and lemmata over the whole philosophical corpus. A specific attention will be devoted to the section on the Ethics. Going through the structure and contents of this text, the presentation will offer some remarks about the teaching method of the masters of the arts as well as on the relevance of the ancient Latin version of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics in the building of the moral lexicon of the Medieval philosophical discourse.

Salle / Room 3.09

Aula 9: Moses Maimonides

Ordinary Session
Chair: Silvia Di Donato

Jennifer Hard Weed: *Maimonides and Analogy: A Radical Oversight*

Moses Maimonides (1138-1204) is well known for his negative approach to naming God. He seeks to preserve his commitment to the doctrine of divine simplicity by denying that affirmative attributes can be predicated of God. However, in *The Guide for the Perplexed*, Maimonides also uses analogies to speak about God. These analogies have not received much attention in the secondary literature. In this paper, I will analyze Maimonides' use of analogy with respect to God and offer an interpretation of those analogies that remains consistent with Maimonides' negative theology.

Nythamar de Oliviera: *Revisiting Spinoza's Reading of Radical Medieval* tolerantia*: Maimonides, Crescas, Gersonides, and Kabbalists*

I propose to show howaradical Middle Ages, particularly its conception of tolerantia, paved the way for the emergence of a humanist Renaissanceanda so-called Radical Enlightenment, of which Baruch de Spinoza is one of the greatest and most renowned representatives. Contraryto the popular myth that toleration is aby-productof modernity, I will show that it turns out to be the other way around, as modern, liberal, andrevolutionary ideals of freedom, equality, and civic solidarity, together with the emancipation of the sovereign state,combined with natural law,the two-kingdoms doctrine, and a morality ofreciprocity,are all indebted to the gradual,radical shift brought about by toleranceuntil it was more broadly embraced by society in the 17th and 18th centuries. Inspired by a critical reading ofMaimonides, Crescas, Gersonides, and Iberian Kabbalists, Spinoza stood for a much more radical, moral universalismthan the ones offered by particular orthodox interpretations of both Judaism and Christianity.

Jason M. Yonover: *Spinoza's Practical Thought and Its Medieval Jewish Predecessors*

At least some scholars working on the radical early modern philosopher Spinoza have long emphasized the importance of his medieval Jewish predecessors; contra skeptics like van Bunge 1997, see for instance Taouti 1990, according to which "il est absolument impossible de

comprendre un Spinoza [...] si l'on ne connaît pas la philosophie juive medieval." But nonetheless, relatively little work has actually investigated in detail the relation between Spinoza's philosophical views and those of Maimonides, Crescas, Gersonides, or others (classic work like Wolfson 1934 often offers fragmentary overviews, for instance, and few book-length studies follow up on Wolfson's—though see of course more recent articles such as Dobbs-Weinstein 2004, Harvey 2012, or Melamed 2014). In this paper, I extend such work to deal with aspects of Spinoza's therapeutic project in particular. I highlight three aspects of Spinoza's ethical thought, in each case emphasizing the importance of thinkers proceeding Spinoza: 1. his determinism and resulting rejection of free will that can nonetheless undergird any practical intervention (anticipated by Crescas); 2. his specifically intellectualist ethical perspective (anticipated by Maimonides) that builds on his determinism and rejection of free will in order to cultivate active and avoid passive affects, plus eventually the 'intellectual love of God'; and finally 3. his argumentative strategies pursued throughout his accounts of all of this, resulting in a consistent tendency to not only reject some views but also provide metaphilosophical accounts of their origins (anticipated by Gersonides). Especially because these aspects of Spinoza's medieval inheritance have received less attention than for instance relevant debates concerning the relation between philosophy and theology, working out the precise differences between Spinoza's views and those of his philosophical ancestors helps us to understand both. For instance, to take just the first case (1.): an occasional objection against Spinoza would have it that, given his metaphysics of necessity, no practical perspective can make any sense. 'What we should do is irrelevant, because what we do do is fixed at any given moment by the causal nexus.' However, while the latter clause is true for both Crescas and Spinoza, this cannot be taken to rule out any intervention on their part; as while Crescas saves the purpose of the Torah by noting that it, too, can enter the causal nexus and push us in some productive direction, Spinoza will likewise answer that his own Ethics similarly enters a world of cause and effect with the power to nudge us in some direction taken to be attractive. Contra Maimonides, who—at least on a traditional reading, despite Harvey 1981—ellides fatalism and determinism before rejecting both, the practically-oriented deterministic thinker can thus simultaneously (and consistently) defend intervention, so long as this intervention is understood in equally deterministic terms.

Salle / Room 3.10

Aula 10: From Philosophy to Practical Theology: Three Paths in Bacon's Works

Special Session proposed by Roberto Lambertini
Sponsor: Roger Bacon Research Society
Chair: Cecilia Panti

Roger Bacon's conviction that human learning culminates in the *scientia moralis* is a renowned aspect of his thought. In turn, Bacon considers theology almost as a practical discipline in which all other sciences find their own completion as ways leading humans to the highest end of life. The three contributions to this panel expand on examples of Bacon's attitude towards the relationship between theology and the other sciences. In her contribution, Celina Lértora Mendoza devotes her attention to Bacon's approach to biblical exegesis which was remarkably influenced by his philosophy of language. In the second paper, Francesca Galli deals with the use of optics in moral theology. Galli focuses her attention on a neglected history of the influence of *Opus Maius* (Part V) on medieval practitioners of different disciplines, especially Franciscans. In the third contribution, Roberto Lambertini discusses the role that the *Secretum secretorum* played in Bacon's political theology.

Francesca Galli: *Moralised Optics: Roger Bacon, Peter of Limoges, and Franciscan Preaching*

In the ending paragraphs of the fifth part of the *Opus maius*, Roger Bacon presents a series of phenomena related to optics and light propagation interpreting them in a moral fashion. The same line of interpretation grounded on a perceived connection between optics and ethics was resumed and systematised by Peter of Limoges in his *De oculo morali*. This work is deeply indebted to Bacon's *Perspectiva* as regards to many technical notions, which are reinterpreted by Limoges according to their spiritual and doctrinal meaning. My talk proposes a comparison between the moralization of optics developed by Bacon and Limoges and similar attempts carried out by contemporary Franciscan friars (e.g., Bartholomeus Anglicus, Mark of Orvieto, Bartholomew of Bologna, Servasanto of Faenza). Through an analysis of relevant case-studies, my aim is to assess the progressive "hybridization of science and theology" (Newhauser 2018) and the implications that such approach entailed for medieval practitioners.

Roberto Lambertini: *The* Secretum secretorum *as a Mirror for Princes and Bacon's Political Theology*

In his ground-breaking work on the reception of the *Secretum secretorum* in the Latin Middle Ages. Williams (2003) remarked that the *Secret of Secrets* was also read by several medieval authors as a Mirror for princes. The present paper deals with on one important and very well known case: Bacon's so called "edition" of the *Secretum Secretorum*. In particular, the presentation will examine whether and to which extent the image of the ruler emerging from the *Secret of Secrets* can be considered an essential part of Bacon's political theology. As is well known, in fact, the basic tenets of political thought Bacon mainly takes from Avicenna's *Metaphysics* are embedded in a full-fledged theological project of defence and expansion of Christendom, so that we are entitled to consider Bacon's attitude to political phenomena as a sort of "theology of politics".

Celina A. Lértora Mendoza: *Roger Bacon and the Linguistic Turn of Biblical Exegesis*

The "scientific" turn of philosophy in Roger Bacon's work is known and widely praised as an important novelty in thirteenth-century Latin philosophy. One aspect of this turn, less studied, is the scientific-linguistic turn that he proposes for exegesis. The fact that he himself was not an exegete and that he has no theoretical works on the subject has obscured this aspect of his thinking. But this turn is appreciated in its purpose of revising the sacred texts and those of the oldest Christian authorities based on diverse scientific knowledge (geography, physics, etc.). In this work I will focus on his linguistic proposals. I develop the theme in three main points, assuming as an initial principle (taken from Grosseteste) that literal exegesis is the decisive point of confrontation of any other biblical sense. 1) the correction of words and misinterpretations, through a correct use of grammar; 2) the interpretation of the words of doubtful meaning through semantics. and 3) the interpretation of the doubts that persist through the pragmatics of the reference: what reference should they have according to scientific data (calculations of calendars, geography, physics, etc.). This linguistic turn of exegesis has consequences for biblical theology to be proposed by Roger, who warns of the danger of a dogmatic theology with a poor biblical basis.

Salle / Room 3.11

Aula 11: Intention as a Foundation of Radical and Not-so-Radical Evil in Fourteenth Century Moral and Political Philosophy

Special Session proposed by Juhana Toivanen
Chair: Juhana Toivanen

This special session focuses on three specific medieval discussions on moral and political philosophy: bestial vices, curiosity, and lying. The main focus is on the role of intentionality as a crucial criterion for normativity. When medieval commentators considered different forms of

radical evil, they distinguished bestial behaviour that stems from the lack of reason from intentionally vicious action. Likewise, there are authors who suggest that curiosity (a form of pride) may not be evil, if the intention of the curious person is right, and intention also explains some of the intricacies in medieval analyses of the moral psychology of lying. The session explores three distinct discussions in medieval philosophy that share this common element of intentionality. They also bridge the gap between moral philosophy, moral psychology and political philosophy, as they are deeply rooted in medieval ethics but also have a strong political dimension to them.

Juhana Toivanen: *Radical Evil in Medieval Ethics: Buridan and Others on Bestiality and Vice*

Human tendency to vice and sin was a recurrent topic in discussions concerning practical philosophy in the middle-ages. One the main reasons for its centrality was Augustine's view of the fallen human nature, which affected both political and moral theories significantly. Medieval philosophers inherited the view that humans are unable to direct themselves to good without grace, and it provided them a broad theoretical framework to analyse various detailed philosophical topics. Augustine was not, however, the only source where ideas concerning human wickedness were found. Despite Aristotle's more optimistic outlook concerning the human nature, he presents two ideas that medieval commentators found highly relevant for understanding human potential for evil: (1) the idea of bestial vice in book seven of *Nicomachean Ethics*, and (2) the remark in *Politics* 1.2 that one who exists without law and justice is worse than animals. These two cases relate the vicious person to animals, but in different ways: the first is similar to animals, while the second is normatively speaking below them. The fundamental difference between these two cases of radically evil behaviour points to two conceptions of moral viciousness. On the one hand, humans act against common good and natural law because they are drawn by emotions, and in the most radical case they lack reason altogether and are guided by emotions only, just like beasts. On the other hand, vice can be seen as the opposite of virtue: a stable disposition to act in ways that are opposed to the common good and natural law. In essence, the difference boils down to the role of intentionally choosing radical evil vs. lacking a proper rational control over one's actions. This presentation analyses medieval discussions of these different ways of being radically evil, focusing on John Buridan (d. ca. 1360) but considering also other fourteenth century authors, such as Nicholas of Vaudémont (fl. 1370s).

Ritva Palmén: *Vicious, Neutral or Good Curiosity?*

My paper will analyse the interconnections of intentionality and curiosity in a set of twelfth and thirteenth century texts that comment on the role of curiosity in religious life. As several studies have demonstrated in detail, the medieval theologians usually presented curiosity as a thoroughly negative human activity that should be reined as far as possible, counting curiosity as a vicious passion and one of the subspecies of pride. Several notable theologians such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas mentioned curiosity as a major intellectual vice referring curiosity as a desire to know only for the merely sake of knowing. Bernard of Clairvaux and other monastic authors noted that excessive curiosity had also dire social implications, since it promoted wrong kind of individualism in religious community or made people interested in other people's doings instead of focusing on the state of one's own soul.

My paper aims at presenting more nuanced picture, however. While the medieval authors usually consider that curiosity is a disturbing factor in both private contemplative endeavour as well as communal life, in some cases the curiosity receives deliberations that are more positive. These positive accounts of curiosity suggest that spiritually and morally advanced people may approach various objects of attention with curiosity – if their intention is right. In these cases, curiosity is reminiscent with admiration or studiousness, both of which are considered as good and humble dispositions of the mind.

Ziang Chen: *Lying, Intention, and Rational Choice in Peter Auriol and Gerald Odonis*

Medieval discussions of lying and mendacity were dominated by Augustinian arguments which focus on the notion of an intention to deceive (volens fallendi). The introduction of Aristotle's Ethics and the Stagirite's brief analysis of truthfulness and lying brought new perspectives to the intellectual discourse, where lying is understood not only as a free and rational choice, but also as a moral capacity. My paper will explore the works of two early fourteenth-century Franciscan masters, Peter of Auriol and Gerald Odonis - contemporaries at Toulouse studium - to study the evolution of Augustine's theory of lying in the Franciscan milieu in southern France and the influence of Aristotelian moral philosophy on the debate: namely, how lying and its moral psychology are discussed not only as an interior will to deceive, but also as a triad of intentionality, rational choice, and virtuous/vicious capacity. The paper will also seek to analyse the radical implications of Augustine's purism concerning mendacity (i.e. all acts of lying are sinful) and its reverberation within Auriol's and Odonis's philosophical discussions: Auriol considers that the clergy should be held to the highest and most extreme standards for truth, therefore disallowing even jocose and dutiful lies (mendacium iocosum and mendacium officiosum); Odonis holds moral truth as the highest good that is inviolable, even when a friend's life is at stake, and the violation of truth is especially egregious if committed by a person of power. Augustine's notion of intention, interpreted strictly in its original sense, is central throughout the Franciscans' discussions: the intention to deceive is what defines mendacity and it cannot be supplanted even by an intention for common good. Traces of Aristotelian ethics are also present: the greater capacity for deception makes for a greater evil. On the surface, the Franciscan masters may seem to follow to the root of Augustine's theory of mendacity; yet at the same time their views bear the indelible marks of Aristotelian influence.

10h30-11h00: Coffee Break

11h00-12h15: 3e Session Plénière/ 3rd Plenary Session

Auditorium 250/Auditorium 150

Virpi Mäkinen: *The Radicalism of Franciscan Poverty and its Legacy in Western Political Thought*

Chair: Tobias Hoffmann

The Franciscan Rule of 1223 (*Regula Bullata*) involved that "the friars are to appropriate nothing for themselves, neither a house, nor a place, nor anything else". By the mid-13th century, the Latin words *nihil sibi* appropriare were understood as the renunciation of any appropriative stance (i.e., *dominium* understood as equivalent with *ius*). The friars were only allowed to *usus facti*, a non-legal permission to consume daily necessities belonging to others' *dominium*. The long-lasting discussion on the interpretation on poverty and property among Franciscan and secular theologians was imbued with juridical concepts and theories which integrated into forms of legal and economic rationale of the time. This qualified the radical status of the Franciscan poverty. The radicality, however, emerged also in another senses: in their relation to other mendicant orders as well as to earlier monastic tradition; in their sociocultural and political message, emphasizing social inequalities and solidarity to the poor, and finally, in the development of subjective rights. These

all were also ambivalent contributions and thus, the history of Franciscan poverty is full of paradoxes. This presentation addresses the one influential paradox in the Western intellectual and political history: how the radical renunciation of all rights paved the way to the emergency of subjective rights, especially to property and subsistence rights?

12h15-14h00: Lunch

14h00-15h00: III. Special commissions: Hebrew Philosophy

Auditorium 250

Chair: Steven Harvey

15h00-16h30: Sessions ordinaires et spéciales / Ordinary and Special Sessions

Salle / Room 50

Aula 1:À la racine de la connaissance, du vouloir et de l'agir / III : À la racine de la vérité et du libre arbitre

Special Session proposed by Tobias Hoffmann
Sponsor: Centre Pierre Abélard, Sorbonne Université
Chair: Charles Ehret

Marta Borgo: In foribus quis delinquet ? *Le chemin vers la vérité d'après quelques lectures de* Métaphysique *I, 1 et II, 1 au XIII^e siècle*

Dans les chapitres A1 et α1 de la *Métaphysique*, Aristote aborde la question de la genèse de la connaissance dans deux perspectives différentes. Si dans le premier livre il se concentre surtout sur les étapes que l'homme, mû par son désir naturel de savoir, est censé franchir pour acquérir la connaissance, dans le deuxième livre il porte l'attention sur les difficultés que la recherche de la vérité entraîne et sur l'importance et la nécéssité de la contribution d'autrui dans l'enquête philosophique, qui vient ainsi s'enraciner non seulement sur les grandes découvertes, mais aussi sur les erreurs commises. La réception de ces deux chapitres dans les années 70-80 du xiii^e siècle fera l'objet de ma contribution, qui sera tout d'abord consacrée à la lecture que Thomas d'Aquin propose de ces deux chapitres dans son commentaire littéral à la *Métaphysique*. Seront ensuite examinées trois collections de questions, encore largement inédites, soulevées autour de ces textes respectivement par Richard de Clive, l'Anonyme dit « de Zimmermann » et Pierre d'Auvergne, et dont atteste l'intéressant manuscrit miscellané Cambridge, Peterhouse 152. Il sera ainsi possible non seulement de reconstruire comment se développe le débat sur la possibilité, les limites et les moyens d'acquisition de la sagesse dans le milieu parisien et anglais à cette époque, mais aussi de le situer plus précisément dans l'histoire de l'aristotélisme au xiii^e siècle, par rapport à l'exégèse thomiste et aux réactions qu'elle suscita. Dans ce but, quoique non systématiquement, les apports au débat de Gilles de Rome, de l'Anonyme de Leipzig et de Siger de Brabant seront examinés.

Kristell Trego: *Un libre arbitre radical. Volonté et raison, de Robert Grosseteste à Jean Duns Scot*

« L'unique racine de la volonté et de la raison est la substance et quiddité du libre arbitre », affirme l'évêque de Lincoln, Robert Grosseteste (*De libero arbitrio*, recensio posterior, xvii, 26). Nous voudrions nous interroger, à cette occasion, sur les rapports étroits entre la volonté et la raison dans la tradition franciscaine, de Grosseteste à Duns Scot, en passant par Richard Rufus de Cornouailles. Plus radicalement que la question de la racine du mal, le libre arbitre se trouverait en effet à la racine même de nos actes psychiques. En affirmant qu'il est une unique essence, qui se porte à un acte rationnel ou bien volontaire, unique essence qui se laisse dénommer libre arbitre, Grosseteste fait sans doute de la liberté de l'âme humaine une détermination non pas dérivée, mais bien originaire, autrement dit un élément inamissible en l'homme. Mais une telle liberté n'intervient jamais seule. L'affirmation de Grosseteste pose plus précisément la question du rapport des facultés entre elles. Comment la distinction des facultés ne signifie-t-elle pas leur hétérogénéité radicale ? L'image de la racine, relayée par celle du soleil et de ses rayons, concilie de ce point de vue l'un et le multiple, le même et l'autre : l'*aspectu* et l'*affectus* se distinguent bien, mais n'en sont pas moins un en vertu de l'unique essence de leurs racines. Il semble dès lors que la liberté ne soit pas uniquement volontaire, sans que n'intervienne aucunement l'intellect, mais qu'il faille reconnaître une dimension rationnelle essentielle et originaire de la liberté. En envisageant sous cette angle l'idée de « racine », la présente contribution entend dès lors examiner la question de la distinction des puissances de l'âme, et la manière dont elles concourent l'une avec l'autre. L'enjeu est ainsi de revenir sur l'étiquette de « volontariste » par laquelle on présente généralement la position franciscaine, tout comme d'envisager, sous un jour nouveau, la question débattue de l'évolution de Scot sur la volonté, et ce faisant donc du volontarisme radical auquel il se serait rallié à Paris.

Olivier Boulnois: Radix libertatis. *Du libre arbitre radical à l'enracinement de la liberté*

La philosophie médiévale a cherché la « racine de la liberté » (et le libre arbitre radical), tantôt dans la raison, tantôt dans la volonté. Les étiquettes d'« intellectualiste » et de « volontariste », même si elles sont grossières, permettent de distinguer et de classer les positions, à condition de ne pas identifier un auteur à une seule position : Thomas d'Aquin lui-même a interprété la *radix libertatis*, successivement comme se trouvant dans la raison (*De Veritate* q. 24, a. 2) puis dans la volonté comme sujet (*Somme théologique* III, q. 17, a. 1). Ces diverses positions sont-elles libertaires (*libertarian)* ou compatibilistes ? Je ne chercherai pas à trancher cette question, insoluble parce que mal posée, à partir des énoncés de surface. J'essaierai plutôt de chercher une racine commune, plus profonde encore, et de remonter à l'histoire et à la structure sous-jacente dont ces diverses positions sont le symptôme. À quelles conditions une telle approche généalogique est-elle possible ? Peut-on remonter, au-delà de cette alternative, jusqu'à une racine commune des problématiques de la liberté ? Faut-il voir dans le concept métaphysique de libre arbitre, comme l'enseigne la philosophie médiévale depuis Boèce, le fondement de toute la philosophie morale ? Est-il, comme disait Kant, la *ratio essendi* de la moralité, qui est réciproquement la *ratio cognoscendi* de la liberté ? Ou bien pouvons-nous découvrir en quoi cette construction métaphysique est problématique et mérite d'être abandonnée ? Dans ce cas, au lieu d'un libre arbitre radical, nous atteindrions ainsi une liberté enracinée dans l'éthique. Ces questions seront abordées à partir d'auteurs du XIII^e^ siècle, notamment Thomas d'Aquin, Gauthier de Bruges et Siger de Brabant, en relation à leurs sources : Aristote, Augustin et Boèce.

Salle / Room 3.01

Aula 2: Radical Thinking in Maimonides / I

Special Session proposed by Steven Harvey
Chair: David Lemler

Edward C. Halper: *Maimonides' Ethics as a Transformation of Philosophy and of Judaism*

Since the medieval philosophical aesthetic places a high premium on both personal modesty and the wisdom of the past, medieval philosophers were apt to hide their radical conceptual innovations within seemingly traditional commentaries. This paper argues that Maimonides' approach to ethics is radical philosophically and that it radically transforms Judaism as a religion. It is well-known that Maimonides' ethics is broadly Aristotelian, but Aristotle emphasizes the development of the faculty of phronesis (practical wisdom) that allows one to make the best choice of action under the circumstances; whereas Maimonides, constrained to follow the laws dictated by the Torah and specified by the Talmud, cannot allow for the practical development of phronesis. One is enjoined to follow Torah law, rather than make one's own choices. As a result ethics comes to be a theoretical science rather than the practical science that Aristotle describes. So, one does not live a good life by exercising reason (phronesis) in rule or other offices of the state, as Aristotle thought. Instead, one lives a good life by contemplating how Torah law (1) molds human nature to perform virtuous action and (2) teaches us about human nature. Importantly, in grasping human nature through the Torah or otherwise, a person (3) comes to fulfill his or her human nature. This is what we see in the Eight Chapters and in the third part of the *Guide*. Interestingly, in the process of contemplating the law, we come to understand human nature, that is, human reason: human reason comes to contemplate human reason. Apart from its transformation of philosophy, this reckoning with human nature also represents, I propose, a radical intellectualization of Judaism; that is, an indirect way of fulfilling the (radically new) religious obligation to know an unknowable God that is suggested by the last chapters of the *Guide*.

Soroosh Shahriari: *How Radical is Maimonides' Negative Theology and What Can It Tell Us about His Prophetology?*

Maimonides' negative theology is arguably among the most "radical" stances within Jewish, and one may even argue among all religious, circles of medieval philosophy. His outright rejection of the human's ability to comprehend God's existence and His essential attributes, and, consequently, our intellectual capability to formulate any meaningful statement about God's essence have left us with a critical question regarding Maimonides' prophetology: Was Moses equipped with a "super-human" faculty beyond his intellect that made him capable of describing God with essential attributes? If Moses did not posses any such power, which sounds more in line with Maimonides' philosophy, then Mosaic revelation ought to be understood as the highest stage of intellection (formulated previously by Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā) and nothing more. If we follow the latter, the issue remains still in place: Maimonides argues that the human intellect *per se* cannot gain any meaningful concept (*maʿnā / inyan*) of God's quiddity or His attributes, and there is no difference between us and Moses when it comes to the nature of human intellect. One may then ask how Moses could talk to God *directly* and ascribe to Him essential attributes, while we, in turn, must follow his words verbatim in our prayers or, even better, keep silent. In this lecture, I will argue that the key to solving this problem may be found in Maimonides' interpretation of the verse "And God created Adam in His image" (Gen. 1:27) in the very first chapter of the *Guide* (I:1), in his use of the allegory of "light and flash," and by taking into account his ontological formula regarding the identity of the intellect (*ʿaql/sekhel*), the subject of intellection (*ʿāqil/maskil*), and the object of intellection (*maʿqūl/muskal*) (*Guide*: I:68). He hints in the *Shemonah Peraqim* (The Eight Chapters), that the only veil between Moses and God is the human intellect attached to a material body which prevents

Moses from "the perception of the true reality of God's existence." Reading these passages side-by-side seems to suggest that Moses could have detached himself from his bodily constraints. Standing at the peak of human perfection, Moses was able to suspend (*taʿṭṭalah/nitbaṭṭel*) his faculties of imagination and sensations when he talked to God directly. Discussions about whether Maimonides was a "radical" or a "traditionalist" thinker occupied much of the scholarly research of the second half of the 20th century. These scholarly discussions were, for the most part, combined with the second grand question of Maimonidean studies – that of his esoteric and esoteric teachings and his "true" beliefs. This lecture will discuss the extent to which this constellation in recent research has influenced, encouraged or prevented scholars active in the history of Jewish philosophy to adopt (or not to adopt) more radical, anti-traditional interpretative models in their study of philosophical sources - models that were current in the intellectual discourse in the humanities of the later 20th century.

Salle / Room 3.02

Aula 3:Radical Theories of Cognition /I

Special Session proposed by Thérèse Cory, Claire Murphy, Dominic LaMantia and Andreas Waldstein
Sponsor: University of Notre Dame
Chair: Claire Murphy

David Cory: *The Relative Immateriality of Sensation in Thomas Aquinas*

In the literature on sensation in Thomas Aquinas, much attention has been paid to the reception of sensible species, and especially to the fact that Aquinas adopts Aristotle's idea that in sensation the form is received "without the matter." What tends to remain obscured in these discussions is whether such a reception should be called immaterial. There are two problems facing the contemporary interpreter. First, there is no obvious measure for what should count as an "immaterial" reception. And second, sensation is an activity that follows upon the reception of the species, which means that whatever measure one puts in place must measure both the reception and the activity that follows from it. I propose that "immateriality" should be measured in two ways. The first is in reference to the active and passive qualities of the elements, which are the principles of paradigmatic material actions. The second is in relation to the subject into which a form is received. I will argue that these distinctions are necessary in order to appreciate Aquinas's ontologically sophisticated account of sensation.

Jordan Lavender: *Rethinking the Relationship Between Cognitions and Their Subjects in Fourteenth-Century Averroism*

Philosophers in the second quarter of the fourteenth century inherited from Scotus and Ockham the view that the relationship between a subject of cognition and her cognition was one of inherence: A cognition is an accident that inheres in a subject. But worries that this metaphysical model could not account for the phenomenal character of cognition led to a radical rethinking of the relationship between subjects of cognition and their cognition. Inspired by Ibn Rushd's (Averroes) concept of *ittiṣāl* (*continuatio* or *copulatio*), Nicholas of Autrecourt and John of Ripa presented two new accounts of the relationship between subjects of cognition and their cognitions that could, they argued, better account for the phenomenal character of cognition. Though inspired by Ibn Rushd, Autrecourt and Ripa's accounts of the relationship between subjects and their cognitions were also highly original, developing Averroism in ways not anticipated by Ibn Rushd or by thirteenth-century Latin Averroists.

Abigail Whalen: *Of One Mind: Exploring Interpretations of Ibn Rushd's Monopsychism*

In this paper, I explore the tension between Ibn Rushd's monopsychism theory of a single intellect containing universal intelligibles for all humans and the intellectual agency of individual humans as causal and agential actors in their own cognitive processes. I begin by defining Ibn Rushd's monopsychism theory in contrast to the Neoplatonist portrayal of universals as distinct and real forms that precede particulars. I then outline the role of a human intellecta speculativa within the Material Intellect. Given the relationship posited by Ibn Rushd in his Long Commentary on De Anima, I assess competing interpretations of this relationship as they relate to and integrate individual agency in understanding. I address specifically the movie model proposed by Deborah Black (2004) and the "common instrument model" suggested in Thomas Aquinas' 'common eye' analogy. Finally, I suggest an additional strategy for making the common instrument model more plausible by considering humans as instruments of the Agent Intellect prior to their using the Material Intellect instrumentally and propose that the common instrument model has the most potential for further nuance and exploration.

Salle / Room 3.03

Aula 4: William of Ockham's Radical Thinking

Special Session proposed by Charles Bolyard
Chair: Lydia Deni Gamboa

Philip Choi: *Why Ockham's Evidentness-First Epistemology is Radical but Coherent*

One of the most controversial ideas in Ockham's epistemology is that an intuitive cognition of a non-existent is a cognition by virtue of which a cognizer would judge that the cognized thing does *not* exist, insofar as it is intuitively cognized. As is well-known, this view has been criticized widely not only by his immediate successors (e.g., Walter Chatton, Adam Wodeham), but also by modern interpreters (e.g., Etienne Gilson, Marilyn Adams). And it is not hard to see why their criticism is intuitively appealing. For, given that it seems to you that there is an apple in front of you (where there is no such apple), how can you judge that that apple does not exist, as Ockham claims? The most natural account of this case seems to be that you would falsely judge that the apple *does* exist by intuitively cognizing it. In this respect, Ockham's account of intuitive cognition of non-existents sounds quite radical and implausible. In this presentation, I argue that all these critics failed to appreciate exactly why Ockham needs such a radical view in his epistemology. Specifically, I argue that in order to preserve the philosophical coherence of his epistemology of intuitive cognition, Ockham must say what he says about intuitive cognition of non-existents. And I further argue that most (if not all) critics of his view failed to appreciate the theoretical structure of Ockham's epistemology. Whereas their criticism is based on what I call the Same-Direction Epistemology, according to which the cognitive and epistemic dependence between an intuitive cognition and its corresponding judgment are to be explained in the same direction, Ockham's epistemology amounts to what I call the Opposite-Direction Epistemology, according to which the cognitive and epistemic dependence are to be explained in the opposite way. On Ockham's view, although an intuitive cognition is prior to a judgment that follows from it in the cognitive explanation, it is the epistemic feature of a judgment, i.e., evidentness, that explains the epistemic feature of an intuitive cognition. In short, Ockham's epistemology can be seen as a form of the evidentness- first epistemology. I conclude by pointing out three implications of Ockham's evidentness-first epistemology. First, contrary to a recent interpretation by Claude Panaccio and David Piche, Ockham's theory of intuitive cognition of non-existents is not directly relevant to the reliabilist answer to skepticism. Second, Ockham's epistemology shows a more radical departure from theories of intuitive cognition suggested by his predecessors (e.g., Peter Auriol, John Duns Scotus) than it seems. Lastly, Ockham's Opposite-Direction Epistemology provides an insight into what

to make of important epistemic issues in contemporary epistemology such as the epistemic basing relation, disjunctivism, and, most importantly, how to answer skepticism.

Charles Bolyard: *Knowleddge, Epistemic Regress, and the* Ultima Visio *in Ockham's* Quodlibets

This paper investigates vision (*visio*) and its relation to knowledge in Ockham's *Quodlibets*. After exploring the various ways he characterizes vision in this work, special emphasis will be placed on Ockham's attempt to block an epistemic regress by appeal to the "last vision" (*ultima visio*) in II.12, and on his closely related discussion in I.14. Our inability to experience the last vision in this life, coupled with the object-independent account of knowledge he offers in VI.13, raises questions about the true extent of his empiricism.

Salle / Room 3.05

Aula 5: The Fundamental Interplay of* Mathematics *and* Physics *in the Late Middle Ages

Special Session proposed by Clelia Crialesi
Chair: Zita Toth

There is nothing new in thinking about the world mathematically, and this is true also for the Middle Ages – with no radical turn with respect to Antiquity. However, as we look at the medieval approaches to natural philosophy, we find something 'radical' – that is, a consistent and systematic trend – in conceiving of the physical realm by means of mathematics. This applies especially to the late Middle Ages, when mathematical reasonings became key to discuss essential features of nature. In the proposed panel, this fundamental interplay of mathematics and physics is addressed by exploring three issues that are representative of the philosophical debates between the 13th and 15th century: the conception of the infinite, which testifies to the broadening of the field of physics by comprising mathematical topics; the use of geometry to grasp the structure of quanta; and the understanding of physical phenomena by means of mathematical concepts, such as the notion of 'denomination'.

Cecilia Trifogli: *Comparing Infinities: Some 13th-Century Discussions*

The pioneering studies of John Murdoch published in the 1960s on the introduction of mathematics in Scholastic philosophy – *Mathesis in philosophiam scholasticam introducta* is the eloquent title of one of them – have shown that one of the favorite channels through which this introduction took place is the discussion about the comparison of infinities. In very abstract terms, the dominating medieval approach to this topic is focused on the question of whether the fundamental quantitative relationships of being equal to, greater than, smaller than, which hold between finite quantities, can be legitimately applied to infinite quantities too. Medieval philosophers engaged with this question with great depth and sophistication, using examples and techniques of mathematical nature. Murdoch mainly investigated the later medieval/14th-century treatments of this aspect of the mathematics of the infinite. More recent studies, however, have shown that there are important contributions from the 13th century too. In my talk I will present the salient features of the discussions about the comparison of infinities in some English commentators on Aristotle's *Physics* around the half of the 13th century. One important methodological principle adopted by these commentators is that of keeping absolutely separate the question of the comparison of infinities from that of their existence. Following Aristotle's view, they deny that infinities exist in the physical world, but they think that it still makes perfect sense to speculate about their comparability. It is not physics but mathematics that provide them with the two primary models of infinity on which their speculation is based: the geometrical model of an infinite line, and the numerical model of the series of natural numbers. Our commentators also think that in assessing the question of the comparability of the infinities it is of crucial importance to introduce a

distinction between 'one-directional' infinities and 'two directional' infinities: a half-line, that is, a straight line extending infinitely in a single direction from a point, and the whole line, i.e., a straight line extending infinitely in both directions, are their standard examples of a geometrical one-directional and two-directional infinity respectively. The general conclusion that they reach using this conceptual apparatus is that two-directional infinities are not comparable, whereas they have contrasting views about the comparability of one-directional infinities. Some commentators maintain that they are comparable but only with respect to the direction in which they are finite. Others deny that this is the case. I will explain the significance of the different conclusions reached by our commentators and present the very original mathematical constructions and examples that they use in their support.

Clelia Crialesi: *Mathematical and Physical* quantum*: 14th-Century Geometrical Arguments for and against Indivisibilism*

The medieval debate about the structure of the space – and more specifically, about the structure of *quanta* – is revealing of the radical correlation between mathematics and natural philosophy in the pre-modern Latin-speaking world. This discussion was characterized by two opposing views on the nature of extension: 'divisibilism' (which claims that everything that is in a space – whether it be a geometric figure or a body – is indefinitely divisible) and 'indivisibilism' (which maintains that extended spaces are made up by elements – atoms or points – that cannot be divided). These positions were held by Aristotelians and atomists, respectively. Medieval attempts to consider the existence of atoms or indivisibles were mainly grounded in the reading of Aristotle's natural works, particularly in his *Physics*. However, a distinctive aspect of the debate between Aristotelian and atomists concerning the *continuum* is represented by the mathematical arguments raised to defend the one view or the other. The origin of these mathematical arguments, which were mainly based on Euclidean geometry, could be found not only in Al-Gazali's *Metaphysics*, but also within the pseudo- Aristotelian literature, such as the *De lineis insecabilibus*, whose impact in the Western history of science and philosophy still needs to be fully appreciated. These geometrical arguments drew interest and acquired philosophical prestige after Duns Scotus employed them in his *Opus Oxoniense* to criticize the indivisibilism, showing the contradictions existent between atomism and geometry. In this paper I will consider four ways of dealing with the issue of the *continuum* in the 14th century, which are in accord to the Euclidean paradigm. I will focus on four Oxonian thinkers who pursued the investigation regarding the composition of a *quantum*: on the one hand, Henry of Harclay (1270-1317) and Walter Chatton (1285-1343) – who defended atomism –, and, on the other hand, Thomas Bradwardine (1300-1349) and Adam Wodeham (1298-1358) – who supported divisibilism. I shall provide a survey of the main *rationes potissimae* employed by these thinkers, namely, of those geometrical arguments involving two-dimensional figures and solids, making use of parallel and radial projections, and stemming from Euclidean axioms. What my analysis will show is that both opposing parties employ geometry as a common ground to debate about the structure of the physical realm. More generally, the aim of this paper is to show that these medieval scholars shared (although implicitly) the idea that the physical space overlaps the mathematical one, where the latter provides a substantial rationalization of the former. This mindset, which characterizes both the indivisibilists and divisibilists I will focus on, is revealing of a more general issue: what is at stake here is not just the defense of the Euclidean truth, but rather the relation between mathematics and physics.

Sylvain Roudaut: *Quantifying Medieval Science: the Concept of Denomination between Semantics, Mathematics and Metaphysics*

It is well known that the Aristotelian classification and definition of sciences makes little room for the use of mathematics to describe and analyze non-mathematical objects. The doctrine of the

equivocity of being, indeed, seems to rule out the possibility of applying quantitative predicates to beings of other categories. Yet, the late Middle Ages – from the 14th century onward – witnessed a remarkable tendency to quantify and calculate various sorts of phenomena. Not only did it become common to think that many physical phenomena could be measured and quantified, but an increasing number of metaphysical and even theological themes were analyzed through mathematical tools. The story of how this drastic change of attitude toward the very foundations of sciences and their mutual relations took place remains to be told to a large extent. How core principles of the paradigmatic Aristotelian classification of sciences came to be modified so as to make room for a mathematical approach to physical and even metaphysical topics? What role was played exactly by the redefinition of concepts proper to the scholastic tradition which, in this process, shake the core foundations of the medieval conception of science? The aim of this contribution is to focus on one factor which played a profound role in this radical epistemological shift, namely the notion of "denomination". It will be argued that the notion of "denomination" was one the fundamental concepts that enabled late medieval philosophers to transfer mathematical tools to topics proper to natural philosophy as well as to metaphysical themes. The concept of denomination, indeed, is present in different fields of medieval science. In its most general sense, a "denomination" refers to any word, sign or term that enables one to name some object or property. Besides this general meaning, the notion of "denomination" was a core concept in mathematics and, more precisely, in the mathematical theory of proportions inherited from the Euclidean tradition. In this context, the denomination of a proportion refers to a number that makes it possible to compare two distinct quantities. Finally, in the field of metaphysics and theology, "denomination" was used to refer to a divine name and, thereby, to some transcendental property (like 'being' or 'goodness') which creatures could participate in from a metaphysical point of view. In this contribution, it will be shown that the tightly intertwined uses of "denomination" were one of the conceptual keys which made it possible to undermine the very roots of the Aristotelian typology of sciences and the correlated prohibition of a quantitative approach to non-mathematical objects. While the general semantic principle according to which a subject is "denominated by its form" was gradually reinterpreted as a way to provide a quantitative description of physical properties in natural philosophy, the mathematical theory of proportions became similarly applied to metaphysical and theological matters. By focusing on the conceptual use of "denomination" in the works of William Heytesbury and Richard Swineshead for natural philosophy, as well as its role in the Parisian theology of the 1350s, it will be shown that a crucial change took place in the 14th century, which deeply modified the bases of the medieval conceptions of scientific discourse and which was then directly inherited by late medieval and early modern thinkers.

Salle / Room 3.06

Aula 6: Radical Parisian Masters

Ordinary Session
Chair: Christophe Grellard

Roberto Zambiasi: *A Radical Conception of Sensible Qualities in Medieval Latin* De sensu *Commentaries of the Beginning of the 14th Century*

A central aspect of Aristotle's theory of perception is the belief that a sensible quality is defined by its ability to act on the external senses. This belief lies at the foundation of Aristotle's claim, in *De sensu* 6, 446a7-10, that, if a portion of matter too small to be perceived were separated from the wholeto which it belongs, it would be immediately corrupted by the containing medium, so as to lose its sensible qualities and to acquire those of the medium itself. Yet, what would happen in the absence of the corrupting action of the medium? Could, in that case, such portions of matter retain their sensible qualities? Following a problematic remark by Aristotle himself (at *De sensu* 6,

446a10-13), and the discussion on it by Alexander of Aphrodisias, many Medieval Latin *De sensu* commentators of the second half of the 13th century accepted, at least as a hypothetical, that in this case such portions of matter (usually defined as '*insensibilia propter parvitatem*') would retain their sensible qualities, although these sensible qualities could not act on the external senses or, in any case, act on the external senses with the power required to be perceived.However, some Medieval Latin *De sensu* commentators of the beginning of the 14th century (mostlyactive at the Parisian Faculty of Arts and whose main representative is certainly John of Jandun) remarked that this idea violated a fundamental metaphysical principle formulated by Averroes in his *Long Commentary* (*Tafsir*) on Book Θ of the *Metaphysics*, namely, that if an entity loses its proper operation, it also loses its essence (as John of Jandun synthesises it, « qui tollit operationem, tollit essentiam »). At the same time, these commentators did not want to renounce to the idea of *insensibilia propter parvitatem*. Therefore, in order to be able to propose a theory of *insensibilia propter parvitatem* which was compatible with this Averroistic principle, these commentators came to formulate a radical claim, one which profoundly innovated Medieval conceptions of perception and of the sensible world: the proper operation of sensible qualities is not that of acting on the externalsenses, but, rather, that of providing a "demarcation criterion" for the natural world. This paper retraces the genesis of this ground-breaking idea, the main ways in which it was articulated and its implications for Medieval Latin theories of perception and of the sensible world.

Amalia Salvestrini: *Radicalité de la recherche. Le concept du beau chez Nicolas d'Autrécourt*

La question de la radicalité dans la pensée de Nicolas d'Autrécourt peut être posée en deux sens. D'abord à propos de la définition de « scetticismo radicale » que Mario Dal Pra a donné à la pensée de Bernardo d'Arezzo esquissée par Autrécourt. La mise en discussion de Bernardo du rapportentre apparence et réalité jusqu'à nier toute possibilité de connaissance et aussi tous liens sociaux, comme nous pouvons le lire dans l'*Epitre* I d'Autrécourt à Bernardo, est indiquée par Mario Dal Pracomme une forme « radicale » de scepticisme. D'autre part, si on ne peut pas décrire Autrécourt comme un « sceptique radicale », nous pouvons nous interroger si la perspective autrécourienne présente elle-même une quelque forme de radicalité. Nicolas ne se limite pas à suivre la pensée partagée des Maîtres des Arts aristotéliciens del'université de Paris dans les années '30 du XIV siècle, mais propose sa pensée comme radicalementdifférente en questionnant le fondement de toute connaissance. On doit *convertir* l'intellect aux choses même, il dit dans le *Prologue* de l'*Exigit ordo*, plutôt que commenter toujours les livres d'Aristote et prendre ses conclusions comme si elles étaient des prémisses. La pensée d'Autrécourt est-elle alors radicale par rapport à l'opposition à la fois à une forme radicale du scepticisme et une forme fossilisée du dogmatisme ? Cette proposition vise à montrer comment la pensée d'Autrécourt ne présente pas uneradicalité du scepticisme, mais plutôt une *radicalité de la recherche*, en raison de son appel au fondement qui n'est pas conçu comme une donnée présupposée. En revanche le fondement est compris comme un point d'arrivé et d'orientation de la recherche. Notre attention sera limitée à un aspect particulier de la pensée d'Autrécourt, c'est-à-dire la conception de la beauté, par moyen d'un parcours en trois étapes. D'abord nous esquisserons la constitution du concept du beau à partir du lexique rhétorique du *conveniens, decor, decens, ornatus*.En deuxième lieu nous examinerons l'articulation entre les différentes dimensions de la connaissance,de l'art, de la nature et du discours en soulignant le fondement probable et rhétorique. Enfin à partir de notre parcours sur le beau, nous essayerons de répondre à la question : la pensée d'Autrécourt est-elle radicale ?

Vesa Hirvonen: *Was Jean Gerson's Interest in Children Radical?*

Jean Gerson (13631429) was a theologian and philosopher who had a notable interest in children, both in his texts and in his actual teaching work. He was, therefore, called by his contemporaries "Le Docteur du people et le Docteur des petits enfants". Was his interest in children in some way radical? At least one can say that Gerson's attitude towards children was extremely positive and

extremely negative at the same time. On the one hand, Gerson considered children less corrupted than adults and emphasized a kind and loving formation of children. According to him, an instructor should even become a child himself, smile with the children, babble to them, praise them and so on, in order to be friendly. In this way the instructor may succeed with the children, get them, for instance, to confess their sins. Gerson, however, seems to be personally fascinated with children and considers even adults' play with children as positive. Did Gerson even enjoy children's company too much? Gerson's great interest in children was questioned already by some of his contemporaries, and he had to defend himself. According to D. Catherine Brown, Gerson's text called *De parvulis ad Christum trahendis* is basically a defence of his work with Parisian schoolchildren. Especially Gerson's interest in children's sexuality has provoked different interpretations also afterwards. Brown says neutrally that "it may well be that he [Gerson] is a precursor of a new awareness of sexuality in children". Brian Patrick McGuire considers it possible that there was a type of voyeuristic closeness to children in Gerson. On the other hand, there is the severe Gerson, considering children as corrupted both by their own original sin and adults, and therefore demanding constant supervision of them. The severe Gerson's presence with children is calculating, he does not trust either children or the instructor, but demands that the instructor is constantly attentive to both the children's and his own sinful tendencies. McGuire's final estimation of Gerson is that "his strategy for the young points to a totalitarian future". Was Gerson a radical innovator in his theories, like some scholars have thought? In most of these particular ideas, no; as Brown and McGuire have shown, several of them (such as gentleness) can be found at least in some form in his precursors' texts (such as the texts of Anselm of Canterbury, Giles of Rome, Vincent de Beauvois, and Lawrence of Orleans). Gerson himself is quite eager to refer to previous authorities. Rather than being an innovator, Gerson develops and intensifies ideas and systematizes a program intended for the formation of children. He pays exceptionally much attention to children and their formation, since well formed children could be used for the purpose of Church reformation, a project which Gerson primarily wanted to serve.

Salle / Room 3.07

Aula 7: Second Scholasticism and Scholastica colonialis II

Special Session proposed by Roberto Hofmeister Pich, Alfredo Culleton and Alfredo Storck

Chair: Roberto Hofmeister Pich

Alfredo Culleton: *The Concept of* Dominium *in Ibero-American Scholastic Theory of Restitution*

The issue of Restitution as a duty of justice and imperative of reason is recurrent and very differently treated by most authors of Ibero-American Scholastics. The treatment of restitution in the medieval tradition is not limited to the theological-sacramental aspect, but more especially to that of moral theology, where politics and law are dealt with. Among Ibero-American scholastics, it is a recurrent theme, widely debated either separately in works like *de restitutione* type, or within larger works like *de iustitia et iure*, *de contractibus*, or in the *de legibus*. On this occasion, we want to deal with the issue of restitution, from the point of view of domain (*dominium*), as this is precisely what leads to restitution, since returning the thing to the original owner assumes possession of the thing and it is based on the domain; that's why if someone takes something, and if that thing has no owner, he is not obliged to return it. In this sense, the theme will have direct implications for the treatment given to issues about black slavery, the relationship with native peoples and the exploitation of precious forests in American lands. And so we have to say something about domination before we get to restitution and its imperative.

Laiza Rodrigues de Souza: *The Mental Discourse of Thomas Hobbes: A Computational Thought Model?*

The hypothesis of mental language defends the existence of a deep grammatical structure in thought. The association of thought with language is very present in philosophy, especially in the field of analytical philosophy. The hypothesis of mental language has reached its summit in the 14th century with William of Ockham's and John Buridan's *oratio mentalis*. However, there is another way of conceiving thought which is through the notion of *idea*. Starting with Aristotle, who defended that "the soul never thinks without images" until the philosophical movement called the *Way of Ideas*, which in the 17th century was the predominant conception of what thought is. This movement defended that to think is to have ideas, the combination of ideas and the passage from one idea to another. The notions of thought as language and as image are not exactly irreconcilable, but to suppose that thought is structured as a sequence of ideas or images is far from the assumption that thought is structured as language. Thomas Hobbes is closest to the tradition that conceives that thinking is having ideas. We find with Hobbes in the 17th century a mental discourse. He differentiates the notion of mental discourse from that of oral discourse to emphasize that his mental discourse does not have a grammatical structure. He conceives mental discourse not as a sequence of propositions or as a grammatical structure as the scholastics of the 14th century did, but as a sequence or enchainment of thoughts, the succession of one thought to another. For Hobbes, thought is not itself discursive, which means, it does not have a deep grammatical structure because he conceives thought in a different way from the logical terminists of the 14th century. On the one hand, the hypothesis of late scholastic mental language defended the notion that our thought is structurally discursive, meaning, structured as a language, with grammar and propositions composed by subject, predicate, and *copula*. On the other hand, Hobbes conceives thinking as having ideas, in other words, as having a sequence of ideas coming from the sensations that we have through the body. These two conceptions of thought, and consequently the theories of mental discourse on which they are based, represent a paradigm shift between the grammatically structured thought of medieval scholastics and Hobbes' computational thought. Therefore, this research aims to discuss if the notion of mental discourse of Thomas Hobbes represents the paradigm shift from a conception of thought as a grammatical structure to the conception of computational thought. Our intention is to contrast the notion of mental discourse developed by Hobbes in the 17th century with the mental language developed in the 14th century by the logics of the terminist tradition, especially William of Ockham and John Buridan.

Jean Christian Egoavil: *The Philosophical Projection of Medieval Scholasticism in the American Territories Throughout the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*

The aims of this paper are twofold. Firstly, to analyse the ways in which medieval thought, especially scholastic thought (13th and 14th centuries), was projected to the American territory during the 16th and 17th centuries when the viceroyalties of Mexico and Peru were founded. This is a novel field of study that requires the analysis of both European and American sources at the dawn of the encounter between the two worlds. Likewise, a historiographical model is proposed to study this period of philosophical exchange between the scholastic Middle Ages and American viceregal thought in a temporal period that brings together the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in Europe with the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in America. In this way, a continuation of scholasticism in America can be seen, but with important differences that distinguish the course of viceregal philosophical thought. In this sense, the second objective of this essay is to analyse the main aspects of American viceregal philosophy that distinguish it from European scholasticism. This last aspect does not intend to deny the medieval roots of American philosophical thought, on the contrary, it is an important evidence to affirm the scholastic sources of American viceregal philosophy developed in a different geographical, political and social context during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which is why it took a different course that must be studied and recognised.

Salle / Room 3.08

Aula 8: What are the Roots of Humanity's Specific Difference?

Special Session proposed by Nadja Germann and Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen
Chair: Nadja Germann

Nadja Germann: *Uncovering the Hidden Truth: Abū ʿUthmān al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 868) on Language and Thought*

Language (*nuṭq*), Abū ʿUthmān al-Jāḥiẓ is convinced, is humanity's specific difference. However, in contrast to the impression this formula most likely evokes upon first reading, it does not simply rehearse Aristotle's famous definition of the human being as *zoon logon echon* in Arabic terms—Jāḥiẓ's notion of *nuṭq* fundamentally differs from Aristotle's *logos*: For Jāḥiẓ, *nuṭq* primarily is language and only secondarily thought. It is by means of language—granted, a very specific kind of language, namely divine speech, but nonetheless a form of linguistic discourse—that God created the world. And it is by way of language that humans can decipher the divine revelation, both the messages communicated by the things, i.e., God's creation, and those transmitted by His prophets, last but not least Muhammad. In my talk, I will scrutinize this specific notion of language, which had a tremendous impact on the intellectual culture of the pre-modern Islamic world: its metaphysical underpinnings, its relation to thought, and its normative implications (a particular language use as moral obligation).

Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen: *Bringing Creation Back to its Root: Epistemology According to Magnus Hundt (d.1519)*

Magnus Hundt, a late medieval master at the University of Leipzig and ardent follower of Thomas Aquinas, claims that knowing a thing is more than just having an image that represents the thing in the mind. Rather, knowing means to place this image in a mental network relating it to the images of all other things. But what are the roots of this mental network? Is it just the sum of all the images collected in the mind, or is it something else? For Hundt, it is something else. It consists of the thoughts produced by the human mind. Thoughts articulate something that is intimate to the nature of the things but that the things themselves cannot express. It is thoughts that reveal and communicate the divine plan behind creation and, thus, recall what Adam said, when in Paradise God invited him to name all things. In my paper, I will discuss the passages in Hundt's *Compendium totius logicae* (1493) and his commentary on the *Parvulus philosophiae naturalis* (1500), in which he makes this claim.

Final Discussion on the Panel

Salle / Room 3.09

Aula 9: After John Duns Scotus

Special Session proposed by Francesco Fiorentino
Chair: Francesco Fiorentino

Fabrizio Amerini: *Ockham and Chatton on the Nature of Demonstrative Concepts after Scotus*

With Scotus the question of the cognition of singulars makes its definitive entrance in the philosophical debate, becoming one of the most discussed points of later medieval theories of knowledge. Scotus provides a qualified answer to the question, more in line with Aquinas than with Ockham. After Scotus the debate radicalizes. I my talk I propose to reconsider two opposite reactions to Scotus, those of William Ockham and Walter Chatton, by focusing on the special case

of demonstrative concepts. While Ockham defends the possibility for our mind to have intellective intuition of singulars and so assumes that things can cause immediately and directly demonstrative concepts on us, Chatton claims that he wants to return to Scotus and then give arguments for proving that we can obtain such concepts only after we formed universal concepts.

Simone Luigi Migliaro: "Nomen non exprimit rem nisi intelligenti". *The Connection Between Signifying and Understanding According to Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and Ockham*

For much of the Latin Middle Ages the existence of a perfect parallelism between the couple *intelligere-significare* was regularly assumed without particular hesitation. As a matter of fact, even many developments that took place in semantics only become understandable in light of the new epistemological and psychological acquisitions achieved in that period. For example, research carried out by scholars such as C. Panaccio and G. Pini has shown that the renowned *magna alercatio* concerning the immediate meaning of vocal words, which occurred in the second half of the XIII century, appears to be closely related with the discussions on the intelligible species as well as on what is to be established as the proper object of the intellect. However, some hesitation arises on the way this one-to-one correspondence between *modi intelligendi* and *modi significandi* has to be applied in the theological field; since human knowledge of God must always be regarded as partial and unsatisfactory, one might wonder if this assumption would contaminate the meaningful possibilities of language. This is the direction undertaken by Thomas Aquinas, who in his Sentence commentary (d. 22, q. 1, art. 1) states that human beings know God so imperfectly that he looks like stutterer when they try to nominate it. However, in a paper published in 1980, E.J. Ashworth had already identified at least three philosophers who, in dealing with the same problem, departed from the Thomistic outcomes: Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham. In this paper, I, therefore, proceed along a parallel path to that already traced by the famous scholar, in order to bring to light additional information to understand whether – and to what extent – the solutions elaborated by these philosophers in a theological context also entail an overhaul of the perfect correspondence elapsing between *intelligere* and *significare*. Although in Henry of Ghent this tradition of thought still seems to play a decisive role (see, e.g., *Summa quaestionum ordinarium*, 73, I, qq. 9-10), he argues that when we make a conscious and "informed" use of language, our knowledge exceeds signification, since the external words and discourses prove incapable of fully imitating the depths of human thought. As far as Duns Scotus is concerned, he believes that in many cases something can be signified more distinctively and precisely than it is understood : this applies with theological terms, but also with those falling under the genus of substance (my attention falls mainly on *Rep.* I-A, d. 22 and *Ord.* I, d. 22). It was Ockham, however, who integrates Scotus' insights into a total revision of the notion of "signification", which through the concept of "supposition" can be purged of its psychological and epistemological connotations (see Ord., I, d. 22). With this last passage, a definitive breakup between semantics and epistemology seems to be clearly introduced. This cannot but be considered as a "radical" innovation in the Middle Ages.

Andrea Nannini: *Univocità e individuazione. Retrospezione tra Giovanni da Ripa (1355) e Giovanni Duns Scoto*

La dottrina dell'univocità dell'essere di Giovanni Duns Scoto non può prescindere dall'attribuzione della ben nota *haecceitas* (la differenza ultima-individuante) ad una gradazione precisa dell'essere. Poiché infatti (a) l'essere si divide nei suoi modi intrinseci infinito/finito, ma (b) l'essere rimane univocamente il medesimo tra i domini increato-infinito e creato-finito, e (c) il grado infinito è per sua stessa natura unico, (d) i gradi finiti rappresenteranno potenzialmente le (infinite) espressioni dell'essere creato, ciascuna individuata dal proprio grado intrinseco. Questa lettura, dalle forti commistioni metafisiche, dell'univocità scotiana, risulta pienamente compatibile con gli sviluppi della filosofia trecentesca, che germineranno nell'individuazione di

latitudines (*latitudo entium*, *latitudo perfectionis*) all'interno delle quali gli enti si identificheranno grazie al proprio grado intrinseco. Il francescano Giovanni da Ripa (1355) può ben rappresentare il 'campione' di questo approccio innovativo e ancora da esplorare nel dettaglio. Lo stesso Giovanni da Ripa è anche estremamente importante ai fini dell'approfondimento della dottrina dell'univocità dell'essere: nella sua interpretazione dell'univocità dell'essere scotiana, il super-sottile si stupisce infatti di come Giovanni Duns Scoto abbia creduto di dire 'grandi cose' escludendo la predicazione dell'*ens in quid* dalle differenze ultime e dalle proprietà trascendentali dell'essere. In verità, secondo Ripa, il Dottor Sottile avrebbe dovuto estendere l'esclusione della predicazione dell'*ens* da qualsiasi altra denominazione di perfezione che non sia l'essere stesso. Attraverso una lettura delle due proposte, si cercherà di fare emergere le differenze tra due metafisiche i cui presupposti conducono ad esiti incompatibili: una vera e propria univocità metafisica, estesa da Dio al creato, nel caso di Duns Scoto; un'univocità ristretta al solo dominio creaturale, e per di più secondo la sola perfezione dell'essere, nel caso di Giovanni da Ripa.

Salle / Room 3.10

Aula 10: La pensée radicale dans les commentaires à l'*Ethique à Nicomaque */ II

Special Session proposed by Valeria Buffon and Irene Zavattero
Chair: David Piché

Pavel Blažek: *Mariage radical: Le débat sur la polygamie dans les commentaires médiévaux sur les* libri morales *d'Aristote*

Un des sujets souvent traités dans les commentaires médiévaux sur les libri morales d'Aristote était celui de la polygamie. On trouve une discussion de ce thème dans plusieurs commentaires sur l'Étique à Nicomaque (Albert le Grand, l'anonyme d'Erfurt, Henry de Friemar, Buridan) – pourtant, dans ce texte, Aristote ne soulève pas la question explicitement–, dans les commentaires sur la Politique – où le Stagirite aborde le thème de la polygamie dans le cadre de sa critique de l'utopie platonicienne de la communauté des femmes et des biens (Albert le Grand, Thomas, Pierre d'Auvergne, Walther Burleigh) –, ainsi que dans les commentaires sur les Économiques pseudo-aristotéliciennes (Bartolomeo da Varignana, Barthélemy de Bruges). Les commentateurs médiévaux s'interrogent sur le statut de la polygamie et de la monogamie dans le droit naturel en se demandant si la polygamie puit représenter un modèle de mariage mieux adaptée à la nature de l'homme et à la société. Bien que répondant à cette question unanimement par la négative (sur ce point ils se révèlent moins „radicaux" que certains théologiens de l'époque), ils s'accordent néanmoins à dire que la polygamie n'est pas complètement opposée à la nature humaine et que dans un certain sens elle y correspond même davantage. Dans mon exposé je présenterai le développement de cette discussion sur la polygamie et je l'insérerai dans son contexte intellectuel et historique plus vaste.

Taki Suto: *The Transformation of the* Summa theologiae *in John of Dinsdale's* Quaestiones super librum Ethicorum

John of Dinsdale's Quaestiones super Librum Ethicorum is one of the few late 13th century Ethics commentaries that are known to have been written by a Master of Arts at the University of Oxford. The commentary is more similar to the Second part of Thomas Aquinas's Summa theologiae than any other contemporary Ethics commentaries. John's arguments, however, sometimes rely on different authorities from Aquinas's, for instance, Aristotle and Averroes instead of Eastern Church Fathers. John never mentions the existence of future life and divine grace. He discusses "felicitas" in place of "beatitudo", "uitium" in place of "peccatum", "amor" in place of "caritas". Although Aquinas certainly asserts the superiority of the contemplative life over the active life, he says that we should sometimes renounce the contemplative life for the active life due to the necessity of the present. In contrast, John claims that we should rather abandon the active life for

the sake of the contemplative life. Thus, comparing John's several arguments with Aquinas's, I will show the radicality of John's Ethics commentary.

Alexander Stöpfgeshoff: *Moral Skepticism and Certainty: John Buridan on Acting well with False and Limited Information*

Medieval philosophers often thought that knowledge requires certainty. Nicholas of Autrecourt argues that if knowledge requires certainty, then only what would lead to contradiction to deny can be known. Because God can alter the world, he can make any of our beliefs about the world false (unknown to us). John Buridan famously argues that this sort of skeptical challenge can be met. Buridan's account of how natural knowledge is possible has received much attention. However, Buridan himself also thought that Autrecourt's skepticism challenged moral knowledge. Central to Buridan's answer is that morality only requires moral certainty. There is little consensus among scholars what moral certainty, in the end, amounts to. I propose that we need to look at Buridan's discussion of these matters in his commentary on the Ethics. It turns out that Buridan is an early proponent of a form of subjectivism about right/virtuous action. What is right/virtuous depends on the subjective perspective of the person acting. What one ought to do depends on what information one has at hand. When we have limited and/or false information, through no fault of our own, what we ought to do is different from when we are fully informed. Buridan's account here stands in contrast to, for example, Thomas Aquinas's discussion of good actions and ignorance. In this reading, Buridan's subjectivism enables him to answer Autrecourt's skepticism concerning morality. Because moral knowledge in a situation does not require knowledge of the matters of fact, God can deceive about all kinds of matters of fact while we retain our ability to act morally. A study of his commentary on the Ethics will provide us with a better account of moral certainty. I propose that a person is morally certain when she has adequately investigated the situation at hand. For example, a judge is morally certain when she has followed the procedure proper to the courts. This explains why moral certainty is compatible with not knowing some matter of fact. On this view, a prudent person need not think she knows what she is morally certain of. I will argue that this account of moral certainty has a number of advantages over other proposed accounts (King 1987; Pasnau 2017, chap. 3; Klein 2020; Grellard 2017, Choi, 2020).

Salle / Room 3.07

Aula 7: Radicality and Feminism in Medieval Mysticism

Ordinary Session
Chair: Ana Rieger Schmidt:

Yael Barash: *Images as a Radical Argumentation Method in Hildegard of Bingen's Rupertsberg Codex*

Can we know about God from physical observations? During the 12th century theologians started to answer positively to this question. Masters of the Chartres School discussed how God might be seen in nature as its' creator; Monks from St. Victor focused on biblical images that include signs for God; Alan of Lille used images from nature for his discussions about God; And these are only a few examples. However, methods that used sense perceptions were rare. Hildegard of Bingen (1098–1179) received divine visions from God; her knowledge came to her through her senses. Hildegard's visions started with receiving unique sights and were followed by vocal commentaries that were delivered by a divine voice. The commentaries included identifications of the visual objects she miraculously perceived, and abstract explanations about these objects. The identifications of the visual objects by the divine voice were so unique, that one could not interpret them only according to medieval conventions. The explanations of the divine voice on moral, theological, and cosmological themes fit the contemporary discussions. Between these arguments,

one can find a holistic worldview and many analogies between God and the creation. In the talk I would like to suggest that Hildegard even used a more radical sensory method than analogues – images. There is one illustrated codex that was made under Hildegard's supervision, named Rupertsberg Codex (1165–80). It was made during the composion of Hildegard's last book, *Liber divinorum operum* (*LDO*). According to the divine voice, as it is quoted in *LDO*, Hildegard perceived her miraculous visions in her inner senses. God has revealed the visions to her in order to help humanity know where God may be found in nature. If humans will look for God with the right mind, they will see Him with their inner senses, while perceiving physical objects. Thus, the explanations of God's interactions with nature enable the possibility of the readers to know God. The use of Analogies between nature and God is a main method in the commentaries of *LDO*. Rupertsberg Codex only includes Hildegard's first visionary book, *Scivias,* which was written more than a decade before (c. 1142–52). By analysing the compositions of the illustrations, I would like to suggest that the illustrations visually convey abstract concepts that appear also in the commentaries of the visions. The viewers of the physical images can find in them intellectual meanings. Finding the abstract meanings remind finding God in creation; perceiving abstract with the inner senses. Hildegard excessively used the illustrations in order to convey her ideas. She activated the principle that one is able to study from visual perceptions, and even discarded words. This is a radical method, rationalized by the common principal that one might know God through physical perceiving.

Tatiana Barkovskiy: *Maternal Images of God in Medieval Philosophy and Mysticism*

The Catholic tri-personal God does not and cannot, as a pure spirit, possess gender in its natural, biological sense. However, it is conventional to speak of God using masculine pronouns and articles. Nevertheless, there exist feminine images of God within the Christian tradition, carried out primarily through an emphasis on the sexuality of a woman as a person who has the potential to become a mother. God is thus not only the Father but also the Mother. The God-as-Mother theme is famously realised in its most explicit, consistent, and systematic way in the writings of Julian of Norwich. Is her approach isolated in the theological and philosophical discourse of her time, and thus radical? This does not seem to be the case, as God-as-Mother is discussed by other medieval thinkers. Furthermore, it is considered in a variety of elaborate ways: for Anselm of Canterbury, motherhood is linked to the image of (self)sacrifice, and the God-Mother is for him a merciful, loving, and nurturing parent, while for Gertrude of Helfta God is a strict mother, who out of love sometimes puts her child to a test. Various biological aspects of motherhood are also evoked: Anselm employs the framework of conceiving and giving birth, Bernard of Clairvaux stresses the importance of breastfeeding, and Guerric of Igny associates the wounds of Christ with the female womb. Moreover: the notion of God-as-Mother finds support in the medieval philosophy of language, which stresses the fundamental incomprehensibility and unknowability of God and thus argues for the possibility of God- language as based solely on analogy and the consequent need to apply multiple names to God. Remarkably, this motif reaches beyond the scope of common theological and devotional intuitions, in which the role of the Divine Mother is usually assigned to the Virgin Mary; what is more, it demonstrates how flexible the medieval understanding of gender was. Considered together, the novelty of the proposed research is twofold. On the one hand, it relies on contemporary feminist reflection, which acknowledges the physiological and psychological aspects of femininity in experiencing faith, and thus emphasises the importance of corporeality in presented imagery, thereby adding to the classic literature on the God-as-Mother theme (C. W. Bynum 1982; E. A. Johnson 2002; E. H. Pagels 1976). On the other hand, it embeds the undertaken issues in apophatic theology and the medieval theory of analogy, in contrast to the current literature (A. M. Małek 2020), which refers to the principles of cognitive linguistics and the theory of metaphor. Strangely, in terms of common thinking about God and divinity, the medieval concept of God-as- Mother

still appears to be quite radical. As a whole, it finds ground in feminist philosophy of religion, which stems from a discontent with the monotonous perspective provided by an exclusively 'paternal' God, and seeks to construct and legitimise a binary or non-binary image of God.

Miquel Beltrán: *Precedence of the Impure Forces and Radicality of Evil in the Text of Some Early Kabbalists*

The previous existence of impurity associated with the darkness of the Genesis and forged through a literal interpretation of Is 45, 7 is common in the text of some Kabbalist of the Middle Ages. The imperativeness of purification of the negative elements in the Deity is, for some of them, essential to the emanative process and consequently of capital importance for human activity. The term qelippot (husks or shells) suggest the rough surface of a fruit in opposition to its kernel. But some of these texts advocate for the usefulness of the shells which must to be anterior to protect the fruit pulp. There is a link between God, perfection, and evil according to some of the Castillian Kabbalalist in the thirteen century. This primordial evil had, according to Moshe Idel, a first formulation in Europe in a text written some centuries before the arising of the Kabbalah, a letter whose author was the bishop Agobard of Lyons. Our purpose in the paper is to find out the real contribution of this text to the history of Jewish mysticism, specially concerning the thesis that the Thought has in its highest level evil as its object. The system of sefirot is related to divine thought, but an event described as destruction of the worlds took place earlier, for a reason that Castillian Kabalists does not try to clarify, even if some did not hesitate when articulating a special type of nexus between divine thought and evil: writers like Moshe of Burgos, in whose Works an inclusive visión of evil and a concept of perfection are found together. The affinity betwen divine thought and the emergence of evil is also explicit in R. Joseph Angelet. According to him, evil constitute a primeval part of the instrumental vision which assumes that without its existence, the world would not be perfect. On the other side, we will try to demonstrate that in German Kabbalah the myth of the destroyed worlds as elaborated, for instance, by Rabbi Isaac ha-Kohen, shows as well the prioriry of evil. According to ha-Kohen, the previous worlds were completely evil, and were destroyed for this reaon. In his turn, Rabbi Eleazar of Worms concieved God to créate at first, ideal worlds which would be completely evil, in order to be consequently able to produce finally righteous worlds. God fails in this, and the created world is a mixed world, in which good and evil are combined, and which succesfully produces from time to time righteous persons which justify its existence. Therefore, evil comes drectly from God in Rabbi Eleazar's system, and is no trace of a dualistic actitude. Evil fulfills a divine function. The divine plan displays evil in every state of creation according to every event, to finally attain righteousness. It is necessary even for the sake of the righteous, given that otherwise they could not been able to show their true nature.

16h30-17h00: Coffee Break

17h00-18h30: Round Table: The Future of Medieval Philosophy

Auditorium 250

The Future of Medieval Philosophy
Special Session proposed by Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen

The number of SIEPM members is growing and the participation in events such as the present Congress is substantial. Yet, doing medieval philosophy is no longer a self-evident matter, as it was

when the general philosophical focus in academia lay on the Greek and Latin West. To be sure, already at an early stage the SIEPM opened its doors for Arabic, Byzantine and Jewish philosophy. Here the SIEPM is well prepared for a more global approach, to keep in touch with other disciplines such as history and literary studies. The same goes for the challenges of the digital humanities. Medieval Philosophy was one of the first humanities disciplines to embrace digital tools to open up new ways of research. The pioneers in the field were SIEPM members, as is still the case today. The real threats to the field, however, are coming from elsewhere, and they are many: the academic curricula that no longer offer the necessary language skills and paleographical training, the loss of permanent positions, the opposition against a historical period that is for a large part white male dominated, the publish-or-perish attitude that makes researchers refrain from embarking on long- term critical editions of texts, the focus on English as the preferred language of research which puts non-native speakers in an infavorable position, the changing demands of society that is no longer interested in the past, and shift of research money from the humanities to the natural sciences, to mention only the most obvious challenges. To be sure, some of these threats are more general and also touch other disciplines, but some are specific to our field. These transitions, which in different countries may have different levels, call for a discussion among the members of the SIEPM, in order to share experiences, ponder strategies and explore responsabilities for the SIEPM. To this end, the Bureau invites the SIEPM members to participate in a session devoted to the future of medieval philosophy and the role of the SIEPM therein. The session will open with a short introduction from the side of the Bureau, after which the floor is open for a discussion among the members about the SIEPM and the future of medieval philosophy.

19h00: *End of Voting*

Jeudi / Thursday 25-08-2022

9h00-10h30: Sessions ordinaires et spéciales / Ordinary and Special Sessions

Salle / Room 50

Aula 1:À la racine de la connaissance, du vouloir et de l'agir / IV : À la racine de la connaissance, du jugement et de l'acte de foi

Special Session proposed by Tobias Hoffmann
Sponsor: Centre Pierre Abélard, Sorbonne Université
Chair: Véronique Decaix

Hamid Taieb: *L'*esse iudicatum *chez Pierre Auriol : qu'est-ce que c'est et d'où cela vient-il ?*

Pierre Auriol emploie parfois, comme équivalent de la notion d'*esse apparens*, qui désigne le mode d'être que les objets des actes mentaux acquièrent en tant qu'ils sont pensés, la notion d'*esse iudicatum*. À première vue, il n'est pas évident de savoir s'il s'agit là d'une seule et unique notion, simplement dénommée à l'aide de deux expressions différentes, ou si la distinction linguistique exprime bel et bien une distinction conceptuelle. Mon hypothèse est que la notion d'*esse iudicatum* est corrélée, chez Auriol, à l'acte de *iudicium*, qui fait état d'une dimension active de la cognition. Plus précisément, le *iudicium* exprime le moment de production d'un objet intentionnel. Ainsi, malgré son nom, il ne s'agit pas d'un acte judicatif, car il n'est ni prédicatif, ni même existentiel, mais simplement objectuel. Le *iudicium* est ainsi à la racine de la connaissance, car il sert à expliquer la donation d'objet, préalable nécessaire à toute activité judicative. Je montrerai qu'Auriol se rattache sur ce thème à une longue tradition, qui va d'Aristote à Thomas, en passant par Averroès. Le *iudicium* est en effet dérivé d'une notion peu étudiée de la tradition aristotélicienne, celle de *krisis*, qui renvoie à une dimension active de la cognition, y compris au niveau perceptuel. Or, la *krisis* est rendue, précisément, par le nom de « *iudicium* » dans les traductions latines du *De anima*. Auriol lui-même se base sur Averroès pour développer sa théorie du *iudicium*. D'après Auriol, le *iudicium* désignerait chez Averroès un aspect actif de la cognition, tant perceptuelle qu'intellectuelle, et serait élaborée dans le cadre d'une réflexion sur la saisie des privations et négations. Mon plan est le suivant : je commencerai par quelques brèves indications sur les racines grecques de la *krisis*, puis sur sa transposition dans le monde latin, en prenant Thomas comme point de référence. Je me tournerai ensuite vers Auriol, afin d'étudier plus en détail la façon dont lui comprend le *iudicium*, et en m'attardant sur la reconstruction qu'il fait d'Averroès sur ce thème. J'interrogerai ensuite les rapports qu'Auriol établit entre l'*esse iudicatum* et l'*esse apparens*. Je conclurai par quelques remarques évaluatives sur la théorie d'Auriol.

Antoine Côté: *Jean, Thaddée, Maino et les autres: les maîtres ès arts, parisiens surtout, face au défi de la noétique durandienne*

S'il est une théorie de la connaissance radicale au début du XIV^e^ siècle, c'est bien celle de Durand de Saint-Pourçain, qui rejette en bloc le modèle explicatif de la connaissance hérité d'Aristote et d'Averroès, récusant l'idée que pour connaître l'intellect requiert une forme, innée ou non (celle de l'objet), et substitue à ce modèle une noétique qui relègue l'objet au statut d'une simple cause *sine qua non*. Cette critique donnera profondément à réfléchir aux maîtres ès arts, quelles que soient les différences de doctrines qui les séparent par ailleurs. Si, dans l'ensemble, ceux-ci refusent tout net certaines innovations de Durand, ils n'en feront pas moins une place importante à ses arguments, au point, dans certains cas, de risquer de dénaturer leur « aristotélisme » ou d'en compromettre la cohérence.

David Piché: *Les multiples racines de la certitude, de Thomas d'Aquin à Pierre de La Palud*

La réflexion des théologiens médiévaux sur les statuts épistémologiques comparés de la foi, de la science et de l'opinion leur a donné une occasion privilégiée pour penser la notion de certitude sous ses diverses formes. Ma communication entend faire entendre la polyphonie des conceptions de la certitude qu'une telle réflexion a mis en jeu. Sans négliger au besoin d'autres penseurs des années 1250-1350, je vais me concentrer sur trois figures dominicaines qui ont offert des contributions significatives à l'histoire du concept de certitude, laquelle demeure toujours à écrire : Thomas d'Aquin, Durand de Saint-Pourçain et Pierre de La Palud. Alors que l'Aquinate, dont la pensée évolue du *Commentaire des Sentences* à la *Somme de théologie*, se dote progressivement d'une notion résolument externaliste de la certitude de foi, dont il situe la racine dans sa cause externe, à savoir la Vérité divine qui révèle les articles du *Credo*, Durand de Saint-Pourçain, privilégiant contre le Docteur angélique un modèle internaliste de la certitude du croyant, entend faire de celle-ci un état épistémique qui s'enracine dans l'intériorité du sujet intellectuel. Quant à Pierre de La Palud, dont je travaille en ce moment à éditer les textes à ce sujet, je montrerai qu'il cherche à revaloriser certains acquis du modèle thomasien face à la critique durandienne, tout en posant deux gestes radicaux auxquels l'Aquinate n'aurait pas songé : relativiser la certitude d'évidence, celle qui caractérise la vision et la science, en la reconduisant à la nécessité seulement hypothétique du cours de la nature et promouvoir les exigences d'une certitude *de iure* au-delà des seules considérations *de facto*.

Salle / Room 3.01

Aula 2:Hylomorphism in the Later Middle Ages: Contrasting Perspectives / II

Special Session proposed by Zita Toth
Sponsor: *Studying Medieval Hylomorphism Whole*, KU Leuven Internal Funds, C14/20/007
Chair: Sylvain Roudaut

Zita Toth: *How Many Matters? The Problem of Celestial Matter in some Fourteenth-Century Dominican Thinkers*

According to Aristotle, the region above the moon differs greatly from the region below the moon. While things here below are generated and corrupted, and undergo all kinds of accidental changes, things in the heavens don't. While the natural motion of things here below is either down towards the center of the universe or up towards its perimeter, celestial bodies move with eternal, uniform, circular motion. One way medieval authors accounted for this vast difference was to postulate that the heavenly bodies have a different metaphysical constitution from that of the earthly ones: according to some of these authors, heavenly bodies do not have matter as a metaphysical constituent at all, while according to others, their matter differs essentially from the matter here below. It is this latter view that will be the focus of the present paper. How can we make sense of different kinds of prime matter, if prime matter is, by definition, characterless? How many different kinds of matter does the theory need to posit? I examine these questions in the writings of three fourteenth-century Dominican thinkers, Hervaeus Natalis, Peter of Palude, and Nicholas of Trivet.

Nicola Polloni: *Systematising Matter in Coimbra: Manuel de Góis on the Epistemology of Prime Matter*

In writing the Coimbra commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, Manuel de Góis attempted an overall systematisation of how this central text ought to be interpreted. The aim of the commentary required De Góis to engage with a wide web of often opposed theories and sources and give a broad picture of how the natural world should be considered, understood, and described. Yet some central items entailed by the Scholastic explanation of nature exceeded nature itself: this is the case

of prime matter. My talk will discuss De Góis's treatment of matter in his commentary on the first book of the *Physics*. I will focus particularly on the question inquiring about the definition, conceivability, and name of prime matter (bk 1, ch. 9, q. 2). How does the Coimbra commentary engage with these problematic aspects arising from an epistemological consideration of prime matter? How are De Góis's claims related to his stances about the ontology of this peculiar entity? And how does the insertion of new sources that were unavailable in the Middle Ages, like Plotinus, impact on the consideration of prime matter as epistemic object? First, I will present some of the main problems entailed by an epistemological consideration of prime matter. Second, I will analyse how the Coimbra commentary on the *Physics* deals with this problem through the discussion of definition, conception, and name of prime matter. Finally, I will examine how De Góis's stances are connected to his general interpretation of hylomorphism and the role that both new and old sources play in his solution to the problem about the conceivability of prime matter.

Erik Åkerlund: *The Form-Matter Union in Rodrigo de Arriaga's Substance Dualism*

According to Rodrigo de Arriaga, S.J. († 1667), prime matter as well as substantial forms are unequivocally substances in their own right. Prime matter is not really different from proximate matter, for Arriaga, and always comes with "where-ness" and duration. The primary examples of substantial forms are, for their part, as earlier for Suárez, human souls. The composite that is made up of matter and form is also a substance, a *prima res*, though. How does Arriaga account for the unity of the form-matter composite within this framework of form-matter substance-dualism ?

Salle / Room 3.02

Aula 3:Radical Natural Philosophy

Special Session proposed by Thérèse Cory, Claire Murphy, Dominic LaMantia and Andreas Waldstein
Sponsor: University of Notre Dame
Chair: Claire Murphy

Jeff Brower: *Aquinas's Anti-Realism about Space—An Aristotelian Argument*

In this paper, I examine a particular argument against the existence of space (*spatium*) that Aquinas presents in his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* IV.4. Although the argument is clearly Aristotelian in inspiration, Aquinas's development of it goes well beyond anything in the original text. What makes the argument interesting, moreover, is that it not only identifies what Aquinas takes to be a decisive reason for denying the existence of space, but also sheds important light on his understanding of quantitative objects in general. In particular, it helps to explain why he thinks it is impossible for there to be any extended, quantitative objects other than bodies.

Emma Emrich: *Aquinas and Buridan on the Soul: Intermediary Properties Rooted in the Soul's Essence*

Thomas Aquinas and John Buridan present opposing views on the question of whether the essence of the soul is distinct from the soul's powers. Buridan argues that they are only conceptually distinct, while Aquinas holds that they are different in reality and that the powers are designed to act on other accidents via the soul's essential power to fulfill specific functions in the body. According to Buridan, Aquinas's account is open to two objections: first, he uses figurative language to describe the powers as "rooted in" or "flowing from" the essence, which is not philosophically rigorous, and second, his account does not provide an adequate schema for understanding how the powers relate to the substance of the soul as accidents. In this paper I argue that Aquinas's account can respond to these objections through his theory of properties (*propria*)

as intermediaries between essence and accident, which explains how the powers of the soul are truly "rooted" in the essence of the soul yet distinct from it in such a way that each power is able to exert a unique causal role. I argue that Aquinas's argument exemplifies his epistemological method of tracing the nature of powers from our knowledge of their acts. A radical difference in act, as an effect of the power, points to a real distinction in the powers as causes. From this principle Aquinas can conclude that the powers of the soul are distinct from the soul's essence, while also providing a rigorous explanation of how the powers relate to the essence and other accidents through his account of intermediary properties. I argue that Aquinas can accomplish this without merely metaphorical language since the language of being "rooted" in the essence is grounded in his philosophical account of properties as intermediary accidental effects of the essence. In addition to helping Aquinas answer Buridan's objections, his account of properties is important philosophically since it adds nuance to the common understanding of medieval categories of substance and accident. Through this analysis, I attempt to show that although Aquinas's account might seem to exemplify the type of radicalism characterized by extreme intellectually inflexible, or a radical adherence to certain (Aristotelian) doctrines, his account of the soul in fact exemplifies a more positive sense of the term, expressing a return to the roots (*radices*) of things. Aquinas's attempt to trace the effects of the properties of the soul from their causes or foundations in the essence shows not a blind adherence to a pre-prescribed doctrine, but a meaningful instantiation of his epistemology and philosophy of causation: differences in the better-known effects of action point to a real distinction in the powers as causes. Thus, the powers of the soul are rooted in yet distinct from the essence of the soul, just as our knowledge of these powers stems from their acts as effects in the intelligible world.

Christian Emrich: *Aquinas on the Radical Dependence of Metaphysics on Natural Philosophy*

Thomas Aquinas defines the subject genus of the metaphysics as 'being as being.' In his commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate, Aquinas lays out the division of the speculative sciences into natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics. This division follows from the subject's relation to matter and motion. Metaphysics, then, is the science whose subject relies on matter neither for its understanding nor for its existence. For Aquinas, one can only proceed in science upon the supposition that one knows that the subject of the science actually exists, however all the objects of our immediate experience are intimately bound up with matter and motion. So how does one discover that being can be completely removed from matter such that the science of metaphysics is possible? Many prominent commentators on Aquinas, such as Etienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, Joseph Owens, and John Wippel, locate the discovery of the subject genus of metaphysics in Aquinas's account of the faculty of judgment, which Aquinas holds is the second act of the intellect, the first being simple apprehension and the third argumentation. This paper argues, however, that the subject genus of metaphysics cannot be discovered through the faculty of judgment, but rather that an argument is needed. In other words, the discovery of the subject of metaphysics comes through the third act of the intellect, not the second. By showing this, the paper intends to argue that natural philosophy is at the root of the knowledge of metaphysics in Aquinas's thought, for it is natural philosophy that discovers the existence of immaterial being, which secures the subject of metaphysics. The paper will first argue against the position that the faculty of judgment is enough, focussing on the account given by Wippel. Wippel interprets Aquinas as holding the position that the negative act of judgment or the act of separation (as distinct from abstraction) secures the subject of metaphysics by separating 'being as being' from 'being in some way.' The paper argues that this act of separation is not enough to establish 'being as being' and that one needs to know that immaterial being exists in order to begin metaphysics. The paper then proceeds to establish the radical dependence in one's knowledge between natural philosophy and metaphysics. The paper focuses on the two primary ways that natural philosophy can establish the existence of immaterial being and open one's knowledge to the science of

metaphysics. The two ways are the argument for the existence of an immaterial first mover given by physics, and the second, often overlooked way which biology provides, namely through proof of the existence of the immaterial human soul. These two ways are closely linked by Aquinas in his account of the generation of the human soul. In looking at these two ways to establish the existence of immaterial being one sees that for Aquinas, a knowledge of natural philosophy is a prerequisite for a knowledge of metaphysics.

Salle / Room 3.03

Aula 4: La pensée radicale dans les commentaires à l'*Ethique à Nicomaque */ III

Special Session proposed by Valeria Buffon and Irene Zavattero
Chair: Irene Zavattero

Pedro Konzen Capra: *The Wall of Separation Between the Deliberative and the Scientific Part of the Soul in the Nicomachean Ethics – Thomas Aquinas against Aristotle?*

It's well known that the Thomistic ethical doctrine is heavily influenced by Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (N.E.), but the quality of this impact or the fidelity of Thomas Aquinas with Aristotelian thesis it's an open question in which recently many works have been dedicated and one of the most chosen registers of his oeuvre to this challenge is the Sententia Libri Ethicorum (S.L.E.). Scholars debate, usually, between tree hypothesis, that Aquinas basically reproduces with the aim of fidelity the Aristotelian ethical doctrines, that he baptizes the works of the ancient philosopher misrepresenting his opinions or that his commentaries on Aristotle's works are intended to expose what is most coherently in a philosophical perspective of the doctrines of the thinker from Stagira regardless of what the texts say exactly. Although his S.L.E. has the characteristic of been a commentary line by line of the N.E. and not a commentary by questions as Super Ethica of Albert the Great, which suggest that Aquinas wants to expose as close as possible the Aristotelian text, I want to discuss in this presentation a passage commenting 1139a11-15 (N.E. VI, 1-2) in which the medieval thinker evidently criticizes the ancient philosopher. In this famous passage of N.E. it's argued that the scientific part of the soul is separated from the deliberative part because each has one different object of consideration, the first deals with the necessary and the second deals with the contingent. In contemporary studies of N.E. this passage is often used to defend that for Aristotle the discipline of ethics is eminently practical and that there is no epistemological relation with a possible theoretical discipline of ethics, diminishing the importance of the famous function argument (N.E. I, 7) for the intellectual virtue of prudence. Without doubt Aquinas criticizes this Aristotelian opinion arguing that this separation by the different objects is false even for Aristotle in other works. This development seems coherent with sorted evidence all over the commentaries that for Aquinas ethics is not just both practical and theoretical but also that there is an epistemological relation between the two parts of this discipline. I think that the analysis of this passage could be not just a case for the hypothesis that his commentaries on Aristotle's works are intended to expose the most coherently philosophical doctrines of the ancient philosopher, but also to be a counterexample for the interpretations of Aquinas doctrine of natural law defending that the practical intellect is radically independent of speculative intellect, which mean for them that no proposition or concept acquired by the speculative part of mind could be used by the practical part. At some point, the conceptual difficulties which the Aristotelian scholars face are the same which the Thomistic scholars have when dealing with his natural law doctrine. My aim in the presentation is to discuss Aristotle's argument and the objection of Aquinas punctuating the relations of these passages with the problems referred-to.

Ziang Chen: *Une tentative sur la théorie de la contingence radicale en philosophie morale dans le commentaire sur* l'Éthique à Nicomaque *de Guiral Ot*

Le maître franciscain, Guiral Ot, déclare dans son commentaire sur l'Éthique à Nicomaque d'Aristote (vers 1324) que la vertu de prudentia est superior simpliciter à la vertu de sapientia. Cette position se trouve au contrecourant dans la tradition établie aux universités où la sapientia est considérée en générale (Albert le Grand, Thomas d'Aquin, Raoul le Breton, etc.) comme la vertu intellectuelle suprême et que l'intellect scientifique domine l'intellect pratique. La déclaration de Guiral peut se montrer, en surface, rien d'offensif, mais elle peut engendrer des conséquences radicales dans le schéma de sa philosophie morale. Pour ma communication, je réunirai les réponses de Guiral sur une série de questions concernant les rôles joués par prudentia et par l'intellect pratique et je viserai de montrer que Guiral propose une lecture de l'Éthique qui met en question la validité et même l'existence de principes moraux universels. Au sein de son anthropologie morale, Guiral considère que l'âme pratique forme la base de l'humanité de chaque individu et que la vie morale de celui-ci se compose d'abord de jugements et d'actions concernant les affaires contingentes. L'intellect pratique règne sur l'intellect scientifique, autant plus que le principe pratique l'emporte d'une manière générale sur l'universel. Dans ses pensées politiques, l'epieikeia d'un homme de prudence prévaut toujours sur l'exigence universelle de loi ; un prince doté de perfection pratique est toujours préféré à la parfaite raison des lois universelles ; même les principes universels de loi naturelle sont susceptibles d'être supplantés par la raison humaine prudentielle. Si les affaires morales sont toujours particulières et contingentes, exigeant partout la délibération pratique, on peut tenter de conclure que Guiral laisse aux universels moraux une espace exiguë, tant qu'il peut arriver à dénier leur validité au-delà des plus fondamentales commandes de loi naturelle. Finalement, je considérerai les arguments de Guiral dans le contexte de ses confrères franciscains contemporains, dans le but de montrer que ses positions, bien que radicales au sein de la tradition des commentaires aristotéliciens, ont néanmoins plus de résonance dans le milieu franciscain.

Salle / Room 3.05

Aula 5:From Paris to Heidelberg: John Wenck's Teaching in the Mirror of his Unedited Works

Special Session proposed by Mario Meliadò
Sponsor: Universität Siegen
Chair: Mario Meliadò

Alessandra Saccon: *L'albertismo nel commento al* De anima *di Johannes Wenck*

Attraverso l'analisi del commento di Johannes Wenck al terzo libro del *De anima* (Mainz, StadtBibl. Hs I 610) si intende precisare il significato della sua adesione all'albertismo filosofico. Il commento, che si può ricondurre agli anni di studio delle Arti a Parigi (1413-1426), sostiene infatti con convinzione alcuni degli elementi distintivi della teoria della conoscenza albertista. Vengono presi in esame soprattutto due motivi: il tema della conoscenza di sé e quello della possibilità di conoscere senza la mediazione di "phantasmata". Proprio questa possibilità sarà però fermamente negata nella sua polemica con Cusano; ci si chiede pertanto se si tratti di un ripudio delle posizioni giovanili o se sia necessaria una contestualizzazione più ampia, anche considerando la dimensione teologica della polemica con Cusano.

Mario Meliadò and Zornitsa Radeva: *John Wenck as a Reader of the* Liber de causis

The paper aims to present our work-in-progress critical edition and study of John Wenck's *Quaestiones super Librum de causis*. It offers a preliminary analysis of the manuscript tradition of this commentary and reconstructs methods, sources, and doctrinal intentions of Wenck as a reader of

the *Book of Causes*. Moreover, the contribution explores Wenck's reception of the *Liber de causis* in the broader context of his philosophical and theological production: from the commentary on Boethius' *De hebdomadibus* to the exposition of the works of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. By doing so, the paper intends to sketch an intellectual portrait of Wenck as a careful and unconventional interpreter of the Neo-Platonic tradition.

Andrea Fiamma: *John Wenck's* Principia *on the* Sentences

From 1431 to 1432, Johannes Wenck (†1460) held his *Principia* on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* in order to obtain his master's degree in theology at the University of Heidelberg. The text he read to his colleagues and teachers is conserved as autograph in the manuscript Tübingen, Universitätsbibliothek, n. 31 and has not yet been edited. In this paper, I will present the main contents of Wenck's *Principia*, their sources as well as the academic context to which they were addressed. Moreover, I will investigate the doctrinal positions of Wenck as a *bachalarius sententiarius* in Heidelberg to ascertain whether, in the years 1431-1432, he still adhered to the Albertist positions he defended until 1426 as a master at the Faculty of the Arts in Paris.

Salle / Room 3.06

Aula 6: Radical Thinking in Maimonides / II

Special Session proposed by Warren Zev Harvey
Chair: Warren Zev Harvey

Albert D. Friedberg: *Maimonides on Anthropomorphism: Should Scripture Be Read Philosophically?*

There is a general consensus that Maimonides' exegesis, in the *Guide*, was intended to resolve the philosophically informed reader's perplexity with Scripture's anthropomorphic language. To bring the Bible's language into correspondence with philosophy, Maimonides produced a study of problematic terms that "insisted upon a nonliteral, allegorical understanding of all anthropomorphic expressions, both physical and psychical…" (*Encyclopedia Judaica*, entry "Anthropomorphism", vol. 3, p. 56). This in-depth lexicographic effort covered the first 50 chapters of the *Guide*. Nestled in this treatment are two chapters that contain no lexicographic material and that, strangely, appear to be totally disconnected from, or unaware of, the surrounding chapters. Based on these two chapters, I will argue that, on the contrary, the lengthy lexicographic and exegetical discussion represents only a pedagogically motivated concession, that the real explanation rendered absolutely unnecessary the much touted philosophical readings, and, finally, that Maimonides held that the Bible is not a philosophical book and, as such, could not represent a source of perplexity. I shall also show that Maimonides offers in the *Guide* a remarkably parsimonious and naturalistic explanation for the occurrence of anthropomorphisms.

Reimund Leicht: *Radical Interpretation of Maimonides in the Context of Intellectual Discourse of the Later 20th Century*

Discussions about whether Maimonides was a "radical" or a "traditionalist" thinker occupied much of the scholarly research of the second half of the 20th century. These scholarly discussions were, for the most part, combined with the second grand question of Maimonidean studies – that of his esoteric and esoteric teachings and his "true" beliefs. This lecture will discuss the extent to which this constellation in recent research has influenced, encouraged or prevented scholars active in the history of Jewish philosophy to adopt (or not to adopt) more radical, anti-traditional interpretative models in their study of philosophical sources - models that were current in the intellectual discourse in the humanities of the later 20th century.

Chiara Carmen Scordari: *Radicalizing Prophetical Anthropology and Messianism: Maimonides under the Lens of Joseph Soloveitchik*

Several traits of Maimonides' prophetical anthropology are subtly reshaped by Joseph Soloveitchik (1903-1993) into new human types, more fit to contemporary contingencies (both religious and political). Building on Maimonides' Abraham, Soloveitchik adds to his character melancholic and messianic features. Faced with the paradoxical experience of faith and the dialectical nature of human beings, the new Abraham-type foreshadows the liberal educator and skeptical believer, endowed with a redemptive mission. His wandering and anarchic-charismatic soul, segregated from the rest of the world, immortalizes itself in history, by stretching its existence into an everlasting covenantal community. Under the influence of Hermann Cohen, Soloveitchik radicalizes Maimonides' notion of the messianic era as a "training time", always present in the here and now. He even goes further by internalizing the messiah as the human potential that continuously unfolds in history and covenantal community. Traces of such a hidden redemptive strength can be found not just in Abraham but in Lot's daughters, in Tamar, and in Ruth. As types of human personalities, they instill the messianic soul with a threefold prophetical heroism, i.e., in loneliness, in faith and waiting, and in universal ethical commitment.

Salle /Room 3.07

Aula 7: Radically Rethinking Medieval Philosophy from a Social Perspective

Special Session proposed by Jenny Pelletier
Chair: Julie Brumberg-Chaumont

Philip Choi: *Morally Certain but Invincibly Ignorant*

As recent studies have shown (e.g., works by Christophe Grellard, Robert Pasnau, Rudolf Schüssler), we can find a prototype of social epistemology in the Middle Ages. Their studies on various epistemic issues (e.g., loosening the criteria of knowledge, considerations of the ordinary usage of the term 'know (*scire*)', the role of testimony in producing knowledge, the justification provided by religious communities, the appeal to experts or 'wise men' in explaining probable ignorance, religious disagreement) clearly show that they were interested in the social dimension of our epistemic achievements and failures. In this presentation, I aim to examine a negative part of medieval social epistemology, namely, how later medieval philosophers in the Latin tradition explain our epistemic *failures* such as ignorance and error, and how they connect these failures to explaining our moral and social responsibility. More specifically, I focus on a particular type of ignorance that they call 'invincible ignorance (*ignorantia invincibilis*)', and its connection to the epistemic condition of moral responsibility. According to the so-called 'Aristotelian' account of moral responsibility, which originated in the Book III of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and widely discussed in later medieval epistemology and moral philosophy, there are two necessary conditions of moral responsibility. The first condition is the freedom condition, according to which an agent S is morally responsible for her act *a* if a is done by S freely. The second condition is the epistemic condition, according to which S is morally responsible for *a* if S is aware of important aspects of *a* such as its consequence, conformity to the laws, etc. This means that, given that we can understand moral responsibility in terms of moral blame or culpability, S's ignorance of *a* can at least sometimes provide S with a moral excuse for what S has done as a failure to meet the epistemic condition. But, clearly, not all types of ignorance would provide S with a moral excuse. To explain this, later medieval philosophers use the distinction between invincible and vincible ignorance, and claim that only the former type of ignorance is inculpable and thus provides a moral excuse for an action that is based on it. An important desideratum for this explanation, then, is to further explain what conditions need to be satisfied for S's ignorance to be invincible (and thus inculpable). In this context, later medieval philosophers often appeal to a weaker kind of epistemic certainty that they

call 'moral certainty'. On this view, S's ignorance is invincible if S makes a morally certain but false judgment. I show that moral certainty has not only individualistic, epistemic requirements (e.g., S's morally certain judgment that *p* requires *p*'s being evident *to S*), but also non-individualistic, epistemic requirements (e.g., the social role of S determines to what extent S must eliminate possibilities of error to gain moral certainty) and even non-individualistic, non-epistemic requirements (e.g., S ought to assent to *p* with certainty for S's own practical/moral good as well as the good of the society where S belongs).

Ana Maria Mora-Marquez: *Medieval Social Empiricism : From Kilwardby to Buridan*

Medieval philosophers were fully aware of the limits of human knowledge and of the implications such limits have on the possibility of being able to conduct perfect scientific demonstrations. But do they resort to socio-epistemic notions in order to explain the possibility and mechanisms of less-than-perfect scientific knowledge? The aim of this talk is to present a comparative study between Radulphus Brito, John of Jandun and John Buridan's discussion of demonstration in their commentaries on the methodological part of Aristotle's *Physics* I. I will focus on the question "*Utrum in omni scientia ex cognitione principiorum, causarum et elementorum contingat alia scire et intelligere, scilicet principiata, causata et elementata*" and "*Utrum ad perfecte sciendum aliquem effectum oporteat scire omnes causas eius*" with the aim of assessing the extent to which, if at all, socio- epistemic notions like evidence, '*nobis notioribus*' and so on play a crucial role in their understanding of the use of demonstration in the natural sciences, notably in physics and mathematics. I shall focus on the semantic and epistemic status of the premisses of *propter quid* and *quia* demonstrations in physics and geometry according to the three Parisian masters with the goal of establishing the continuities and ruptures between their views regarding their socio- epistemic approach (or lack thereof) to scientific demonstration.

Jenny Pelletier: *William Ockham and Francis of Marchia on Social Groups and Group Action*

In the *Work of Ninety Days,* composed between 1332-1334, William of Ockham anonymously and systematically criticized Pope John XXII's bull *Quia vir reprobus* (1329). This text is the first that Ockham wrote in the aftermath of his involvement in the Franciscan poverty debate in Avignon in the late 1320s and marks his abrupt change from theologian, logician, and natural philosopher to political philosopher. It is considered by some scholars to bear the most resemblance to his earlier theological-philosophical *corpus* but its focus falls on the keys terms the poverty debate: property, use, ownership, natural and positive rights, the renunciation of rights associated with property, the position of Christ and the early church on property, and so on. Ockham's text has been the subject of considerable study. It has also by now been established that the ideas, positions, and arguments he brings to bear in that text did not come out of thin air. On the contrary, he was part of a group of Franciscans and wrote from within that context. One fellow Franciscan theologian-philosopher on whom he heavily relied was Francis of Marchia (c. 1285-90, died after 1344) who was exiled along with Ockham after escaping Avignon in 1328. Francis of Marchia composed his *Improbatio contra labellum domini Iohannis qui incipit "Quia vir reprobus"* probably in 1330, and the work of Roberto Lambertini and Jonathan Robinson has explored the mutual connections between the two Franciscans. The topic of this presentation will focus on one such connection in relation to the discussion on ontological status of social groups and the role that group agency might play in forging the unity and identity of a social group. Against John XXII, Ockham clearly argues that social groups including the Franciscan order itself, are real, being identical to their individual members in some sense, and one of the reasons for holding this view is precisely that a social group can act. In the *Improbatio*, we find that while Francis also argues that a social group can act, he nevertheless appears to hold to a more nuanced position on group unity and identity. Unlike

Ockham, he distinguishes between two types of community: logical and collective. Only the members of the latter can exercise group agency, while the former remains somewhat mysterious and underdeveloped. While this connection has been noted in passing in some of the literature, notably by Miethke in the 1960s, my presentation will compare Ockham and Francis on the question of the nature of social groups and their ability to act in considerably more depth and in light of new historical and systematic developments in the literature.

Salle / Room 3.08

Aula 8: Secular/Mendicant Conflict at the University of Paris

Special Session proposed by Andrew G. Traver
Chair: Claire Angotti

Sita Steckel: *Fake Truth. The Fragmentation and Polarization of Epistemological Consensus in the Polemics of William of Saint-Amour against the Friars*

The theologian and polemicist William of Saint-Amour, whose anniversary of death recurs for the 750th time in 2022, is a well-known figure in the history of philosophy, largely because of his involvement in the large-scale controversy between mendicant friars and secular masters at the University of Paris during the 1250s. But William's fame does not rest on theological work, and he mostly figures as an adversary of more prominent scholars, such as Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure. Ultimately, William was a polemicist, and his dramatic warnings against the hypocrisy of the friars clearly transgressed the limits of scholarly argumentation, for example by making use of religious demonizations which might well be understood as conspiracy theories. In older research William's writing has therefore been devalued as non-scholarly, and at times even ridiculed. More recent studies have not only drawn attention to various argumentations contained in his work, but have also sought to re-evaluate his writings as highly functional, sophisticated polemics, which certainly fulfilled their intended political functions excellently. In the paper, I would like to take this perspective one step further and draw attention to the pressures the large-scale controversy surrounding the friars put on established conflict regimes and constructions of truth and authenticity. Given the current pre-occupation with misinformation, 'fake news' and conspiracy theories in the political sphere, the mendicant-secular controversy indeed appears as a model case of the breakup of epistemological consensus. A closer look at William of Saint-Amour's polemical work reveals that his argumentation is often shaped by exaggerations and polarizations which sought to subvert or shift the regulations and consensus governing theological argumentation, for example through exaggerated uses of otherwise legitimate authorities. On the other hand, William consciously attempted to devalue his opponent's methods and argumentative ways of establishing religious authenticity, not least by problematizing the correspondence of signs and their signification. The paper attempts to sketch how the breakdown of conflict communication also created or widened cracks in the epistemological consensus of the scholarly communities at Paris, ultimately leading to several radicalized ways of establishing the truth of religious authority claims.

Stephen M. Metzger: Probare irrefragabiliter: *Gerard of Abbeville's Argument and Rhetoric against the Mendicants*

Decima L. Douie once pointed out in a short treatment of the controversy between seculars and mendicants in the thirteenth century that Gerard of Abbeville's academic training, especially in logic and argument, made him a particularly difficult adversary for his mendicant opponents trying to defend their notions of apostolic poverty and spiritual perfection. Indeed, Gerard's arguments provoked significant responses from the two brightest lights in the mendicant fold: Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas. Nevertheless, with the exception of the studies by Philippe Grand in the

1970s, recent scholars, mainly mendicants themselves, have largely dismissed the claims of Gerard of Abbeville and his supporters among the secular clergy as insignificant, if not in fact heretical, for daring to challenge the obvious correctness of the mendicant position. It has been easy to characterize the conflict between the secular clergy and the mendicant orders as one charged with emotion. The events of the 1250s give particular credence to this assessment as the situation involved bombastic rhetoric, brawls, condemnation, and exile. By contrast, however, the debate rekindled in the 1269 by Gerard of Abbeville with a sermon given in the church of the Franciscans was remarkably bereft of such histrionic displays. Even what one would consider a rather inflammatory act, Gerard preaching a sermon to the friars in their own house that the very life they lived was against the tradition and practices of the Church, seems to have provoked only a literary debate rather than the violence and passion that one would have expected from the tenor of things fifteen years earlier. A key factor to was the fact that during the period the Holy See was vacant and that the Bishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier, was a former colleague in the Faculty of Theology, making a formal condemnation of Gerard and his supporters unlikely. This is not to say that the debate was a tranquil and elevated exchange of ideas. Insults were indeed hurled and inflammatory claims made, but the strength of Gerard's argument should not be overlooked as an important factor in setting the tone of the debate. Thomas, Bonaventure, and the friars had to take these arguments seriously not just because they were not couched in the Apocalyptic terms employed by William of Saint-Amour but on their own merit. This paper will explore the nature of Gerard's arguments and rhetoric against the friars to show their sophistication but also to examine the nature of the term "radical". Gerard clearly thought that his position was rooted in the solid tradition of scriptural interpretation and the practices of the church, viewing the friars as radical (and unnecessary) innovators.

Andrew G. Traver: *The Role of Nicholas of Lisieux in the Secular/Mendicant Conflict at the University of Paris*

One of the most prolific students of William of Saint-Amour was the secular theologian Nicholas of Lisieux. During the papal interregnum of 1268-1271, Nicholas assumed the mantel of his master and championed the cause of those who questioned the legitimacy of the mendicant orders. Indeed, he and his colleague Gerard of Abbeville turned this period into a veritable struggle for survival for the friars in France. Despite both papal and university prohibition, Nicholas remained in contact with William and dedicated two of his works to his former master. Nicholas wrote five works against the friars during this second period of anti-mendicant polemic at the University of Paris. In the first half of the past century, scholars have edited and published three of his minor works. Bierbaum edited his *Liber de ordine praeceptorum ad consilia*, which addresses the correct observance of the commandments to the evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience.[1] Glorieux published a list of twenty-three errors that Nicholas had collected and circulated from Aquinas' *De perfectione spiritualis vitae* and Lenten 1270 Quodlibet.[2] Clasen likewise edited Nicholas' *Hanc quaestionem.*[3] Nicholas had divided this question into three parts: the first addresses counsels and precepts, the second is a response to Pecham's disputed question *De perfectione evangelica,* while the third portion is a brief reply to Aquinas' *Contra doctrinam retrahentium a religione* (*Contra retrahentes*). Two of the major works of Nicholas, however, remain unpublished. Nicholas' first work, and his *magnum opus* is his massive *De perfectione status clericorum*, his rejoinder to Aquinas' *De perfectione.* In early 1271, Nicholas revised the latter two sections of *Hanc quaestionem* to produce his final work *Contra Pecham et Thomam*, which also remains unpublished. The bulk of this work consists of a point by point refutation of the Franciscan John Pecham's conclusions about absolute renunciation in his *De perfectione evangelica*; about one-sixth of the text comprises a repudiation of Aquinas' arguments in *Contra retrahentes* about accepting children into the religious life. This current paper revisits the theme of radical polemic and proposes a more comprehensive approach to the life and

career of Nicholas of Lisieux by addressing these latter two traditionally neglected works and incorporating them into the secular/mendicant dialogue at Paris.

Salle / Room 3.08

Aula 9: Necessity and Contingency

Ordinary Session
Chair: Lisa Devriese

Luka Kuchukhidze: *Future Contingents, The Nature of Truth and Divine Foreknowledge in Boethius's Commentaries on* De Interpretatione

The discussion of future contingents in the history of Western Philosophy derives from Chapter 9 of Aristotle's De Interpretatione, where it is asked whether predictions such as "There will be a sea battle tomorrow" future events are inevitable. This passage stimulated many philosophical difficulties which have resulted in varying interpretations in the history of philosophy. In Late Antiquity there were four competing interpretations regarding the problem of future contingents. It is generally accepted that Boethius's solution, along with Ammonius's one, belong to the fourth interpretation of the problem, which was labelled by Norman Kretzmann as the 'Second-oldest Interpretation`. This view states that truth of future contingent statements is neither definitely true, nor definitely false, but only indefinitely true or indefinitely false. In my paper, I analyze whether this answer suggests that these events in themselves are indefinite and by realization, they gain definite form of truth or falsity, or that the truth of future contingents is not accessible to humans, because they assert the truth of something that cannot be known (De Interpretatione II, 211.26–213.18). My claim is that, without further qualification, this reading can sound very similar to the third interpretation from late Antiquity (The Epicureans), which accepts that statement about undecided future events, are neither true, nor false. This can mean that truth of future event is not adequately captured by two-valued logic, which would be Jan Lukasiewicz's solution, or even more radically, that truth implies a certain antinomy, without which freedom is abolished, as Russian philosopher and theologian Pavel Florensky argued in his views on antinomies, roughly at the same time as Lukasiewicz. I maintain that that the subtlety of Boethian interpretation can be captured only in relation to *De Consolatio Philosophiae*, where the problem of determinism emerges again, when Boethius transfers Aristotle's logical questions of truth and falsity into a theological framework, and asks how can there be any act of deliberation, if God already knows the future events? In order to resolve the difficulties, Boethius developes the so-called *Iamblichus principle*, which asserts that things do not have to be known as they are in themselves, because knowledge is not of the same nature as things. This principle considers knowledge in terms of capacities of the cognoscente subject and thus relativizes it. But I argue that, if we can speak of epistemic relativism here, it can only be hierarchical and not simple or straightforward, because of its relation to the divine mind or intellect. Finally, my claim is that, even though Iamblichus principle helps Boethius to avoid fatalism and save divine foreknowledge, this kind of relativization of knowledge becomes problematic, in terms of his general theory of meaning, in which *passiones animae* (thoughts\affections of the soul) of Aristotelian semantic triangle are *same for all.*

Parwana Emamzadah: *Raoul le Breton et la scientificité de la grammaire : une approche radicale*

Considérée comme un art propédeutique depuis l'Antiquité, la grammaire accède progressivement au statut de science au cours des XIIe et XIIIe siècle. La réception des Seconds analytiques d'Aristote joue un rôle crucial dans cette reconnaissance : certains philosophes grammairiens se sont appuyés sur les critères de scientificité qui y sont exposés afin de prouver que la grammaire est une science et que la démarche d'un grammairien est scientifique. C'est le cas des grammairiens spéculatifs « modistes » qui proposent l'un des exemples les plus aboutis de cette démarche. Parmi

eux, Raoul le Breton se distingue par la radicalité d'une approche qui tire pleinement les conséquences de cette idée d'une grammaire « scientifique ». Une radicalité dont nous montrerons qu'elle s'exprime notamment dans sa manière d'appliquer la méthode démonstrative pour décider de la congruité d'un énoncé.

Renato de Filippis: *Boezio e gli* Opuscula sacra*: un pensiero teologico radicale?*

Nel loro complesso, gli Opuscula sacra di Severino Boezio (480-525 ca.) possono essere letti e interpretati come una proposta estrema e radicale di applicare la logica aristotelica ai fondamenti della teologia cristiana, con particolare riferimento alla Trinità e all'Incarnazione. Ma quanto questo sforzo può considerarsi coronato da successo? Questo 'esperimento' ha forse snaturato i caratteri fondamentali di uno dei due universi che si sono in esso confrontati, distorcendo eccessivamente le categorie filosofiche, oppure violando il segreto del dogma? E dai maggiori commenti agli Opuscula, in particolare quelli di Gilberto di Poitiers e Tommaso d'Aquino, è possibile derivare come tale tentativo sia stato recepito nel corso del Medioevo occidentale? La relazione proverà ad evidenziare come la teologia di Boezio sia davvero radicale nella sua concezione e nei suoi esiti, ma contemporaneamente capace di non 'tradire' né la religione né la filosofia.

Salle / Room 3.10

Aula 10: John Duns Scotus from the Will to the Being

Special Session proposed by Francesco Fiorentino
Chair: Fabrizio Amerini

Marcella Serafini: *La dialectique de la volonté et la possibilité du mal. Duns Scot entre Augustine et Abélard*

Cette recherche propose un approfondissement de la pensée de Duns Scot sur le problème du mal en considérant la racine ontologique et les conséquences éthiques. Le conteste de la réflexion est la relation entre volonté, connaissance et liberté. Cette question est associée à beaucoup de problèmes qui se posent à partir de l'expérience de la complexité et des ambivalences de la volonté : pourquoi la volonté choisit le mal ? Pourquoi Dieu permet le mal ? En tant que *potentia ad opposita* (*In Met.* IX, q. 15), la volonté est indéterminée, libre envers l'objet et envers l'action : elle est puissance du bien, mais elle est aussi exposée au risque du mal. Je voudrais remonter à la racine des ambivalences en interrogeant la structure ontologique de la volonté, ses affections, ses motivations et ses dynamiques. Mon étude va partir des distinctions 34-37 du Commentaire au II livre des *Sentences* (*Ordinatio* et *Lectura*), mais il s'étendra à d'autres textes. Pour ce qui concerne la littérature critique, le sujet spécifique a été abordé par Tobias Hoffmann, Guido Alliney et Giovanni Pizzo; toutefois je fais référence même aux études générales sur la volonté (cf. T. Hoffmann, Free Will and the Rebel Angels in Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2021; G. Pizzo, «Malitia» e «odium Dei» nella dottrina della volontà di Giovanni Duns Scoto, in "Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica", 81.1 (1989), pp. 393-415; W. Hoeres, Der Wille als reine Vollkommenheit nach Duns Scotus, München 1962; G. Alliney, Velle malum ex pura libertate: Duns Scoto e la banalità del male, in "Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics" IV (2002) 2: https://www.openstarts.units.it/bitstream/10077/5491/1/Alliney_E%26P_IV_2002_2.pdf).
Mon intérêt se porte également sur l'étude des sources, en soulignant la dialectique entre originalité et continuité. L'influence d'Augustin et d'Anselme a été déjà explorée par les chercheurs ; je voudrais vérifier l'affinité des intuitions de Duns Scot avec la réflexion éthique de Pierre Abélard, en comparant la relation entre *vitium* et *consensus* (étudié par Abélard dans le *célèbre Ethica sive Scito teipsum* et implicite dans le *Dialogus*), avec le dynamisme de la volonté, exprimé par Scot comme possibilité de velle, nolle et non-velle. Que représente le mal pour la volonté ? Simple *defectio*, déni, échec ou est-t-il expression active d'assentiment ? La volonté peut-elle choisir le mal comme mal ?

Dans ce cas, peut-on dire que la volonté qui a choisi le mal est libre ? Voila certaines des questions que je voudrais poser aux textes de Duns Scot. La possibilité du mal atteste le risque de la liberté, mais elle témoigne également la dignité de la volonté humaine et sa tension à l'infini. La liberté reste un mystère impénétrable et abyssal – que la volonté cherche le bien ou que s'humilie contre le mal - une expression de la «incommunicabilité» de la personne ou, exprimé par le langage de Duns Scot, de sa «*ultima solitudo*».

Hernán Guerrero-Troncoso: *John Duns Scotus and Francis of Meyronnes on the First Concept of God. Some Ontological Considerations*

Compared to other ontological positions held by John Duns Scotus, such as univocity of being, the formal distinction or his account of the transcendentals, his concept of infinity seems to occupy a secondary place in the Scotistic literature of the last century. Scholars have focused mostly on infinity as an intrinsic mode, and have largely neglected the fact that the discussion regarding the existence of God, the divine essence and its attributes revolves around this notion, since it is "the most perfect concept which we can have of what is in itself the first subject" (Ord. prol. n. 168, I 111). Since Scotus conceives God as an infinite being, infinity is the key notion that sets the foundation for all his other doctrines concerning ontology and theory of knowledge. Moreover, it emerges as a reply to Henry of Ghent's own account of infinity as the supreme degree of perfection (*Summa* art. 44, q. 2 sol., ed. Hödl, AMPh series 2, 29, 93-94) and even to Richard of Mediavilla's primacy of simplicity over infinity (*Quaest. disp.* q. 1 sol., ed. Boureau, 6-8; *ibid.* q. 2 sol., ed. Boureau, 28-32). On the other hand, Francis of Meyronnes, while granting the importance of infinity and its role to conceive God, raises some objections against the primacy of this notion in his first *Commentary* on the *Sentences*, known as the "ab Oriente" redaction. Francis argues against the primacy of infinity, and ultimately claims that the concept of first cause suits the human intellect better in this life, since "anyone, who can be in doubt about infinity, is certain about it" (*Ab Oriente*, d. 3 p. 2 art. 11). This contribution presents the underlying ontological differences that led Scotus and Francis to affirm or deny a primacy to infinity as the highest conceivable notion of God in this life. First, it outlines Scotus' account of infinity in contrast to Henry of Ghent's and Richard of Mediavilla's own conceptions, to show how they derive from opposite ontological frameworks. Then, it follows Francis of Meyronnes discussion of infinity and first cause, to examine whether his preference for the latter indicates his support of an ontological framework different from Scotus' or not. In the conclusive part, it reflects on What Scotism means, given that it might comprise many opposite views on the underlying ontological framework of its central positions.

Chiara Maurelli: *Logic and Metaphysics in Duns Scotus. The Case of Formal Distinction or Formal Non-Identity*

One of the distinctive traits of the Scotus' approach is the complex relationship between logical and metaphysical question: the logician is concerned with how we signify and conceive of entities; instead, the metaphysician studies how such entities are, regardless of intellectual consideration. The Scottish philosopher is thus in contrast with the tradition of the Parisian modists and with Thomas: with the former, because Scotus denies that our *modus significandi* and *intelligendi* necessarily follows the *modus essendi*; with the latter, because, according to the Subtle Doctor, logic cannot be a legitimate tool in the metaphysical investigation. Despite the radicalism in the distinction between logical and metaphysical realms, it is difficult to shed light on how to place Scotus formal distinction within this epistemological context. The flourishing debate among the exponents of the Scotism tradition for or against the realist reading in a strong direction of this particular distinction, testifies to this interpretive problem. Leibniz himself grasps the Scotian *distinctio formalis* as intermediate between the real distinction and the simply rational one. In fact, according to Scotus, the formal distinction is prior to any intellectual act: it seems to be a metaphysician's

matter, although it does not lead to two really distinct entities, because they are not separable and independent of each other's existence. These emerged *realitates* are distinct only by their different and non-inclusive definitions; they do not affect the unity in which they are found, since they are not formally identical yet inseparable. As typical of the conceptual subtleties of the Scotus' *corpus*, the Subtle Doctor apparently does not offer a unique insight into the matter, precisely because the Scotian conception of what is real is not always the same. The present paper aims at investigating these nuances within Scotus' mature work, contextualizing the issue in the comparison with Henry of Ghent's doctrine and deliberately starting from two textual places of different types. On the one hand, the Scotus commentary on the seventh book of Aristotelian *Metaphysics* (*quaestio Nineteen*), where the Subtle Doctor, in the role of metaphysician, focuses on the relationship between gender and specific difference. On the other hand, the second and eighth *distinctio* of the first book of the *Ordinatio*, where Doctor subtilis, as a theologian, argues for the simplicity of the divine essence by positing the attributes of intellect and will as formally non-identical. The *distinctio formalis*, as a safeguard of the coexistence and distinction of the aspects of being, is the main element of Scotus' complex metaphysical structure, but also offers to logic a new space for discussion, namely the non-identical.

Salle / Room 3.11

Aula 11: Radical Thought in Thomism and Humanism in the 15th Century

Special Session proposed Karsten Engel

Chair: Karsten Engel

Is to follow a school tradition a radical thought? If one takes the word "radical" and its etymological origin seriously (radix), it seems so. By declaring their thoughts to be inspired by Thomas Aquinas in most of the own treatises, 15th century Thomists always make themselves aware of the roots of their ideas. Their thinking is radical!

But what happens when Thomism meets humanistic thought? In the 15th century, for example, we find this case at the University of Leipzig. Even though the Leipzig university statutes did not pay any attention to humanism for a long time, but only prescribed teaching according to the *via thomae*, some Thomists obviously engaged in exchange with humanists and humanist thoughts (e.g. Lorenzo Valla's). The same applies to Italian Thomism, which similarly seeks exchange with those ideas – for example, in Girolamo Savonarola.

In this session we therefore want to have a closer look at the Leipzig Thomist Magnus Hundt and contrast him with his Italian contemporary. In some of Hundt's writings, the Thomist subtly tests his reasoning in confrontation with humanist thought – both in agreement and disagreement. Hundt was obviously concerned to educate and form his students according to the Thomistic model, but at the same time he was also interested in questions that touched the spirit of his age. What emerged in the end was a subtle new mixture of thoughts that inspired his views on logic, natural philosophy, theology and his conception of man. In a similar way, this also applies to Savonarola.

The commitment to radical (i.e. genuine) thoughts with a principled openness to one's own time can thus produce something quite unexpected.

Therefore, this session is about questions on the interference of radical, Thomistic thoughts with other humanistic ideas of the 15th century:

- Where, above all, do overlaps of Thomism with humanism occur?
- What were the reasons for the confrontation of those "radical" thinkers with others?
- What are the similarities and differences between the two mentioned thinkers?

Karsten Engel: *Magnus Hundt and His* Anthropologium

In the first talk, I will introduce the Magister Magnus Hundt in more detail and take a closer look at his Leipzig environment. It will be shown that Overfield's theses from his 1984 book *Humanism and scholasticism in Late Medieval Germany* also apply to Leipzig around 1500: the sometimes polemical criticism of some humanists towards the scholastics did not generate polemics on the other "side" in most cases. On the contrary, many "typical Scholastics" certainly took up humanist considerations and incorporated them into already existing knowledge structures. Magnus Hundt also did this in his *Anthropologium de hominis dignitate* (1501). The title itself indicates that Hundt was in contact with some of his humanist contemporaries and included the spirit of the times in his work. In my talk, I will therefore discuss Hundt's new narrativisation of the concept of man and present how he integrates humanist thoughts into his Thomistic worldview in the first chapter of his *Anthropologium*.

Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen: *Radical, but not too Radical. Magnus Hundt in Discussion with Lorenzo Valla*

In my paper, I will discuss those passages in the grammatical and logical writings of Magnus Hundt, written at the University of Leipzig, in which he engages with the view on human language defended by humanist authors such as Lorenzo Valla. First, I will show how Hundt invokes the authority of Thomas Aquinas to defend the separation between mental and spoken language, a distinction which he considers fundamental and which he regards as blurred in the writings of some his contemporaries, among which most likely also was Lorenzo Valla. Second, I will investigate those passage in which Hundt evaluates Valla's dealing with authorities on language such as Quintilian and Priscian. As will become clear, Hundt takes Valla's positions seriously, but is reluctant to accept their novelties. He rather prefers to root himself in commonly accepted traditions and not in radical innovations. Keeping to the received view is the best guarantee not to be considered mistaken, he pointedly argues in his commentary on Donatus (1487) when separating himself from Lorenzo Valla: "Qui cum multis errat, non videtur errare".

Silvia Negri: *Radical Humility? Girolamo Savonarola's* Trattato dell'umiltà *in Context*

In my paper, I will focus on the figure and writings of Girolamo Savonarola (Ferrara 1452 – Firenze 1498), especially on his conceptions of humility within his pastoral, didactic and political project. In reconstructing these conceptions, I will consider both his knowledge of texts of Thomas Aquinas and his dialogue with humanist contemporaries. Savonarola, Dominican friar, was in all probability a pupil of the Thomist Petrus de Bergamo, and his "Thomism" has been repeatedly asserted by scholars. However, recent scholarship has also shown his links with the Italian Humanists (see e.g. Lorenza Tromboni, 2019). Nikolaus Egel (2021) has argued that Savonarola's attitude towards some intellectual humanist claims is intimately connected with his appreciation of a certain intellectual humility and fideism – whereby this very attitude highly influenced for example the program of Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola. My point of departure will be his *Trattato dell'umiltà* – written in Italian and interestingly also translated into Latin – as well as his chapters on humility as a species of *modestia* (very much in the sense of Thomas Aquinas) in one of his philosophical compendia that have not yet been thoroughly and contextually studied.

10h30-11h00: Coffee Break

11h00-12h15: 4e Session Plénière/ 4th Plenary Session

Auditorium 250/Auditorium 150

Kantik Ghosh: *Radical Perplexity in Later Medieval England*
Chair: Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen

Late-medieval England witnessed the rapid and large-scale transmission of ideas derived from scholastic philosophy and theology into the English vernacular in a wide range of learned and quasi-learned genres, primarily because of the efforts of the Oxford followers of John Wyclif beginning in the 1370s (i.e. simultaneously with the start of the Papal Schism and the manifold official condemnations of Wyclif's ideas across Europe) and continuing well into the fifteenth century. Roots, grounds and foundations form an important strain of 'radical' Wycliffite imagery relating to conceptualisations of the true Church and University as well as of valid biblical hermeneutics. However, the fundamentalist thrust of this discourse, and the polemics, politics and intellectual methods it supports, are pervasively qualified, indeed compromised, by very different emphases and methods drawn from medieval probabilistic thought as also by a pronounced consciousness of moral-psychological fallibility and soteriological opacity. The end product, I will argue, is a kind of 'perplexed' idealism, which, in the course of its long drawn-out conflict with its interlocutors over more than seven decades, results in various radicalisms: not only those characterised by inflexibility and extremism, but also those which seek to accommodate fundamental uncertainty and error.

12h15-14h00: Lunch

14h00-15h00: IV. Special commission: *Electronic Tools*

Auditorium 250

Chair: Jean-Luc Solère

14h-14h05 **Jean-Luc Solère**: *Introduction*
14h05-14h20 **François Bougard** and **Monica Brinzei**: *The Online Resources of the Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes*
14h20-14h25 **Monica Brinzei**: *Online Training in Medieval Philosophical Manuscripts*
14h25-14h35 **Jose Higuera**: *The Exploring-Annotating tool IIIF Reader*
14h35-14h45 **Christian Kaiser, Oliver Schrader, and Tessa Gengnagel**: *Digital Critical Edition of Peter of Abano's Conciliator*
14h45-15h **Paul Tombeur**: *The Latest Developments in the Centre "Traditio Litterarum Occidentalium" Databases*

15h30-17h00: GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Auditorium 250/Auditorium 150

17h30-18h45: LECTURE of the LIFE-TIME ACHIEVEMENT AWARDEE

Auditorium 250/Auditorium 150

Chair: Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen

19h00: ***Cocktails, Condorcet GED***

Vendredi / Friday 26-08-2022

9h00-10h30: Sessions ordinaires et spéciales / Ordinary and Special Sessions

Salle / Room 50

Aula 1:À la racine de la connaissance, du vouloir et de l'agir / V : À la racine de la connaissance

Special Session proposed by Tobias Hoffmann
Sponsor: Centre Pierre Abélard, Sorbonne Université
Chair: Marta Borgo

Alessandro Valsecchi: *Le verbe divin comme principe de la connaissance et de l'être dans l'*Homélie *sur le* Prologue de Jean *de Jean Scot Érigène*

L'*Homélie sur le prologue de Jean* est une des œuvres les plus appréciées du philosophe carolingien Jean Scot Érigène. Ce livre ne contient pas seulement une explication des premiers versets de l'évangile de Jean, mais il offre également une interprétation philosophique du texte johannique. Une fois identifiées la connaissance et l'essence de l'univers, d'après la doctrine néoplatonicienne de Jean Scot, il devient possible de lire le Prologue de Jean comme la véritable reproduction de l'acte créateur de Dieu. Érigène décrit la remontée surnaturelle de l'évangéliste, sortant de soi-même et dépassant toutes les choses qui sont et qui ne sont pas, avant d'être déifié pour pouvoir contempler et annoncer les mystères trinitaires du principe unique. Par son entrée en Dieu, Jean devient le principe, à savoir il contemple (et, ce faisant, il s'identifie à) la cause suprême et participe au procès de création par l'expression qui ouvre son évangile : « dans le principe était le Verbe ». La connaissance du principe n'est accessible qu'à Jean déifié. Et c'est par cette connaissance que le texte biblique et l'univers peuvent commencer à être. Dans mon intervention, je voudrais démontrer que l'*Homélie* érigénienne peut être comprise de la même manière. Dès son début, elle considère l'évangéliste déifié comme la racine de la connaissance de Dieu ; et lorsque Jean Scot accède avec lui à l'intérieur du principe unitaire et ensuite en sort, il assure sa diffusion et son éparpillement dans la multiplicité du réel. Dans les mots d'Érigène, il descend de la montagne de la théologie à la vallée de l'histoire. Je soutiendrai également que, si l'essence de l'univers coïncide avec sa compréhension par la nature humaine, leurs racines doivent être identifiées. Je proposerai alors de lire les multiples développements offerts par ce texte (l'*Homélie* elle-même ; le Prologue de Jean ; la sortie johannique de son humanité ; la description des rapports trinitaires) non seulement comme des explications ayant pour objet les causes du monde, mais aussi comme le véritable processus par lequel ces causes adviennent. Comment cette vision se différencie-t-elle d'une position exégétique plus canonique qui considèrerait le texte du Prologue comme la simple énonciation des rapports intra-trinitaires ? Comment, chez Érigène, exégèse et gnoséologie s'entremêlent-elles jusqu'à se confondre dans une théorie ontologique originelle ? Je voudrais démontrer que les réponses à ces questions peuvent être retrouvées dans l'interprétation érigénienne de l'*incipit* johannique. « Dans le principe était le Verbe » revient à représenter le principe à la fois de la connaissance et de l'essence, et doit être compris comme la cause néoplatonicienne de l'émanation universelle. C'est à la racine de la connaissance que les choses commencent à être.

Charles Girard: *À la racine des modalités de saisie d'un objet : Raoul le Breton et Hervé de Nédellec*

Je peux penser à des objets de multiples manières : de manière singulière (comme à cet homme), de manière abstraite (comme à l'homme selon son propre), de manière commune (comme à

l'homme en tant que l'homme se retrouve en plusieurs individus). Qu'y a t-il à la racine de ces diverses modalités de saisie ? Deux penseurs médiévaux, Raoul le Breton et Hervé de Nédellec, utilisent chacun des propriétés d'arrière-plan pour rendre compte de telles modalités. Dans cette conférence, je définis les propriétés d'arrière-plan comme des propriétés ayant la double caractéristique d'être des instruments non-intermédiaires au sein des actes mentaux et d'être non-perçues dans l'acte lui-même. Je montre ensuite en quoi les propriétés d'arrière-plan mobilisées par Raoul le Breton (modes d'intellection) et Hervé de Nédellec (intentions secondes) diffèrent drastiquement. En conclusion, je reviens brièvement sur la critique des propriétés d'arrière-plan proposée par Gérard de Sienne.

Tobias Hoffmann: *À la racine de la clarté : la nature et la fonction du verbe intérieur chez Hervé de Nédellec*

Hervé de Nédellec, dans son traité *De verbo* (daté 1307–1309), développe une théorie riche et originale du verbe intérieur. Il l'identifie au concept (*conceptus*) et à la pensée formée (*cogitatio formata*). Alors que l'espèce intelligible est le principe de la connaissance confuse, le verbe, qui est le fruit d'une activité discursive causée par la volonté et l'intellect agent, permet une connaissance claire. De même qu'un animal qui entend quelque chose veut voir de quoi il s'agit et se meut à le voir, de même aussi l'homme qui connaît quelque chose de manière confuse désire voir la chose clairement et se meut à la formation du verbe. Le résultat du verbe peut être une définition (*verbum diffinitivum*, par exemple « l'ange est une substance immatérielle et intellectuelle »), un énoncé qui exprime qu'un certain prédicat convient à un sujet (*verbum enuntiativum*), ou l'assentiment à un énoncé (*verbum ratiocinativum*). L'aspect le plus intéressant de la théorie du verbe de Hervé consiste dans sa thèse selon laquelle les bienheureux peuvent former des verbes. Tout en ayant la vision de Dieu en entier, de manière indivisée et tout à la fois (*unite, indistincte et simul*), selon Hervé ils peuvent considérer successivement différents aspects de la divinité, tels que sa miséricorde, sa justice et sa sagesse, en formant des verbes distincts de ces attributs. Dans ma communication, je propose d'élucider la théorie d'Hervé et d'en discuter quelques aspects problématiques, surtout en ce qui concerne la formation des verbes dans la vision béatifique. Par exemple, comment peut-on former des verbes particuliers de Dieu, qui est simple et infini ? Et pourquoi formerait-on des verbes tout en possédant déjà une connaissance parfaitement claire ?

Salle / Room 3.01

Aula 2:Radicals and Roots in the Latin Tradition

Special Session proposed by Richard C. Taylor, Luis López -Farjeat
Sponsor: *Aquinas and 'the Arabs' International Working Group* (AAIWG)
Chair: Richard Taylor

Katja Krause: *The Epistemic Roots of Experience according to Roger Bacon, Albert the Great, and John Buridan*

What are the epistemic roots of experience (*experientia/experimentum*) appealed to by some key medieval natural philosophers? Historians of science and philosophy have largely agreed in their investigations. They have searched for evidence of direct observation and experiment in the natural philosophical treatises of, for instance, Roger Bacon, Albert the Great, and John Buridan. But these searches have often resulted in conclusions of disappointment: there is no (single) empirical approach to be found in the natural philosophical treatises of Roger, Albert, and John. In my talk, I propose a complementary reading of the experience appealed to by these three medieval Latin natural philosophers. I suggest that the epistemic roots of experience in their natural philosophies resist any reduction to an empirical approach, and I explain why this is the case. In my conclusion,

I propose a new framework of reference for thinking about the epistemic roots of experience in medieval Latin natural philosophy.

Andrea A. Robiglio: *The Laugh of Truth: Reason, Folly, and Laughter according to Thomas Aquinas*

With the publication, ten years ago, of the academic collection edited by Albrecht Classen (Laughter in the Middle Ages and Early Modern Times, Berlin 2010) fresh scholarly attention has been paid to the issue of the Medieval laughter and the theological questions it can entail. Against the widespread condemnation of risus, seen as a provocation on the edge of blasphemy, some theologians made efforts to uncover the other, positive side of the phenomenon. In the Bible even God "smiles", while Aristotle had taught that the human being is a rational animal, i.e., the animal who is "able to laugh". In my contribution, the complex relation of Aquinas with the phenomenon of laughter is explored, both in theory and in practice: Thomas's understanding of the interplay between rationality and humor and his analysis of the laughter are tested on Aquinas's own radical use of irony and humor in his dialectical argumentations.

Salle / Room 3.02

Aula 3: Second Scholasticism: Francisco de Vitória

Ordinary Session
Chair: Alfredo Storck

Lidia Lanza: *What Stance Should Be Taken Toward a Radical Procedure? Sixteenth-Century Jesuits on Torture*

In the Middle Ages, the issue of torture was discussed far more by canonists and civil law authors than by theologians, who only discussed it incidentally. This issue started being discussed at some length by theologians quite late, arguably on account of the establishment of the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal. The first theologians to do so were Jesuits teaching at the Portuguese University of Évora, who addressed it in their interpretations of *Summa theologiae*, IIa-IIae, q. 69, art. 2. The aim of this paper is therefore to examine three commentaries produced in Évora, namely those by Fernando Rebelo, Nicolau Godinho and António de Carvalho (all of them are extant only in manuscript form; however, they enjoyed some circulation). The main concern of these theologians was to determine under which conditions such an extreme procedure might occur. For this reason, they focused on its efficacy and on how much the evidence gathered through this procedure can be certain and claim a status of truth, and, conversely, on the offender's rights and on the presumption of innocence.

Jörg Alejandro Tellkamp: *Social Epistemology in Late Scholastic Moral Thought*

One of the underlying assumptions regarding medieval moral thought is that there are objective normative truths, rooted on divine command and rational principles, that are transparent and the validity of which cannot be denied. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, thought that natural law is of that kind. Yet, he also anticipated that such a theory based on the pure intelligibility of moral norms would have to be applied in particular normative contexts, thus producing positive law and customs relative to geography, culture and history. The indeterminacy of particular norms in concrete situations with regard to objective norms has drawn considerable interest in the 16th century, which in the end produced probabilistic theories of normative truths. In my paper I would like to draw attention to one of the most recognizable figures of 16th century thought, Francisco de Vitoria and analyze how he establishes the social criteria of talking about moral truths, which encompasses topics such as certainty, the role of the expert and the relevance of testimony. I would like to show

that valuable recent attempts to come to terms with the history of probabilism, lack a more consistent approach to Vitoria's role in that very history.

Rogério Tadeu Mesquita Marques*: Liberdades nas Américas a partir do* Ius Gentium *de Francisco de Vitória*

O presente trabalho se propõe a analisar, a partir da recepção medieval do conceito de *Imago Dei*, os diversos tipos de liberdades analisados nas releições em que Francisco de Vitória, tomista da chamada segunda escolástica, discorreu sobre o direito dos povos, ou Ius Gentium, sobretudo na *De Indiis recenter inventis* e na *De Iure Belli*. Num contexto de início da dominação espanhola nas Américas, no século 16, em meio a denúncias de abuso de poder dos colonizadores e da consequente defesa dos povos originários por parte de freis dominicanos, o mestre de Sagrada Teologia de Salamanca, através de várias releições, pôs, ainda à contra gosto do Rei da Espanha, as bases dos direitos dos povos originários que deveriam ser respeitados por todos. Neste contexto se desenvolve uma série de liberdades que devem ser asseguradas aos povos pela sua condição humana, tais como a liberdade de movimento, a liberdade religiosa e mesmo a liberdade de escolher seus próprios governantes. A partir desse contexto se analisará a importância desta discussão iniciada com o mestre de Salamanca sobre a liberdade no âmbito internacional, e como, apesar da dominação ibérica ter se consolidado sobre os povos originários, a liberdade nacional só foi reconsiderada a nível latino-americano após as revoluções Americana e Francesa, sem tanta participação dos povos originários. No bicentenário da Independência do Brasil é conveniente restaurar a origem do tema da liberdade nacional, passado à Modernidade pelo escolástico Francisco de Vitória.

Salle / Room 3.03

Aula 4: Later Medieval Action Theory: Free Will and Desire

Special Session proposed by Russell L. Friedman
Chair: Russell L. Friedman

Can Laurens Löwe: *Thomas Aquinas on Voluntary Passivity*

In the first chapter of the third book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle claims that a voluntary (*hekousion*) action must not come about through violence (*bia*), violence being a sufficient condition for an action's being involuntary (*akousion*). He defines a violent action as one "of which the moving principle is outside, being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who acts or is acted upon" (1110a1-3, trans. Ross/Urmson). Aristotle does not indicate what the precise nature of the "contribution" that is absent in cases of violence is. However, the examples that he adduces in the same chapter strongly suggest that he has in mind a kind of *physical* contribution, and this is also how he is read by a number of contemporary commentators. On Aristotle's account, then, a person who is carried away by a strong gust of wind, for instance, is moved violently because they make no physical contribution to their locomotion. This account of violence is problematic, as I hope to show in the first part of my paper, because it cannot deal with cases of what is today known as "voluntary passivity." Imagine a person's being willingly carried away by a strong gust of wind—say, because they think that the wind will transport them to their desired destination. Alternatively, to use a less fanciful example, imagine a person's being willingly examined by a physician without moving their limbs in any way. On Aristotle's account, these examples seem to count as cases of violence and so as instances of involuntary actions because a physical contribution of the agent is absent. But this is very implausible because, in neither case, does the agent oppose the change that the y undergo by some external principle. Thomas Aquinas was aware of this problem, and the second part of the paper argues that this led him to refine the Aristotelian understanding of violence and the voluntary. For Aquinas, it is not

sufficient for an action's being violent that the agent makes no physical contribution to it. On his view, the agent must not even make any volitional contribution. In his terms, there must not be any "interior act" (*actus interior*) of the will on the part of the agent. Aquinas describes the salient interior act as one of "consenting" (*consentire*) to being moved by something else. If such an act is present, he argues, then even if the agent passively undergoes a physical change by something external, what occurs to the agent will be voluntary. More precisely, what occurs to the agent will be "voluntary according to passion" (*voluntarium secundum passionem*). My paper aims to spell out what this voluntariness according to passion consists in, for Aquinas, and to do so I shed light on the nature of the act of consent. Aquinas understands it as an active doing of ours, even if it is paired with our passively undergoing some physical change by something else. More specifically, I argue, consent can be viewed as what in contemporary theory of action is referred to as a "mental action." As I hope to show, Aquinas's discussion of consent makes it clear that he refines Aristotle's account of voluntariness in the following way. Voluntariness does not require any physical intervention in the world on our part. What it requires is, rather, that we display some kind of activity in our mental life.

Sonja Schierbaum: "*What's Love Got to Do with It" – Motivation and Beyond: The Role of Love* (amor) *in Ockham's Theory of Action*

We all want or desire things: Olaf Scholz wants to become German Chancellor, while others just want to go on holidays, and we all want the pandemic to be over. Desires play an important role in our active, everyday lives, not least because, according to a widespread, contemporary view, desires motivate us to act. It is therefore surprising that there is comparatively little discussion on desire in the contemporary, philosophical debate, compared to other types of mental states such as perception, belief, emotion, and intention. Also, current debates take it for granted *that* we actually desire things, without further asking the more fundamental question *why* we desire or want anything at all. This, however, is a legitimate question of genuine, philosophical interest. In this talk, I consider this important question by means of the voluntarist position of William Ockham. The Franciscan explicitly holds that there is a basic kind of volition that grounds desire while being irreducible to it. This basic kind of volition is called "love" (*amor*). "Love", however, is not to be mistaken as a mere feeling. It has nothing to do with the modern idea of romantic love. Rather, it is a kind of affective embracing or approval of oneself or of another person for the sake of which then all kinds of particular desires can arise: accordingly, one can desire all sorts of things, because, ultimately, one loves oneself or another person or both. (See Ockham, *Quaest. Var.*, q.4, (OTh VIII, 102: 76ff)). Thus, the more specific assumption of the paper is that love (*amor*) is not (just) motivational, but constitutive of particular desires or volitions more generally. To argue for this, the conceptions of William Ockham in opposition to both Thomas Aquinas and Peter Auriol should be reconstructed. Against this backdrop, it is to be answered how exactly love (*amor*) is constitutive of our actual desires and what the further implications of this constitutive relation are. Given Ockham's supreme valorization of the human will, implied by his voluntarist, that is, appreciative stance on the human will, the goal here is to show that rationality is not a decisive feature of this most fundamental level of our willing; rather, rationality comes only on a less basic level, namely when we desire things on account on what we love, namely persons, both divine and human: the point is that love, beyond rationality, grants the unity and consistency of our desires which, in turn, can be rational or not. The role of the love for God is crucial for the moral quality of one's volition. In this talk, however, I concentrate on the non-moral aspects of love that are constitutive of Ockham's theory of action.

Salle / Room 3.05

Aula 5: Hétérodoxies ibériques et au-delà. Pour revisiter Menéndez Pelayo / II

Special Session proposed by José Meirinhos and Pedro Mantas-España
Sponsor: Instituto de Filosofia da Universidade do Porto
Chair: Nicola Polloni

Vera Rodrigues: *Nécessité et causalité dans le commentaire de Pedro da Fonseca à* Métaphysique*, VI.2*

Si eles n'ont pas été radicales dans le sens d'une rupture avec la (ou les) traditions philosophiques et théologiques precedentes, les discussions sur le libre-arbitre, la prescience et l'omnipotence divines au XVIe s. dans la Péninsule ibérique, au lendemain du Concile de Trente, ont certainement été fracturantes: la seule controverse *De auxiliis*, opposant jésuites et dominicains, le prouve. Au coeur des débats se retrouvait la doctrine de la *scientia media*, dont Pedro da Fonseca semble partager la paternité avec Luís de Molina. Em partant de la lecture que fait Pedro da Fonseca du *Perihermeneias*, 9 dans son commentaire à la *Metaphysique*, VI, 2, et surtout de sa conception de la necessité et de la causalité, je chercherai à mettre em evidence, dans les enjeux logiques et épistémologiques de sa position, combien sont parfois subtiles les frontières entre continuité et rupture.

João Rebalde: *Providence and Middle Knowledge in Pedro da Fonseca*

In the third volume of the commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, the Jesuit Pedro da Fonseca (1528-1599) deals with divine foreknowledge, providence and predestination and their compatibility with human free will. From this work results an innovative and heterodox doctrine, still little studied, which contributed to the positions that the Society of Jesus adopted on these issues in the XVI-XVII centuries. This paper is focused on the problem of human freedom in Fonseca's doctrine of providence and predestination, aiming at showing the relevance of Fonseca's doctrine on "middle knowledge".

Tommaso de Robertis: *A Heterodox Approach: Plato's* Timaeus *as a Work on Philosophical Method in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Italy*

The aim of my paper is to explore the late medieval and early Renaissance fortune of Plato's *Timaeus* within the debates over the best philosophical method. As Plato's body of works was being recovered during the fifteenth century, his *Timaeus* soon imposed itself as a foundational text for the understanding of Plato's method of studying and teaching philosophy, a method that was meant to rival Aristotle's one, until then domineered in universities. What was ultimately at stake in the debate over the best method for teaching philosophy was in fact the question of whether Platonism ought to be included in university curricula, such that Plato's supposed unreliability as theorist of philosophical method became a central *topos* for those attempting to delegitimize the academic teaching of Platonism. In my presentation, I will survey a number of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century commentaries on Plato's *Timaeus* as well as some *comparationes* between Plato and Aristotle, both in Latin and the Italian vernacular, that discuss the problem of philosophical method, in order to bring out some important features of this debate.

Ann Giletti: *How Radical is Radical? Heterodoxy and the Late Medieval Radical Aristotelians*

If being a medieval radical philosopher has two senses – being uncompromising about philosophical principles, and adhering to conclusions even when they conflict with faith – we as historians have a convenient label for Christian philosophers bordering on heterodoxy. But how radical were they? What line did they cross? Were they guilty of being in error or, worse, heresy? One of the clearest explanations of what constituted a heretical idea was written by Catalan inquisitor Guido Terreni, who showed how a philosophical theory could be proved to be heretical. Yet even if a theory was heretical, or had been condemned as an error, could an inquisitor find that Christian philosophers were guilty of heresy or error if they still held the Christian beliefs their theories challenged? The rare example of an actual Aristotelian philosopher-heretic helps us see how this is a problem. Thomas Scot, who under examination in Lisbon made blasphemous statements and denied several teachings of the Bible and Creed, held that the human race and world were eternal. He held this both as an Aristotelian theory and in explicit denial of Scripture. By contrast, the limited information we have about the radical philosophers in Paris – such as the preamble to the Condemnations of 1277, and perhaps the early thought of Siger of Brabant – suggests they were devout Christians, and thus that their rational conclusions and religious beliefs were not aligned. So how radical were they? Or perhaps we should ask instead: is a radical someone who adheres to an idea through rational conviction or through personal feeling/belief – or both?

Salle / Room 3.06

Aula 6: Radical Note-Taking

Special Session proposed by Alexandra Baneu
Sponsor: Projet ERC-Nota, n° 948152
Chair: Ota Pavlíček

Florina Hariga: *Radical Thoughts on Sin, Will and Intellect from the Manuscript Paris, BnF, Lat. 16408*

The notes present in the sixth sextern starting with the folio 61r from the manuscript Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Latin 16408 reveal how Étienne Gaudet, the original owner of the manuscript, according to Zénon Kaluza, approached the relationship between different levels and hierarchies of sin and their connection to the will and intellect. Gaudet gathers numerous sources and their arguments, collecting the opinions of authors such as Thomas Bradwardine, Thomas Buckingham, and Jean de Ripa, while jotting down the discussion surrounding the question whether one may sin in a venial manner and earn eternal life at the same time (*Utrum quis simul possit peccare venialiter et mereri vitam eternam*). The aim of this paper is to identify the interpretation given to these sources and the finality of their use in the argumentation unwrapped by the Parisian theologian. The methods employed in order to achieve this desideratum will be centred on textual inquiries and a comparative analysis between the manuscript Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Latin 16408 and the manuscript Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Latin 16409, identified as a partial copy of the Bibliothèque nationale de France, Latin 16408, pertaining to Thomas of Krakow, will also be put forward.

Mihai Maga: *Notes on the Question of Étienne Gaudet against Marsilius of Padua*

The unedited treatise against the schism by Étienne Gaudet, preserved as an autograph in the last folios of the manuscript Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Latin 16408, contains in its last part the question "Whether the professors of theology or the professors of canon law ought to reject the intruder and confront him and thus to remedy the present schism, out of the necessity of their salvation". The intruder in question, also called the greatest present adversary of the Church and of the faith, is identified by Gaudet as Marsilius of Padua, because of his treatise *Defensor pacis*. Thus, from a discussion about the competences of the faculties of theology and canon law in

responding to heretics he moves on to a critique of Marsilius of Padua's view on the Church and politics. This critique however is limited and partially borrowed. Gaudet limited himself to quoting only the first ten conclusions from the last *Dictio* of *Defensor pacis*, then he consequently approached only the first two conclusions in what seems to be an unfinished work. He borrowed ideas and several paragraphs of text from William Ockham's *Dialogus*, but rarely mentioned the English Franciscan friar. Since the condemnation of Marsilius in 1327 by Pope John XXII there were not so many systematic efforts to reject the theses from *Defensor pacis* because it was seen in its entirety as a heretic work. Gaudet makes an effort to put together a complex and sometimes repetitive argumentation against the two conclusions, that only the divine Scripture is necessary for the eternal beatitude, and that only the general council of the believers can elucidate the divine law. Yet, after a close inspection, his counterarguments are not directly opposed to Marsilius' line of reasoning, and this raises the question of whether Gaudet had actually read *Defensor pacis* or if he devised a different strategy against what he interpreted as a schism.

Alexandra Baneu: *English Philosophical Sources in the Library of Étienne Gaudet*

In his article "Étienne Gaudet devant le problème de la preuve en théologie", Zénon Kaluza states that this author is "a mirror of his times", due to the typical problems that he discusses, the solutions he proposes and his eclectic methodological approach. He read the Senteces in Paris, in the academic year 1361-1362 and became a doctor in 1365 or 1367, so he belonged to the generation that preceded that of Pierre d'Ailly and Jean Gerson. A group of manuscripts, the bulk of which are collections of notes, represent the only surviving material from Gaudet's library. The manuscripts in question are: Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Latin 15561, 15888, 16408, 16425, 16533, 16534, 16535, 16279 and 16621. Of these, number 16425 and 16279 are full copies of other works, the first of the Summa de casibus of Raymond of Penyafort and the second of a list of biblical concordances. All the rest are collections of notes assembled by Étienne Gaudet in order to be used for the production of his own texts and academic exercises, as well as sketches of his personal works. Among these sketches one can count the list of questions to be included in his own commentary on the Book of Senteces, which can be found in the manuscript Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Latin 15888, at folio 157v, as well as the draft of a treatise on the schism, bound at the end of the manuscript Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Latin 16408. Going through the manuscripts in this list, one notices the numerous references to English sources which are contemporary or almost contemporary to the period in which Gaudet gathers his notes. Although the influence of English authors in Paris has been discussed in the literature, we would like to propose a more applied study, in which we look at how Étienne Gaudet transforms and uses these sources throughout his notes. We will ascertain, for instance, what authors he prefers, all the while analysing whether the ideas copied from these English authors tend to be more on the radical side. Since some of the texts amassed in this collection of manuscripts are summaries of questions discussed at Paris (for instance the questions transmitted by the first part of the Paris Bibliothèque nationale de France, Latin 16408 manuscript), such a survey will not only allow conclusions relating to the interests of Étienne Gaudet, but also to the Parisian intellectual milieu in the second half of the 14th century, proving that this scholar, known mostly due to the survival of his library, is actually a "mirror of his period", as Zénon Kaluza so eloquently states.

Salle / Room 3.07

Aula 7: Metaphysics

Ordinary Session
Chair: Roberto Hofmeister Pich

Cecilia Cintra Cavaleioro de Macebo: *A questão da luz na metafísica de Ibn Gabirol*

Nossa intenção neste trabalho é investigar a noção de luz na metafísica de Ibn Gabirol. Embora usualmente traduzida pela mesma palavra, a ideia é poucas vezes citada como lux e muitas como lumen. É também bastante significativo que seu uso vá se tornando mais e mais frequente à medida que seu modelo metafísico se desenvolve em direção aos níveis mais elevados e incorpóreos. Se a alusão à luz não aparece sequer no primeiro tratado sobre as substâncias que sustentam as categorias, e é referida somente duas vezes no segundo tratado, sobre a substância que sustenta a corporeidade do mundo, ao ascender no seu caminho em direção aos inteligíveis e passar a ter como objeto as substâncias simples e sua ação, a situação se mostra consideravelmente diferente. Isso se explica porque "quanto mais descendam as substâncias em direção ao mais baixo e mais se aproximem do corpo, mais incapazes serão de receber as formas e menos luz terão, e muito mais semelhantes serão ao corpo ao receber poucas formas, e vice-versa" (V, 16). No terceiro tratado, denominado "da asseveração das substâncias simples" o termo surge cinquenta e duas vezes; no quarto, "da investigação sobre a ciência da matéria e da forma nas substâncias simples", surge cinquenta e seis vezes e no quinto e último, "sobre a matéria universal em si e a forma universal em si", apesar de sua não tão grande extensão, trinta e uma vezes. Nesse último, é utilizada frequentemente para referência à forma: "imagina que a essência da forma é uma luz...", "imagina a forma nela como a luz", entre outras, e ainda "a descrição da forma universal seria a seguinte: ela é a substância que constitui a essência de todas as formas. Pode também ser descrita como sabedoria perfeita e luz puríssima". Em outras passagens, utiliza-a para se referir à própria essência da Vontade divina, como em "a parte de luz que a matéria recebe da Vontade é muito pequena em comparação com a luz que há no interior da Vontade" ou "a matéria adquire a luz e o esplendor do que há na essência da vontade". Outras vezes, ainda, vincula a luz à unidade, como em: "a matéria primeira, porque está próxima à unidade, deve fluir nela sua luz e sua virtude" e "porque a matéria está próxima da unidade, é compelida a adquirir dela a luz e o desejo". Com base nessas diferentes utilizações, indagamos: seria essa unidade que distribui a luz idêntica à Vontade, ou a unidade aqui seria uma referência ao próprio Autor Primeiro? Qual a relação entre a luz da forma e a luz da Vontade? O termo luz é usado meramente como metáfora (da luz sensível) ou é um termo técnico crucial para compreendermos a metafísica de Ibn Gabirol? E ainda: haveria, como em Plotino, uma distinção substancial entre os inteligíveis e os sensíveis que justificaria o termo luz ser removido ao tratarmos da Natureza e das substâncias sensíveis? Estas são algumas das questões que pretendemos discutir.

María Jesús Soto-Bruna: *La radicalidad de la unidad en el pensamiento de Domingo Gundisalvo*

Dominicus Gundissalinus (ca. 1110-1190) es ya considerado en la actualidad como el primer pensador medieval que trató la temática central de la metafísica desde una perspectiva estrictamente racional. Desde esta apreciación se encuentra en su obra especulativa un tratamiento especial acerca del planteamiento del estatuto de la relación entre la unidad y la multiplicidad, el cual redefine el panorama neoplatónico presente en el ambiente filosófico de la época, así como la herencia aviceniana y gabiroliana que recibe a través de las traducciones realizadas entonces en Toledo. Sabemos, en efecto que Domingo Gundisalvo tradujo al latín la *Metafísica* de Avicena y que colaboró en la traducción del *Fons vitae* de Avicebrón. Es inicialmente en su tratado *De unitate et uno*, donde expone, no ya la relación entre la unidad y el ser, sino la caracterización del uno como un trascendental que conviene al ente en cuanto tal; para pasar después a analizar los diferentes tipos de unidad que se encuentran en el orbe de lo finito. Estas cuestiones son planteadas desde una especulación filosófica que admite la creación y, por lo tanto, el abordaje del análisis de la propia entidad del ser finito que, en su condición de compuesto, remite a una unidad fundante. Mi reflexión final sobre el lugar del tratado *De unitate* en la historia de la filosofía muestra dos conclusiones principales, que iré desarrollando a lo largo de esta investigación. Primera,

aristotelismo y platonismo se hallan presentes en la obra: tanto por el papel que juega la unidad en la explicación del mundo en su referencia a la unidad primera, como en la explicación de la noción de forma para exponer y desarrollar la unidad que conviene a todo ente para ser y ser tal. Segunda, advierte con claridad que la explicación del proceso creador no sigue el emanacionismo presente en el *Fons vitae*. Además, la unidad se presentará como el bien que todas las cosas apetecen y en el cual perseveran si no les adviene la destrucción o separación de sus primeros elementos metafísicos.

Francisco O'Reilly: *El eclecticismo radical del* Liber de causis primis et secundis

El pensamiento medieval tiene en los procesos de traducción una de las fuentes más potentes de innovación en el pensamiento. Asimismo, las asimilaciones de las nuevas fuentes llevan a formas de asimilación imperfectas, pero en algunos casos provocativas y transformadoras. La recepción del pensamiento árabe en el mundo latino tiene diversas etapas, nuestra presentación se centrará en el período de finales del siglo XII y principio del XII en la que encontramos las primeras interpretaciones del pensamiento árabe y su fusión con las fuentes latinas existentes. Junto a los aportes realizados por Domingo Gundisalvo, Gerardo de Cremona nos encontramos con el *Liber de causis primis et secundis,* de autor anónimo, que propone una lectura de las nuevas fuentes árabes a la luz de San Agustín, Eriúgena y Boecio. La propuesta del autor anónimo es yuxtaponer algunas ideas de la comprensión del mundo eriugeniana, la teoría de la iluminación de san Agustín con la teoría del intelecto aristotélica interpretada por al-Farabi y Avicena. Esta interpretación no solo resulta radical para una visión más ortodoxa desde la fe, sino que también implica un eclecticismo radical por parte del autor, donde la coherencia del texto a veces se somete a las intuiciones principales del mismo. La presentación tomará en cuenta la totalidad del tratado, aunque se focalizará en el desarrollo del capitulo 10 del mismo como evidencia del método ecléctico del autor.

Salle / Room 3.08

Aula 8: Thomas Aquinas II

Ordinary Session

Chair: Samuel Pell

Rodrigo Camilo Camargo: *Les transcendantaux en tant que racines de la philosophie juridique thomasienne*

Dans sa *Somme théologique* I-II, q. 94, a. 2, Thomas d'Aquin pose la question de savoir s'il y a un seul précepte qui sous-tend la loi naturelle ou s'il y en a plusieurs. Lors de sa solution, l'auteur médiéval réaffirme le parallélisme entre les raisons spéculative et pratique et soutient qu'elles se distinguent précisément par leurs fins, qui sont différentes, mais qui font partie d'une même faculté potentielle: l'intellect. Le parallélisme se confirme lorsque Thomas d'Aquin explique, dans la même question, la structure formelle des raisonnements employés par chaque raison. Selon lui, la dynamique des deux raisons consiste, également, à procéder des premiers principes vers la fin, la conclusion. La principale différence entre les deux types de raison réside dans la nature des premiers principes, qui génèrent par conséquent des conclusions différentes. La raison spéculative se fonde sur de premiers principes qui ont pour but la vérité (par exemple, le principe de non-contradiction), tandis que la raison pratique se fonde sur les premiers principes qui ont pour but le bien (par exemple, faire le bien et éviter le mal). La vérité pour cette raison n'est considérée que comme une norme. En ce sens, Jan Aertsen déclare : "La raison pratique connaît la vérité, comme la raison théorique, mais considère la vérité connue comme une norme (règle) d'action" (Aertsen, 1996, p. 327). De cette manière, Thomas assure une certaine autonomie à la science morale par rapport à sa métaphysique. Cependant, cette autonomie ne se caractérise pas par une séparation radicale. Nous pouvons justifier cette affirmation par une autre questions de la *Somme théologique* I, q. 79, a. 11, s. c., dans lequel Thomas d'Aquin soutient que la raison théorique (spéculative) devient pratique par extension

(*per extensionem*). Et il ajoute que: "[…] il faut dire que la vérité et le bien s'incluent mutuellement. Car la vérité est un bien sans lequel elle ne serait pas désirable ; et le bien est une vérité, sans laquelle il ne serait pas intelligible[1]" (*ST*, I, q. 79, a. 11, sol. 2). C'est-à-dire que l'extension entre les raisons théoriques et pratiques est constituée par l'inclusion mutuelle de son propre but : la vérité et le bien, tous les deux transcendantaux. En ce sens, s'appuyant sur la théorie des transcendantaux, Aertsen soutient qu'il est concevable de proposer un lien entre transcendantalité (métaphysique) et moralité dans la pensée thomasienne (Aertsen, 1966, p. 326). Partant de la position d'Aertsen, cette présentation visera à démontrer le rôle des transcendantaux en tant que racines de la philosophie juridique de Thomas d'Aquin. Pour la réalisation de cet objectif, nous prendrons en compte avant tout le rapport de la loi naturelle avec le bien et la vérité transcendantaux.

Cody Warta: *The Thomistic Development of Aristotle's* τόπος.

This paper explores the degree to which Thomas Aquinas develops the Aristotelian concept of *place* beyond its original use. In *Physics* IV, Aristotle defines place as "the boundary of the *containing* body at which it is in contact with the *contained* body" (emphasis original). He later adds the qualification that for an object to be in a place, it must also be at rest. As such, Aristotle's place is not (as Newtonian absolute space would suggest) a plotted coordinate but instead the relationship between an object's surface and its surroundings. Aquinas modifies this view slightly by positing that place refers not merely to the boundary of a containing body itself but the *situs et ordo* (often translated in this context as *position and relation*) of its surface with another body (or set of bodies) at rest. Thus, the place of a ship which is floating down a river is determined not by the point of contact between the ship and the water but by the position of its surface in relation to the river as a whole (which remains more or less static even while the water of the river moves). Seeing an advantage in the implications of this view, Thomas uses the concept of place as a problem-solving tool for his metaphysics of the Eucharist. Since a given object's place depends on its surface, it is also (in part) dependent on its *dimensive quantity* (its measure of extension). Thereby, while neither Aquinas nor Aristotle would locate place in either the matter or the form of an object, Aquinas notes an interdependence between an object's place and its accidents; when the demensiveness of an object changes, so too the place. For example, if one were to shrink the boat on the river to half its size, this would—by definition—result in a change of its place. Similarly, should a substance adhere sans *accidens* (as Aquinas wants to say occurs in the Eucharist), it would technically do so without being located in a place since it lacks a necessary dimensive quantity altogether. This solution allows Aquinas to affirm that the body of Christ could substantially reside on a variety of altars (*per se*) without being locally present therein (*per accidens*). After noting the oddity and unique advantages of his view, I conclude this project by suggesting that Thomas's position here might yield explanatory power for understanding his motivation elsewhere. Namely, this definition of place appears to be closely related to his view of *individuation*. Although a full examination of Aquinas's position on what individualizes an object is beyond the scope of this project, I draw attention to his affirmation that object X is distinct from object Y not just because each is composed of different matter but (much like with place) because each differs in dimensive quantity. As such, there may be a benefit for understanding Thomas's development of the rather strange Aristotelean concept beyond its immediate (primarily liturgical) use.

John O'Callaghan: *Radicalizing Mercy: Aquinas on* Divine Misericordia

There are two different senses of 'mercy' discernible in Thomas Aquinas' discussion of God's mercy. The first can be traced back to stoic *clementia*, the act and virtue by which a ruler or judge restrains punishment of a malefactor. It is associated with the cardinal virtue of temperance. This kind of mercy Aquinas avoids attributing to God, because God, being impassible, is not subject to the passion of vengeance that leads to a desire to impose excessive or harsh punishment. The

second can be traced back to St. Augustine's treatment of *misericordia* in his criticism of the stoics for their lack of compassion, indeed their condemnation of "suffering with" those who suffer. *Misericordia* prompted by compassion acts to alleviate suffering to the extent possible. It would seem that Aquinas should avoid attributing this form of mercy to God for the same reason he avoids attributing *clementia* to God—because it requires the suffering of a passion, in this case *compassion*. However, Aquinas is at pains to attribute this form of mercy to God, motivated by biblical and theological themes concerning the justice and mercy of God. In his earliest work in the *Sentences* commentary and latest work in the *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas radicalizes the concept of *misericordia* attributed to God by extending it even to the act of creation itself. He argues that creation addresses the defect of non-being in a creature, changing it from the condition of non-being, a kind of suffering, to the condition of being. This account is a radicalization of the concept of *misericordia* insofar as Aquinas chooses to explicitly contradict what he argues elsewhere is a mistake in thinking about creation, namely, that it is a kind of change in the creature from a condition of non-being to being. The paper suggests how best to understand Aquinas' choice to contradict himself as exhibiting a specific point about the use of metaphor in communicating the truth of *Sacra Doctrina*, specifically a truth about the incarnation of Christ as expressing divine compassion.

Anselmo Tadeu Ferreira: *Quem é o aristotélico radical? A ousada teoria do intelecto de Tomás de Aquino*

O tema da natureza do intelecto humano foi objeto de um dos mais importantes debates no contexto da universidades medieval; seja por reunir todas as áreas do conhecimento de então, as artes, a filosofia, a medicina, a teologia e o direito seja por reunir todos os maiores pensadores da cristandade ocidental com participação decisiva dos pensadores muçulmanos e mesmo bizantinos. A temática é tão importante que já mereceu um grande Congresso Internacional da SIEPM, há vinte anos, tido na cidade do Porto justamente com o título "Intelecto e Imaginação na Filosofia Medieval". Não pretendemos, em uma breve comunicação, explorar os desdobramentos daquelas discussões e menos ainda expor o estado atua de uma questão tão debatida e iluminada pelas reflexões daquele Congresso. Entretanto, pode-se ainda acrescentar uma ou duas palavras sobre o tema. Desde a obra de Alain de Libera, o Comentário ao De Unitate intellectus de Tomás de Aquino, formou-se uma ideia segundo a qual, à força de esclarecer as opiniões dos adversários para melhor combatê-las, o Angélico acabou por dar forma ao mito do averroismo latino, o aristotelismo radical daqueles que, afinal, não compreendiam Aristóteles. Em uma obra mais recente, Robert Pasnau examina a noção de natureza humana em seu Estudo da I Parte da Suma de Teologia - questões 75-89, o assim chamado tratado da natureza humana de Tomás de Aquino. Nesta parte da Suma, escrita pouco antes daquele opúsculo dissecado por De Libera, já se encontram presentes as mesmas ideias e argumentos com os quais Tomás atacou impiedosamente os adversários. Pasnau indica também que Tomás de Aquino desafia aristotélicos de todos os matizes ao propor a noção de uma alma que é, ao mesmo tempo princípio, como qualquer forma substancial e uma substância em si mesma. É quase certo que pelo menos algumas ideias de Tomás de Aquino tenham sido postas sob suspeita do mesmo modo que a dos adversários, averroistas ou não. A intenção de nossa comunicação é explorar o aspecto revolucionário e radical da solução de Tomás de Aquino ao tema da alma, solução que procurava incorporar a ciência aristotélica da alma com a tradição do pensamento cristão e que se arriscava a "desagradar gregos e troianos". Também pretendemos mostrar o estágio atual de nossa pesquisa sobre a noção tomasiana da alma racional, na qual procuramos confrontar os textos relevantes de Tomás de Aquino com a tradição em que ele se baseou e com os desenvolvimentos posteriores em direção da psicologia moderna.

Salle / Room 3.09

Aula 9: Radical Approaches to Eternal Principles

Special Session proposed by Thérèse Cory, Claire Murphy, Dominic La Mantia, Andreas Waldstein/6
Sponsor: University of Notre Dame
Chair: Richard Cross

Stephen R. Ogden: *Averroes and the Problem of the Eternal Intelligibles*

In his Long Commentary on the *De Anima*, Averroes (Ibn Rushd) claims to solve key problems in his intellect theory with the proposal that intelligibles are one and eternal in the separate Material Intellect, but many and generated with respect to individual images of particular human beings. Some historical and contemporary commentators have objected that this solution only raises further difficulties, especially regarding the eternality of the intelligibles. How can intelligibles be both temporally generated through acts of abstraction from particular images and eternally present in the separate Material Intellect? How can the Material Intellect receive what it already has? Although Averroes does not appear to offer an explicit answer, I will sketch two possible strategies for resolving this issue. On the one hand, Averroes could maintain that the intelligibles are straightforwardly and continually generated in the Material Intellect while holding that their 'eternality' is like that of the human species. Or, on the other hand, he could argue that every intelligible really does always exist in the Material Intellect, though there is still an eternal priority of abstraction to reception. While each strategy has strengths and liabilities, either can absolve Averroes's theory from the charge of incoherence.

Dominic LaMantia: *Scotus's Doctrine of Divine Simplicity and his Rejection of the Indiscernibility of Identicals*

Like all of the scholastics, Duns Scotus accepted the doctrine of divine simplicity, whereby all of God's attributes are identical with God and each other. But unlike many of his fellow scholastics, Scotus thought that it is necessary to hold to some sort of *ex natura rei* distinction between the attributes. This led Scotus to adopt a radical position: the indiscernibility of identicals is false, and thus the attributes can be both identical with each other and God, and yet there be differences between them *a parte rei*. Scotus therefore introduces the formal distinction into God, as it allows him to deny Leibniz's law. In this paper, I will present two of Scotus's arguments for rejecting the indiscernibility of identicals in the context of divine simplicity. I will then examine the responses of Cajetan and Capreolus to these arguments. I conclude that one of Scotus's arguments has considerable force, and the objections of the Thomists are an inadequate response.

Nora McCann: "*Taught According to the Order of the Subject Matter:" Aquinas's Placement of Immutability in the Order of the Attributes*

Many theologians, notably Augustine and Anselm, have taught that God is immutable. This seems to follow from the intuition that things which are changeable are imperfect: since God is perfect, He must be unchangeable. However, some find it easy to conceive of immutability as a kind of restraint, or imperfection in God, since it seems not to allow him to love and interact with creation as we see portrayed in scripture. Aquinas also maintains that God is completely immutable. However, he emphasizes that this knowledge is not merely an intuition, but that it follows necessarily from knowledge we have by the natural light of reason. In fact, because we tend to find

God's immutability so intuitive, St. Thomas is careful to point the readers of the Summa Theologiae back to the origin of their knowledge of God and His attributes – namely, their experience of changeable creatures, and the argument for the existence of pure act. As Thomas explains at the beginning of the Summa Theologiae, because the beginner in Sacred Theology is taking God as his subject, he wants to know God and His attributes in the order in which they are best understood in themselves, rather than the order in which they are first discovered. Thus, Thomas waits until Question 9 to address God's immutability, although he could have proven it earlier. He does this because immutability follows most properly from the difficult notion of pure act. This notion, although contained in the notion of the first unmoved mover, is initially unclear to us, and must be unfolded in the intervening questions. Waiting until Question 9 allows Thomas to prove that God's immutability follows from the fact that He is pure act. It also allows him to reveal other attributes of pure act which shed light on how pure act is immutable. Because understanding God's immutability depends on a prior understanding of pure act, I first show how Thomas, following Aristotle, abstracts the idea of act from our experience of motion. Although we never experience act on its own, apart from potency and material things, we come to know it by separating it in thought from our experience. Thomas uses this understanding of act to argue for the existence of God as the first unmoved mover, which he then shows must be pure act. This account of how we come to know pure act explains why the concept is initially so unclear. Since we cannot know pure act directly, but must instead argue to its existence, we are unable to see what pure act entails until we develop and purify our understanding with further arguments. Accordingly, I next show how Thomas develops the notion of pure act through his arguments for God's simplicity, perfection, and infinity. Finally, I show how these intervening arguments inform his account of God's immutability in Question 9. Thus, in order to understand Thomas's account of God's immutability, we must attend to his ordering of God's attributes and the origin of our knowledge.

Salle / Room 3.10

Aula 10: Hugh of St. Victor and the Victorins

Ordinary Session

Chair: Francesco Siri

Ritva Palmen: *Instructive, Transcendent, or Radical Use of Imagination?*

The history of philosophy witnesses several insightful attempts to understand and analyse imagination, trying to explain its place in human life and thought. My paper aims at exploring innovative, even radical ideas of imagination written by Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173) in twelfth century Parisian context. Richard's reliance on a Neoplatonist dualist worldview and his presumptions in Christian theological anthropology enable him to give imagination a prominent place within his system of thought, demonstrating how the metaphysical commitments have a clear effect on the accounts of imagination. While building on his predecessors thinking, he also suggests radically new interpretations of imagination, evaluating its potential roles as well as its limits in theology and philosophy from a fresh angle. First, my paper argues that imagination has both instructive as well as transcendent uses in Richard's philosophical psychology. I will present how Richard claims that imagination is capable of acting as the main link between visible and invisible realities, uniting the body and soul and helping to proceed from the visible things to investigate the invisible things. Then, I will discuss Richard's idea of the so-called rational imagination, which builds on his conviction that imagination is able to co-operate with the upper abilities of the soul like reason and understanding. The combination of imagination and reason allows one to understand and use metaphorical language or invent rhetorical devices within one's speeches. The means for both creating and explaining symbols is the joint use of imagination and reason. While imagination turns out be a necessary precondition for human reasoning in general (instructive use), it also reveals the religious metaphors and sets the contemplative process in motion, functioning

as a link between the lower levels and the higher spiritual levels of contemplation (transcendent use). Second, I will address Richard's question what we can know about imagination through introspection. I will argue that while Richard builds on standard philosophical and theological method of self-examination, Richard's proposal is radically new. By urging the individual to know the structures of one's soul Richard encourages us to ask what the nature of imagination is, how we can use imagination, and what the limits of imagination are. This discussion also probes a significant question about the possible creative acts of imagination, asking whether it can create something completely new without any preceding matter. The analogy is thought provoking, suggesting that through studying the characteristics of imagination we are able to learn some particular information about the Creator himself. These areas of examination together manifest the originality of Richard's speculations of imagination and philosophical theology more generally. However, the radical repercussions of Richard's theory of imagination were left unnoticed in later medieval intellectual treatises inspired by Aristotelian reception and faculty psychology, but were further discussed and developed in medieval vernacular texts and 19th century Romanticism.

Marguerite-Marie Vernet: *La prédication en vue du Salut : l'usage de la radicalité dans les sermons d'Absalon de Saint-Victor*

À partir du corpus des cinquante-et-un sermons d'Absalon de Saint-Victor, nous pouvons observer que la radicalité n'est pas un enjeu majeur dans la pensée de ce prédicateur. De fait, on ne trouve pas chez les victorins d'exemple de pensée radicale au sens où nous l'entendons généralement, si ce n'est peut-être dans le traité de Gautier Contre les quatre labyrinthes de la France. De plus, chez Absalon du moins, le sermon n'est pas le lieu du déploiement de la pensée spéculative, mais a plus spécifiquement une fonction opérative, dans le sens où il cherche à avoir un effet sur ses auditeurs. Cependant, ce prédiacteur porte tout de même une forme d'aspiration radicale qu'il partage avec son époque, à savoir celle du Salut, seule fin souhaitable pour l'homme. Nous retrouvons cette aspiration dans le contexte de la réforme de l'ordo monasticus et de l'ordo canonicus au XIIe siècle, mais aussi, à la fin de ce siècle, lorsque se met en place la pastorale du salut obligatoire, où la recherche de la perfection dans tous les états de vie est bien le signe d'une radicalité en vue du Salut. Le sermon participe de cet état des choses car le prédicateur, dans notre cas Absalon, appelle à une radicalité en prêchant pour le martyr ou pour la participation à la guerre de Dieu. Ce qui est intéressant à observer dans ces appels, c'est aussi la différence extrême, voir radicale, entre ceux-ci et l'expression tout autrement radicale qu'ils prennent dans le cas de la vie quotidienne du chanoine, à savoir une vie de pénitence, de jeûne et de prière. Absalon use souvent d'un discours violent en vue de la conversion des cœurs, discours qui pourrait être qualifié de radical. Cependant, nous observons là aussi que ce discours se construit généralement à travers des images guerrières ou de combat : ce sont donc ces images qui portent la violence et non le discours lui-même. Leur usage est aussi à mettre en lien avec la conception philosophique et théologique de l'image proposée par Hugues et les victorins. Cette dernière permet alors la réunification de l'homme divisé par le péché pour le disposer à la contemplation. Ces images ont donc un effet sur la mémoire et l'imagination des auditeurs, et jusque sur leurs âmes, et contribuent à l'efficacité du sermon, lequel cherche à changer les cœurs et à faire grandir la foi en vue du Salut.

Marcin Janecki: *Entre* vanitas et pulcritudo mundi. *La lecture sapientielle et contemplative de la réalité dans le* Super Ecclesiasten *d'Hugues de Saint-Victor*

Le maître Hugues de Saint-Victor, établi dans la première moitié du XIIe siècle à la célèbre Abbaye de Saint-Victor de Paris, fut un écrivant prolifique et original. Entre ses œuvres figure un commentaire inachevé à un des livres bibliques plus difficiles et controversés qui est le Livre de Qohelet. Dans son *Super Ecclesiasten* le Victorin expose sa vision du monde et de l'homme. Inscrivant sa pensée entre la *vanitas* et la *pulcritudo* il invite ses lecteurs à lire la réalité dans une

perspective sapientielle, c'est-à-dire avec un recul nécessaire pour ne pas se laisser tromper par les apparences (*species*) des choses visibles, mais retrouver une pleine et originaire capacité de voir la *pulcritudo totius*. Cette beauté est la trace de la Sagesse laissée dans les créatures. Hugues propose une lecture englobante et universelle de la réalité grâce à la réouverture de l'*oculus mentis* dans la contemplation. C'est uniquement ainsi que l'homme atteint la Sagesse qui lui permet de surmonter l'ombre (*umbra*) d'un monde fragmenté en une multitude de *phenomena* et saisir dans la clarté l'invisible cohérence et l'unité de la réalité qui découle de sa source divine. C'est ne qu'en buvant d'elle, l'homme peut trouver le sens pour son existence et remplir de paix son cœur inquiet. La beauté se présente donc comme un chemin privilégié qui conduit l'homme par une ascension anagogique vers la Vérité, sa patrie.

Salle / Room 3.11

Aula 11: Avicenna

Ordinary Session
Chair: Said El Bouklaoui

Taymaz Azimi Sadjadi: *A Neo-Avicennan Approach to Ontological Pluralism*

Ontological pluralism is the view that takes entities of different ontological kinds to exist in different ways – e.g. tables and chairs exist in a different way than numbers. Ontological pluralism has been the dominant view about being for the majority of the history of philosophy, but it has been largely ignored by philosophers of analytic tradition since the damning rejection of it by W.V.O. Quine in his canonical paper 'On What There Is' (1948). Recently, however, there has been a new surge in ontological pluralist views among analytic metaphysicians advocated by the likes of Kris McDaniel (2010 & 2017) and Jason Turner (2012). Unsurprisingly, the mainstream of analytic philosophy is very much resistant against any such pluralist view about existence, and the fact that it's advocates defend pluralism from a generally Quinean framework does not help their case either. Meanwhile, there are a number of strong arguments that the analytic advocates of ontological pluralism could borrow from historical debates on this particular matter which could greatly help their case against Quinean univocalist hegemony. In this paper I focus on one such argument (or rather a cluster of arguments) based entirely on Avicenna's modal ontology. Avicenna (d. 1037) suggests in his *Metaphysics of Healing* (as well as a few other of his books) that there are different ways in which something exists, each of which is relevant to that thing's modal status. He proposes five such modal status relative to 'necessity' and 'independence' of things: (i) necessary in itself, (ii) necessary through another, (iii) possible in itself, (iv) possible through another, and (v) impossible. After offering an overview of Avicenna's modal ontology, I shall show this view to be compatible with some post-Quinean modal theories such as modal realism [as defended by David Lewis (1986) and Phillip Bricker (2006 & 2008)] and then build upon this to offer a graded pluralist view about existence in which things exist to higher or lower degrees relative to their modal status. Finally I argue that taking existence to be a 'graded' notion – which has its roots in Avicenna's Neo-Platonist tendencies – is useful to incorporate Quinean univocalism (that being has only one *sense*) into this neo-Avicennan view in that everything exists in the same sense, but that one sense comes in degrees – which are in turn determined according to entities' modal status.

Miriam Rogasch: *La radicalité de la conception avicennienne de la quiddité*

En réfléchissant sur les aspects radicaux de la pensée d'Avicenne, ce qui vient à l'esprit en premier est la division modale des êtres qui fait dépendre tous les êtres autres que Dieu de sa causalité existentielle. La division modale des êtres dépend cependant, à son tour, d'un autre élément central de la métaphysique d'Avicenne, à savoir sa compréhension de la quiddité. Il est bien connu qu'Avicenne conçoit la quiddité comme étant autre que l'existence et ses modes, c'est-à-dire comme

possédant en elle-même ni une existence universelle ni une existence particulière. Cette altérité vis-à-vis de l'existence et de ses caractéristiques signifie que la quiddité peut se manifester dans les deux modes d'existence : elle peut avoir une existence universelle autant qu'une existence particulière, mais sans se réduire à aucun de ces deux modes existentiels. La radicalité de ce geste avicennien est, en un sens, évidente : Avicenne est le premier, dans un cadre aristotélicien, à avoir pensé jusqu'au bout la distinction entre la quiddité et l'existence. Néanmoins, la 'vraie' radicalité d'Avicenne réside moins dans cette séparation entre essence et existence que dans ce qui la rend possible. Autrement dit, pour apprécier véritablement la portée philosophique de ce geste avicennien, il faut remonter à ses racines, aux 'conditions de possibilité' d'une compréhension de la quiddité comme quelque chose qui a un statut ontologique, une consistance entitative, au-delà ou en deça de ce qui lui revient en tant qu'existant. Plusieurs hypothèses quant au statut ontologique de la quiddité chez Avicenne ont été formulées, mais aucune n'a, pour l'instant, fait cesser les débats autour de ce point. Je propose d'examiner une nouvelle hypothèse interprétative mise en avant par D. Janos (*Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, De Gruyter 2020), qui s'appuie sur une analyse extensive de la quiddité dans ses différents contextes. D. Janos affirme que la quiddité a un mode d'être intellectif qui lui est propre et qu'il y a donc un troisième mode d'existence, celui de la quiddité 'pure', au-delà des deux modes d'existence habituellement reconnus, à savoir l'existence universelle et particulière de la quiddité. Contre D. Janos, il s'agira de montrer que la radicalité de la conception avicennienne de la quiddité consiste précisément dans la compréhension de la quiddité comme irréductible à un quelconque mode d'existence et non pas dans l'aménagement d'un troisième mode d'existence qui n'appartiendrait qu'à elle. L'intelligibilité de la quiddité en tant que telle n'est donc pas la marque d'un troisième mode d'existence, mais elle constitue plutôt la marque d'un fondement commun du monde et de la pensée, qui, pour pouvoir être accessible, ne peut jamais se donner en tant que tel.

Mateus Domingues da Silva: *Plato, Pure Quiddities and Divine Knowledge According to Suhrawardī's Metaphysics of Lights*

In his *Philosophy of Illumination* (*Ḥikmat al-išrāq*), as-Suhrawardī al-Maqtūl (d. 587/1191) presents his own understanding of divine knowledge. It turns out that the views on divine knowledge discussed by Suhrawardī — as a good Avicennian — are first and foremost linked to a discussion on quiddities, which makes it necessary to recapitulate Avicenna's major teachings on quiddities, their concomitants, and divine intellection of quiddities. In the light of my presentation, we discover that Suhrawardī is not satisfied with the Avicennian answer on the status of quiddities in divine knowledge. From this consideration, I am proposing a study of Suhrawardī's doctrine of Platonic forms, as it follows in the paragraphs 164–173 of the *Philosophy of Illumination*. The presentation thus tries to clarify some capital features of Suhrawardī's philosophy: his very specific defense of Platonic Forms, his understanding about the nature of knowledge, and his thesis concerning the status of quiddities in the divine knowledge and in the divine realm. In conclusion, I attempt to show that even if some conclusions of Suhrawardī depart from some of Avicenna's major metaphysical doctrines, the Avicenna's essentialism remains at the foundation of Suhrawardī's approach. It is thus by no means a refutation of Avicenna's metaphysics, but rather an endeavor to subsume Avicenna's Aristotelianism within the framework of "Plato's metaphysics," that is to say, of Suhrawardī's own science of lights, which is his reception of the pseudo-*Theology* of Aristotle.

10h30-11h00: Coffee Break

11h00-12h15: 5e Session Plénière / 5th Plenary Session

Auditorium 250/Auditorium 150

Emma Gannagé: *A Radical Turn between Theory and Practice: Avicenna and his Successors on Properties*

Chair: Cristina Cerami

12h15-14h00: Lunch

14h00-15h00: V. Special commission: *Arabic Philosophy*

Auditorium 250

Chair: Fouad Ben Ahmed

15h00-16h30: Sessions ordinaires et spéciales / Ordinary and Special Sessions

Salle / Room 3.01

Aula 1:Radical Metaphysics

Special Session proposed by Thérèse Cory, Claire Murphy, Dominic LaMantia and Andreas Waldstein
Sponsor: University of Notre Dame
Chair: Dominic LaMantia

Fr. John Peck, S.J.: *Aquinas's Radical Revision of Prime Matter*

The standard motivation for prime matter is that it allows one to explain substantial change. Since nothing comes from nothing, in every change there is a subject that underlies the passing away of one form and the coming to be of another. In the case of substantial change, prime matter underlies the passing away of one substantial form and the coming to be of another. But supposing that prime matter is pure metaphysical potency, this motivation is incoherent. It is impossible that the pure metaphysical potency once actualized by a wood-form is numerically identical to a potency now actualized by an ash-form. I argue that Aquinas's doctrine of prime matter is impervious to this charge of incoherence. Famously, Aquinas affirms that prime matter is metaphysically pure potency. Moreover, like Aristotle, he affirms that explaining substantial change requires appealing to prime matter. But unlike Aristotle, he denies that prime matter is a subject of form. In that case, neither is prime matter a subject of substantial change. Instead, according to Aquinas, prime matter partially explains both substantial unity and substantial change because, for any material substance x, x's prime matter is its potency either to exist as a substance or to corrupt and make way for a new substance. Although it raises additional questions, Aquinas's revision blocks the attack one finds most frequently in the prime matter literature.

Fr. Philip-Neri Reese, O.P.: *Thomas Aquinas on* Esse *and* Ens*: A Radical Revision*

Despite the fact that Aquinas's doctrine of *esse* has long been acknowledged to be a centerpiece of his metaphysical thought, the question of how best to articulate the relationship between *esse* and *ens* continues to be a vexing one. On the one hand, it is tempting to think of *esse* as a principle of *ens*: just as form stands to matter so as to constitute a changeable being, so *esse* stands to essence so as to constitute a being as such. On the other hand, it is tempting to think of *esse* as a property of

being—not, to be sure, as an accidental property, but rather as a being's proper activity or actuality: just as the act of running stands to the runner as its proper activity, so *esse* stands to *ens* as its proper activity. These alternative ways of construing the relationship between *esse* and *ens* track another vexed question in Aquinas's metaphysics, namely, whether '*ens*' is predicated of creatures essentially or accidentally—for if *esse* is an intrinsic principle of every being, '*ens*' will be predicated essentially, but if *esse* is an extrinsic property of every being, '*ens*' will be predicated accidentally. In this paper, I answer both of these vexed questions by offering a radical rethinking of the relationship between *esse* and *ens* in Aquinas's metaphysics. On my account, *esse* is neither an intrinsic principle nor an extrinsic property. Rather, it is an extrinsic principle of every being as such, for on my account *esse* is a final cause of *ens*.

Alessandro Passera : *Qu'est-ce que radical? Henri de Gand*

Le terme radical qualifie le nom auquel il est référé dans une double direction. Dans le cas de la pensée, radicale est celle qui nait et s'enracine dans une autre (premier sillon de la radicalité est l'enracinement) et qui tire de cet enracinement profond des conséquences qui n'appartient qu'au radicalisme lui même, mais qui semblent maintenir un lien avec l'original. Ce lien au moyen âge se fait à travers l'auctoritas, qui se manifeste comme citation trahissant la pensée de l'auteur. Il n'est pas question d'origine, originalité. L'intellectuel se sert de l'autorité pour former sa propre pensée. En ce sens les positions scotiste et henricienne sur la signification de la "res"exploitent l'autorité d'Avicenne de manière radicale et radicalement différente un par rapport à l'autre. Dans ce qui suit, nous voudrions montrer comme à l'intérieur des deux auteurs la même source prend des directions dont les conséquences son révélatrices de deux métaphysiques radicales, l'une, celle d'Henri, encrée à l'être dans le concept d'ens analogue, l'autre, dans la tentative de détruire l'analogie henricienne, pose, quoique sans expliciter clairement, une unification de l'essence et de l'existant qui finit pour dépasser l'être qu'elle voudrait contenir. Nous essayerons de montrer ces deux radicalismes à partir de l'autorité d'Avicenne telle qu'elle est exploitée par les deux auteurs, cherchant de démêler l'enracinement entre ce qui est l'origine, Avicenne, et l'originalité de la pensée radicale qui se fait à partir d'autre que soi même.

Salle / Room 3.02

Aula 2:Issues in Islamic Philosophical Theology and Political Philosophy

Special Session proposed by Richard C. Taylor and Luis López -Farjeat
Sponsor: *Aquinas and 'the Arabs' International Working Group* (AAIWG)
Chair: Josep Puig Montada

David Bennett: *Zeal and the Limits of Reason*

When has a would-be imam gone too far? For generations, heresiographers compulsively recorded aberrant sectarian movements from the first century of Islam. Many of these movements propounded radical political and theological agendas: Khārijites (so-called because they would "depart" from any group with whom they disagreed) enjoined particular strictures of piety to define their communities; Ghāliyya so-called because of their "extreme" claims) formed zealous bands around prophetic figures whose mysterious utterances thrilled or appalled their audiences. Most of these groups, however colourful, were historical curiosities at best: yet systematic, soberminded theologians continued to pass down their notorious beliefs. In this paper I argue that forensic analysis of theological innovation played a key role in the development of kalām, and that the heresiographers' taxonomies exhibited a rationalistic approach to even the most deviant theological propositions. The radical trajectories taken by "departers" and "extremists" were not mere fodder for polemic, but fundamental for the establishment of the technical discursive methods for the articulation of kalām.

Luis Xavier López-Farjeat: *Revisiting the Sources of Radical Islamic Atomism*

While radical atomism became the dominant physical theory among Islamic mutakallimūn, most philosophers adopted an Aristotelian view of nature, and were thus anti-atomists. To some extent, the discussion between atomist and anti-atomists within the Islamic context echoes the Greek controversy between atomists and Peripatetics. However, there is no clear evidence that the mutakallimūn were familiar with Greek atomism. The project of uncovering the Greek sources of Islamic atomism has been intriguing. While Islamic foundational sources do not refer to an atomist physical theory, it is reasonable to suspect that the mutakallimūn learned about atomism from a foreign source. In this presentation, I revisit the discussion on the possibility of attributing Greek sources to Islamic atomism. After discussing the work of some scholars who have suggested which Greek sources could have served to transmit some of the views of the Greek atomists into the Islamic context, I argue that our search for the sources of radical Islamic atomism should include texts and fragments containing implicit references to Greek atomism. I propose the inclusion of Alexander of Aphrodisias into this ongoing debate.

Nadira Fedouache: *Éléments de radicalité dans la philosophie « politique » d'Ibn Bājja (Avempace)*

Le Tadbīr al-mutawaḥḥid (Le régime du solitaire) du philosophe Ibn Bājja (Avempace, m. 1138) est considéré comme l'une de ses œuvres authentiques, car il ne s'agit pas d'un commentaire d'un texte d'Aristote ou d'al-Fārābī, comme ce fut le cas pour ses autres écrits. En effet, Le régime du solitaire est un livre unique, dans lequel Ibn Bājja a présenté sa conception particulière de la position du philosophe dans la cité. La spécificité de cet ouvrage consiste, à notre avis, dans son approche radicale selon laquelle il a abordé la relation du philosophe avec sa communauté, à laquelle il doit faire une rupture surtout lorsque les deux parties ne partagent pas les mêmes valeurs ou les mêmes finalités. Quelles sont les circonstances qui ont permis à Ibn Bājja de développer cette nouvelle perception du philosophe au sein de la cité ? Et comment Ibn Bājja a-t-il réalisé un exploit intellectuel en rupture avec les perceptions philosophiques antérieures ? Pour répondre à ces deux questions, nous proposons de faire le point sur les manifestations de cette perception radicale ; ce qui peut être délimité à trois niveaux:

Sa vision de la cité: Selon la tradition aristotélicienne, les philosophes musulmans considéraient que la cité était nécessaire à l'homme, car il est un animal politique. Avec Ibn Bājja, nous nous trouvons dans une nouvelle conception selon laquelle la cité est surtout utile au commun car elle représente une des fins de ce dernier, alors qu'elle est nuisible au philosophe, et non nécessaire à sa perfection. Ainsi, le philosophe peut, et doit, s'isoler de la ville et de ses habitants si sa perfection l'exige.

Son regard sur les autres : les gens ayant des opinions corrompues, le philosophe en diffère fondamentalement. Ainsi, il se retrouve isolé des autres qui vivent une sorte d'aliénation dans les affaires quotidiennes. Sa relation avec les autres dans ce contexte se distingue également par l'indépendance, puisqu'il déclare explicitement que sa présence n'est pas une présence au service des autres ; une telle interaction avec les autres sera un obstacle à la perfection de soi.

En revanche, au troisième niveau, le philosophe ne trouve aucun mal à rencontrer un groupe qui lui ressemble et partage les mêmes intérêts et objectifs, c'est-à-dire l'intérêt des scientifiques ou des philosophes, car ce qui les unit est une opinion pure et désintéressé même s'ils ne se trouvent pas au même moment et dans le même espace.

Salle / Room 3.03

Aula 3: Meister Eckhart

Ordinary Session

Chair: Loris Sturlese

Robert J. Dobie: *Meister Eckhart: a Radical Thinker?*

The medieval, Dominican, mystical theologian, Meister Eckhart, has acquired the reputation in modern times as a "radical" (read: "heterodox") religious thinker, with many books and articles being written on his thoughtand "spirituality" for a large, popular audience. But modern notions of "radicality" when applied to Eckhart or any other medieval thinker suffer from many dubious and anachronistic assumptions. My paper will address the ways in which "radicality" may be appropriate in characterizing Eckhart's thought and ways in which it is not appropriate. Eckhart's thought does not look so radical when examined in the context of his theological and philosophical background and his intentions and goals (as far as we can discern them). Eckhartian mystical theology is a development of the strongly Neoplatonic tradition of German Dominican theology stemming from Albert that Great and which was developed by important and respected Dominican theologians such as Dietrich of Freiberg, Ulrich of Strasbourg and Berthold of Moosburg. Indeed, in so far as Eckhart integrates classical Thomistic themes and arguments into his scholastic works and commentaries, his thought represents something of a moderating synthesis within the early 14thcentury German Dominican theological school. Moreover, Eckhart's vernacular sermons are clearly an attempt to direct heretical spiritual movements like that of the "Free Spirit" into orthodox channels. But, as the circular states: "radicalism" can be "not so much a sign of excess as a sign of restraint caused by the desire to be as true as possible to a certain doctrine, theory or philosophical position..." In this sense, Eckhart is truly radicalin his attempt to carry to its logical conclusion his synthesis of the German Neoplatonic and Aristotelian-Thomistic strands within Dominican theology. Such is his zeal for this synthesis that Eckhart rejects the assertion of his confrère, Thomas, that there are theological mysteries, like the Trinity and the Incarnation, that cannot be given philosophical grounding –that we can only argue that they are not against reason. Rather, some of Eckhart's most distinctive doctrines concerning detachment, the priority of the intellect to being, the Birth of the Son in the Soul, the Breakthrough, etc., can be seen as the result of a systematic attempt to recast these mysteries into the language of natural reason and of the Neoplatonic ascent of the intellect to the Good (a process distinct from but related to his translation of the Latin of the schools into the language of the "vulgar"). While it is clearthat his intention was to show that the truths of natural philosophy and the intellect are fundamentally grounded in the mysteries of the faith, many, both in his day and ours, saw his projectas reducing the mysteries of the Christian faith to mere rational philosophy. But is Eckhartthen nota "radical" in either case ?

Tamar Tsopurashvili: *The* Liber de Causis *as the Source for Meister Eckhart's Radical Thinking*

Meister Eckhart's thought was condemned by the inquision in 1329 in Avignon. 28 sentences of his doctrine were claimed as heretical. Among his condemned sentences is his radical idea about the "birth of God in the human soul" and the dialectic between God and human, *causa* and *causatum*, that he makes a central idea of his metaphysics. In order to express this dynamic in the German language, he develops a concept of *Seelenfunke/Fünklein* to characterize the *topos* where *causa* "meets" *causatum*. In this paper I will argue that with this metaphor Eckhart translates into German his theory of univocity, developed in his Latin works as an interpretation of the medieval *causa-essentialis*-theory derived from the *Liber de Causis*. He particularly develops the main thesis of this theory (*ens in sua causa non est ens*) into the idea that *causa est in suis causatis,* and thus creates a basis for the univocal relation. The difference between the Eckhartian understanding of analogy and univocity is very clear expressed in his Latin work *Expositio sancti Evangelii secundum Iohannem*, where he writes: "*Ubi notandum quod in analogicis semper productum est inferius, minus, imperfectius et inaequale producenti; in univocis autem semper est aequale, eandem naturam non participans, sed totam simpliciter, integraliter et ex aequo a suo principio accipiens*." (LW III, n. 5, 7,4-7). In this paper I will refer to the reconstruction of univocity in Eckhart, made by Burkhard Mojsisch in his monograph in relation to Eckhart's

theory of intellect. I will demonstrate that the ontological model of univocity is very closely connected for Eckhart with his understanding and reading of predicative sentences as well. I will demonstrate how the idea of univocity builds simultaneously the bridge between Eckhart's Latin and German works and as a radical theory forms a unifying ground for his metaphysics.

Salle / Room 3.05

Aula 4: Volontarism

Ordinary Session
Chair: Pascale Bermon

Nicolas Faucher: *La racine de l'acte de foi chez Ockham: une exception volontariste ?*

Dans leurs travaux ayant trait à l'acte de foi chez Ockham, Ch. Grellard et, à sa suite, D. Piché estiment que le fondement de l'acte de foi réside dans un acte de volonté premier, injustifié et injustifiable, dont découlent les actes successifs qui aboutissent à l'acte de foi au sens propre, pris comme assentiment intellectuel aux propositions qui doivent être crues. Ils parlent à cet égard de "point aveugle" de la théorie ockhamiste. Le sujet croyant n'a pas besoin d'être en mesure de justifier pour lui-même son propre acte de foi ni d'expliquer ce qui l'amène à vouloir croire. Il suffit que Dieu approuve cette croyance par l'entremise d'une disposition surnaturellement donnée au fidèle pour que celle-ci soit moralement justifiée. L'acte de foi fait alors figure exception dans l'ensemble de la morale ockhamiste, qui s'attache en règle générale au rôle de la droite raison dans la justification de tout acte moral, y compris les actes des vertus théologales, la droite raison étant précisément la raison considérée comme capable de rendre compte des choix moraux des agents et de les rattacher à des principes moraux généraux, religieux ou naturels. Chaque agent moral est supposé être capable de faire usage de cette droite raison et de justifier pour lui-même ses actes. Pourquoi la foi ferait-elle exception ? Nous arguerons que la position de Grellard et de Piché repose sur une lecture du texte ockhamiste qui n'est pas la seule possible, et qu'une autre approche suggère que la foi ne fait aucunement exception dans le système moral d'Ockham. Suivant cette lecture, ce dernier propose un traitement de la question proche de celui de ses contemporains, tel Chatton, qui ne laisse place à aucun point aveugle, quoiqu'elle pose ses propres questions et difficultés.

Niccolò Bonetti: *Salvare Averroè? Il problema della conoscenza divina in John Baconthorp*

How 'radical' is the interpretation of Averroes by the Carmelite theologian John Baconthorp (1290-1349), called 'prince of the Averroists' by Agostinus Nifus and Marcantonio Zimara? If M. Xiberta y Roqueta in the 1930s completely denied the alleged Averroism of the Carmelite theologian, J. Etzwiler in the 1970s weakened Xiberta's view and showed that Baconthorpe attempted to reconcile the dogmas of Christian theology with Averroistic philosophy through a reinterpretation of Aristotle and Averroes. The issues involved were, for example, the unicity of the possible intellect, creation ex nihilo, eternity and providence. Since then, although there has been no shortage of publications on the Carmelite theologian, the problem of his alleged Averroism has not been discussed in depth. Moreover, the presence of Averroist themes in Baconthorpe's thought is not limited to the ones already studied, but extends to many other issues. Obviously, it is not possible to examine the presence of Averroes in Baconthorpe's entire oeuvre, but one needs to find a specific focal point, such as for instance divine knowledge. Considering a selected sample of questions on divine ideas and divine knowledge, my aim is to investigate the Carmelite theologian's use of Averroist arguments, since the issue of divine knowledge of individuals is a point of radical contention between Christian theologians and Averroes. Moreover, Baconthorp devotes a quarter of his quodlibetal questions to this theme. Such investigation may contribute to answering the following questions concerning the relationship between the Carmelite theologian and Averroes' philosophy: Why is it so important for Baconthorp to discuss with Averroes? How 'radical' is

Baconthorp's Averroist interpretation and how 'concordist' is it with his theological positions? How original is Baconthorp's solution compared to that of his contemporaries? In the light of the eventual answers, a somewhat clearer picture may begin to emerge of the possible originality and radicality of Baconthorp's interpretation of Averroes.

Valentin Braekman: *André de Neufchâteau : un volontariste radical ?*

André de Neufchâteau, franciscain lorrain de la deuxième moitié du XIVe siècle, est un penseur qui a récemment fait surface dans les débats contemporains, notamment en méta- éthique. Cette « renaissance » est due en bonne partie aux travaux de Janine Idziak, qui a consacré plusieurs études à l'histoire de la « divine command ethics », très à la mode aux États-Unis, chez les spécialistes de la philosophie analytique de la religion. Dans ses travaux, Idziak présente André comme un représentant du volontarisme radical, une théorie selon laquelle il n'existe aucun fondement objectif au droit naturel, aucune justice par nature : la morale et le droit sont strictement dépendants de commandements divins, eux-mêmes arbitraires et muables. Influencés par cette lecture, Philip Quinn qualifie la pensée d'Andrée de « full-fledged voluntarism », tandis que Hans Kraml en fait l'apôtre d'un « Willkürgott ». Pourtant, ces deux dernières études ne reposent pas sur une analyse des sources dont nous disposons. Quinn ne mentionne André que pour mettre un nom sur une case dans l'échiquier philosophique (l'éthique du commandement divin), et Kraml se fonde exclusivement sur l'édition d'Idziak, une édition déficiente à plusieurs égards, ce qui l'amène à une interprétation fragile et caricaturale de notre auteur. Mon intervention entend faire un peu de lumière sur cette figure méconnue, à l'aune d'une sélection de textes issus des dernières questions de son *Primum scriptum Sententiarum*. Ces questions, publiées à Paris par Jean Granjon en 1514, n'ont pas survécu sous forme manuscrites. Néanmoins, elles révèlent la finesse d'un penseur qu'on aurait tort de percevoir comme naïvement obsédé par l'hétéronomie radicale et le commandement divin arbitraire. Replacer l'auteur dans son contexte, et étudier en profondeur ses réflexions complexes pour se faire une idée plus nette de sa conception de Dieu et de la morale, voilà le programme que je propose.

Salle / Room 3.06

Aula 6: Thomas Aquinas / III

Ordinary Session

Chair: Francisco O'Reilly

Tadeysz Bartos: *La personne en tant que relation*

Le radicalisme de cette idée découle de la théologie trinitaire développée, entre autre, par Thomas d'Aquin. Le concept de personne divine en tant que relation est un théorème limite. Une personne n'est pas quelqu'un qui se rapporte mais elle est elle-même une référence. Et si la théologie médiévale a pour axiome l'imitation de la divinité, alors le radicalisme d'une telle anthropologie nous est révélé. C'est l'une des conséquences non pensées, non dites, des axiomes théologiques dans la pensée de Thomas d'Aquin. Ma présentation consiste en une analyse de certains points de la Somme théologique de Thomas d'Aquin. Sth I, q. 28, q. 29 etc. Sth I, q. 29, a. 4 : «Relatio autem in divinis non est sicut accidens inhaerens subiecto, sed est ipsa divina essentia, unde est subsistens, sicut essentia divina subsistit. Sicut ergo deitas est Deus, ita paternitas divina est Deus pater, qui est persona divina. Persona igitur divina significat relationem ut subsistentem».

John Dudley: *Aquinas as a Radical Thinking*

Aquinas is often viewed as the opposite of a radical thinker, since he opposed some radical Aristotelian views, most notably Averroes' interpretation of the unicity of the agent intellect. The

aim of this paper is to show that Aquinas was radical in other ways, since he put forward a number of very important views that reversed the prevailing supernatural emphasis of Christian thinkers from the earliest times. The subordination of philosophy to theology was a view first put forward by Philo of Alexandria and accepted by Christian thinkers for over 1000 years. However, Aquinas, contrary to St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure, distinguishes the natural end of the philosopher from the supernatural end of the theologian (De veritate 14,3), a view that promoted the emancipation of philosophy from theology. This emancipation is striking in the view of natural law adopted in the thirteenth century, notably by Aquinas (ST 1a 2ae 91.2), who holds that natural law is the law of right reason, which coincides with the biblical law, but is separate from it. Thus the way was open for Gregory of Rimini to write that even if God did not exist, still an offence against whatever reason was available to man would remain sinful (In 2 Sent. q.1, dist. 34, art.2). On the basis of natural law emancipated from theology Aquinas defended Aristotle's theory of the natural slave (ST 2a 2ae 57.3 ad 2), contrary to the views of Christian thinkers from the beginning who recognized the equality of all human beings (at least in theory) and attributed the undesirable institution of slavery to a necessity arising from human sinfulness. Aquinas also put forward a radical and highly influential change in the understanding of politics by following Aristotle's view that it is natural for humans to rule and be ruled and by holding that this would have been necessary even without Adam's sin (De Regimine 1.1.744, 741), a view that eliminates the supernatural. In this way he undermined the dominant view from the start of Christianity that the state had no legitimacy, as it was a mere necessary evil due to original sin, and the real power was the spiritual power held by the Church. His emancipation of politics from theology was revolutionary and only fifty years after his death Marsilius of Padua held that the Church is subordinate to the State in temporal matters. The most important radical view of Aquinas is arguably his defence of private property. While the Church Fathers, most notably St. Augustine, had held that we are tenants in this valley of tears and rejected the concept of a natural right to private property, Aquinas justified ownership of private property (ST 2a 2ae 66.2 ad 1) on the basis of Aristotle's arguments and held that it is an addition to natural law (emancipated from theology). A striking methodological consideration is Aquinas' use of "utilitas" to establish natural law.

Mathieu Eychenié: *La racine anarchique. Sur la destruction heideggérienne de la philosophie thomasienne*

Au paragraphe 6 d'*Être et temps*, Heidegger présente la philosophie scolastique comme une philosophie déracinée(*entwurzelte*), voulant signifier par là que cette dernière a réinvesti les concepts fondamentaux de l'ontologie antique tout en oubliant leur signification originaire, c'est-à-dire existentielle. L'analytique existentiale ne pourra dès lors se déployer qu'à la condition de mettre en œuvre la destruction(*Destruktion*)des concepts médiévaux ; le motif de la destruction signifiant positivement chez Heidegger le retour à la racine, à la souche, à l'origine. Nous souhaiterons interroger le sens de l'entreprise heideggérienne de retour au so l(*Boden*)en la distinguant de ce qu'elle n'est pas: le retour au principe(*archê-principium*). Il s'agira ainsi, en premier lieu, d'analyser en détail la destruction heideggérienne de l'ontologie thomasienne, accomplie en particulier dans les cours de 1923-1924 et 1926-1927–la réduction du sens de l'être à l'être-produit, induite par la compréhension de l'étant suprême comme *principium* (interprété comme *causa prima*), constituant le ressort principal de la lecture de Heidegger. Il s'agira de comprendre, dans un second temps, comment le premier Heidegger a voulu substituer à cette ontologie principielle une pensée de l'enracinement, qui trouve notamment sa source dans la lecture des épîtres pauliniennes et des Confessions d'Augustin (les cours des années 1920-1921 et 1921 en témoignent tout spécialement).Ainsi le phénoménologue prend-il pour guide l'élucidation augustinienne des trois formes de concupiscence afin de penser le déracinement qui caractérise, de prime abord et le plus souvent, l'existence facticielle. Il thématise également ce qu'il nomme alors l'accentuation du monde du soi-même (*Selbstwelt*)sur la base des analyses augustiniennes et pauliniennes relatives à la

memoria sui et à l'attente inquiète de la parousia. L'enjeu sera ici de comprendre comment le premier Heidegger entend opposer à la conception thomasienne du Dieu-causa prima l'expérience proto-chrétienne de la relation au divin –une expérience qui, en mobilisant le motif de la racine(rhiza, radix) plutôt que le champ lexical de la causalité, donne à penser la possibilité d'une existence propre (en grec: *idios* ou *oikeios*, où il faut entendre la référence à l'*oikos*), d'un séjour, d'une habitation angoissée, c'est-à-dire sans appui au sens strict, sans ancrage.

Salle / Room 3.07

Aula 7: Avicenna's Metaphysics and Its Islamic Reception

Special Session proposed by Jari Kaukua
Chair: Jari Kaukua

Jari Kaukua: *Concepts, Conceivability, and Modality in Avicenna*

'Concept' (or 'conception', *taṣawwur*) is both a descriptive and a normative notion for Avicenna: all cognitive content can be called *taṣawwur*, but only the intellect's true conceptions of real essences meet the criteria for real concepts. There is a certain tension between the descriptive and normative senses of *taṣawwur*, which gives rise to the problem of how we can conceive of things that are never realised. If real concepts are restricted to real essences, what sort of thing are our concepts of unreal things? This is a particularly pressing task, given that it is often difficult, if not impossible, to tell the difference between real concepts and their unreal counterparts. In this paper, I suggest that Avicenna does have a solution that relies on his theory of the so-called internal senses, especially the faculty of imagination. Impossible things are not conceivable in the strict sense of the word (there are no real concepts of them), but they may be conceived as conjunctions of real concepts that are instantiated in mental images construed by our imagination. These images suffice to ground a conjunction of real concepts that itself is not real. Importantly, such conjunctions may be phenomenologically indistinct from real concepts, and this raises an interesting question about the metaphysical conclusions we can draw from mere conceivability. I conclude with the suggestion that Avicenna would not have appreciated conceivability as a criterion of possibility in scientific reasoning.

Francesco Omar Zamboni: *Neither more nor less than Reality: Correspondence and its Ontological Implications in Faẖr al-Dīn al-Rāzī*

This contribution aims to discuss the specific understanding of the correspondence theory of knowledge defended by the Islamic philosopher and theologian Faẖr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210), highlighting its consequences in the field of ontology.

In general terms, the correspondence theory holds that mental contents constitute instances of knowledge if they refer and correspond to extra-mental realities: notions are adequate if there are extra-mental objects or properties that match them; similarly, beliefs are true if there are extra-mental states of affairs that do the same. The specificity of Rāzī's doctrine consists in its absolutely uncompromising nature when it comes to the conceptualization of correspondence as such. Correspondence means strict one-to-one correspondence: for any single and distinct mental item, there must be a single and distinct extra-mental item that corresponds to it. In other words, Rāzī implicitly rejects the possibility that knowledge obtains in the case of one-to-many correspondence (one mental item, multiple extra-mental items) or many-to-one correspondence (many mental items, one extra-mental item). This peculiar understanding of correspondence has significant reverberations in Rāzī's ontology, with two issues being particularly noteworthy. The first is the ontological status of universals. The second is the ontological status of trans-categorical properties (e.g., existence, unity, individuation). In both cases, Rāzī defends a form of immanent realism,

explicitly rejecting conceptualist positions which imply one-to-many correspondence (for universals) or many-to-one correspondence (for trans-categorical properties). In summary, the contribution argues that these crucial and controversial features of Rāzī's ontology can be traced back to his uncompromising adherence to a very simple basic tenet concerning correspondence.

Agnieszka Erdt: *The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Its Necessitarian Consequences in Post-Avicennian Metaphysics*

Avicenna's determinism can be detected in a number of his metaphysical and physical doctrines. For example, it comes to the forefront in his theory of chance and his claim that all possible existents have causes that necessitate them and ultimately go back to God, the Necessary Existence and the Cause of all causes. Upon this understanding, chance is not an additional cause in any real sense, it results from clashes of two independent causal chains which on their own can be traced back to God. Avicenna thus departs from Aristotle in that he qualifies the latter's theory of chance defined by the frequency of events. Namely, on his understanding, all events – not only those that happen always or for the most part but also the rare and unexpected ones – have a necessary cause. In Avicenna, the notion of chance, which according to Aristotle is unpredictable and thus beyond scientific description, becomes associated with the notion of contingency. Things in their essential contingency may happen or not, but once they are determined by a cause, they become necessary. As such, they can be scientifically explained. This signals a subjectivistic, epistemic interpretation of chance which explains it simply as our ignorance of the real causes at work in the world. Avicenna is also one of the first pre-modern philosophers to argue for the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), that is, the claim that everything has an explanation and there can be no brute facts. One of the possible consequences of PSR is necessitarianism, i.e., the assertion that all truths are necessarily true. The radical import of PSR is that it goes against our strong intuition suggesting that things could have been otherwise. This aspect of Avicenna's philosophy, especially its significance for later developments, however, has been less systematically studied than his views on chance, matter and determinism. Our goal is then to investigate, among others, the following questions. Does PSR necessarily lead to necessitarianism? Or can the necessitarian consequences of PSR be mitigated or restricted to only some facts? The presentation will focus on these issues in post-Avicennian debates, most importantly in Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's (d. 1274 CE) works such as *Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād* and several commentaries on this canonical text. Most importantly, we will look into how the purported Avicennian necessitarianism is confronted there with the theological thesis about God as the voluntary agent.

Salle / Room 3.08

Aula 8: Radical Feminism in the Middle Ages

Ordinary Session
Chair: Catherine König-Pralong

Christian Kaiser: *Equality of Women and Men – Traces of a Radical Idea in Medieval Philosophy and Medicine*

It is common knowledge that women in the Middle Ages were subordinate to men in many respects. For example, girls and women were denied access to universities. Especially two areas of knowledge–philosophy and medicine–provided many arguments against the participation of women in higher education. Thus, it was considered scientifically proven that they were inferior to men in almost all physical matters, but above all that their intellect did not reach the capacities of men. The man is simply more perfect than the woman, the latter, however, rather an imperfect man. The medieval proponents of this anthropological concept found their main support in

Aristotle, Galen, the Scripture, and the Church Fathers. However, it is also known that there were certainly female philosophers and physicians in the Middle Ages, albeit relatively few. How was it explained that these women obviously had similar or even the same intellectual talents as their male colleagues? Christine de Pizan attributed the inequality between women and men to the unequal distribution of education. By nature, both were equally capable of reason and accessible to education, it was just that girls had to be taught in the same way as boys. In the medieval context of structural misogyny this claim is radical, since it asserts that women and men are equally endowed in those capacities that are essential for learning, science, and philosophy. In fact, it would take until the 20th century for this approach to become fully accepted in Western philosophy, medicine, and society. The paper will firstly outline the most important medieval positions on the topic of equality and difference between men and women. Secondly, it will recapitulate those women philosophers and physicians of the Western Middle Ages of whom we have knowledge, at least by name. Thirdly, it will have to be shown that they can be divided into two groups with regard to the origin of their individual education: those women who had been taught by women–mostly by nuns–and those who had been instructed by men–most often their own scholarly fathers. Common to both groups is the fact that the teachers positioned themselves against the prevailing scientific and philosophical doctrines, at least implicitly and in pedagogical practice, because they obviously assumed that their students were capable people, despite the fact that they were girls. However, an important difference should also be discussed: Women who have acquired their erudition from other women usually hide or minimize this circumstance. This is regularly the case with those learned women whom we are used to call "mystics", such as Hildegard of Bingen. Their legitimation is the immediate inspiration by divine power, not secular learning. In contrast, those who had been taught by their fathers or other male teachers typically emphasize this biographical element, e.g. Christine de Pizan and almost all known medieval female physicians. Finally, it will be argued that, in this autobiographical self-fashioning, there is a relation to the contemporary medico-philosophical theory of biological inheritance, which locates any "virtus," especially that necessary for using reason, in the father's seed.

Ana Rieger Schmidt: *Christine de Pizan on Wisdom and Power*

We intend to evaluate the philosophical contributions of medieval thinker Christine de Pizan (1363-1430), concerning the notion of wisdom applied to the monarch, as well as to identify and analyze the philosophical sources of her argument justifying the king's power to ruler overall. In *The Book of the Deeds and Good Character of King Charles V* (1405) Pizan focus on the qualities of the deceased monarch. Besides a book dedicated to the memory of the king and his erudition, this work promotes a reflection on the intellectual qualities expected of a great king. In Book III Pizan develops the concept of wisdom, understood as first philosophy. In this context, an interesting connection is made between the place of metaphysics in the hierarchy of sciences and the king's position at the top of the hierarchy of power. We suggest that Pizan combines two sources in order to built up her reasoning: Giles of Rome's *De ecclesiastica potestate* Thomas Aquinas' Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics. The quest for the philosophical dimension of Pizan's work needs to take into account a fundamental sociocultural distinction for the medieval period: the distinction between cleric (*clericus*) and layman (*laïcus*). One major challenge of including women in the philosophy canon is the fact that they appear to be rather isolated and do not seem to belong to an established tradition. As a result, we need to create a narrative seeking to connect their writings and views to a specific intellectual context. In order to address this problem, we state that Pizan should be approached as a humanist, that is, as part of a layman intellectual milieu apart from the scholastic tradition. This intellectual condition explains Pizan's original appropriation of scholastic texts for the benefit of new intellectual secular interests.

Simona Vucu: *Catherine of Siena, Christine de Pizan, and Laura Cereta on Friendship between Women*

In the books dealing with the issue of friendship that were most widely read in the Middle Ages, notably Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and Cicero's *De amicitia*, friendship is understood primarily as a relationship between men. It is true that Aristotle speaks of the possibility of an imperfect friendship between men and women and even of the friendship between women and their children, but the possibility of friendship between women is not even considered. But what did medieval women writers have to say about the possibility of female friendship? In dealing with this topic, they not only had to recontextualize Aristotle's and Cicero's views about male friendship to make them apply to female experiences, but they also had to address widespread misogynistic views that envisaged women as beings who lack virtues and engage in backstabbing and gossip, traits that are hardly conducive to friendship as it was usually conceived. In this paper, I will investigate what Catherine of Siena (1347–1380), Christine de Pizan (1364–ca. 1430) and Laura Cereta (1469–1499) have to say about female friendship. These three writers were active in very different contexts. Catherine was a theologian who carried on extensive correspondences with women from different backgrounds and advised them on their interpersonal relationships. She is concerned with the partiality of friendship, and usually talks about friendship in the monastic context. Christine de Pizan writes in the *Treasure of the City of God* about friendship among women at court and deals extensively with the issue of envy and backstabbing. In her letters, Laura Cereta also discusses the issues of envy and backstabbing between women who aim for literary success. I will argue that these three women writers agree on the view that friendship requires virtues, but have different views about the types of virtues that are conducive to friendship between women. I will further show that their different views about the types of virtues required for friendship have implications for how to conceive of women's solidarity and more generally about the transformative power of female friendship.

David Albertson: *Immanence as Exile: Hadewijch as Radical Philosopher of Desire*

Until expelled by her peers, Hadewijch of Antwerp led one of the autonomous beguinage communities that avoided ecclesiastical control through the 14th century. Beguine women were economically independent, teaching and caring for each other yet without taking vows. Hadewijch's letters, poems, and visions in Middle Dutch belong to the earliest vernacular literature by European women. Since her rediscovery in the 1940s, scholars have sought to describe her independent voice. In The Mystic Fable (1982), Michel de Certeau depicts her as "one who has vanished, who in turn sought One who had vanished." In Promised Bodies (2013), Patricia Dailey shows how Hadewijch's body mediates inner and outer experiences of God. In Acute Melancholia (2016), Amy Hollywood suggests that Hadewijch "linguistically transgenders" divine Love as female. Such studies assume that Hadewijch is first and foremost a female "mystic," locating her within this familiar, if constructed, category. By contrast, I interpret Hadewijch not simply as mystic, but as avant-garde philosopher, a radical before her time. Precisely in her distance from the monks and scholastics who populate current narratives, Hadewijch invents novel approaches to subjectivity, language, reason, and desire. Theorizing her location outside her native community, Hadewijch construes the condition of philosophical immanence itself—distance from divine presence—as an exile to be embraced. She sacrifices her enjoyment of God and confines herself to a desert of longing, in tribute to the absent Lover. Hadewijch endures the separation by refusing the lures of universal reason and the false respite of superficial religion, seeking instead an "unfaith" and "nonvictory" that abide "without repose." Focusing on selected letters and stanzaic poems, I outline Hadewijch's radical philosophical contributions in three sections. The first, "The Desert of Exile," addresses divine abandonment and philosophical immanence. The second, "The Silence of Love," turns to Hadewijch's complex account of desire as unfaith and stereoscopic rationality. The

third, "The I of Heaven," treats her performance of doubled subjectivity and titanic self-regard. If Hadewijch is less mystic than radical philosopher, we should lift her exile and grant her residence within the narrative of medieval philosophy. Christia Mercer has contended that Descartes and Leibniz were not the "fathers" of modern philosophy, but benefited from the achievements of Julian of Norwich and Teresa of Ávila. Likewise, rather than exclude Hadewijch we should perceive how her uncanny voice troubles the continuum that organizes conventional historiographies. Occasionally Hadewijch's writings anticipate later authors. As she stares into the void of absent Love, embraces the restlessness of desire, yet reaffirms her joy, one is particularly reminded of Friedrich Nietzsche. Rejecting every escape into world-denying transcendence, condemned to wander in the wilds of immanence, Hadewijch arrived too soon, unwelcome like Zarathustra. Yet she excels Nietzsche in one regard: she knows the mystery of a love stronger than death.

Salle / Room 3.09

Aula 9: Radical Jewish Philosophical Approaches to Religiosity, Dogma, and the Commandments

Special session proposed by Steven Harvey

Chair: Gitit Holzman

Omer Michaelis: *Between* Nafs *and* Nafs: *Baḫya ibn Paqūda's Concept of the Soul*

Kitāb al-Hidāya ilā Farāʾiḍ al-Qulūb (The Book of Direction to the Duties of the Hearts), written in Judeo-Arabic by Baḫya ibn Yosef ibn Paqūda of Saragossa (c. 1080), is a key work in Jewish medieval thought, and a cornerstone for the development of a vast literature dealing with the internalization of Jewish religious life. In this work, the author sought to transform Jewish religiosity, turning it from a community-based, ritualistic form of life, to one that is centered on the individual and focuses on one's mental activity. To establish this transition, Baḫya constructed in his work an elaborated philosophical outlook that addresses the various theological, anthropological, and ethical issues that inform his novel mode of religiosity. This radical philosophical formation, though not systematically presented by Baḫya, serves as the infrastructure to his work, and can be reconstructed from the analysis of several pivotal discussions throughout his work.One of the concepts that most elude definition in Baḫya's philosophical formation is his concept of the soul (Ar.: *nafs*). In some of its occurrences in the work, it is negatively rendered; considered to be the agent of human impulse that causes one to act according to bodily desires alone. However, this is not its only form of presentation. In many – if not most – of its other occurrences, the soul is treated positively, identified with one's intellect (Ar.: *ʿaql*), acknowledged as divine in its source and as crucial for leading a pious life. What leads Baḫya to employ this dual valency of the soul throughout the work? and how does he seek to resolve it? In my presentation, I will propose that the dual valency of the soul reflects primarily the fact that Baḫya drew in his work from two distinct Muslim intellectual currents, embodied in two separate textual corpora that were available to him and that informed his writing. The first is Islamic asceticism, and specifically, the writings of Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (d. 857) that were available in al-Andalus. The second is Arabic Neoplatonism, and specifically, the Neo-platonically inspired *Rasāʾil Ikẖwān al-Ṣafāʾ* (10th century; generally translated as "Epistles of the Brethren of Purity"). While the first corpus presented the soul as rebellious and stubborn, worthy of unrelenting battle against its influence, the second corpus introduced an altogether different conception of the soul and its metaphysics. I will present Baḫya's sources, show how his work is situated – sometimes trapped – between two different intellectual trends, each featuring its own technical language and ideational emphases, and consider Baḫya attempts to navigate between the two. In the final part of the presentation, I will remark on what Baḫya's case teaches us about the Jewish and Islamic cultural landscape in al-Andalus between the 11th and the 12th centuries.

David Lemler: *What Is Radical in Religious Dogmatism? Medieval Jewish Philosophers and the Principles of Judaism*

In this paper, we aim to elaborate on the fact that one of the main fields in which the lexicon of "root" is at play in Jewish philosophy is the determination of a list of religious principles of Judaism. As it appears this field is by many ways a *locus* through which "radicality" is both implemented and thought about by Jewish philosophers. Following a suggestion of Sarah Stroumsa, the setting of religious principles of Judaism is one of the reasons for calling Maimonides a "fundamentalist" thinker: reducing Judaism to a limited number of fundamentals. Our exploration of how radicality is involved in the Medieval philosophical discourses on the Jewish principles of belief will take three main directions.

1. Reviewing the terms used by the main authors involved in this discussion (from Saadia Gaon to Isaac Abravanel) to refer to these principles: the metaphor of roots and foundations is indeed employed in both Arabic (*uṣūl*, *qawā'id*) and Hebrew (*'iqqarim*, *shorashim*, *yesodot*).

2. Recalling how the very endeavor of defining Judaism as a faith based on fundamental beliefs is an innovation introduced in the rabbinic tradition by philosophically oriented authors. It is therefore instructive to study their justifications for such a novelty, often based on a rhetoric of rediscovering the buried roots of tradition (see, e.g., the introduction of Baḥya Ibn Paquda's *Duties of the Heart*, or Yosef Albo's *Sefer ha-'Iqqarim*, I, 4).
3. Interpreting the diverse posterities of the issue among post-Maimonidean philosophers in terms of "radicalism". A "radical" trend, from Nissim of Marseille to Spinoza, interprets these roots as political tools, necessary beliefs aimed at the masses. But it is also for the sake of "radicality" – in the sense of being genuinely rooted in tradition, that some authors such as Isaac Abravanel refuse the very idea of reducing Judaism to a finite number of principles.

Oded Horezky: *Philosophy and Law in Maimonides and Gersonides: Philosophical Interpretation of the Reasons for the Commandments and the Question of Radicalism*

Modern scholars of medieval Jewish philosophy tend to adopt the intellectual-religious narrative of the non-philosophical (and sometimes anti-philosophical) schools when they refer to, or make use of, normative categories such as "radicalism" and its opposite, "conservatism." Some scholars even offer an intermediate category or group, the "moderate," that manages to combine a certain openness and receptivity to philosophical studies and ideas that is limited within clear and defined borders of commitment to religious tradition, dogmas, and beliefs. The medieval opponents of the philosophical-allegorical interpretation of the biblical stories (for example in *Minḥat Qena'ot* [*"Meal Offering of Jealousy"*] warned the philosophical commentators that their commentaries would eventually lead to a dangerous interpretation of the commandments. In the eyes of these opponents, the philosophical interpretations of the commandments reflect a radical and even heretical stance that would eventually lead to antinomianism. In my lecture I would like to reflect on this common assumption by comparing the two greatest medieval Jewish philosophers who were affiliated with the Aristotelian school, Moses Maimonides and Gersonides (Levi ben Gershon), and their very different and distinct approaches to the reasons for the commandments. I would like to demonstrate how systematic allegorical interpretation of the Jewish law can result from conservative motives. The insights gained from our study of the approaches of Maimonides and Gersonides to the reasons for the commandments will help us formulate a subjective criterion for the characterization of conservative tendencies (vs. radical) in medieval Jewish thought and

biblical exegesis and show how strong and positive is the relation that a certain thinker sets between the commandments and the ultimate and most noble human goal.

Salle / Room 3.10

Aula 10: Albert the Great II

Ordinary Session
Chair: Alessandro Palazzo

Fiorella Magnano: *The Role of the* Communes animi conceptiones *in Boethius and Albert the Great*

Boethius's famous definition of a common conception of the mind, "*Communis animi conceptio est enuntiatio quam quisque probat auditam*" (a common conception of the mind is a statement which anyone accepts as soon as he hears it) (*De hebdomadibus* 1), was well known among the Latin Scholastics. Indeed, it played a central role in Boethius's epistemology, logic, ontology and metaphysics. Boethius referred to these common conceptions of the mind as "self-evident propositions" (*propositiones per se notae*) because of the source from which these conceptions arise – namely the *intellegentia, animus*, or *mens* – as well as "maximal propositions" (*maximae propositiones*), which is the specific way in which he interprets Aristotle's topics. In Boethius's view, these conceptions represent the translations into propositional terms of the strong interaction between reason and intellect. Indeed, they are 'propositions' because the object of reason is the universal and, if this is the case, a proposition is the only way through which reason can conceive and express the intuition of simple forms. Therefore, they are the highest propositions our mind can conceive and the most universal, whose content is very general, immediately self-evident and accepted as soon as one hears them, for they directly arise from the intellect. Many medieval philosophers inherited and trasmitted this theory. My lecture focuses on Albert the Great's reading of Boethius, who, in his commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics,* clearly identified Boethius's common conceptions of the mind with the immediate premises of the demonstrative syllogism.

Rubio Mercedes: *Albert the Great's Radical Understanding of the Active Intellect*

Aristotle's *De anima* book 3 was one of the most commentated philosophical texts during the Middle Ages, and his description in it of the active intellect, one of Aristotle's greatest discoveries, was probably one of the most controversial ones. This text (*De anima* 3, ch. 5) and its parallel in *De generatione animalium* (book 2, ch. 3) gave rise to a variety of interpretations and was generally interpreted by his Arabic and Jewish commentators as supporting the existence of a single separated, substantial active intellect shared by all human beings.

Most Latin and Jewish scholars rejected this interpretation as incompatible with personal individuality and human freedom. This Aristotelian teaching was relegated to a mere point of contention. It gave rise to a radical divide on the understanding of man between philosophers active in Latin and Arabic cultural centers, and between members of the Faculty of Theology and some members of the Faculty of Arts in Paris (the so-called Latin Averroists).

With the passage into modernity the Aristotelian doctrine on the active intellect and its various interpretations fell into oblivion. However, the questions that had prompted Aristotle to advocate its existence are still unanswered. If act takes precedence over potency and according to experience the human intellect is not always active, an active intellect is a must. Many medieval scholars had seen this yet failed to lead this hypothesis to its last consequences in line with Aristotle's doctrine of act. Albert the Great offers a radical reading according to which the active intellect must be in the order of human *esse* and therefore neither a potency nor an accident of the soul, nor in the order of human essence as most Latin and Jewish medieval scholars would argue.

Salle / Room 50

Aula 11: Radical Thinking in Middle Ages

Special Session organized by Monica Brinzei
Sponsor: DEBATE-ERC, n° 771589
Chair: Russell L. Friedman

Christopher D. Schabel: Esse radicale *in an Oxford Principial Debate in the Early 1330s: The Franciscan Robert of Halifax vs a Socius on Grace*

The Parisian innovation of starting the academic year with debates between the bachelors of theology lecturing on the *Sentences* was imported into Oxford by the early 1330s. The subject of grace and merit dominated the principial debates at Oxford throughout the decade. Probably in 1332-1333, the year that Thomas Bradwardine and most likely Richard Kilvington were *sententiarii*, the Franciscan Robert Halifax engaged in a heated exchange with an anonymous *socius* who asserted that one can merit eternal life without grace – except according to its radical being.

Monica Brinzei: *Matthaeus de Aularegia, Socius of a Pre-Radical Jan Hus in a Prague Principial Debate*

Matheus de Aularegia's *principium* on book II in manuscript Leipzig, BU, 418 is the only surviving material from his participation in the principial debates held in Prague in 1408-1410. The motivation for investigating this text of a Cistercian bachelor of theology from Zbraslav Abbey is threefold: (1) the text is a significant testimony to how *principia* were performed in Prague as a radical genre; (2) Matheus' confrontation with Jan Hus might shed new light on what we know about the pre-radical author of Hussitism in his youth; (3) the intrinsic doctrinal interest of the exchange. This talk will explore the discussions and solutions on topics such as God as the unique principle of creation, the eternality of sensitive worlds, the idea of a mental archetype of created things, and whether Christ's Incarnation should be associated with redemption.

Ioana Curut: Ut magister meus ex scripturis astronomorum optime noscit: *Thomas Ebendorfer's Debate with John of Gmunden in His* Principia

My paper examines the principial lectures on the *Sentences* composed by Thomas Ebendorfer of Hasselbach in 1420-1421 at the University of Vienna, with a focus on his first *principium* (on book II, in ms. Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 4393, ff. 1r-9r) and third *principium* (on book IV, in ms. Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 4369, ff. 197r-202v), where Ebendorfer is debating with John of Gmunden on the demonstrability of creation *ex nihilo*. By taking a closer look at the major points of contention, as well as the arguments and counter arguments, I investigate how radical was Ebendorfer's departure from the 'Vienna Group Commentary'.

VISITE DE PARIS / VISIT OF PARIS

Visite scolastique du Quartier Latin / Scholastic Visit of the Latin Quarter

Jacob Schmutz (UC Louvain) will offer a 90-minute guided tour around the most relevant sites of the Quartier Latin, the old Sorbonne, the site of the major convents and humanist colleges, where Medieval and Renaissance philosophy happened in Paris. We will end the tour by joining the reception at the "Couvent des Cordeliers".

Appointment: 17h30 place de la Sorbonne, under the statue of Auguste Comte.

Registration is compulsory: siepm2022paris@gmail.com

19h00: *Final Cocktail: Couvent des Cordeliers, Paris, Latin Quarter*

List of Participants:

List of Participants:

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AMERINI Fabrizio
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ANGOTTI Claire
ANISIE Alexandra
ANSARI Rosabel
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ANTTURI John G.
ARFA Mokdad
ASCARATE Luz
ATUCHA Iñigo
AZIMI SADJADI Taymaz

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BANEU Alexandra
BARAN Wojciech
BARASH Yael
BARKOVSKIY Tatiana
BARRETTE Genevieve
BARTOS Tadeusz
BAUWENS Michael
BEN AHMED Fouad
BECCARISI Alessandra
BELTRAN Miquel
BENNETT David
BERMON Pascale
BERNARDINI Paola
BIANCHI Luca
BIARD Joel
BINOTTO Francesco
BIRIUKOV Dimitry
BLAZEK Pavel
BOBILLIER Stève
BOBOVNIK Nena
BOLYARD Charles
BONINI Francesca

BONETTI Niccolò
BORDJI Kahina
BORGO Marta
BOSE Mishtooni
BOULNOIS Olivier
BOUGARD François
BRAEKMAN Valentin
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BROWER Jeff
BROWER-TOLAND Susan
BRUMBERG-CHAMONT Julie
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CHEN Ziang
CHITI Elisa
CHOI Philip
CIOLA Graziana
CODA Elisa
COLISH Marcia
CORDONIER Valerie
CORY David
CORY Therese
COTÉ Antoine
CRIALESI Clelia
CROSS Richard
CUADROS Loren
CULLETON Alfredo
CURUT Ioana

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DEMANGE Dominique
DEMETRACOPOULOS John A.
DEVRIESE Lisa
DEZZA Ernesto
DE BENEDITTIS Francesco
DE FILIPPIS Renato
DE LIBERA Alain
DE PASCALIS Alessandro
DE ROBERTIS Tommaso
DI DONATO Silvia
DI MAIO Andrea
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DOMINGUES DA SILVA Mateus
DRAELANTS Isabelle
DUBA William
DUDLEY John

EBBESEN Sten
EDMONDS Dartanyan
EGOAVIL RIOS Jean Christian
EHRET Charles
EL BOULSKLAOUI Said
EMRICH Christian
EMRICH Emma
EMAMZADAH Parwana
ENGEL Karsten
ENGEL Michael
ERDT Agnieszka
ESU Matteo
EYCHENIÉ Mathieu

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FAUCHER Nicolas
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FIORENTINO Francesco
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FORNASIERI Giacomo
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O'REILLY Francisco

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WHALEN Abigail
WHITE Kevin
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WILLIAMS Thomas

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ZAMBONI Francesco Omar
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